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Preface
This volume is the product of research on the history of Japan’s trade and industry
policy in the late twentieth century. At the direction of the Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry (METI, formerly the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry [MITI]), the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI)
established a Committee on the History of Japan’s Trade and Industry Policy,
which undertook comprehensive, systematic research under the leadership of
Committee Chair Professor Konosuke Odaka. The research began in 2006 and was
completed in 2013. The results of the project were presented in Japanese as Tsūsho
Sangyō Seisakushi: dai 2 ki, 1980–2000 (History of Japan’s Trade and Industry
Policy, The Second Era) in 12 volumes.
This exhaustive history, totaling almost 8,000 pages, was subsequently distilled
and synthesized by Prof. Haruhito Takeda, Deputy Chief Editor of the Committee,
and translated into English by Dr. Louisa Rubinfien. The result is this volume.
We deeply appreciate the contributions of Prof. Odaka, Prof. Takeda, the
authors, and all others involved in this project.
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1 The Mission of the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI)
This book provides an in-depth examination of Japan’s policy responses to the
economic challenges of the 1980s and ’90s. While MITI’s earlier role in pro-
moting rapid growth has been addressed in other studies, this volume, based
on official records and exhaustive interviews, is the first to examine the after-
math of rapid growth and the evolution of MITI’s interpretation of the econ-
omy’s changing needs. Covering such topics as the oil shocks, trade conflict
with the United States, and the rise and collapse of the so-called bubble econ-
omy, it presents a detailed analysis and evaluation of how these challenges were
interpreted by government officials, the kinds of policies that were enacted, the
extent to which policy aims were realized, and lessons for the longer term.
The legal basis for MITI policies covered in this volume is found in the follow-
ing sections of the 1952 Ministry of International Trade and Industry Establishment
Law, Article 3 (Odaka 2013, p. 3–4):
1.1 Promotion and coordination of trade, and coordination of foreign exchange in
commerce
1.2 Promotion of international trade and economic cooperation
2 Advancement, improvement, coordination, and inspection of the production,
distribution and consumption of mining and manufactured goods
3 Administration pertaining to the rationalization and optimization of commercial
enterprises
4 Administration pertaining to weights and measures, and to measurement
5 Operational coordination of electric, gas, and heat utilities (supply businesses)
6 Securing the supply of energy: development of mineral resources, promotion of
the utilization of these resources, coordination of hydraulic power generation
7 Clerical oversight of mine security
8 Affairs concerning industrial property rights
© Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry 2020
Committee on the History of Japan’s Trade and Industry Policy. RIETI,
Dynamics of Japan’s Trade and Industrial Policy in the Post Rapid Growth Era (1980–2000),
Economics, Law, and Institutions in Asia Pacific, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1987-1_1
1
2 1 Introduction: Overview
9 Promotion and guidance of small and medium enterprises
10 Experimental research on the science and technology of the mining industry
and dissemination of its results
11 Elucidation and dissemination of industrial standards
12 Oversight of surveys, statistics, and other duties related to commercial mining
and manufacturing
13 State-owned trade businesses
14 Alcohol monopoly
Although responsible for industrial policy overall, MITI did not have exclusive
jurisdiction over it: coordination and cooperationwith theMinistry of ForeignAffairs
were required on trade-related issues, and with theMinistry of Finance on the admin-
istration of foreign exchange and the introduction of foreign capital; shipbuilding,
because of its relationship to themaritime industry, fell underMinistry of Transporta-
tion jurisdiction, and boundary questions also arose with the Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications with regard to the information and communications sectors.
The need for or pertinence of policy involvement in these areas was dictated in any
given era by the then-prevailing understanding of Japan’s economic issues (Naka-
mura 1995). In hindsight, using an economics framework, it is evident that policy
involvement arose in cases in which: “(1) the market was under- or undeveloped; (2)
information was biased or incomplete (in other words, cases of information ‘asym-
metry’); (3) an economic entity’s behavior raised costs for third-party economic
entities (in other words, cases of ‘external diseconomies’); (4) market participant
behavior was excessively selfish and therefore generating confusion in the market;
and, finally, (5) government actions that were deemed necessary for political reasons
(such as the resolution of international trade friction) were justified in order to cor-
rect, supplement, or revise market movements that did not fully meet their desired
role, for the sake of upgrading and improving economic welfare” (Odaka 2013, p. 5).
Based on the above, it is now widely accepted that the aims of trade and industrial
policy were to (1) encourage market development, (2) correct information asymme-
tries, (3) remove external diseconomies, (4) maintain market order, and also (5) to
respond when necessary for political–economic reasons.
However, a policy’s legitimacy was not in its own day explained with words like
“information asymmetries” or “external diseconomies,” but rather in terms of Japan’s
economic backwardness, its structural vulnerability, or its lack of international com-
petitiveness. It is probably beyond dispute that this perspective was especially pro-
nounced in the years from postwar recovery to high economic growth, as is made
evident in the first edition of the History of Industrial Policy, which focuses on the
period up until the 1970s. Thereafter as well, however, the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry continued to interpret policy issues along the lines of the earlier
era and to formulate and promote prescriptions for their resolution. Because these
prescriptions were justified in terms of the challenges facing the Japanese economy
at any given time, they were not driven by a consistent set of principles. Rather,
characteristic of industrial policy was its flexible response to changing times and its
attempts through trial and error to develop prescriptive policies to resolve problems
(Hashimoto 2001).
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2 The Keynotes of Industrial Policy
2.1 The Organizational Reform of 1973
Although MITI’s approach was characterized by this flexibility, it does not neces-
sarily follow that its policies were ad hoc responses to circumstance. Each era was
characterized by major economic trends, such as declining growth rates or the sever-
ity of international economic friction, and the attendant changes in the underlying
policy philosophy are clearly discernible in the industrial policies addressing these
trends.
To summarize in the broadest terms:
Two successive stages are evident in the basic “philosophy” of industrial policy
during the period from the 1970s until the end of the century.
Even after the controls of the postwar recovery era had been lifted,MITI continued
to adhere to the 1950s model, developing corrective market policy interventions as
needed to promote the modernization and rationalization of the Japanese economy.
Industrial policy aimed to rationalize key industries, nurture infant industries, and
make adjustments for declining industries, and so on,while trade policywas designed
to facilitate the orderly expansion of exports and controls on imports suitable for
economic development under foreign currency constraints.1
These policies engendered moves by domestic business for greater independence
from the government, as reflected in the Draft Law on Temporary Measures for
the Promotion of Specified Industries, as well as international criticism of the close
ties between government and business, encapsulated in the term “Japan Inc.” It was
against this backdrop that MITI undertook a broad reconsideration of its policy aims
and measures and shifted its sights to the establishment of an internationally open
economic system. Its means were the liberalization of trade and foreign exchange,
which began in the 1960s, and the capital liberalization that followed.
The need for policy change was expressed explicitly in the call for a “shift to a
knowledge-intensive industrial structure” in the 1970s Vision for Trade and Industry
Policy. This position was based on the recognition that as its heavy and chemical
industrialization progressed, Japan was becoming a mature industrial society like the
other advanced economies, and that it therefore needed to seek out new directions
for industrial development. The limitations of the traditional policy framework were
becoming evident as core industries became fully competitive internationally and as
independent corporate entities no longer needed government support, meaning that
policy questions needed to be addressed from a broader perspective than before.
This policy shift also reflected the need to ascertain what policy measures could
be used by way of support, given that liberalization was proceeding more smoothly
than expected and that themeans of policy interventionwere gradually being lost (the
1Sumiya Mikio, in his general discussion of the history of industrial policy in the first era, pointed
out the multifaceted character of policy development, as seen in the terms “birth and nurturing,”
and “terminal care” for policy corresponding to the life cycle of industries (Sumiya 1994, p. 112).
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biggest among these being foreign currency allocation). In the 1970s, when Japan’s
status as an economic power became fully apparent, it was no longer sufficient in
international eyes for Japan to prioritize its domestic interests as if it were still a
“small country.” Rather, Japan was called on to take responsibility for its influence
on the world economy and to make changes to reflect its changing international
status.
However, that same growth gave rise to domestic challenges where economic
development intersected with people’s lives: environmental conservation issues,
overcrowding and depopulation, consumer issues, and price problems, among others.
The limitations of policies directed at export expansion and at upgrading an industrial
structure centered on heavy and large-scale industries became increasingly appar-
ent, generating calls for a more “knowledge-intensive” industrial structure (greater
knowledge intensity). At the same time, new and mounting problems in external
affairs, including trade friction, the international balance of payments problem, and
currency exchange issues, required policy responses.
Itwas in this context that theMinistry of International Trade and Industry launched
a large-scale organizational reform, which marked the starting point of the period
under examination in this volume. The basic policy governing the organizational
reform—“To achieve a comprehensive internal reorganization of this Ministry by
utilizing the particular strengths of the bodies charged with design, planning, and
implementation and coordinating among them for a well-balanced result”—was
summarized by MITI as follows:
(1) Unification of the trade policy bureaus. This meant reconfiguring the existing
International Trade Bureau and Trade Promotion Bureau as the International Trade
Policy Bureau and International Trade Administration Bureau.
(2) Conversion of the existing Enterprise Bureau into the newly named Industrial
Policy Bureau, in order to strengthen efforts toward cross-sector (horizontal) policy
principles.
(3) Establishment of the Industrial Location andEnvironmental ProtectionBureau
to engage actively in their namesake issues.
(4) Reconfiguration of sector-specific organizations (vertical divisions). For this
purpose, the various industries were reassigned according to shared organizational
principles into theBasic IndustriesBureau, theMachinery and Information Industries
Bureau, and the Consumer Goods and Services Industries Bureau.
(5) Last but not least, the establishment of the Agency of Natural Resources and
Energy, charged with promoting a strong and comprehensive energy administration
(Odaka 2013, p. 262).2
The trade policy bureaus (item1)were reconfigured so that international economic
policy planning would be undertaken in one, and trade policy—a unified administra-
tion of exports and imports, insurancematters, etc.—in another. The Industrial Policy
Bureau (item 2)was chargedwith the central task of coordinating shared policy areas,
while its divisions focused on specific areas: the Price Policy Division concentrated
2Original materials are found in Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Overview of the
organizational reform of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. June, 1973.
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on price problems, the Business Behavior Division “promoted appropriate corporate
action,” the Industrial StructureDivision “forwarded the knowledge intensification of
the industrial structure,” and the International Business Affairs Division “promoted
industrial structure policies from an international perspective.” With the establish-
ment of the Industrial Location and Environmental Protection Bureau (item 3), the
departments related to industrial sites (previously in the Enterprise Bureau) and
pollution protection were integrated into a single bureau. Similarly the Agency for
Natural Resources and Energy, was established as an affiliated agency that combined
the formerMining andCoal Bureau and PublicUtilities BusinessBureau. Themerger
was based on the reasoning that a comprehensive and powerful resource and energy
administration is needed in order to advance policies in such areas as: the securing
of stable supplies of resources and energy, energy efficiency, the increasingly serious
pollution problem, resource conservation, and energy conservation (Fig. 1).”
2.2 Toward a Shift in Industrial Policy
In order to trace how policy trends changed based on the awareness described above,
let us focus on the major issues as seen in the “New Policy” prepared each year by the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Table 1). The document’s subtitle, “In-
dustrial Policy Priorities “ corresponds to the basic policy stance of the government.
In the 1970s, this meant responding to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s recon-
sideration of the high-growth path and its shift to pledging to build a welfare society.
The emphasis in domestic policy became the “improvement and enhancement of
national welfare,” and in foreign policy, the importance of international cooperation
in areas such as foreign currency problems.
Under this framework, industrial policy from the mid-1970s on was from the
most basic level addressing different policy problems than before, including: (1)
how to locate new industries and bring their development to fruition, and (2) how to
fulfill Japan’s responsibilities in the international community. The principal areas of
focus (the so-called itchoume ichibanchi or “priorities”), listed in the policy menus
published from 1976–1979 (see prologue appendix), are shown below.
1976 Promotion of industrial policy to achieve Japan’s economic recovery and
stable development
1977 Newly developing industrial policy under stable growth
1978 Developing pump-priming measures and new industrial policies
1979 Formulating the 1980s Industrial Policy Vision
Industrial policy had reached a stage of seeking new directions and that contribut-
ing to the world economy had become a major priority, reflecting the international
pledge made in 1979 by the Takeo Fukuda cabinet. This is an indication that shift in
policy principles had occurred.
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Existing Organization Proposed New Organization
Minister's Secretariat (7 Divisions) Minister's Secretariat (8 Divisions)
Research and Statistics 
Department (4 Divisions)
Research and Statistics 
Department (10 Divisions)
Commerce Bureau (8 Divisions) Trade Policy Bureau (7 Divisions)
International Economic Affairs 
Department (2 Divisions)




Trade Promotion Bureau (5 Divisions)
Economic Cooperation 
Department (3 Divisions) Trade Bureau (5 Divisions)
Export Insurance Department 
(4 Divisions)
Corporate Bureau (11 Divisions)
Industrial Policy Bureau (7 Divisions)
Pollution Safety Bureau (6 Divisions)
Industrial Location and Pollution
Bureau (7 Divisions)
Heavy Industry Bureau (14 divisions) Security Department (4 Divisions)
Chemical Industries Bureau (6 Divisions)
Distribution and Consumption
Bureau (7 Divisions)
Alcohol Enterprise Department 
(3 Divisions)
Basic Industries Bureau (8 Divisions)
Textile Goods  Bureau(7 Divisions) Alcohol Enterprises Department (3 Divisions)
Mining and Coal Bureau
(6 Divisions)
Machinery and Information
Industries Bureau (9 Divisions)
Coal Department (5 Divisions) Electronic Information Department (4 Divisions)
Public Utilities Bureau (9 Divisions) Consumer Goods IndustriesBureau (10 Divisions)
Agency of Natural Resources
and Energy
Director General's Secretariat 
(4 Divisions)
Petroleum Department (3 Divisions)
Coal Department (5 Divisions)
Public Utilities Department 
(5 Divisions)
Electronic Facilities/Nuclear 
Power Department (5 Divisions)
Fig. 1 Overview of the organizational reform (1973)
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Table 1 Changes in the headings of the “New Policy Priorities” (FY1973–2000)
FY “Industrial Policy Priorities”
(Subheadings)
“Priorities” (Headings)
1973 The improvement of domestic welfare and
promotion of international cooperation
To construct a non-polluted society
1974 The achievement of domestic welfare and
promotion of international cooperation
Price stability and an enriched consumer
life
1975 The further improvement of domestic
welfare and cooperation with the
international community
Price stability and an enriched consumer
life, to establish the foundations for a
comfortable life
1976 The improvement of domestic welfare;
contributions to the development of the
international economy and society
Promotion of industrial policy to achieve
Japan’s economic recovery and stable
development
1977 The further enrichment of domestic
welfare and active contribution to the
stable development of the world economy
Newly developing industrial policy under
stable growth conditions
1978 Opening of paths to a new prosperity; and
development of Japan’s economy and
society
Developing pump-priming measures and
new industrial policy
1979 Forming the foundation for achieving an
enriched domestic life and a smooth
transition to stable growth and securing
the motive power for the prosperity and
development of Japan’s economy and
society
Formulating the 1980s Industrial Policy
Vision
1980 None Ensuring energy security
1981 Aiming for a society with vitality and
economic security
Establishing energy security and
preparing for extrication from petroleum
dependency
1982 Aiming to establish the foundations for
long-term development of the Japanese
economy
Steadily developing a comprehensive
energy policy
1983 Aiming for active contribution to the
world economy and the establishment of
the foundations for Japan’s economic
growth
Promoting industrial revitalization and
technology development with a mid- and
long-term perspective
1984 Contributing to the sustainable
development of the world economy and
establishing a creative society
Forming the foundation for creative
development
1985 Establishing the foundations for long-term
development and international
contributions thereby
Building the foundation for technological
development
1986 Achieving new dimensions of
internationalization and establishing the
foundations for long-term development
Aiming for new dimensions of
internationalization
(continued)
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Table 1 (continued)
FY “Industrial Policy Priorities”
(Subheadings)
“Priorities” (Headings)
1987 Toward constructing a new economy and
industrial society aimed at creative
development
Promoting policies on industrial structure
based on an international perspective
1988 Aiming at international harmonization
and bringing vitality to economic society
Bringing vitality to local areas
1989 Dedication to the world and new
long-term development
Dedication to the international economic
community
1990 Toward the realization of “Coexistence
and coprosperity at a global scale” and
“an economic society replete with leisure
and vitality”
Correcting external imbalances and
realizing internationally harmonized
economic structures and industrial
activities
1991 None Realization of lifestyles of comfort and
richness
1992 Seeking “links and coordination with
international society” and “creating
regional industrial culture”
Dedication to international society and
promotion of self-reform
1993 Overcoming global issues and creating a
“creative and comfortable society”
Comprehensive promotion of policies on
energy and the environment
1994 Self-reform for further development and
responsible responses to the international
community
Structural adjustments and the
maintenance of developmental
foundations for creative innovation
1995 None Promotion of reform to realize a rich
economic society opened to the
international community
1996 Aiming to create a new economic society Accelerating structural economic reform
1997 Toward realization of a
knowledge-creating country
Structural economic reform aimed at a
knowledge-creation country—measures
aimed at industrial hollowing out
1998 None Strongly promoting structural economic
reform
1999 Realization of economic regeneration
through revitalization of industry
Breaking away from a sluggish
macro-economy
2000 Foundations for the regeneration of 21st
century economic development
Recovery to stable growth trajectory
centering on private demand
Odaka (2013, pp. 30–32). Author’s reconstruction based on Odaka’s table
However, these new directions were not pursued in a clear and sustained way,
because of exogenously generated “shocks.” As is well known, price and energy
problems came to the fore intermittently during these years because of the transition
to a floating exchange rate regime and the turbulent rise in crude oil prices. In the
two years immediately after the first oil crisis, MITI found it necessary to prioritize
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price stabilization and improvements to consumer life, as evident in the “priority”
policies of 1974 and 1975:
1974 Price stability and an enriched consumer life
1975 Price stability and an enriched consumer life, to establish the foundations for
a comfortable life.
Similarly, energy policies became the priority in 1981–1982 due to the worsening
oil situation:
1981 Establishing energy security and preparing for extrication from petroleum
dependency
1982 Steadily developing a comprehensive energy policy.
Among the policies onprices,MITI’sAggregateDemandControl Policy produced
results in a relatively short period, even as comparedwith other advanced economies.3
Energy conservation efforts began to penetrate, even as the issue rapidly lost its
urgency with the stabilization of oil prices.
Moreover, the medium-range aim of decreasing Japan’s dependence on fossil
fuels was aided by the mid-1980s takeoff of nuclear power generation at light-water
reactors. It became the dominant view that this tailwind would help enable Japan to
achieve both economic growth and a stable energy supply.
In this way, the Basic Direction of Trade and Industrial Policies as defined in the
early 1970s emerged once again as a top priority concern. Construction of a “long-
term development base” frequently appears in the New Policy subtitles, as illustrated
in the priority policies of 1983–1985:
1983 Promoting industrial revitalization and technology development with a mid-
and long-term perspective
1984 Forming the foundations for creative development
1985 Building the foundations for technological development.
MITI’s emphasis on technological development points to an expectation that the
new technologies and systems would become the foundations for future industrial
development. This was the case in new energy, developed against the backdrop of
urgency in energy issues, in information processing and semiconductor technology,
in factory automation (FA), the utilization ofmicroelectronics technology (ME), and,
related to these, the area of space development.
Fields such as these require large-scale investment in research and development,
making it difficult to rely on voluntary action by private enterprises to assure sufficient
investment. In other words, MITI sought policy involvement in areas that could not
3In general, due to small budgets (excluding bank loans based on the Fiscal Investment and Loan
Program (FILP)), industrial policy was rarely affected by cyclical fluctuations such as economic
stimulus measures. One feature of industrial policy, therefore, was that it was able to maintain its
basic stance regardless of fluctuations in the economy. It is therefore not clear how much MITI
contributed to the calming of prices under the policies of restraints on aggregate demand. Further
investigation is needed on the contribution of MITI to cyclical conditions of this kind.
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be left entirely to market forces, and began especially to take note of these as priority
issues.4
Looking in aggregate at the measures aimed at new industrial development, how-
ever, it is clear that they could not be detached from policy authority over the
information and communications industries that were at the core of that development.
Although communication means and information acquisition were expanded and
diversified far beyond expectation in the data communications field (areas such as
VAN, or value-added networks), MITI’s involvement in the field, beginning with the
liberalization of the principal communication networks, was restricted by its need
to share that role with other agencies granted jurisdiction by the government.5 This
continued to act as a constraint on the effort to develop an integrated industrial policy.
2.3 Emphasis on Free Trade and Deregulation
The development of industrial technology was prioritized over international con-
tributions in the early 1980s because Japan’s trade surplus contracted temporarily
with soaring resource prices, especially that of crude oil. When crude oil prices then
fell, Japan’s trade surplus recovered, arousing criticism from the United States and
Europe and resulting in serious trade friction. For this reason, MITI’s emphasis also
shifted to trade policy in the latter 1980s. This is evident in the growing importance
4Nevertheless, with regard to pollution and environmental measures, which became policy priori-
ties in this period, strict corporate emissions regulations were maintained based on environmental
regulations. It is important to note that the stance of entrusting this to the voluntary action of busi-
nesses and expecting that markets would adjust accordingly was not equivalent to the pursuit of a
hands-off policy. Of course, MITI’s position on this matter served as a counterweight to the strong
regulatory bent of the Environment Agency, aimed at preventing excessive burdens being placed
on industrial enterprises. In the division of labor among ministries and agencies, MITI’s position
was in general to restrain interventions in the market. On the other hand, when it came to policy on
industrial location, it could use financial and tax incentives to help ease the overconcentration of
industrial sites in the Pacific belt.MITI pursued efforts to disperse industrial sites and achieved some
results (although no greater a range of diffusion than was originally sought), and MITI therefore
did not hesitate to adopt policy measures to correct external diseconomies. In policy on small and
medium-sized enterprises as well, traditional interventionist policy measures were maintained in
much their original form.
5It would not be correct, however, to see MITI’s inability to fulfill its own claims as the result only
of disputes over authority. Information and communications technology made more progress in
development of software than in that of hardware (such as large-scale computers) that MITI had
emphasized up to that point. As these became integrated in overall communications at production
sites, greater significance was attached to a highly dispersed, guerilla-style development, accumu-
lation, and transmission. This action resulted because MITI was not necessarily able to find policy
issues and take appropriate measures to respond flexibly to change, because it had little experience
with policy intervention regarding consumer goods. In that respect, the postal administration can-
not be said to have been effective either. Regardless, given the continuing restrictions on MITI’s
involvement in the information and telecommunications field, it was difficult to develop ideas about
Japan’s future industrial structure and to establish adjustment policies to address them. It should be
noted that those restrictions were not removed even in the organizational reform of 2000.
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given to international harmonization, and illustrates the fact that in the later half of
the decade, a greater priority was placed on international contributions.
1986 Aiming for new dimensions of internationalization
1987 Promoting policies on industrial structure based on an international perspec-
tive
1988 Bringing vitality to local areas
1989 Dedication to the international economic community
1990 Correcting external imbalances and realizing an internationally harmonized
economic structure and industrial activities.
Where these policies concerned international relations, the following points are
notable:
First, the demand that they be considered for diplomatic reasons—namely, Japan–
US relations—placed strong constraints on the policy options; second, they bear the
strong influence of the earlier temporary export restraints that had been promoted for
the sake of “orderly exports.” As a result, bilateral and bi-regional negotiations under
these conditions were repeated endlessly, with only the item in question changing,
and Japan was forced to make unilateral concessions.
Nevertheless, MITI continued to promote the development of the Japanese econ-
omy while at the same time reaching a clear understanding of the new direction
Japan would have to pursue in order to fulfill its international responsibilities. That
is, rather than promoting measures that limited free trade, such as voluntary export
restraints based on bilateral agreements, Japan would adopt policy solutions based
on international rules agreed upon multilaterally. This was the shift in principle that
MITI had been seeking since the 1970s. In the negotiations that led to the World
Trade Organization (WTO) agreement, Japan’s response to international trade fric-
tion was to advocate “maintaining the free trade regime” and to limit the scope
of issues handled either by single governments or by bilateral agreements between
governments. In other words, it achieved better results in its negotiations with the
outside world when it sought to avoid quantitative targets in trade and demands for
preferential treatment for certain trading partners. This approach in turn exposed the
need to overhaul the myriad regulations that shaped industry and the relationships
among industries domestically.
Deregulation arose as a result not of foreign pressure but of internal pressures.
To avoid raising corporate taxes, while at the same time overcoming the burden of
government debt due to Japan’s post-oil-crisis macroeconomic recovery measures,
the Second Extraordinary Administrative Investigative Committee called for “small
government,” or administrative reform, in the early 1980s.
MITI, ahead of other ministries and agencies, aggressively promoted deregulation
as a measure for easing trade friction. It is not clear that this approach contributed
to an actual expansion of imports6; its significance was often only symbolic, but
6While it is true that Japan’s import structure changed greatly by 1990 with an increase in imports
of manufactured goods, the main reason for the change was the overseas relocation of enterprises
due to the yen’s appreciation and Asian industrialization; it was not that trade relations expanded
with industrialized countries more analogous to Japan.
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deregulation conveyed a clear message to the outside world that the government was
doing its best within the limits of its jurisdiction. At the same time, given the marked
confrontation that had always characterized the relationship between industrial policy
and the Antimonopoly Law, this new emphasis on deregulation raised the question of
how government could engage in a competitive order shaped by the Antimonopoly
Law.
As I argue in detail in the main body of this work, it is apparent from the key
industrial policy measures of this era that a major shift took place. The 1978 Law
on Temporary Measures for Stabilization of Specified Depressed Industries and
the Industry Stabilization Law, the 1983 Temporary Measures Law for the Struc-
tural Adjustment of Specific Industries and the Structural Improvement Law, the
1987 Law on Temporary Measures to Facilitate Industrial Structural Adjustment,
the 1995 Law on Temporary Measures to Facilitate New Businesses, and the 1999
Law on Special Measures for Industrial Revitalization and the Industrial Revitaliza-
tion Law all suggest that the thrust of industrial policy was no longer one of seeking
exemptions from the Antimonopoly Law.
This approach did not change significantly even after the collapse of the bubble
in the early 1990s. The subtitles of the Priority Measures were frequently omitted
or the wording changed due to policy fluctuations in the short-lived government
administrations of the first half of the 1990s, but as discussed below, there was no
perceived need for a major change in the framework of priorities established in the
1980s: (1) to achieve balanced trade throughmultilateral coordination, (2) to promote
regulatory reforms limiting government involvement, and (3) to achieve both a stable
supply of energy and economic growth.
1991 Realizing a comfortable and affluent lifestyle
1992 Dedication to the international community and promotion of domestic reform
1993 Comprehensive promotion of policies on energy and the environment
1994 Structural adjustment and improvement of developmental foundations aimed
at creative innovation.
2.4 Seeking Another Conceptual Shift at the End
of the Century
As the recession dragged on, however, regulatory reform began to be deployed as
part of the efforts to reform Japan’s economic structure. It was also looked to for a
comprehensive resolution to multiple policy issues, including the handling of non-
performing loans, fiscal reconstruction, and economic recovery.
These efforts indicate that new principles were once again being sought for indus-
trial policy. Because this process is still ongoing, caution is needed in making any
definite assessments, but I will make a preliminary attempt to examine the prospects
for a shift and the direction it might take.
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The principlemeasures of the latter half of the 1990s are shown below.One of their
key terms was the above-mentioned “economic structural reform,” but in this case
the explicit macroeconomic goal was economic recovery and a return to economic
growth (see 1999 and 2000, below).
1995 Promoting reform for a rich economic society open to the international
community
1996 Accelerating structural economic reform
1997 Structural economic reform aimed at knowledge creation, measures for
addressing the hollowing out of industry
1998 Strongly promoting structural economic reform
1999 Pulling out of sluggish macro economy
2000 Recovering a stable growth trajectory centered on private demand.
To promote structural reform of the economy, MITI has shifted to a principle of
promoting competition and undertaking comprehensive regulatory reform, for exam-
ple attempting bold changes in its policies on small and medium-sized enterprises
to make firms take on more responsibility. Trade policy has also changed some-
what due to Japan’s long-term recession and to the advancing industrialization of
South Korea, China, and others, but overall, MITI has adhered to its emphasis on
multilateral coordination.
However, faced with the need to focus on macro growth, MITI’s stance on policy
has taken on a new dimension. Although industrial policy prior to the early 1990s
indeed led ultimately to economic growth, that does not mean that the aim of the
policies was economic growth itself. Rather, they were concerned with issues such
as distribution and with the distortions to the economic structure that were caused by
the market economy. For example, the reason MITI sought the modernization and
rationalization of the tiny, small, and medium-sized enterprises that were hindering
economic development in thefirst half of the high-growth periodwas that it concluded
that policy intervention was the only way to resolve the problems posed by the
dual economy. Its decision to address such issues as nurturing new industries or the
tensions arising with declining industries was also due to its judgment that active
intervention was needed for economic development to be realized in the medium
term. In the latter half of the 1990s, however, when the long recession came to be
viewed as a consequence of structural problems in the Japanese economy, MITI
began to see not only structural reform but also economic growth itself as a policy
concern.
Because macroeconomic policy was key to the market intervention regulations
designed to address the vicious downward cumulative cycle inevitable in market
economies, the logic that industrial policy could enable economic recovery simply
by ensuring the broadest possible freedom for corporate behavior was insufficient
as a foundation for policy thinking. Thus, while the macroeconomic perspective on
business cycles remained a priority along with policies promoting the competitive
order, it was also evident that companies were players in the market and therefore
that their own reform and the reform of Japan’s corporate and employment systems
would also be necessary for achieving economic growth.
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At the same time, it was becoming increasingly difficult to reach agreement with
other countries onmultilateral policies for resolving conflict, because of newmoves to
form regional and bilateral agreements. This in turn made it hard to pursue economic
growth solely on the principle of “protecting the free-trade system.”
These were the various elements leading to a second phase in the change in
the underlying principles of industrial policy. The ultimate trajectory of these new
moves is not yet clear, but the conclusion reached in the course of this study—that
this represents a “transitional period”—is probably not far off the mark.
This volume proceeds as follows. This chapter explores the shift in industrial
structure premised on theVision for the 1970s, and it presents the prototypical policies
formulated to respond to the crisis posed by the yen’s appreciation and constraints
on resources. It also discusses the policy-formation process. Chapter 2 traces the
progress of the shift to a policy system based on rules and on a prioritization of
external policies. Chapter 3 lays out the path by which “economic structural reform”
became the clear focus in the course of Japan’s long-term recession.
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The “New Policy” Formulation Process
Every year,MITI produced an explanatory document or “Approval Request Form” to
accompany its new budget request for the next fiscal year (Odaka 2013, p. 88). This
was included in the government budget plan after examination by the Ministry of
Finance and the year-end Cabinet Decision, and its content was determined through
debate in the Diet after the new year. To formulate its budget request, MITI thought
through a variety of policy plans, or “New Policies,” to serve as its constituent
elements, and carried out broad-based preliminary discussions internally.
The New Policy was formulated as follows. From March to April each year, the
Assistants to the General Affairs Division of each department gathered at the Minis-
ter’s Secretariat General CoordinationDivision and created a draft. This draft became
the springboard for discussion of the thinking that should underlie the New Policy
and was forwarded to all the departments in the Ministry. These departments created
“Materials for the New Policy” related to their own areas. At the same time, the
General Coordination, Budget and Accounts, and Personnel Divisions examined the
underlying laws pertaining to their particular areas, budgets, personnel, and so on. In
April, two meetings (in-house hearings) to review the New Policy were conducted
within each bureau. Based on the attendant reference materials, the Ministry con-
ducted full-scale hearings focused on the bureau findings, with the aim of developing
the pillars of the New Policy. In many cases, they met twice. At the first hearing, the
Director of the Budget and Accounts Division carried out the examination of those
proposals that had survived the process thus far (so-called tama). The proposals for
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the Fiscal Investment andLoan Programwere decided on relatively early for account-
ing reasons. The last proposals to be deliberated were those whose funds would come
from the General Accounting budget. The second hearing involved the entire Min-
istry, which carried on the discussions of the tama. The centerpiece or key points of
the New Policy in the budget request for the following year were decided inmid-July.
Then, from late July until early August, the “Industrial Policy Priorities for the Next
Fiscal Year” were presented for deliberation by the governing party’s Commerce and
Industry Committee and the Industrial Structure Council. Once approved, an “esti-
mated request (draft)” was created. This was submitted by the end of August to the
Ministry of Finance Budget Bureau Budget Examiner in charge of trade and foreign
affairs. Budget negotiations with the Ministry of Finance then began in advance of
the Diet deliberations that started in November and the year-end Cabinet decision
on the upcoming budget. That said, changes were rarely made to the content of the
budget proposal and policy objectives.
This process changed in response to the needs of the times. In the early 1980s, the
margin for political negotiation narrowed. In the early 1990s, the Prime Minister’s
Official Residence (Kantei) took center stage in the policy-formation process. Until
the 1980s, Japanese administrative agencies had sufficient investigative and admin-
istrative capacity for policy planning, which enabled parliamentarians to redirect
much of their time and energy to other tasks. Japanese politicians therefore did not
necessarily have occasion to acquire policy-planning skills. Such skills could not be
immediately upgraded, which led to a loss of credibility for the executive branch. It
is fair to say that policy planning’s becoming more politicized was not necessarily
the best outcome for the national welfare.
MITI’s internal policy-making process also changed. The Ministry continued
to put younger bureaucrats to work seeking out new ideas but also reformed its
approach in order to devise policies that would both align with and exert influence
over the policy directions of the Advisory Council and the Cabinet. New Policy items
accordingly became more extensive and exhaustive. Lastly, the turn of this century
also saw changes in response to growing doubts within the Ministry about the New
Policy planning process, which had become increasingly self-interested. Tentative
plans (tatakidai) were proposed, serving as springboards for discussion; they were
created and disseminated based on the assessments of current conditions heard by
the Minister’s Secretariat, and each bureau and division then revised and submitted
their New Policy proposals accordingly.
Under what is known as the “1955 regime,” preparation of the policy drafts—
New Policy formation and the formulation of its associated budgets—was often
delegated to central government offices by the ruling LDP. As politically neutral
and competent actors, the government bureaucrats devised policy proposals based
on Cabinet policies and also on what they themselves judged to be national needs;
and while taking into account the views of private-sector members of the Industrial
Structure Council and consulting with the relevant members of parliament, they
submitted the approved draft (or revised draft) to discussion and negotiation within
theMinistry.When it had been approved in these discussions, the responsibleminister
presented it to the Cabinet, along with the budget proposal and bills already assessed
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by the Finance Ministry. Once approved by the Cabinet, it was passed on for Diet
deliberations.
The formation of the policy plan was thus based on mutual trust between the
political and the bureaucratic parts of the government. Preparing an excellent policy
plan required familiarity with the actual conditions and needs of the target of the
policy. It is a task that requires significant time and effort on the part of those with
specific expertise and skills, and it was therefore natural, even inevitable, that the
process would be left in the hands of bureaucrats specializing in these areas.
This system began to change, however, with the end of the so-called 1955 regime.
One of the factors spurring this change was the accumulation of budget deficits,
which weakened the bonds that had enabled team play between the government and
the bureaucracy. In addition, the eruption of scandals (such as the Recruit Incident)
implicating politicians and bureaucrats triggered political reformand the introduction
of a single-member electoral district system and so on. As the exploration of new
political systems proceeded, greater emphasis was placed on political leadership
in the policy-making process. This reform manifested itself in the instances of the
top-down policy making mentioned above. The large-scale organizational reform of
central government agencies at the turn of the century reflected the centralizing trend
in policy making through demands for administrative reform.
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Chapter 2
Japan’s Industrial Structure: Forced
to Change (1973–1982)
1 The Evolution of Japan’s Trade and Industrial Policy
in the 1970s
1.1 Pursuing the Shift to a “Knowledge-Intensive” Industrial
Structure
The rapid growth of the previous decade had enabled the Japanese economy to
catch up with the world’s advanced economies and to overcome the constraints
imposed by periodic balance-of-payments deficits, a limit that Japanese economists
had come to call the “balance-of-payments ceiling.” By 1970, Japan was making a
structural shift to heavy and chemical industrialization, establishing amass consumer
society, and becoming amore open economy through trade and capital liberalization.
Also becoming apparent, however, were the stresses of such economic growth on
Japan, namely, rising prices, the twin problems of depopulation in the countryside
and overcrowding in the cities, and pollution. These prompted mounting calls for a
reconsideration of Japan’s growth-oriented policies. The year 1970 was noteworthy
for Japan internationally and domestically: the 1970 Japan World Exposition (Expo
‘70) in Osaka was the first World Expo to be held in Asia and showcased to the world
the fruits of the country’s economic growth; meanwhile, pollution issues dominated
proceedings in the Diet, which established the Environment Agency and adopted
regulatory measures to address escalating concerns about pollution.
InDecember 1969,MITI established a policy research group on industrial policies
for the 1970s chaired by the Director of the Policy Planning Office in the Minister’s
Secretariat. The group was composed of four subcommittees, one tasked with con-
sidering the overall picture, and the other three focusing on international economic
policy, domestic industrial policy, and policy regarding social overhead capital. After
more than a half-year of deliberations, the group’s summary report was released on
August 4, 1970. The overview beginswith the following enumeration of Japan’s prin-
cipal aims for the 1970s: “To secure for every citizen a life that is truly rich in human
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spirit, to contribute actively to the peace and development of the international com-
munity, and, as the essential foundation for both of these, tomaintain and enhance the
creativity and vitality of citizens.” Basic trade policy adhered to these aims and was
intended to contribute to their achievement with policies for both domestic industrial
activities and international undertakings. Domestic industrial policy was tasked with
the following:
a. Consumer life: securing a sufficient quantity of consumer goods and improving
their quality, ensuring stability in daily living, enriching leisure time, and other
measures.
b. Work environment: raising income, increasing the number of rewarding jobs,
assuring a safe and comfortable working environment, and shortening working
hours.
c. Social and natural environment: preventing environmental destruction, improv-
ing social overhead capital, enriching education, and other measures.
Realizing these aims would also require the achievement of certain conditions in
the international arena, including the formation of an international division of labor
corresponding to advances in the domestic industrial structure and of an international
economic environment favorable to the Japanese economy in other ways.
The report also addressed the ongoing problem of the relationship between the
government and the private sector and proposed the establishment of a comprehensive
system of trade and industrial administration that would respect the independence
of the private sector, provide coordination in sectors that could not be expected to
work together on their own, and develop the optimum mix of private sector and
government leadership.
The 1970 report was an early presentation of the framework introduced more
thoroughly in the May 1971 interim report of MITI’s Industrial Structure Council
titled Vision of MITI Policy in the 1970s. The interim report cited five major tasks
for administration of the industrial economy: (1) cultivating industry’s overall devel-
opment capacity and the foundations for that development, (2) making qualitative
improvements in the standard of living, (3) establishing a positive social and natural
environment, (4) expanding the number of rewarding jobs and assuring a comfortable
working environment, (5) developing the Japanese economy in cooperation with the
international economic community.
The report further submitted that for Japan to achieve these aims, macroeconomic
administration in the 1970s would have to shift its basic orientation from high-speed
growth to “growth-utilization.” The role and responsibility of industrial policy was
to achieve this growth-utilization style of economic management. Because Japan
had a market economy, that industrial policy had to be predicated on the maximum
utilization of market mechanisms, an issue that required detailed examination. In
other words, the industrial economy was facing changing conditions in the 1970s,
which resulted in a growing number of sectors that could not achieve the anticipated
results by relying on market mechanisms alone. Such sectors included both those
in which non-economic social effects were coming under question, including rural
depopulation and urban overcrowding, environmental degradation, safety, and job
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content; and those that might give rise to international issues, requiring policies to
minimize trade friction and promote active international cooperation.
With the clarification of these parameters, the goal of trade and industrial policy
for the 1970s became the promotion of “knowledge-intensive industries.”1 Major
changes in policy focus were under way, which led in turn to the need to reconsider
existing policies on industrial structure and organization. A novel and ambitious
approach was accordingly needed even with regard to the promotion of technological
development, not only to discover new industries but also to include the perspective
of enhancing the welfare of the people. There was, moreover, recognition of the need
for external cooperation as well as domestic policies, which required a review of the
fundamental approach to foreign investment.
1.2 The Turbulent 1970s: The Nixon Shock and the Oil Crisis
Just three months after the release of the interim report, international currency prob-
lems, long a source of concern, erupted, marking the beginning of a decade of tur-
bulence. The international environment was different from anything the Japanese
economy had yet faced. US President Richard Nixon adopted a “dollar-defense pol-
icy,” meaning the suspension of the gold standard for the US dollar, in response to
the economic strains caused by the quagmire in Vietnam. Japan was therefore forced
to raise the value of the yen, which had been fixed at 360 yen to the dollar for more
than 20 years. Given Japan’s persistent trade surplus, the yen appreciation should not
have posed a problem, but both government and business overreacted to the change.
Fearful that the yen’s rise would bring about an export slump that would in turn cause
a depression, the government sought to buoy the economy with an aggressive fiscal
policy driven by deficit bond issues. As a result, the money supply increased rapidly,
creating excess liquidity and spurring inflation. Wholesale prices, which had been
stable until that time, soared in 1973. Consumer prices, until then growing steadily
at somewhat over the 5% level, leapt as well, by 20%.
The first oil crisis, which followed the outbreak of the fourth Middle East war
and the “petroleum strategy” adopted by Arab oil-producing countries, cemented
1The 1960’s Vision, released in 1963, regarded the following as the principle tasks of industrial
policy: strengthening industry’s international competitiveness, which in policy terms meant it was
essential to “raise the level of the economic structure” and “promote the liberalization of trade”;
and with regard to manufacturing industries, supporting those sectors with high “income elasticity
value” and “rates of productivity increase.” In industries with high-income elasticity values, the
demand for goods increases more rapidly than income does. In industries with high productivity
increase rates, production efficiency improves rapidly and markedly due to capital investment. In
fact, the targets for policy supportwere presumed to be heavy and chemical industries and someother
materials industries. Underlying the recommendationswas the hidden premise that policies centered
on these industries would ultimately nurture manufacturing industries as a whole and thereby lead
to the successful modernization of the economy. Export promotion, too, was recognized as essential
specifically so that Japan could acquire the foreign currency it needed to procure raw materials and
other components overseas that were required by the country’s basic industries.
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the economic changes in Japan. In January 1973, the per-barrel price of oil was
US$ 2.6. Based on predictions of a moratorium on supplies if the tensions persisted,
it topped 3 dollars in October; after the war began on October 6, it rose to US$ 5.1,
and then soared to US$ 11 by January 1974. The rise in prices internationally for
agricultural products and raw materials had already been generating concern. Now
it escalated all at once to what was dubbed “frenzied prices.” Meanwhile, Japan was
experiencing an upsurge in land prices due to the speculative investing sparked by the
Kakuei Tanaka administration’s “archipelago remodeling plan,” and wages were up
by 20–30% following on the increase in prices. The impact of the oil crisis reached
every facet of daily life, setting off panic buying of necessities such as toilet paper
and detergent.
1.3 Policies on Industrial Structure in the 1970s
Given this upheaval in the international arena, Japan needed to secure a stable supply
of energy, in addition to addressing, as quickly as possible, the recession triggered by
the appreciation of the yen. Although the oil crisis had not been anticipated, earlier
organizational reforms had established an Agency for Natural Resources and Energy
to promote a comprehensive energy policy, and this proved convenient for addressing
the immediate disarray. But it was only after the second oil crisis, in the budgets of
1980 and 1981, that energy policy was given the highest priority. In the mid-1970s,
the emphasis remained on stabilizing domestic prices and improving consumer life.
So abrupt a change in the economic environment made it difficult for policymak-
ers to prioritize the Vision of the 1970s, but it is clear nevertheless that trade and
industry policy was based on the 1970s Vision throughout this time. Issues such as
the promotion of industrial technology temporarily took a backseat, but the effort to
establish a knowledge-intensive industrial structure continued without interruption.
Reference standards were established to serve as the basis for envisioning a
future industrial structure built on knowledge-intensive industries. These reference
standards included both those of the high-growth era—income elasticity and pro-
ductivity growth—and new ones: “standards on overcrowding and the environment”
and “standards on the content of labor.” In other words, the Ministry anticipated
the social demand for reduced reliance on scarce production factors and energy, and
for the realization of safe, comfortable and fulfilling workplaces. The 1970s Vision
was notable for its consideration of how to meet the social needs arising in newly
emerging sectors.
The followingwere cited as knowledge-intensive industries that could be expected
to deliver particularly high growth in the 1970s:
(a) R&D-intensive industries (computers, aircraft, electric cars, industrial robots,
nuclear power-related industries, integrated circuits, fine chemicals, new syn-
thetic chemicals, new metals, special ceramics, marine development, and
others.)
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(b) Advanced assembly industries (telecommunications equipment, office machin-
ery, computer-controlled machine tools, pollution control equipment, home
heating and cooling equipment, educational equipment, factory-produced hous-
ing, automated warehouses, large construction machinery, high-grade plant
engineering, and others.)
(c) Fashion-related industries (luxury clothing, high-end furniture, residential
furniture, electro-acoustic instruments, electronic musical instruments, and
others.)
(d) Information industries (information processing services, information provi-
sion services, education-related industries including video industries, software,
system engineering, consulting, and others.)
The Vision’s conception of the structural transformation ahead highlighted the
machine industries that would grow with heavy industrialization; it also envisioned
a shift “from hard to soft,” meaning a shift to industries that would contribute to
consumer life and the development of the welfare society.
However, the changes already under way in the industrial structure only acceler-
ated due to the yen’s appreciation and soaring energy prices. In particular, smokestack
industries such as petroleum refining, metal smelting, and production of vinyl chlo-
ride, other petrochemicals, and chemical fertilizers struggled with the sharp rise in
costs, despite repeated efforts at energy conservation.
These basic materials industries faced an array of challenges: high energy costs,
the difficulty of differentiating general-purpose products, substantial fixed costs and
therefore a heavy burden of interest payments when operating rates decline. They
were also at a disadvantage in price negotiations because so many of their consumers
were large users, and they were extremely capital-intensive.
As a result, MITI had to adopt measures to address recession in these industries,
while their declining position spurred changes in the industrial structure overall.
The shift to a knowledge-intensive industrial structure had originally been pro-
jected in the 1970s Vision as the next step for a mature economic power, but
the addition of energy conservation to the agenda made the country’s turn away
from smokestack industries that much more significant: machine industries began to
receive greater emphasis within the industrial structure.
This policy perspective meant that the priority at this time was on adjustments
to the domestic economy. International economic friction, although a concern, tem-
porarily took a backseat even as great changes continued to rock the international
environment.
This was because the balance-of-payments issue was temporarily obscured, first
by the Nixon Shock and yen appreciation, and then because of the surge in crude
oil prices, which was directly linked to import increases that masked the large trade
surplus. Domestic measures to counter the ill effects of the higher yen were accord-
ingly put in place, as were energy policies. After the first oil crisis, priority was given
to policies addressing skyrocketing prices. For the time being, longer-term policies
were shelved.
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2 The Vision of the 1970s and the Machinery
and Information Industries
2.1 Toward a Knowledge-Intensive Industrial Structure
and Machinery and Information Industry Policy
2.1.1 The New Machinery and Information Industries Bureau
In the reorganization of July 1973, MITI established the Machinery and Informa-
tion Industries Bureau. The new Bureau incorporated 10 Divisions previously in
the Ministry’s Heavy Industries Bureau: the Industrial Machinery Division, Cast
and Wrought Products Division, Electronics Policy Division, Information Process-
ing and Data-Processing Promotion Division, Electronics and Electrical Machinery
Division, Automobile Division, Weights and Measures Division, Aircraft and Ord-
nance Division, Vehicle Division, and Machinery Insurance Division. To these were
also added a General Affairs Division and an International Trade Division.
This reorganization was in line with the 1970s Vision’s recommendation of a
conversion to a “knowledge-intensive industrial structure.” The Industrial Structure
Council Machinery Industry Committee, to recommend concrete measures for the
1970s Vision, released an interim report, 1975–1984 Vision for the Machinery Indus-
try, while the Information Industry Committee issued an interim report in September
presenting the basic direction of policy for the machinery and information industry
(Hasegawa 2013, p. 19).
The Vision for the Machinery Industry stressed the strategic importance of the
industry as one “that is most suitable for our country and that is a frontier industry
with the potential to constantly bring forth new industries and products as science
and technology advance.” The Vision accordingly called for an active response to
the needs of the industry and active development internationally. The specific rec-
ommendations included: (1) strongly promoting the development of autonomous
technologies through the development of cutting-edge products such as electronic
calculators and aircraft, (2) promoting regularization and standardization, securing
the supply of rawmaterials, strengthening the foundations of small andmedium-sized
machinery producers, promoting engineering and the modernization of distribution,
and so on, to make the machine industry stronger and more efficient.
The Information Industry Committee’s interim report showed an awareness that
the expansion of information through the use of computer technology would in the
long term enable Japan to overcome such constraints as the industrial pollution,
environmental destruction, overcrowding, and depopulation that resulted from rapid
growth, as well as the resources and energy shortages that emerged in the oil crisis. It
pointed out that, in order to prepare the infrastructural foundation for the information-
based economy, it would be necessary to establish a smooth system for information
dissemination to enable the efficient advance of information processing and to train
people for developments in the information field. These approaches would enable the
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development of the computer industry and of the information management industry,
including areas such as software.
2.1.2 From the Electronics and Machinery Industries Law
to the Machinery and Information Industries Law
The legal basis for machinery and information-industry policy was the Law on Tem-
porary Measures for the Promotion of Designated Electronics Industries and Desig-
nated Machinery Industries enacted in March 1971 and based on the Industry Struc-
ture Council’s July 1970 “Report on the future of machinery industry policy: The
best path forward for the machinery industry in the 1970s.” Ninety-five machinery
models were covered by this law by September 1975, and plans for the advance-
ment of each of these brought about joint ventures, research and development, and
systematization.
The necessary capital was provided by the Japan Development Bank and the
Smaller Business Finance Corporation within special frameworks andwith favorable
interest rates. For fiscal years 1971–1977, 48.86 billion yen of the loans went to the
machinery industry and 16.555 billion yen to the electronics industry (Table 1). The
automotive parts and semiconductor industries were particular priorities.
At a joint meeting of the Machinery Industry and Information Industry Commit-
tees in October 1977, as the Electronics and Machinery Industries Law approached
termination, the Industrial Structure Council approved a report titled “The future
direction of the machinery and information industries and the formation of machin-
ery and information industry policy.” This report defined the role of the machinery
and information industries as follows: (1) to actively respond to new social needs;
(2) to respond to employment problems, including providing comfortable employ-
ment opportunities; (3) to respond to social demands, such as consumer issues; and
(4) to develop harmonious international economic relations (Hasegawa 2013, p. 32).
The first of these covered (1) planning for systems to supply social infrastructure,
including medical care, urban development, education, transportation, and informa-
tion needed in daily life, with the aim of achieving a higher level of social welfare;
(2) supplying the new tools required to overcome resource and energy problems, envi-
ronmental pollution, workplace accidents, and so on; (3) developing new products
to advance resource and energy conservation, minimize pollution, and to improve
safety in conventional as well as new machinery sectors. Because the machinery and
information industries were seen as key to Japan’s ability to respond to a wide range
of needs, their development was consistently a central policy aim, leading to the July
1978 Law on Temporary Measures for the Promotion of Designated Machinery and
Information Industries (Designated Machinery and Information Industries Law).
The new law, like its predecessor, was temporary legislation. It stipulated a seven-
year period of assistance in the form of subsidies and policy-based funding, based on
plans for upgrading hardware (equipment to promote testing and research, indus-
trialization, and rationalization) as defined by Cabinet Order. Although the two
laws took the same form, the new version established several new directions: first,
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Table 1 Loan under the Electronics and Machinery Industries Law, FY 1971–1977 (Unit million
yen)
Model Machinery industry Model Electronics industry
No. of
cases
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Table 1 (continued)
Model Machinery industry Model Electronics industry
No. of
cases




















Auto parts 160 30,850
Forged products 10 1,450
Cast products 20 3,060
Subtotal 284 48,860 82 16,555
Source Hasegawa (2013, p. 31)
within the machinery industry, it singled out for promotion those devices that inte-
grated electronics (computers); second, its Cabinet Order designations eliminated
the requirement that the target sector “contribute to labor-saving and other business
improvement activities” and added instead that it “contribute to rationalization of
resource use”; and third, it added the software industry as one of the areas targeted
by the new law.
The new Cabinet Order therefore targeted 88 industries, seven fewer than before.
The new law placed a greater emphasis on policies that treated the machinery and
information industries as a single unit. The two had remained distinct even after
the establishment of the Machinery and Information Industries Bureau, but from
FY 1979 forward, they began to be conceived of as united. The increased emphasis
on the electronics industry (especially semiconductors) is clear in the Designated
Machinery and Information Industries Law financing shown in Table 2.
2.1.3 Electronics Industry Promotion Measures
One particular issue facing the 1970s information industry was how to respond to
trade liberalization. Liberalization of the computer market began in July 1972 and
was complete as of April 1976. The main focus of industrial promotion policy there-
after was the development of a 3.5-generation computer that could compete with the
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Table 2 Loans under the Designated Machinery and Information Industries Law, FY 1978–1984
(Unit million yen)
Machine industry model Amount Electronics industry model Amount
Automobile parts 7,500 Compound semiconductor
elements
490
NCI machine tools 1,570 Semiconductor integrated circuits 46,600
Specialty steel screws 80 Connectors 50
Pneumatic/hydraulic instruments 900 Liquid crystal display cells 1,000
Valves 120 Electronic equipment materials 13,320
Specialty steel, carbide tools 270 Calculating computers 4,700
Forged products 1,000 Circuits/mechanical parts 9,180
Agricultural machinery 500 Integrated circuits 6,220
Metal/plastic processing goods 750 Devices with applications to
medical electronics
100




Source Hasegawa (2013, p. 71)
IBM (International Business Machines Corporation) 370 series. Based on the Elec-
tronics and Machinery Industries Law, a system for directing financial support to the
computer industry had been established in 1972, enabling the provision of subsidies
for the development of both computers and peripheral equipment (Hasegawa 2013,
p. 608).
Three groups of domestic computer manufacturers (Fujitsu and Hitachi; NEC and
Toshiba;Mitsubishi Electric Corporation andOki Electric Industry) received the sub-
sidies for computer development, which covered 50% of their costs. Manufacturers
of peripherals also received subsidies for 50% of costs. The 1978 law also clarified
that the software industry would be a target for support, and policies for nurturing
the computer industry were strengthened through such measures as user taxes.
Even with these measures, however, IBM remained the computer industry leader
in the late 1970s. MITI and industry stakeholders were shocked by the information
theywere getting about the newFutureSystem (FS)model beingdevelopedby IBMin
1974. The core technology of FSwas theVery Large-Scale IntegratedCircuit (VLSI).
VLSIs were expected to increase integrated circuit (IC) densities by 100 times or
more, bringing computer prices down to one-twentieth their existing level and the
unit price of computer processing down to one-third or even one-fifth its level. MITI
recognized that it would be difficult for domestic manufacturers to independently
develop IBM’s FS and VLSI counterparts because of the enormous expenditure and
risks involved, and determined that government subsidies were therefore especially
necessary for VLSI development. It also concluded that the domestic development of
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Fig. 1 VLSI research lab achievements and personnel. Soruce [II-7, p. 627]
computers equippedwith VLSIs would lower prices and thereby contribute greatly to
the advancement of small and medium-sized firms and economic society in general
(Fig. 1).
MITI therefore began to explore ways of supporting the endeavor in 1975 and
in March 1976 established the VSLI Technology Research Association to serve as
the core mechanism in the development of concrete policy plans (Hasegawa 2013,
p. 617). Subsidies covered 50% of the Association’s development expenses, and
from FY 1976 to FY 1979 MITI focused the necessary materials and talent as much
as possible on the two groups under the Association’s umbrella: Fujitsu–Hitachi–
Mitsubishi and NEC–Toshiba.
The VLSI project bore fruit, improving the semiconductor industry’s LSI man-
ufacturing technology and contributing to Japanese firms’ significant rise in the
64K DRAM and 1M DRAM industries. Factors in the success of this effort were
the clarity of the goals, the focus on the development of manufacturing technology,
the consistency of project organization and personnel with the targets set, and the
role played by the external environment in promoting R&D. In a related effort, MITI
introduced a five-year subsidy and other measures to promote the development of
fourth-generation computer technology based on VLSIs.
2.1.4 Promoting Software Development
The Information-Technology Promotion Agency (IPA), launched in October 1970,
played a central role in software promotion (Hasegawa 2013, p. 629). The IPA’s
concrete tasks were to outsource the development of particular programs and to
create a credit guarantee business. The first involved planning and developing the
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spread of “programs that particularly need development and the results of which are
recognized as having broad applications in business activities.”
For the technical infrastructure involved in program development, MITI advanced
a production technology development plan with a total budget of 7.5 billion yen for
FY 1976–1981 and outsourced business to the Joint System Development Corp
(JSD), a company established in April 1976 with funding from 17 major software
companies and 13 banks. This plan had several aims: (1) to resolve the Japan–US
software gap, (2) to modernize software production (improve the efficiency of the
development task), and (3) to secure the autonomy of the Japanese economy.
The second of these aimswas intended to address concerns that the labor-intensive
software development industry would face rising costs due to the soaring price of
labor. The technical development plan for software production as described above
produced programs based on four pillars: the “CPL-A language system,” the “pro-
gram module/database system,” the “CPL-B language system,” and “peripheral
related technology and related tools.” These enabled greater efficiency in software
design and manufacture so as to improve the productivity and reliability of software.
2.2 The Machinery Industry as a “Strategic Industry”
2.2.1 Measures on Automobile Pollution and Electric Vehicle
Development
While these efforts to build a knowledge-intensive structure were under way, the
industrial policy on the auto industry focused on (a) stronger exhaust-gas regulation
and the pollution prevention and safety assurances that had suffered from the soaring
gasoline prices, and (b) electric car R&D (Hasegawa 2013, p. 315). In a December
1974 report titled “The auto industry in 1985,” the Automobile Industry Subcommit-
tee of the Machinery Industry Committee suggested that measures should be taken
to resolve the problem technologically and that plans should be made for expanding
demand to a global scale through exports and overseas investment and for forward-
ing internationalization. While maintaining a strong export orientation, this report
also stresses the need for efforts to resolve the pollution issue. These ideas were also
presented in a March 1976 subcommittee report, marking a growing emphasis on
the need for a prompt response to pollution, safety, and energy issues.
Pollution and safety policy were also important policy issues in promoting the
automotive parts industry (Hasegawa 2013, p. 324). Amajor reason for the enactment
of the Electronics and Machinery Industries Law had been the “mounting demand
for greater harmony between industrial activities and people’s lives in areas such
as pollution and safety,” and among the automotive sectors designated under the
law were “automobile pollution-related measuring instruments, automobile testing
and inspection equipment manufacturing industry” and “the automobile parts man-
ufacturing industry.” These received loans and other policy support based on the
associated improvement plans. This area saw no change under the new law. When
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the Designated Machinery and Information Industries Law came into effect, support
for the parts industry—chiefly for improvements in quality and performance and for
cost reduction—narrowed its focus more specifically to pollution and safety. This
is a good example of the flexibility with which industrial promotion policies could
address changing policy objectives to respond to the demands of the times.
The development and diffusion of electric vehicles was promoted beginning in the
1970s as part of broader policies on next-generation automobiles. Since it was not
easy to develop electric cars comparable in performance to gasoline-powered cars,
policy support was offered through the “Large-Scale Project” framework (Hasegawa
2013, p. 373).2 A six-year R&D period from FY 1971 to FY 1976 was set for the
electric vehicle development project, with planned costs of 5.7 billion yen, delivery
of the first prototype at the end of three years, and trial production of an experimen-
tal car in the fifth year. However, because the firms that were to have undertaken
the research and development were not strongly convinced of the need to commit
manpower and funding to the enterprise, it did not produce the desired results. In
the process of identifying project goals, MITI established the Council on Electric
VehicleDiffusionMeasureswithin theMachinery and Information Industries Bureau
in October 1975 to consider measures for promoting the diffusion of electric vehi-
cles. The Japan Electric Vehicle Association (EVAssociation), established in August
1976, was tasked with promoting electric vehicles, and 10 firms together established
the Association for Research on Technology for the Standard Electric Automobile
in February 1987 with the aim of advancing R&D enough to produce an electric car.
In 1976, MITI also established the Electric Vehicle Association as a private advi-
sory body answering to the Director General of the Machinery and Information
Industries Bureau, and put together the Basic Plan for Promotion of the Electric
Vehicle (April 1977). Although this plan did produce an experimental electric vehi-
cle comparable in performance to the cars with internal combustion engines, its
market was expected to be limited until it could become more cost-effective. Pro-
posed uses for the time being included vehicles for milk and newspaper delivery,
which required low-noise emissions, commercial vehicles that traveled only short
distances each day, short-route buses and government patrol cars, as well as vehicles
used only within confined areas and requiring zero exhaust and low noise.
In addition, the plan set ownership targets for FY 1986 of 200,000 regular vehi-
cles and 50,000 vehicles for use only in confined areas. To realize these targets,
the plan urged (1) promoting technological development, (2) making the cars more
economical (3) establishing the necessary service systems, (4) improving the social
environment, and (5) education and PR activities through the EV Association men-
tioned above. Things did not proceed entirely smoothly, however, and even the new
plan issued in December 1983 after review did not put ownership within range of the
targets.
Subsequently, in its October 1991 Electric Vehicle Diffusion Plan, MITI began
exploring new approaches to achieving these targets, saying that it “hope[d] to see
further efforts by automobile, battery, and electrical manufacturers” and signaling
2See Sect. 4.5 for further information on “Large-Scale Projects.”
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thatMITIwould entrust the basic direction of development anddiffusion to the private
sector. An exception was made in the area of batteries, which required enormous
outlays of capital. MITI recognized the need for government to bear the risks of
development, and did so within the framework of the New Sunshine Project. This
plan contributed, through the rapid diffusion of fuel cells, to the spread of a new
generation of automobiles powered in part by electrical energy.3
2.2.2 Measures to Promote the Industrial Machinery and Engineering
Industries
Promotion policies based on these legal frameworks were advanced in other areas
as well, including machine tools, civil engineering and construction machinery,
chemical machinery, textile machinery, and agricultural machinery (Hasegawa 2013,
p. 197). Under the original law, specialized production systems and advances in sys-
tematization were developed to meet the plans for their specific industries, and inter-
industry cooperation was promoted as an especially important goal. The revised law
also recognized amortization of the “first quarter of the first year” as part of Mea-
sures for the Special Amortization of Important Complex Machinery such as high-
performance computer-controlled metal-processing machinery, high-performance
computer-controlled automatic design devices, and high-performance computer-
controlled facsimile storage and exchange devices. This understanding dated back
earlier than the 1978 revised law, having originated in the financing mechanism
created in 1975 to promote machine systems.
These loans sought to create new high-value-added products (mechanical equip-
ment systems) that could couple computers with other machinery based on mechan-
ical engineering. Various measures for subsidizing the machinery and information
systems were adopted with the goal of developing a more sophisticated machine
industry.
Despite the emerging trade friction in the latter 1970s, the engineering industry
showed little sign of it and was expected to become an important player in machinery
exports (Hasegawa 2013, p. 277). In the midst of the first oil crisis, when domestic
capital investment was sluggish, projects materializing in oil-producing countries
boosted the export of machinery and contributed to the goals of securing resources
and energy. MITI considered such exports, including soft services such as product
management, as business sectors and made promoting them a pillar of its export
promotion policies.
In November 1977, MITI established an engineering roundtable as a private advi-
sory body of the Machinery and Information Industries Bureau Director General.
Its interim report of April 1978 called for the development of financial systems and
3Having acted to introduce low-pollution vehicles, in July the Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, and Ministry of the Envi-
ronment worked together to formulate an “Action Plan for the Development and Diffusion of
Low-emissions Vehicles.”
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the standardization of both hardware and software in terminology and other areas,
to advance the engineering industry. MITI accordingly established the Engineering
Advancement Association of Japan in August 1978, through which to develop mea-
sures for strengthening technology development and reinforcing the creditworthiness
of the industry.
2.2.3 Nurturing and Advancing the Nuclear Power Industry
The nuclear power industry was another knowledge- and R&D-intensive- industry
that was expected to grow. It is a high-value-added industry requiring extremely
specific built-to-order plants and is also related to a broad array of industrial sectors
(Hasegawa 2013, p. 451). TheMachinery and Information Industries Bureau stressed
the development of nuclear-plant equipment during this period because the exacting
safety and reliability requirements in this field meant a need for policies ensuring
that due effort was made from the initial stages of production and manufacturing.
The expectation was that after the import of the first nuclear power plants, the
second-generation plantswould rely on domesticmanufacturing. Themeasures taken
to promote domestic production proved effective: by the early 1980s, most of the
machinery used in nuclear power plants was produced domestically (Table 3). Even
so, the level of technology assimilation at this stage was not regarded as sufficient. As
long as nuclear power plants reliedon imported technology, there remained thedanger
that prompt and appropriate technical judgments would not be possible in the event of
an atypical occurrence. Because Japan required strict oversight measures, especially
of radiation exposure, technical improvements were an important responsibility of
policy. This led to plans for improving and standardizing power plants and improving
the reliability of nuclear power generation.
The basic design of nuclear power plants entails the immediate shutdown of the
furnace whenever even small problems arise. Any suspension of operations increases
the costs associated with temporarily switching to thermal power generation. One
hundred fourteen such problems were recorded over the five-year period between FY
1974 and FY 1980. Of these, 40%were due to problems in design oversight, the most
common being stress corrosion cracking (SCC) and thermal fatigue. These issues
contributed to the recognition of a need for policy measures to address reliability and
quality assurance.
In February 1975, MITI established the Committee on the Improvement and
Standardization of Nuclear Power Plants and the Committee on Nuclear Power Plant
Standardization Surveys within the Machine Information Bureau. Their task was
to forward the improvement and standardization of light-water reactors, which were
expected to play a central role in nuclear power generation. The results of the commit-
tees’ investigations were issued in an interim report in April 1977, which presented
the basic concepts that should govern standard specifications: “Plantsmust be safe, of
course, but also improve reliability and capacity utilization, reduce employee expo-
sure to radiation, and implement maintenance and inspection [systems to ensure
that] human error would not be a factor.” Standardization of earthquake-resistant
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Table 3 Domestic production of nuclear power plants







Tōkai 2 51 GE/Hitachi
Tsuruga 55 GE


















Chubu Electric Genshiryoku 1 90 Tōshiba
Genshiryoku 2 94 Tōshiba, Hitachi
Kansai Electric Mihama 1 58 WH
Mihama 2 72 Mitsubishi Heavy
Mihama 3 93 Mitsubishi Shoji
Takahama1 61 WH/Mitsubishi Shoji
Takahama 2 90 Mitsubishi Shoji
Ōi 1 67 WH/Mitsubishi Shoji








Source Hasegawa (2013, p. 455). The original material comes from Yamaguchi (1980, p. 10)
design, although also on the agenda, was left for future consideration because of the
great variety in local site conditions. On the assumption that steady progress would
be made in the improvement and standardization of light-water reactors, the com-
mittees continued to build a series of time-based expectations to serve as standard
specifications and eventually solidified their thinking on how to achieve a model for
light-water reactors that would be suitable for Japan’s specific circumstances.
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The “Interim report on light-water reactor improvement and standardization sur-
veys” issued byMITI inMay 1978 reported that the first three-year stage of improve-
ment and standardization had been completed in FY 1977, and that great strides had
been made both in improving the efficiency of maintenance and inspection, and
in reducing employee exposure to radiation. It also defined goals for the second
stage, including standardization of earthquake-resistant design and improvement in
load-following operating functions, and so on. While efforts continued to improve
automation and remote control, therefore, the scope of the standardization efforts
also expanded from nuclear-reactor steam-generation equipment to reactor building
and other areas. The results of this second stage were compiled in April 1981, and
the plan for the third stage was put into effect, to last until FY1985. Under this plan,
Japan would rely on international technological cooperation until it could build its
own reactors, including the core, as well as related equipment and systems. By the
third stage, Japan hadmade considerable strides toward achieving this goal (Table 4).
2.2.4 Promotion of the Aircraft Industry
The challenge for policy on aircraft-industry development in the 1970s was how
to develop a new commercial airliner to follow the YS-11, which was seen as “a
technical success and a commercial failure.” Among the issues was the question of
how to determine the demand target. As presented in the Aircraft Industry Council’s
1972 summary report, the decision was made to collaborate with Boeing Company
to develop a 150–200-seat twinjet aircraft (Hasegawa 2013, p. 482).
The Civil Transport Development Corporation (CTDC) was established in March
1973 to pursue this goal based on a combination of private-sector energies and
government subsidies. In April 1973, the CTDC entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) with Boeing, and negotiations between the two continued
thereafter.
However, the spending cuts and changes in demand caused by the first oil crisis
in the fall of 1973 led to a reconsideration of the YX development plan itself. The
MOU contract was such that instead of following a joint development model, Japan
would participate in the developmental stages of Boeing’s process. Based on these
new negotiations, CTDC and Boeing signed the YX/767 basic business agreement
in September 1978, and full-scale development was under way. The US Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) gave its approval to the prototype in July 1982, and
the development of the YX/767 concluded as planned.
Meanwhile, theMachinery and Information Industries Bureau began to define the
next policy issues in aircraft-industry development. This was based on the thinking
that next-generation development should always be in the works even before the
completion of the current model in order to ensure the industry’s sound development.
According to MITI’s explanation at the Aircraft Industrial Council meeting in April
1977, the 1980s forecast was for a market consisting of “Jumbo’s, Airbus aircraft,
new 200-seat aircraft, smaller new aircraft and to a certain extent the continued use
of existing aircraft,” which set the parameters for the central challenges of the next
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Source Hasegawa (2013, p. 468). Original materials from Nihon Denki Kōgyōkai (1998, p. 128)
Note BWR Boiling water reactor; PWR Pressurized water reactor
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phase of policy. In April 1979, MITI asked the Aircraft and Machinery Industry
Council Committee on the Aircraft Industry for its opinion on the desired features
of a next-generation civilian aircraft dubbed “YXX.”
The Committee’s August interim report proposed aiming for medium-sized air-
craft of 100 to 150 seats. The Council continued to establish basic policies for this
goal, but meanwhile the CTDC, too, launched preparations for the YXX in June
1981. In March 1984, the CTDC (renamed the Japan Aircraft Development Cor-
poration or JADC in December 1982), together with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries,
Ltd., Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd., and Fuji Heavy Industries Ltd., announced
the exchange of a first-stageMOU on the 7J7 development plan proposed by Boeing,
which would be their official co-developer. InMarch 1986 they entered into a second
MOU.
Policy support also went to the development of engines for use in commercial
aircraft (Hasegawa 2013, p. 511). The new effort began with the FJR10 jet engine
development project, which from 1971 to 1981 was counted among the Industrial
Science and Technology Agency’s Large-Scale Projects. The first period, ending in
1976, saw an investment of 6.8 billion yen in this area; an additional 1.3 billion
yen was budgeted for the second period, ending in 1981. Development progressed
accordingly.
Among the commercial aircraft engines slated to be put to practical use was the
XJB project (RJ500 development) that was launched after the conclusion of a Japan–
UK joint enterprise agreement based on consultation with British aircraft-engine
maker Rolls-Royce Limited in December 1979. The “Outline of the commercial
aircraft jet engine development subsidy” was settled on in November 1980, and the
government offered support in the form of subsidies. This project was carried on by
an international joint development enterprise comprising five countries and seven
companies doing joint R&D on the basis of a March 1983 contract and led to the
development of the V2500 engine.
3 Industrial Relocation and Pollution Regulation
3.1 Promoting Industrial Relocation Plans
3.1.1 Industrial Relocation Promotion Measures and Regional
Recovery
With rapid economic growth came the twin problems of overpopulation in cities and
depopulation in the provinces. In response to these challenges, MITI implemented
the Industrial Relocation Promotion Law and the Law of Public Corporations for
Industrial Location and Coal Mining Region Development (Takeda 2011, p. 11) in
October 1972.
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Records from 1972 show fully 72% of the country’s industry concentrated in the
Pacific Coastal belt, which constituted no more than 20% of Japan’s total land area.
The need for a reconfiguration of land usewas obvious. Regions needing relocation—
either inbound or outbound—were designated on the basis of this law in FY 1972,
but formulation of a concrete plan proved difficult.
A draft proposal was compiled in December 1975, and in July 1977 the Induce-
ments for Industrial Relocation were determined. The reason for the difficulty was
that the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren), along with key indus-
tries such as steel, oil refining and petrochemicals, opposed the relocation measures.
Relocation ultimatelywas implemented through administrative guidance,which took
their opinions into account.
The July 1977 plan set numerical targets for each of the outbound and inbound
relocation areas. Beginning in FY1978, areas thatwere regarded as especially in need
of industry were designated “Special Induction Areas,” including remote prefectures
and those that had experienced structural decline (textile-producing regions, and coal
and other mining regions). Aggressive efforts were made to disperse industry within
these Special Induction Areas through higher subsidy levels and other measures.
Tax and financial incentives were offered to promote relocation. In addition, sup-
port was also offered to fund interest payments for local government bond issues and
loans for creating local industrial complexes, subsidies to municipalities and com-
panies for industrial relocation promotion, and for special corporate and third-sector
policy financial institutions (Table 5).
Because of changes taking place in the industrial structure during the implemen-
tation period, this plan did not produce the target results. Although industry in the
1980s left the designated “outbound” areas, they did not necessarily relocate to the
target “induction areas” but instead moved into undesignated areas. The industrial
base in outlying areas therefore remainedweak and did not showmuch improvement.
The Industrial Relocation Promotion Law was abolished in 2006.
Other efforts were made to promote regional development, including the creation
of regional Visions and the introduction of industry into agricultural regions. In
contrast to the relocation plan’s general focus on urban functions and the over-
concentration of industry in Tokyo, these policies were principally concerned with
correcting disparities among regions.
The firstVision for the agricultural regionswas presented in The Long-termVision
on Industrial Structure, adopted in September 1974 by the Industrial Structure Coun-
cil for implementation in FY 1976. It declared the need to envision the contours of
a future industrial structure specific to each region. This approach sought to correct
disparities not only in income, but also in the availability of appealing workplaces,
of the types of services found in urban areas, and of connections with nature. In other
words, it was concerned with enriching people’s overall living circumstances.
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Table 5 Long-term trends in industry site location (%)
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2003
Number of firms Metropolitan areas 58.2 58.9 49.2 48.1 45.2 45.6
Coastal Kantō 24.7 26.2 20.8 20 17.6 16.7
Tōkai 13.5 15.2 14.7 15.6 15.9 17.4
Coastal Kinki 19.9 17.5 13.7 12.5 11.7 11.6
Rural areas 42.9 41.9 51.5 52.6 55.4 55.1
Number of employees Metropolitan areas 60.2 62.1 54.5 52.3 49.8 48.6
Coastal Kantō 23.4 27.5 23.7 22.4 20 17.5
Tōkai 16.9 16.6 16.5 17.3 18.3 20.5
Coastal Kinki 19.8 18 14.4 12.5 11.5 10.6




Metropolitan areas 64.9 67.6 60.9 58.6 55.5 53.9
Coastal Kantō 25.5 30.7 27.4 25.7 23.2 19.4
Tōkai 16.2 16.2 16.9 19.5 20.8 24.2
Coastal Kinki 22.9 20.7 16.6 13.4 11.5 10.3
Rural areas 36.8 33.7 40.6 42.4 45.2 46.8
Tangible fixed-asset
values
Metropolitan areas 63.9 54.1 53.7 52.3 50.2
Coastal Kantō 28.6 23.4 23.4 21.2 18.7
Tōkai 16.9 15.9 17 18.5 20.1
Coastal Kinki 18.4 14.8 13.2 12.6 11.3
Rural areas 36.1 45.9 46.3 47.7 49.8
Source Takeda (2011, p. 6)
3.1.2 Adjustments to Industrial Locations and the Establishment
of Infrastructure for an Industrial Environment
The “Outline on industrial bills,” compiled at the direction of MITI Minister Kakuei
Tanaka in July 1972, proved an opportunity to create a legal framework for ensuring
environmental preservation in cases of industrial relocation. The Law on Industrial
Location Surveys and Related Matters was revised and a new Factory Location Act
adopted in February 1974, leading to the establishment of regulations on location
(Takeda 2011, p. 155). The regulations were made in response to a recognition that
the worsening pollution in existing industrial districts and the progress of indus-
trialization and urbanization overall were damaging the balance with nature. The
rules on environmental preservation announced by the MITI Minister stipulated that
(1) production facilities could occupy only up to a certain ratio of the site area, and
that (2) notification reports had to be submitted for certain specified factories.
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MITI also carried out the Comprehensive Survey of Large-Scale Industrial Sites
and studies of the FY 1973–1981 expenses for coordinating all-round land develop-
ment. These were intended to help determine the optimal siting of industrial facili-
ties. It also developed measures to improve the factory environment, including noti-
fication reviews for specified plants, subsidies for the promotion of environmental
improvements in industrial parks, and surveys on improving the factory environment.
3.1.3 Securing Industrial Water
Measures governing industrial water had been implemented under the 1956 Indus-
trial Water Law to prevent the ground subsidence caused by excessive pumping of
groundwater for industrial use. Regulations based on regional designations for the
installation of industrial wells were implemented to address the expansion in target
areas and the need for shifts in water sources.
Thesemeasures were consistent with the strengthening of the regulations required
by the interim report of the Industrial Structure Council’s Committee on Industrial
Water Policy, summarized in “The basic direction of groundwater measures” of
November 1975. The law was not revised, but the measures were pursued in the
form of administrative guidance (Takeda 2011, p. 172).
In addition, the Industrial Structure Council once again took into consideration
measures to secure industrial water in the mid- to long-term through the compilation
of the June 1978 Plan for the Long-Term Supply and Demand of Industrial Water
and the August 1985 Interim Report on the Industrial Water Basic Policy Commit-
tee. This led to efforts to promote the construction of industrial water supplies, the
development of water resources, rationalization of use, and other measures. Large
subsidies for construction of an industrial water supply did not prove necessary,
because the relocation process stalled. Measures were instead adopted to respond
promptly to changes in the industrial structure: the Subsidy Framework for Small-
Scale Industrial Water Supply Expenses, for example, was established in FY 1985
to promote the construction of small-scale inland industrial water supplies to serve
locations with enterprises in advanced technologies, such as the IC industry.
Meanwhile, in the interest of rationalizing industrial water use, MITI conducted
“surveys of water consumption, by type, and surveys of the rationalization of water
use, by region.” Research was also conducted on sewage recycling as a possibility
for the future. The R&D of comprehensive water recycling systems launched in 1985
(Aqua-Renaissance ‘90 Project) was one such example. As a result of these efforts,
the FY 1999 surveys issued by the Environmental Protection and Industrial Location
Bureau’s Industrial FacilitiesDivision showed clear improvements in industrialwater
recovery rates and in water consumption (Table 6).
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Table 6 Industrial water demand and unit consumption
Item 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 Notes
Delivery amount (1
trillion yen)
132 161 200 260 274
Area of site (10
thousand m2)
12,506 12,834 13,342 14,623 14,799
Number of facilities 54,392 55,207 58,154 60,974 55,386
Amount of water used
(million m3/day)




39 35 34 36 34
Recovery rate (%) 70.4 73.8 74.9 76.3 77.9
Unit of water used
(m3/day/100 million
yen)




29.5 21.8 17.2 13.7 12.3
Unit of water used
(m3/day/thousand m2)




31.2 27.4 25.8 24.4 22.8
Sources Takeda (2011, p. 191); MITI Environmental Protection and Industrial Location Bureau
2000. Kōgyō Yōsui Juyō Sōtei Chōsa Hōkokusho—Heisei 11 nendo Kōgyōyō Suidō Jigyō Chōsa
[Survey Report on Expected Industrial Demand for Water—FY Heisei 11 Industrial Waterworks
Project Survey]
Note The original source materials do not come with explanation, but the Recovery rate was 1—
water recovery volume/used water volume. The consumption rates are the amount of water used
and amount of water recovered, obtained by dividing the delivery amount and site area
3.2 Strengthening the Regulation of Pollution
3.2.1 Direct Regulation of Pollution: Air Pollution
The year 1970 saw the revision of the Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Control
by the “PollutionSession of theDiet” and the enactment ofmany regulations. In 1971,
the Environment Agency was established. Looking at subsequent environmental
policy from MITI’s point of view, environmental regulations appear to have been
implemented to harmonize with economic development.
Direct regulation of environmental pollution centered on air and water pollu-
tion while also addressing pollution in the form of noise, vibration, and offensive
odors. The regulation of nitrogen oxides (NOx) was particularly important in the
1970s because the increase in photochemical smog had emerged as a serious issue.
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The environmental quality standards enacted under Article 9 of the Basic Pollution
Countermeasures Law therefore included sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, and sus-
pended particulatematter, as they had before, and in 1973 added nitrogen dioxide and
photochemical oxidants. MITI meanwhile strengthened its regulations, for example
extending the application of the K-Value Regulations nationwide on the basis of the
Air Pollution Control Law (Takeda 2011, p. 225).
Sulfur oxide (SOx) is generated when the sulfur contained in fossil fuels such as
petroleum is burned. Sulfur oxide contamination thus became a serious problemwith
the rapid increase in petroleum-based fuel consumption. The government sought to
counter this trend by expanding the area subject to regulation and strengthening the
standards in March 1974 and introducing the Total Pollutant Load Control approach
in June (Takeda 2011, p. 229). Based on this action, prefectural governments estab-
lished regulatory standards on totals andwere enabled to ask factories andworkplaces
to comply with fuel usage standards. As shown in Fig. 2, these measures produced
such great improvements that by the early 1980s, sulfur oxidewas evaluated as hardly
a problem any longer.
Meanwhile, the first controls on nitrogen oxide emissions were implemented in
August 1973 in accordance with the environmental standards set by the Environment
Agency in March 1973. With developments in preventive technologies thereafter, a
second and third set of emissions regulations were established in October 1975 and
June 1977, expanding the facilities subject to regulation and revising the emission
standards themselves. Uniform nationwide regulationwent into effect with the fourth
set of emission regulations in August 1979 (Takeda 2011, p. 232).



















Fig. 2 Changes in air pollution substance concentrations (Takeda 2011, p. 219). Sources Environ-
ment Agency,Kankyo hakusho [EnvironmentWhite Paper]. Study Group on Constant Atmospheric
Monitoring (ed) Taiki osen jōkyō [Japan’s Pollution Conditions].
Notes Sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide: Ambient Air Pollution Monitoring Sta-
tions (APMS) annual average value; Dustfall: 7 constant monitoring stations; Suspended particular
matter: annual average value
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The validity of the environmental standards was questioned with the regulations
on nitrogen oxides. The April 1973 report of the Central Council for Environmen-
tal Pollution Control, which formed the basis for formulating the standards, was
criticized by industry and other sectors for (1) the insufficiency of epidemiological
surveys, (2) the underdevelopment of control technologies, and (3) the strictness of
the regulations compared with those in other parts of the world. In other words, the
stringency of the regulations was called into question from the point of view both
of science and of the aptness of the standards themselves. The Industrial Structure
Council stated in its December 1977 report that “targets that could not be achieved
had been set without any basis” and that “environmental standards should be set
to levels that can be realized, not to some ideal value.” The Environment Agency
reviewed the standards based on the Council Procedure Report and relaxed them
in July 1977 in consideration of the request made by Keidanren (Japan Business
Federation).
While revising the standards in the immediate term, the Environment Agency also
made it known that the newenvironmental standardswould be achieved in 1985 based
on the introduction of controls on total volume. This drew opposition from business
circles, but controls on total volumewere introduced to the Special TokyoMetropoli-
tan Zone and other areas including the cities of Yokohama and Osaka in June 1981.
Reducing auto emissions was difficult because automobiles were so necessary to
mobility, so MITI put its effort into developing regulations on other areas in order to
achieve the total volumes stipulated in the new controls. Its 1979 regulations applied
to trucks and buses, the 1981 regulations targeted light- and medium-weight gas-
powered vehicles, and the 1982 regulations established limits on heavy automobiles
using gasoline and diesel. Even with such measures, however, regulation of nitro-
gen dioxide proved limited in effect. Average concentrations, which had remained
largely unchanged after 1973, began to worsen after 1986. Results fell short of the
standards, particularly with regard to auto exhaust gases.
3.2.2 Direct Regulation of Pollution: Water Pollution
With regard towater pollution, environmental quality standards and effluent standards
were adopted under Article 9 of the Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Control.
Environmental standards set the criteria that were to be achieved and maintained
for the protection of human health and those for the preservation of the living envi-
ronment. The regulations based on the Water Pollution Control Law set nationwide
uniform criteria for wastewater discharged from certain factories, and recognized the
more stringent standards set by prefectures. By FY 1975, all prefectures had added
their own standards (Takeda 2011, p. 259).
With these regulations, about 70% of Japan’s water districts improved or main-
tained their existing levels of water quality from the late 1970s forward. Pollution
worsened in some closed water bodies, however, raising the question of whether
total volume controls would also be necessary to prevent further deterioration. Some
prefectures had already implemented total volume controls after 1973, based on the
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conclusion that regulations of wastewater concentration did not readily stop pollu-
tion. The Central Council for Environmental Pollution Control’s 1977 report, “The
total-volume control system in water quality,” approved this approach.
Because these measures applied exclusively to factories and business sites, MITI
argued that the Environment Agency should consider regulating domestic wastewa-
ter as well, rather than imposing the burden only on industry and business. The 1981
proposal by the Central Council for Environmental Pollution Control that a permit
system be established regarding company site locations drew particular opposition.
MITI sought to ensure that the regulatory measures not be too restrictive of the busi-
ness activities of small and medium-sized enterprises, and after difficult negotiations
with the Environment Agency, a regulatory framework was put into place.
MITI also undertook to raise awareness in order to promote corporate efforts to
address pollution problems, and put effort into the development of anti-pollution
technologies (Takeda 2011, p. 293). In 1973, the research institutes of the Agency
of Industrial Science and Technology undertook R&D on automobile emissions and
NOx air-pollution prevention technologies, and the following year began research-
ing technologies related to the prevention of water pollution as well. At the same
time, industry, academia, and government joined in the research and development
of electric cars and other projects through MITI’s National Research and Develop-
ment Program (“Large-Scale Projects”). MITI also promoted pollution prevention
by offering subsidies for the development of pollution-control technologies through
the Important Technology R&D Subsidy System, instruction on the formulation of
pollution-control plans, and national examinations for pollution-control specialists.
3.2.3 Waste Disposal Law and Waste Management Policy
TheWaste Disposal and Public Cleansing Law (“Waste Disposal Law”) was enacted
in 1970 to address the serious environmental pollution caused by waste disposal
and the diffusion of harmful substances. The law distinguished between industrial
and non-industrial waste, assigned responsibility for the former to the operator and
established disposal systems, and for the latter assigned responsibility for disposal
to the municipality. MITI thereby became responsible for providing guidance on
industrial-waste disposal and for promoting measures to recycle waste from con-
trolled substances (Takeda 2011, p. 395). Its concrete measures included preparing
industrial waste-disposal instruction manuals and establishing the Clean Japan Cen-
ter (CJC) Foundation in 1975 to develop a national campaign promoting resource
conservation and recycling.
The new pollution problem of hexavalent chromium ore (Chromium (VI) Com-
pound Slag) landfill disposal emerged in August 1975, generating strong public
concern, as did illegal dumping. In response, the Waste Disposal Law was amended
in June 1976, and regulatory measures were added to ensure the operator’s liabil-
ity, but awareness among businesses remained inadequate. MITI began to consider
establishing the tentatively named Recycling Promotion Act to (1) develop a recy-
cling system, (2) actively involve the government in the development of recycling
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technology, and (3) train and support business operators in recycling. The plan was
not soon put into effect, however.
Meanwhile, because municipal processing systems were not keeping up with the
increase and diversity of general waste, the idea arose of placing the waste-collection
burdenonbusinesses.Beginning in 1973,MITI began reviewing this issue in itsWaste
Recycling Committee and discussed the Polluter-Pays-Principle (PPP) wherein the
operators internalize the cost of disposal by including it in the product’s price. The
committee did not succeed in solving the problem of how the cost burden should be
structured. TheWaste Recycling Subcommittee of the Industrial Structure Council’s
Pollution Committee issued an interim report in March 1977 that called for the
formation of a resource-conserving industrial structure centered on recycling and
emphasized the need for legislative and policy measures to do so. Meanwhile, the
concern that PPP systems would become mandatory led to the voluntary promotion
of waste-reduction and reuse by industry. As of 1983, about 58% of the 220 million
tons of industrial waste generated was recycled, which, compared with the recycling
rate of 16% in 1975, represented significant progress. Nevertheless, as the problem
of illegal dumping became more apparent, MITI began to offer technical support
for the voluntary initiatives of business operators and to promote their awareness
through educational activities.
3.2.4 Measures to Address Paper Waste
Measures for dealingwithwaste paperwere regarded as significantmeans of reducing
the burden it imposed on the environment and of securing rawmaterials (Matsushima
2012, p. 172). Securing raw materials, energy conservation, waste reduction, and
protection of forest resources were among the reasons given in the 1981 Vision for
the emphasis on this area.
Based on the “Measures to promote the recycling and reuse of paper products,”
which was presented in October 1973 by the Consumer Goods Industries Bureau’s
Paper, Pulp and Printing Industry Division, concrete policies included the pursuit of
legislative measures as well as the establishment of public- and private-sector organi-
zations to undertake promotion campaigns. Legislative measures were not adopted,
but the Waste Paper Recycling Promotion Center was established in March 1974
with responsibility principally for (1) public relations and advertising businesses,
(2) debt guarantee businesses, and (3) warehousing businesses and the like. The sec-
ond of these was adopted because of the tiny scale of the recyclers involved, and
in 1975, the used paper wholesale business became a designated industry under the
Small and Medium Enterprise Modernization Promotion Law (established March
1963). Plans for its modernization were concluded in 1977, principally in order to
promote the development of waste-paper standards, sorting containers, and the like.
The industry was again given special designation under the same law in 1989 and
surveys were conducted on conditions in the industry.
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3.3 Environmental Impact Assessment Legislation
3.3.1 Expanding the Preliminary Surveys on Industrial Pollution
A Cabinet Understanding was approved in June 1972 to “pursue environmen-
tal assessments in order to promote environmental conservation in public works
projects,” and from that point forward, environmental assessments were to be car-
ried out based on specific laws and administrative operations.MITIwas involved first
in the Comprehensive Preliminary Survey on Industrial Pollution where it concerned
large-scale industrial development as part of the Factory Location Law, and second
in the July 1977 assessments on power development based on the decision of the
MITI Departmental Council (Takeda 2011, p. 323).
In areas pertaining to the Factory Location Law, MITI had since 1965 been pro-
viding administrative guidance and instruction to companies based on its forecasts of
future pollution, in the awareness that to forward the establishment of non-polluting
factory sites, surveys had to be conducted before site selection, and the necessary
anti-pollution measures taken. This “Preliminary survey on industrial pollution” was
an attempt to instruct companies and local public entities on planning the new con-
struction and expansion of factories based on field surveys and on predictions of
contamination drawn from both theory and experimentation.
The Law on Industrial Location Surveys and Related Matters was revised in
October 1973, reaffirming the role of these preliminary surveys in locating factories
with an eye to pollution prevention and strengthening the surveys both in content
and systemically. Where pollution prevention was deemed necessary based on these
surveys, the MITI Minister was empowered to designate certain districts, with due
consideration of the opinions of the Industrial Location Water Council, to require
local companies to submit pollution prevention reports and tomake recommendations
and issue orders as needed.
This use of the surveys required that forecasting accuracy be improved. MITI
pursued the development of computerized simulations. In 1969 it began developing
improved forecasting approaches to air pollution and in FY 1970 began doing the
same with water quality. The 1970s also saw the development of methods to predict
the impact of various contaminants, and these were absorbed into the preliminary
surveys. In FY 1985, MITI began developing methods to formulate long-term air-
management plans (LAMP) tomake regional industrial development plans consistent
with the preservation of the atmospheric environment. With “high-technology pollu-
tion” emerging as a new problem in the 1980s,MITI in FY 1986 created a database of
hazardous substances data and usagemanuals and decided to revise its environmental
regulations according to need. The LawConcerning the Examination and Regulation
of Manufacture, etc. of Chemical Substances (“Chemical Substances Control Law”)
was also revised in 1986 to promote further measures ensuring the safety of chem-
ical substances. Investigations of the environmental impact of high-tech industries
continued thereafter.
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3.3.2 Power Supply Sites and the Implementation of the Assessments
The Cabinet Understanding, “Concerning environmental conservation measures
related to public works projects,” was approved in June 1972. MITI did not have
jurisdiction over public works but it nevertheless decided to conduct Environmental
Impact Assessments on new power-plant construction in the Power Supply Devel-
opment Plan. The assumption was that these were large-scale developments that
would have a significant impact. In July 1977 a MITI Departmental Council Deci-
sion was issued on “strengthening environmental impact surveys and environmental
reviews of company locations,” and in 1979 MITI solidified its plans for surveys
and inspections and began carrying out administrative guidance. MITI would carry
out environmental inspections after obtaining environmental impact reports from the
power suppliers, and then would inform the public about the reports and seek the
opinions of local residents, which were to be reflected in the measures ultimately
adopted (Fig. 3. See Takeda 2011, p. 337).
The power industry took a cautious stance on the environmental assessment leg-
islation that would establish uniform rules but actively cooperated with MITI’s own
assessments. In July 1979, however, the Special Committee on Environmental Prob-
lems of the Federation of Electric Power Companies raised two issues. First, local
residents were concerned that acceptance of the environmental impact survey would
inevitably mean approval of the power plant’s construction, and this had made it
impossible to conduct the surveys themselves; furthermore, certain groups of people
had thereby been given a platform for insisting on a zero-impact plan. Second, there
was concern that unlimited liability could be imposed on business operators despite
the limitations of the forecasting methods. These concerns were consistent with the
views that shaped MITI’s cautious stance on the enactment of the environmental
assessment legislation.
Some years later, in 1997, the Electric Power Supply and Demand Subcommittee
of the Electricity Utility Industry Council compiled a report on the environmental
impact assessments for power-plant construction. It explained that whereas the pub-
lic works environmental assessment system required operators to create assessment
reports while hearing the opinions of the relevant prefectural governors, power-plant
assessments were handled differently.MITI undertook its inspections by utilizing the
know-how of administrative inspectors and taking into account the expert opinion
of the Environment Inspection Board and completed the inspection after compre-
hensive surveys had been conducted by the Environment Agency and the relevant
prefectural governors in the Electric Power Development Coordination Council. The
report pointed out that these inspections prioritized the regulatory system of the Elec-
tricity Utility Industry Law and that many exceptions were made to related laws and
regulations, but judged the environmental assessments to have been appropriate,
given the environmental conservation aim. The report gave particular praise to the
fact that the power-plant assessment surveys were more extensive than those based
on Cabinet decisions, and that the array of items subjected to predictive evaluation
was broader than those of other countries. This latter fact was singled out as being
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Fig. 3 Outline of the environmental inspection process for power-supply sites (Takeda 2011, p. 344)
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particularly excellent. The power-plant assessments were reorganized so as to be
included under the Environmental Impact Assessment Law.
3.3.3 Problems Concerning Environmental Assessment Legislation
Meanwhile, the December 1972 interim report of the Central Council for Environ-
mental Pollution Control strongly urged the establishment of environmental assess-
ments and the improvement of the assessment implementation system (Takeda 2011,
p. 351). This gave rise to complications between themovement to legislate the assess-
ments and the opposition to that legislation, which remained a political issue for a
long time.
Industrywaswary for several reasons. First, they feared that power-plant operators
would bevulnerable to subjective judgments if the onlymattersmandatedby lawwere
the procedures themselves, and neither the items for evaluation nor the predictive
methods had yet been established. Second, they were concerned that seeking and
reflecting the opinions of local residents would unduly delay the development of the
plants. Third, they argued that environmental impact assessments should be based
on comprehensive evaluations of both economic and social impacts, including the
effective utilization of land and improvements in public well-being.
In February 1975, MITI summarized the opposition to the Environment Agency’s
Environmental Impact Assessment Bill as follows: first, the environmental assess-
ment items, forecasting methods, evaluation criteria, and other points in the draft
bill were seen as extremely unclear, raising the concern that the burden on business
could expand limitlessly based on local residents’ demands; second, if the procedures
for local residents’ participation in siting public works and factories were regulated,
that could mean that even a mere procedural error could subject the factory location
plan to litigation. While submitting these objections, MITI meanwhile proposed at a
May 1975 meeting of the Factory Location and Industrial Water Council that assess-
ments be carried out based on the Factory Location Law. This proposal placed strong
restrictions on participation by citizens. The two ministries’ drafts of environmental
legislation thus differed significantly on this issue.
In other words, following the Cabinet Agreement of 1972, Environmental Impact
Assessments were carried out through ministerial administrative procedures, but
there were no clear criteria stating which actions and what stages required assess-
ments, and in particular, no procedures were in place for seeking opinions from local
residents. Citizen participation was envisioned as a central element of the system,
based on the judgment that systems were needed both for the plant operators to
conduct self-assessments of the environmental impact and for citizen opinion to be
heard.
Efforts were therefore made to establish a direction for the legislation, centered
on the Environment Agency. A liaison council was established in 1976 composed of
bureau directors from the Environment and National Land Agencies, MITI, and the
Ministries of Agriculture and Forestry, Transport, Construction, and Home Affairs,
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but coordination among themproveddifficult. In 1978, the effort to coordinate the var-
ious points of viewwas shifted to theLiberalDemocratic Party (LDP), but submission
of the bill was still considered premature in April.
The report submitted by the Central Council for Pollution Control in April 1979
said that the system of environmental impact assessments based on ministry and
agency administrative guidance and regulations was generating needless confusion,
that the variations in procedure were causing a lack of clarity, and that uniform rules
were essential. The report therefore called for prompt legislation. The content of the
suggested legislation, as compared with the Environment Agency’s existing drafts,
reflected the consultations that had taken place among the various government offices.
Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira showed strong motivation to enact legislation as
suggested in this report. The draft bill of late April 1981 did not include power plants.
This was a political decision, based on the opposition of the business world and of
MITI to including them in the location assessment targets. However, the bill met
with opposition from within the LDP and the exemptions drew the objections of
the opposition parties, leading the bill to be scrapped in 1983 without deliberations.
Although local governments requested legislation and the government considered
resubmitting the bill in 1984, the LDP decided not to submit it for deliberations
due to business concerns that lawsuits would multiply. Legislating environmental
assessments remained a challenge.
The Environment Agency therefore called for administrative measures that would
be based on the main points in the bill. A Cabinet Decision was taken on Implemen-
tation of Environmental Impact Assessments in August 1984, and the Environment
Impact Assessment Outline was thereupon put in place (see Fig. 4).
In outline, the plants subject to assessment would be those that were either oper-
ated or licensed by the national government, that were large in scale, and that had
a significant environmental impact, and the operators would create environmental
impact statements, taking into account the opinions of the residents and the applicable
governor and mayors.
Business operators were not subject to any binding authority, however, so it was
expected that they would try to influence the views of residents and others. After
nine years of expending enormous energy trying to produce a bill, the end result
was that environmental assessments were handled administratively, based on a Cab-
inet Decision. MITI remained cautious about legislation and ultimately its thinking
prevailed.
3.4 Strengthening Policies on Industrial Safety
3.4.1 Promotion of Security Measures for High-Pressure Gas
In the early 1970s, owing to advances in the petrochemical industry, the rules of
the existing High-Pressure Gas Control Law were no longer compatible with actual
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Fig. 4 Environmental Impact Assessment Law procedures and power-plant assessment procedures
(Takeda 2011, p. 389). Source Environmental Protection and Industrial Location Bureau/Agency
of Natural Resources and Energy, On the proposed bill to revise a section of the Environmental
Impact Assessment Law and Electricity Utility Industry Law, March 19, 1997
50 2 Japan’s Industrial Structure: Forced to Change (1973–1982)
conditions (Takeda 2011, p. 539). Huge plants were being constructed, and lique-
fied petroleum gas (LPG) was being consumed in homes. Most significantly, the
petroleum industry had frequent accidents, notably one in 1973 at the Idemitsu
Co., Tokuyama plant; comprehensive safety inspections were thereupon carried out
at 16 facilities. Meanwhile, the High-Pressure Gas and Explosives Safety Council
issued a report, “Regarding the high-pressure gas security system of the future” (July
1974), which presented plans for changing the existing safety system based on self-
monitoring by operators, and the High-Pressure Gas Control Law was revised in
May 1975. The revisions included the following: (1) strengthening the organizations
responsible for safety management, (2) strengthening hazard prevention regulations
and safety education plans, (3) regulations on specific equipment, (4) regulations
on LP gas containers, etc., (5) strengthening the high-pressure gas safety insurance
organizations, (6) strengthening regulations on production notification systems, and
(7) amending the scale of fees and fines. The fifth of these was intended to strengthen
the public character of the organization through government investment in the High-
Pressure Gas Safety Institute that had been established in 1963. As for the security
provisions mandated by the revised law, policy-based loans were made to busi-
ness operators. Additionally, the Law on the Prevention of Disasters in Petroleum
Industrial Complexes and Other Petroleum Facilities was enacted in December 1975
and MITI undertook a two-year process, beginning in 1977, to create a plan for
earthquake-resistant design standards for petroleum complexes.
During this same period the Law Concerning the Securing of Safety and the
Optimization of Transaction of Liquefied Petroleum Gas was revised, based on the
August 1977 report by the High-Pressure Gas and Explosives Safety Council, and
the regulations concerning LP gas sales companies and equipment contractors were
strengthened. In addition, the Law Concerning the Supervision of Specific Gas Con-
sumption Equipment, enacted in May 1979, required installers of gas equipment
to be certified, while MITI, too, began emphasizing measures to prevent gas leaks,
and launched a leasing system for alarm machines in May 1977 as well as setting
technical standards for the alarms.
3.4.2 Measures to Prevent Mining Pollution
The urgent problem of pollution frommetal mines involved not only operating mines
but also mines that had been abandoned. Therefore, in addition to the mine pollution
prevention measures based on the Mine Safety Law, the Law on Special Measures
for Mine Pollution Caused by the Metal Mining Industry went into effect in July
1972. Based on this measure, the MITI Minister formulated basic policies for mine
pollution prevention while the holders of mining rights and mining leaseholders
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formulated their own such plans, and the Metal Mining Agency of Japan (MMAJ)
was to accumulate a funding reserve in order to cover the cost of operations to prevent
pollution from abandoned mines (Takeda 2011, p. 617).
Meanwhile in 1970, the Mine Safety and Inspection Bureau (Department) had
begun conducting a series of surveys of the abandoned heavy-metal mines that
seemed in the most urgent condition. MITI took the survey results seriously and
decided to establish a subsidy system in 1971 to assist with the costs of construc-
tion to prevent pollution at abandoned mines and also subsidized a portion of the
costs of such construction at mines run by local public entities. In addition, the July
report on the June 1974 inquiries to the Mining Industry Council titled “Policies on
accumulated pollution from metal and other mines” said that the existing policies on
“accumulated mining pollution” were inadequate and recommended the following
concrete measures: (1) the national government should cooperate with local public
bodies in cases where no one is responsible for eradicating the pollution, as, for
example, at abandoned mines; (2) the financial burden of local public bodies should
be greatly reduced; (3) where operators were unable to bear the costs, the national
government should take that into account. In response, MITI expanded the mine
pollution-control subsidy system for abandoned mines in FY 1973.
In FY 1975, MITI began implementing measures to reinforce metal mining,
through guidance and support of design and management, either where the mines in
question were large in scale and run by local public bodies, or where the construc-
tion required for pollution-prevention was on a very large scale or was technically
problematic.
The August 1952 Extraordinary Law on Coal Mine Pollution Recovery and the
June 1963 Law on Extraordinary Measures on Compensation Collateral for Coal-
Mining Pollution (renamed in May 1968 as the Law on Extraordinary Measures for
Compensation, etc., for Coal Mine Pollution) became the legal framework govern-
ing pollution policies pertaining to coal mining and was extended several times for
10-year periods. The reason for the extension was the difficulty in completing the
process within the time stipulated by the long-term plan. Through its national sur-
veys of the volume of mining damage, conducted over a two-year period beginning
in July 1979, MITI ascertained that the mining damage was equivalent to the total
mining damage in 1972, and it therefore extended the measures to facilitate pollu-
tion abatement. Based on the Coal Mining Council’s February 1971 report, MITI
aggressively pursued the early and final resolution of the cumulative mining damage.
On the premise that rationalization and improvement in administrative and financial
efficiency would be taken into account, MITI would undertake to implement the
measures systematically and efficiently.
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4 The Challenge of Stable Energy Supplies
and the Development of Industrial Technology
4.1 The Two Basic Laws on Oil
4.1.1 Responding to the Oil Crisis
Prices of crude oil (Arabian Light) more than tripled in less than half a year in the
first oil crisis that began in October 1973. This also triggered the transfer of the right
to determine crude oil prices from the European and American oil majors to the
oil-producing countries. Following the second oil crisis of January 1978, crude oil
prices doubled between 1979 and 1981 due to price increases by the Organization
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
These crises made the stable supply and volume of energy a top priority and
spurred interest in energy conservation measures and policies for introducing alter-
natives to petroleum. In the medium term, crude oil prices fell after OPEC lowered
the official price by five dollars per barrel in 1983. The soaring price of crude oil
had led non-OPEC countries to increase their production of oil, and Saudi Arabia
abandoned its role as swing producer (adjusting production) in July 1985. In that
sense, the policy question of how to address the crisis was temporary.
Nevertheless, the comprehensive energy policy system that had been developed to
decrease Japan’s dependence on oil exerted a significant influence on public policy.
The policy had three pillars: (1) securing a stable supply of oil, (2) promoting the
development and introduction of petroleum energy alternatives, and (3) promoting
energy conservation. This represented a shift from the rapid-growth era’s pursuit
of “abundant, inexpensive, and stable” supplies to “securing a stable supply as the
priority policy issue.”
In other words, “energy security” (ensuring the stable supply of energy) became
one of the so-called 3 E’s of energy policy, along with “environment” (adapting it to
the environment) and “economy” (utilizing the market principle). This remained the
case into the twenty-first century.4
As mentioned earlier, the Natural Resources and Energy Agency, established as
a MITI affiliate in the July 1973 organizational reform, played the role of promoting
a unified energy policy. The organizational reform had been based on the Industrial
StructureCouncil interim report, which had laid out the need for a comprehensive and
integrated approach to (1) the expansion of the economy and concomitant increase
in demand for energy resources; (2) the changing conditions of resource and energy
supplies; and (3) the establishment of comprehensive natural resources and energy
policies (Kikkawa 2011, p. 41).
4Takeo Kikkawa 2011. Tsūsho Sangyō Seisakushi, vol. 10 Natural Resources and Energy Policy
highlights this point in particular. It was at the end of the 1980s that the emphasis was placed on
the second E, “Environment.”
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4.1.2 The Two Basic Laws on Oil
The Kakuei Tanaka Cabinet, which decided on the Guidelines for Emergency Mea-
sures for Oil at the November 6, 1973 Cabinet meeting, called for conserving con-
sumption. At the same time, it took up urgent legislation to prevent unfair profiteer-
ing and the spread of inflation due to piggybacking price hikes, and established the
Petroleum Supply and Demand Optimization Law and Act on Emergency Measures
for Stabilizing Living Conditions of the Public (the so-called Two Basic Laws on
Oil) (Kikkawa 2011, p. 120).
TheLawonOptimizingOil Supply andDemand stated (1) that the PrimeMinister,
following on a decision by the Cabinet, would implement measures to deal with the
shortage of oil supplies, and (2) that MITI, following on the said Cabinet decision,
was responsible for notifying petroleum contractors of the oil supply targets and
of the plans for the production, import, and sale of oil. The authority was given
to the MITI Minister to make changes, if necessary; it was also declared that oil
consumers should not use more petroleum than the quantities specified by Cabinet
order. TheMITIMinister was further given the authority to order the implementation
of restrictions on sales methods in order to conserve the use of light oil, and likewise
to order the sale and delivery of oil to oil dealers to ensure a “supply of petroleum to
businesses and activities indispensable for the protection of the people’s lives.” In this
way the government (MITI) was given powerful controlling authority, a reflection of
the sense of crisis in the government and related organizations.
Although the emergency measures themselves were removed as of September 1,
1974, efforts to stockpile oil proceeded, and technological development was under-
taken in energy-savings andnewenergy.Thiswill be discussed in greater detail below.
The Petroleum Reserve Law enacted in December 1975 required oil companies to
maintain oil reserves.
The law was enacted in response to international obligations. The International
Energy Agency (IEA), which was established in November 1974, required mem-
ber countries to maintain petroleum reserves: private oil companies were required
to maintain a 70-day stockpile of petroleum, and following the second oil crisis,
that requirement was raised to 90 days’ worth. Meanwhile, the Japan Petroleum
Development Corporation Law was revised to become the Japan National Oil Cor-
poration Law in June 1978 in order to enable national government organs to stockpile
petroleum, with the Japan National Oil Corporation bearing responsibility for build-
ing the reserve. As demand for LPG rose in the 1980s, LPG reserves also began to be
considered a priority, and in 1991, the Petroleum Reserve Lawwas revised to require
private LPG importers to stock a 50-day supply of imported LPG.
The November 1976 Act on the Quality Control of Gasoline and Other Fuels
required distributors to be registered and to carry out quality control measures.
The Advisory Committee for Energy’s Petroleum Subcommittee issued a report
in December 1975 titled “About petroleum refining and sales” out of the desire to
see the consolidation of primary distributors. Structural reform along these lines was
sought because light-oil distribution companies were struggling, and the distribu-
tion of low-quality light oil was becoming a social concern. Thus, in the face of
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the challenge of the oil crisis, policy evolved from the adjustment of demand that
accompanied legal measures, to long-term policy making aimed at a stable supply of
energy, as for example in the June 1979 Act on the Rationalization of Energy Use.
4.1.3 “The Energy Stabilization Policy of the Showa 50 s [1975–1985]”
Report
After the 1973 oil crisis, the first comprehensive examination on how best to
implement energy policy was undertaken by the Coordination Subcommittee of
the Advisory Committee for Energy beginning in February 1974 (Kikkawa 2011,
p. 67). The subcommittee was tasked with considering (1) prospects for the primary
energy supply in FY 1980 and FY 1985, and (2) international energy strategy and
the securing of financial resources.
The interim report “Energy stabilization measures, 1975–1984” was compiled in
August 1975, presenting the four pillars of energy stabilization policy: (1) reduction
of dependence on oil and diversification of non-petroleum energy, (2) securing the
stability of petroleum supply, (3) promotion of energy conservation, and (4) promo-
tion of research and development of new forms of energy (see Table 7 below). MITI
evaluated the measures on supply and demand as a whole and determined the desired
allocation of energy conservation and of various supply capabilities from the point
of view of achieving a stable supply of energy. This approach differed slightly from
prior versions and represented a new philosophy aimed at securing a stable supply
of energy through diversification of energy sources and energy conservation. The
report was also notable for raising awareness that the cost burden of developing the
Table 7 Changes in domestic energy supply sources
Primary energy source (%) Total volume
of energy
supply









1965 27.0 59.6 1.2 10.6 0.0 1.5 168,909
1970 19.9 71.9 1.2 5.6 0.3 1.0 319,708
1975 16.4 73.4 2.5 5.3 1.5 0.9 366,224
1980 17.0 66.1 6.1 5.2 4.7 1.1 397,199
1985 19.4 56.3 9.4 4.7 8.9 1.3 405,323
1990 16.6 58.3 10.1 4.2 9.4 1.4 486,310
1995 16.5 55.8 10.8 3.5 12.0 1.3 543,909
2000 17.9 51.8 13.1 3.4 12.4 1.3 558,651
2005 20.6 49.8 13.9 3.0 11.4 1.3 565,087
Source Odaka (2013, p. 398)
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Table 8 Changes in secondary energy distribution












1965 62.5 7.4 17.6 9.9 2.7 108,537
1970 64.5 7.7 16.2 8.7 2.9 211,226
1975 59.3 9.6 18.4 10.2 2.5 251,083
1980 55.2 10.0 20.8 11.4 2.6 264,541
1985 51.2 10.7 21.8 13.6 2.7 270,545
1990 49.8 11.3 23.0 13.1 2.7 322,870
1995 47.3 12.2 24.1 14.1 2.3 358,795
2000 47.4 12.5 24.1 14.0 1.9 375,740
2005 46.3 12.7 24.5 15.0 1.4 369,975
Source Odaka (2013, p. 419)
oil stockpiles and new energy sources needed for a stable supply of energy would be
borne by the beneficiaries.
Furthermore, in relation to downgrading the earlier policy aim of maintaining
“low-cost energy,” the report pointed out that keeping energy prices low over the long
term would weaken the energy industry and thereby compromise the foundations of
a stable supply of energy. It further noted that while other countries were beginning
to relax their environmental regulations in order to promote energy conservation, one
of Japan’s national goals remained stronger regulation. In other words, it pointed to
a number of contradictions among the various policies and called for consensus to
be formed among the people as quickly as possible (Table 8).
4.1.4 The Basic Thrust of Comprehensive Energy Policy
On April 25, 1975, the Ministerial Council on Comprehensive Energy Policy was
established to formulate comprehensive energy policies for the future, evincing the
Cabinet’s strong concern about the issue. The Council’s mission was to unite the
Cabinet ministers so as to enable formulation of the “Economic Plan for the first
half of the Showa 60 s [second half of the 1970s],” which was already in its first
year. Energy policy, as one of the underpinnings of the Economic Plan, needed to
be considered, and decisions were required on the appropriate economic growth rate
with due consideration for the resource and energy restrictions that had followed the
oil crisis.
The Council focused most on the issues surrounding the creation of a central body
for nuclear-power administration, created to “promote nuclear-power generation.”
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Having reviewed the Long-TermEnergy Supply andDemand Plan and the interim
report on comprehensive energy policy, theMinisterial Conference agreed on a policy
outline titled “Basic direction of comprehensive energy policy” on December 19,
1975. The basic aim was “to advance a reduction in dependence on imported oil
and the diversification of non-petroleum energy as the basis for securing a stable
supply of energy.” This rested on four conceptual pillars: (1) effective utilization
of domestically produced energy and promotion of quasi-domestic nuclear energy,
while diffusing the risk by diversifying Japan’s overseas energy sources; (2) efforts
to ensure the stable supply of oil, which would remain central to the energy supply
for the time being; (3) promotion of energy conservation to reduce the demand-side
burden on the energy supply; and (4) promotion of new energy development with a
longer-term perspective extending beyond the 1980s. The following policies clarified
the details: (1) developing domestic resources such as continental-shelf petroleum,
hydropower and geothermal power, stabilizing domestic coal mining operations, and
promoting LNG and overseas coal development and imports; (2) developing nuclear
energy and improving the nuclear energy administration system; (3) strengthening
the foundations of the petroleum industry and promotion of 90-day oil reserves;
(4) securing the supply of secondary energy such as electricity and city gas; and
promoting (5) energy conservation, (6) technologydevelopment, and (7) international
cooperation. These constituted the government’s long-term energy policy initiatives.
4.1.5 Formulation of an “Energy Strategy for the Twenty-First
Century”
In August 1976, the IEA reviewed the energy conservation policies of each of its
member countries and recommended prompt government implementation of energy
conservation in concrete measures, with the necessary budget to fund them. MITI
took the opportunity to point out the urgency of thematter: “If the current energy sup-
ply and demand structure remains unchanged, people’s lives and industrial activities
in this country will be extremely unstable with the risk of catastrophic dislocation in
the future.” The Ministry had begun preparing comprehensive measures for energy
conservation in February 1976, and the Coordination Subcommittee’s “Long-term
vision of industrial structure” included the development of new energy as one of the
conditions for realizing a “6% growth-rate economy.”
However, although theMinistry sought to pursue policies for “escaping oil depen-
dency,” and although theMinisterial Conference, too, saw nuclear power as an impor-
tant energy alternative to oil, public consensus was likely to be longer in coming.
Because of the time involved in obtaining public approval, the electricity industry
asked MITI to lower the goals for nuclear-power generation stipulated in the Long-
Term Energy Demand and Supply Plan. Within 18 months of the plan’s formulation,
deviations from it were already under way.
MITI therefore decided to review the plan early in January 1977 and to begin for-
mulating a long-term comprehensive energy policy adapted to the new international
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energy situation, and the Energy Supply and Demand Subcommittee of the Advi-
sory Committee for Energy compiled the “Provisional prospects for the long-term
supply and demand of energy” by June. On that basis, the Consultative Council on
Fundamental Energy Issues issued an interim report, “Promoting a comprehensive
energy policy that is consistent and effective,” that strongly urged the importance of
an effective comprehensive energy policy, based on funding and public agreement.
MITI meanwhile solidified its plans to add an Energy Diversification Temporary
Measures Act and an Act on Temporary Measures to Promote Change in Energy
Sources to the existing Energy Conservation Act (provisional names). The first of
these focused on construction of power plants that were not fueled by oil and the
second on diversifying industry’s demand for energy. MITI regarded these as the
“three basic laws on energy” and as the pillars on which to build a long-term energy
strategy of reduced reliance on oil and increased savings and efficiency in energy
use. Japan’s dependency on imported oil dropped from 73.3% in FY 1975 to 57.1%
in FY 1980.
About 14 months after the October 25, 1978, interim report, the General Affairs
Committee of the General Energy Research Committee clarified the background to
the framework described above and compiled a more detailed review of concrete
measures in a report titled “Energy strategies for the twenty-first century.” This
report posed the basic issues as follows: on the demand side was the promotion of
energy conservation policies, and on the supply side were (1) securing the stable
supply of imported oil, (2) developing and introducing alternatives to petroleum and
developing energy technologies, and (3) promoting the siting of power plants.
It also proposed concrete measures on developing and introducing petroleum
alternatives (number 2 above), namely, the promotion of (1) nuclear energy develop-
ment, (2) coal utilization, (3) introduction of liquefied gas, (4) domestic energy
(hydro/geothermal), (5) power-source diversification. The emphasis was on the
technological development necessary for developing and introducing petroleum
alternatives.
Under the category of “developing new technologies,” the first priority was pro-
motion of the Sunshine Project: solar cooling, heating, and hot water supply systems
(the so-called solar house) were almost ready for practical application, and the report
called not only for evaluation and research on improvement through experiments in
trial houses, but also other concrete measures such as the construction of solar ther-
mal power pilot plants, and R&D in solar power generation and hydrogen energy
technology. It also stressed the need for R&D on nuclear fusion and for international
technical and economic cooperation on new energy and called for significant state
funding to develop nuclear and new energy technologies.
Thus Japan’s energy policy shifted its emphasis after the first oil crisis from
promoting anoil orientation to pursuing a stable supply of energy, and frompetroleum
dependency to a departure from dependency. The new priorities remained following
the second oil crisis of August 1979 (see Table 9).
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4.2 Electrical-Power Development and the Move Away
from Oil
4.2.1 Changes in Demand for Electricity and Issues in Electrical-Power
Development
The oil crisis triggered new hardships for the electric power industry. Multiple
challenges struck simultaneously, including high crude-oil prices, sluggish demand
for electric power, a decline in load factors, severe locational and environmental
problems, and a sharp rise in financing costs.
Demand for power had been shifting from industrial (large- and small-scale elec-
trical power) to civilian use (electric lights, electricity for commercial purposes)
since the 1960s; from 1973–1985, demand for large-scale power decreased in tex-
tiles, chemicals, steel, other metals, and mining. The decrease was especially steep
in such large consumers of power as the aluminum and ammonia industries. Mean-
while, the large-scale electricity usage by the machinery industry doubled, while
demand in the commercial sector and for electric lights also grew steadily (Kikkawa
2011, p. 262).
The changes in electricity demand aggravated the problem of peak summer day-
time hours. The load factor of each of the nine electrical power companies fell sharply
in the first half of the 1970s and remained low thereafter. The decline in the load
factor caused costs to skyrocket and worsened the performance of the power com-
panies. Also contributing to their deteriorating performance was the rising cost of
capital, due to soaring fuel costs and declines in the depreciation rates that covered
them. Depreciation and amortization costs were the main internal collateral for the
electric utilities, and the declining depreciation rate lowered their capacity to self-
finance construction and thereby raised their reliance on interest-bearing debt such
as corporate bonds and borrowing. Thus the cost of capital began to influence their
performance.
As their performance declined, the utilities became unable to sustain a low-cost
electricity supply. The nine utilities together raised their electricity rates three times in
succession: in June 1974, June toAugust 1968, andFebruary toApril 1980.Hokkaido
Power also raised its prices on its own in October 1981. The price hikes were not
high compared to the increases in other public utilities, but customers nevertheless
spoke of the end of low-cost electricity and the social antipathy to the rate revisions
was strong.
Meanwhile, the environmental issues around power-plant location became more
serious. From the 1970s into the early 1980s, the implementation of the Electric
Power Development Coordination Council’s development targets never exceeded the
targets themselves. There were significant delays in deciding on locations for thermal
power plants in the first half of the 1970s and for hydropower in the late 1970s into
the 1980s, and consistently across the years in the case of nuclear power. The Three
Mile Island nuclear power-plant accident in March 1979 had a particularly strong
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impact. In response to the delays of power development, the government adopted the
Power Source Location Act and related measures in June 1974.
These included: (1) The Electric Power Development Taxation Law, which
imposed a development promotion tax on general-purpose electric utilities, (2) the
Law on Special Accounts for Electric-Power Development Acceleration Measures,
and (3) the Law on the Development of Areas Adjacent to Electric Power-Generating
Facilities, which provided grants for the improvement of public facilities near power-
supply sites. These were all aimed at making the process of selecting locations for
power plants a smooth one by eliminating the difficulties arising from the fact that
any given power plant might bring little direct economic benefit to its immediate
area. The policy was expanded in October 1971 with the establishment of a special
subsidy system for power plant locations. Power-supply development thus lost some
of its autonomy, instead becoming part of broader policy coordination efforts.
4.3 The Energy Conservation Act
Japan’s total energy consumption rose almost consistently, but the rate of increasewas
lower than the rise in GDP, meaning that energy efficiency was advancing (Kikkawa
2011, p. 369). During this period, energy use changed from a 4:1:1 ratio of industrial,
civil, and transportation sectors in 1973 to 4:3:2 in the early 2000s. This reflected the
high efficiency of energy use in Japan’s industrial sector, the result of post-oil crisis
energy conservation policy.
The government established a national conservation campaign based in the Head-
quarters for the Campaign to Care for Our Resources and Energy following on an
August 1974 Cabinet Decision taken in response to the first oil crisis. MITI, recog-
nizing the need for energy conservation policy, also considered drastically expanding
the existing Heat Utilization Law into an Act on Promoting the Rationalization of
Energy. The Act called for targets for reducing unit consumption of energy and for
drafting industry-specific implementation plans. The Act was strongly colored by
the preference for control that arose out of the sense of crisis, and for this reason
did not reach the Diet floor. But improvements in unit consumption were promoted
through the special measures later taken in taxation (such as special depreciation of
energy-saving equipment) and the creation of loan systems indicated in the basic
guidelines of energy conservation policy.
“The need for and challenges of energy conservation policy,” compiled in Novem-
ber by the new Energy Efficiency and Conservation Subcommittee in the Compre-
hensive Energy Research Committee, called for the following: (1) responding to
the instability and high costs of energy by reducing the growth in energy demand
as much as possible without substantially affecting the economic growth path, and
(2) improving all sectors of economic society to orient them toward an energy-
conserving model, and (3) promoting legislation and regulations for energy conser-
vation. The Act on Promoting the Rationalization of Energy (Energy Conservation
Act) was passed in June 1979.
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The basic framework of the act included the creation of guidelines for the ratio-
nalization of energy use in factories, construction materials, and machine tools, and
guidance when needed to ensure the implementation of the guidelines, but left out
the measures with the strongest “control” aspects. The framework for implementing
energy conservation policy, although premised on industry’s making its own conser-
vation efforts, was thus strengthened to include set guidelines for rationalization and
measures for enabling guidance and recommendations to help achieve them.
4.4 Coal and Resources Policy
4.4.1 The Development of Coal Policy
Although domestic coal production shrank in the 1960s, coal’s role as an energy
resource did not decline. Imports of coking coal, which had rapidly increased in
quantity before the first oil crisis, remained high in its aftermath, and imports of fuel
coal sharply increased in the 1980s. The shift from domestic to overseas supplies of
coal raised the need for structural adjustment policies for the domestic coal industry
as the aim shifted from the industry’s maintenance and rationalization to its grad-
ual contraction. It also required maintaining a stable supply of overseas coal, and
promoting the development and dissemination of clean-coal technology (Kikkawa
2011, p. 207).
Structural adjustment measures on coal began with First Coal Policy in 1963,
and continued through eight stages until 2001. In the Third Coal Policy from 1967
to 1969, the target for domestic coal production target was set at 50 million tons
per year, and even with promotion of the “Fluid Energy Revolution,” various policy
instruments were used to try to reach that target.
The Fourth Coal Policy (1969–1972) was the first not to set production targets,
indicating that the shift toward the gradual contraction of and exit from the industry
was under way. The production targets were revived in the Fifth Coal Policy of 1973–
1976 but sharply scaled down to 20 million tons. The Sixth Coal Policy (1976–1982)
modified the targets slightly upward due to the oil crisis, a level that was retained in
the next stage (1980s).
Meanwhile, summit talks between Japan and Australia, which had an export ban,
led to the launching of Australian coal exports to Japan. Japan also sought to stabilize
its import supply by offering subsidies and technical cooperation to coal-producing
countries (Table 10).
4.4.2 Mineral Resources Policy
The Mining Industry Council Subcommittee on Mining laid out the direction to be
taken by policy on mineral resources in its June 1972 “Basic direction of future min-
ing policy” (Kikkawa 2011, p. 235). This served as the foundation for exploration
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Table 10 Outline of Coal Policies (IV–VIII)
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Table 10 (continued)






































and the burden it
imposes on the
government, with
the final stage of
structural
adjustment to






Source Kikkawa (2011, p. 213)
and development of mining in close alignment with anti-pollution measures. The Act
on Special Measures for Pollution Caused by the Metal Mining Industry was issued
to address damage caused by abandoned mines. Reorganization of the Metallic Min-
erals Exploration Promotion Agency followed, with a 1973 expansion into the Metal
Mining Agency of Japan (MMAJ). MMAJ became responsible for an overall policy
on mineral resources resting on the following: (1) promotion of domestic explo-
ration, (2) support for the development of overseas resources and cooperation with
developing countries on resource development, (3) improvement of the rare-metal
stockpiling system, and (4) prevention of mining pollution originating in abandoned
mines.
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MMAJ’s predecessor had since 1964 been conducting detailed surveys of geolog-
ical structures in order to identify the most stable sources of mineral resources and
to discover superior mines. The surveys, which consisted of three stages—regional
geological surveys, then detailed surveys, then corporate exploration—were carried
out nationwide and are regarded as having achieved significant results. Nine of the
survey cases resulted in the development or expansion of mines; the initial regional
surveys led to the 1981 discovery of gold deposits in the Hokusatsu/Kushikino area
of Kagoshima Prefecture, and became the Hishikari mine run by Sumitomo Metal
Mining Co., Ltd.
Themajor policies for supporting the development of overseas resources included:
(1) an overseas exploration financing loan system and debt guarantee system (imple-
mented beginning in FY1968), (2) overseas geological structure survey system (from
FY 1968) and overseas joint geological structure survey subsidy system (from FY
1974), and (3) basic research on resource development cooperation. The overseas
geological structure survey subsidy system was designed to subsidize up to one-half
the expenses borne by Japanese corporations undertaking surveys in collaboration
with foreign corporations. By FY 2005, 71 projects had been conducted under the
overseas geological structure survey system and 42 projects under the subsidy sys-
tem. The basic research was aimed specifically at enabling the government to sup-
port mineral-resources development in developing countries, with 180 regions in
46 countries surveyed by FY 2006. These policies for supporting overseas resource
development have steadily achieved results.
4.5 Large-Scale Industrial Technology Development
and the “Sunshine” and “Moonlight” Projects
4.5.1 An Emphasis on Basic Technology
In December 1974, the Agency of Industrial Science and Technology established the
Research Group to Formulate Long-Term Strategies for the Development of Indus-
trial Technology as a private advisory body of the director general. Its final report,
“Technical development initiatives for the future” (National Institute of Advanced
Industrial Science and Technology, ed., 1977), cited the importance of “cultivat-
ing basic abilities” both because “Japan has in the past been criticized for using
the results of research undertaken by other countries free of charge” and in order
to build a framework for following up on breakthroughs in research (Sawai 2011,
p. 25). The research group’s conclusions were passed on to its successor (Research
Group on Long-term Planning of Industrial Technology Development), which was
also established as a private advisory body of the director in September 1977. The
interim report of August 1980 continued to point to the importance of “basic tech-
nology,” leading to the launching of the Research and Development Project of Basic
Technologies for Future Industries in October 1981.
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The recognition that technical problems are not merely matters of technology but
part of industrial policy as a whole, and requiring promotion as such, led to the estab-
lishment of the Industrial Technology Council, the 1973 successor to the Industrial
Technology Commission. The “Progress report on new energy technology R&D,”
“Summary of promotion of new energy technology R&D,” and “On ways of promot-
ing new energy technology development,” which were issued almost immediately
upon the Council’s establishment (in October and December 1973 respectively),
produced results in the form of the Sunshine Project. The February 1975 report,
“On ways of developing energy conservation technologies,” was the occasion for
the launch of the Moonlight Project in FY 1978. The interim report of August 1975,
“On ways of advancing future industrial technology policy,” presented the basic
direction of industrial technical policies toward the late 1970s and explained that:
(1) Since Japan’s industrial technology had reached the level of that in Western
countries, Japan could now make the shift from dependency on foreign technology
to self-directed technological development, and that (2) whereas Japan’s technolog-
ical development had hitherto been more private sector-led than that in the advanced
countries of Europe and America and hadmainly focused on improving technologies
introduced from overseas, the government’s role of developing industrial technology
would henceforth become increasingly significant.
4.5.2 The Large-Scale Industrial Technology R&D System
The Industrial Science and Technology Agency launched the National Research
and Development Program (“Large-Scale Project”) in 1966 (Sawai 2011, p. 130).
Based on a November 1966 report by the Industrial Structure Research Advisory
Council’s Industrial Technology Committee in November 1963, it had been created
to facilitate the shift from dependency to self-reliance in technological development,
to carry out the government’s leadership role in the process, and to formulate a
plan for priority technology development and the promotion of research cooperation
by industry, academia, and the government. The Large-Scale Project promoted 31
projects before being restructured in FY 1993. Its budget trended upwards until
peaking at 16.8 billion yen in FY 1981. It was greatly reduced to 11 billion yen in
FY 1984, and then leveled off to about the 15 billion yen level (Table 11).
The Large-scale Technology Subcommittee of the Industrial Technology Council
and of the Subcommittee for each project (1) selected the projects and (2) formu-
lated and evaluated plans for their R&D and implementation, while the Large-Scale
Industrial Technology Committee (organized by the Agency of Industrial Science
and Technology) selected the parties for outsourcing and carried out evaluation of
the R&D.
Project leaders included researchers at the National Research Institute and the
director and executive director of the Research Association for Mining and Man-
ufacturing Technology. The candidate R&D themes were proposed by the original
departments or the testing laboratory based on the needs of the public and of industry.
Themes were then selected from among these proposals based on budget and other
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constraints, and a scrap-and-build approach was taken to maintain the projects and
the National Research and Development Program as a whole.
Thenumber of participating companies in theLarge-ScaleProjects came to 479 for
a total of 31 projects. Eight of these companies participated more than 10 times. The
main companies involvedwere in general electric manufacturing, general machinery,
steelmaking, and the like.
A 1985 evaluation of the Large-Scale Projects by the General Coordination
Department Development Program Office concluded that they had four advantages.
First, the projects were not restricted by technical subject or field and important
or urgently needed technologies could be developed. Second, the program enabled
technological development that could not be done by the private sector because of
the long lead time and excessive risks involved. Third, the links among industry,
academia, and government were advantageous. Fourth, the projects could launch
domestic implementation of international research cooperation in areas such as
advanced robotics.
However, the evaluation also pointed out the need to respond to the changing
environment by upgrading Japan’s international standing, improving Japan’s tech-
nological level, improving the R&D potential of Japanese companies, and raising
social interest in advanced and basic technology. To do so, changes were needed in
operational areas such as: (1) responding to internationalization, (2) research cooper-
ationwith other institutions and systems, (3) strengthening ties with industrial policy,
(4) implementing intermediate evaluations, and (5) strengthening of the surveys of
technical trends.
By field, the Large Scale Projects were as follows: in the petrochemical industry,
“newproductionmethods for olefin” (1967–1972) and “productionmethods formak-
ing olefin from heavy oil” (1975–1981); regarding the shortage of industrial water,
“seawater desalination and by-product utilization” (1976–1977); in resource devel-
opment, “manganese nodule mining systems” (1981–1989). Besides these, projects
included: technologies such as “extremework robots” (1983 to about 1990), expected
to be useful in fields such as nuclear power and marine science and disaster preven-
tion; and the first international joint-development project, “propulsion systems for
hypersonic transport” (1989–1998).
4.5.3 The “Sunshine” and “Moonlight” Projects
Proposals on solar energy and hydrogen energy were submitted when the Industrial
Technology Institute asked for Large-Scale Project themes in February 1973. Project
budget limits and time constraints made it hard to pursue themwithin the Large-Scale
Project framework. TheResearch andDevelopmentOffice of theNational Institute of
Advanced Industrial Science and Technology therefore sought other approaches. The
Sunshine Project was launched in August 1974 following the Industrial Technology
Institute’s report to promote research in solar, geothermal, hydro, and coal gas as
part of the new energy developments being undertaken by the Institute (Sawai 2011,
p. 246).
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The Sunshine Project was conceived prior to the October 1973 oil crisis, and
based on the philosophy stated in MITI’s July 1973 New Clean Energy Technology
Development Plan: “The Sunshine Project will replace existing petroleum-based
energy systems with permanent clean energy systems by utilizing pollution-free and
inexhaustible energy supplies such as solar energy, hydrogen energy and geother-
mal power…. It is an ambitious national technology development plan to develop
the technologies necessary for overcoming the energy crisis that will be caused by
depletion of oil resources by the year 2000.”
The plan was advanced with the cooperation of the private sector, centering on
the Sunshine Project Promotion Committee established in April 1974, but limits to
this approach became apparent as the projects moved from the basic research stage
to the launching of research at pilot plants. In April 1977, the task of implementing
the work was consigned to the Electric Power Development Co. As the effort grew
in scale, a more specialized organization became necessary, and the New Energy and
Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO) succeeded to the role of
the Electric Power Development Co.
With the second oil crisis of 1978–1979, the Agency of Industrial Science and
Technology hoped that the Sunshine Project would make preliminary contributions
to yield about 5% of the total energy supply by FY 1990 (the total at that time was
1.6%). R&D promotion was therefore accelerated. Financial support was provided
based on the Law Concerning Promotion of Alternative Energy Development and
Introduction of Alternative Energy of May 1980, which secured the budget under a
special account.
“About new developments in the Sunshine Project,” the August 1982 mid-term
report of the Industrial Technology Trial/New Energy Technology Development
Committee noted that there had been a gradual relaxation of oil supply and demand.
That conclusion was based on the unchanged expectation that the supply of new
energywould increase over the long term. Of particular importance was the emphasis
on three methods of new power generation: solar power (including amorphous solar
cells), which had high potential for practical application; liquefaction/gasification of
coal; and large-scale deep geothermal heat. In other words, the emphasis shifted not
to photovoltaic generation but to solar thermal power generation. NEDO decided to
launch R&D on power amorphous solar cells in FY 1983. This thinking prioritized
continuity in the Sunshine Project, but also showed that the sense of urgency tended
to fade as energy supply/demand pressures eased (Table 12).
Meanwhile, plans were made for the Moonlight Project based on conservation
measures put together by the Industrial Technology Institute in November 1977 and
on the report compiled by the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Subcommittee
(Sawai 2011, p. 259). The Large-Scale Projects on “waste-heat utilization systems
technology” and “Magneto Hydro Dynamics, MHD power generation” were incor-
porated into the Moonlight Project in FY 1978, its first year. The same year also saw
the launching of a new “high-efficiency gas turbine” project. The National Research
Institute was in charge of carrying out basic research, while private sector companies
directed the systems development. Project implementation took many forms. Before
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NEDO’s establishment in May 1980, the Agency of Industrial Science and Technol-
ogy directly entrusted implementation to companies in some cases, and in others to
Technology Research Associations that it organized.
Research on waste-heat utilization technology, for example, relied on the former
approach, and development of a high-efficiency gas turbine the latter. The structure of
theMoonlight Projects rested on the following six pillars: (1) large-scale energy con-
servation measures, (2) the development of leading basic energy-conservation tech-
nology, (3) international research cooperation efforts, (4) the establishment of and
surveys on methods to achieve comprehensive effectiveness in energy-conservation
technologies, (5) assistance to private-sector corporate development of energy-
conservation technology, and (6) standardization of energy conservation. The first
of these included the “New Battery Electric Power Storage System” project (total
budget 17.5 billion yen) of 1980–1991 for R&D on storing off-peak electric power
in a new kind of battery and then discharging that power during peak hours so as to
equalize the load on the system (Table 13).
4.5.4 Grants to the Private Sector for Technology Development
The Industrialization Test Grant system was established in 1975 to provide grants
and subsidize part of the expenses incurred by private enterprises for research and
development for important technologies (Sawai 2011, p. 295). Priority technology
subsidies had been expanding with the growth of additional subsidies for large-scale
core technologies, but the budget decreased year by year in the 1980s. In FY 1988,
the “priority technology subsidies”were abolished because of steady improvement in
corporate technological capability and the extension of the R&D outsourcing system
promoted by the government in forms such as the Large-Scale Projects.
Even with the shrinking of “priority technologies,” however, various subsidy sys-
tems were created in the 1980s, including the Subsidy System for Practical Devel-
opment of (non-petroleum) Alternative Energy Technology (FY 1980), the Subsidy
System for Practical Development of New Power Generation Technology (FY 1981),
the Subsidy System for Industry Revitalization R&D Expenditures (FY 1983), and
the Subsidy System for Practical Development of Technology for the Rationalization
of Energy Consumption (FY 1983). However, because subsidy policies during these
years tended to face review or elimination in response to international criticism, the
FY 1996 Subsidy System for the Development of Technologies for Creating New
Industries suggested reevaluating their effectiveness as tools for addressing the urgent
need to generate new industries.
Meanwhile, based on the Law on Research Associations for Mining and Manu-
facturing Technology (May 1961), the Mining and Industrial Technology Research
Association System addressed the issue of efficient utilization of human and financial
resources in research through joint experimental research on industrial production
technology (Sawai 2011, p. 312).
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The plan was to give such associations corporate status in order to promote col-
laborative research by industry. The associations operated on a philosophy of mutual
aid.
Thismethodwas also used in the frameworkofLarge-ScaleProjects and Important
Technologies, and many research associations were established by the year 2000.
The pace of association establishment weakened from the 1990s on, however. A
policy document prepared by the Legal Review Committee in April 1993 stated that
“technical innovations by companies were rather more hindered than otherwise by
collaborative research” and called for a “review of the National Research Institutes,
especially of the regional laboratories” and “reviews of the Large-Scale Projects
and other R&D by Research Associations and expansion of the subsidy system for
industry-university collaborative research.”
The special taxmeasures for promotingR&D included the IncreasedResearch and
Research Tax Deduction System established in 1967. This was a tax deduction for a
certain percentage of expenses exceeding the previous highest R&D expenditures. A
1973 revision added support for expenses for advanced technical training related to
computers and information processing. In FY 1985, the Tax Program for Promoting
R&D inBasic Technologies (high-tech taxation system) further extended this system.
Tax deductions were recognized for the depreciable assets needed by corporations to
conduct test research if theymet certain requirements. The Special TaxCredit System
forTestResearchwas established in 1993,making tax deductions permissible in order
to promote public and private research and research on innovative environmental
technologies.
The Japan Development Bank (“the Bank”) established a long-term, low-interest
loan system in 1968 to finance new domestic technologies and the promotion of
businesses for new products and the commercialization of products.
In March 1980, the financing system was expanded based on the Industrial Struc-
ture Council’s “Industrial policy of the 1980s.” What the Bank had called “financing
to turn new technologies into businesses” became “loans for new technology develop-
ment.” The Bank alsomade improvements such as adding infrastructure construction
and acquisition to the targets for financing loans with the goal of “business develop-
ment” as a preliminary step in corporate planning. Also, in FY 1985, it added funds
for technological development (financing for non-equipment uses) to the financing
for general corporate technology development (“new technology development”).
However, industrial technology promotion lending amounts provided by the Bank
declined sharply after peaking at 92.8 billion yen in FY1992. Thiswas in part because
companies expanded their own financing and diversified the sources, both domestic
and international, of their funding, but it is also true that theBank cameunder pressure
to review its traditional policy methods.
4.5.5 Patent Law Revision
The four industrial property rights laws regulating Japan’s intellectual property sys-
tem (Patent Law, Design Law, Trademark Law, Utility Model Law), fully revised
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in 1959 (effective in 1960), provided the foundation of the subsequent framework.
Nevertheless, the rapid increase in applications accompanying rapid growth made it
difficult to respond promptly enough either in granting accurate rights or in aligning
them internationally. The patent lawwas revised in 1970 and again in 1975 and 1978,
and further reforms took place after 1980 (Nakayama 2013, p. 199).
The 1970 revision began with the 1st Industrial Property Legislation Revision
Deliberation Council held in December 1962. The Council put together a report in
July 1965 and urged that a revised law be submitted to the Diet, but the proposal was
scrapped without substantive deliberations.
In November 1966, the Industrial Property Council was once again consulted
and discussion continued. The Council again made a report in November 1968, and
in May 1970, the Partial Amendment of the Patent Law was passed. Amendment
of the review system, including the adoption of a non-examination system, came
under discussion but was not realized, and it was in the 1993 revision that a sim-
plified examination method was adopted in the utility model system. Meanwhile,
large institutional measures for prompt vesting of rights, such as the introduction of
the Early Publication System and of the Examination-on-Demand System, have pro-
moted large institutional measures toward early vesting, and practical improvements
were made for speeding up the appraisal and appeal process and for clarification,
including time limits for amendments and the introduction of pre-assessment reviews
in cases of appeals after patent refusals.
Moreover, because of the gains Japan made in technical capability due to rapid
growth, patents on chemical substanceswere considerednecessary for protection, and
the argument was gaining strength that non-patent status could itself be motivating.
Three areas gained access to patents as a result of these changes: inventions of
chemical substances, inventions of foods and beverages or of flavors, and pharma-
ceutical inventions or inventions of manufacturing methods whereby two or more
existing pharmaceuticals are combined to make one new one. The multi-claim sys-
tem permitted multiple patent claims for one invention, and was in use in many
countries. However, Japan had been using a single-claim system—one patent per
item invented—ever since the patent law of 21 years earlier. While the Industrial
Property Council had discussed reexamining the question, as mentioned above, its
deliberations were not reflected in the system’s revision, but because members of
the 1970 Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) were required to adopt the multi-claim
system, Japan was forced to consider its introduction. In other words, ratification of
the PCT challenged Japan to adopt a multi-claim system for the sake of international
coordination and the harmonization of the international system as a whole.
Trademark lawwas also amended in 1975 (Nakayama 2013, p. 243). This was first
because the number of applications for trademark registration had by 1973 increased
by 5.3 times its level in 1960, the year the law came into effect. Second, Japan
was considering joining the Trademark Registration Treaty (TRT), which created an
international registration system for trademarks, and shortening of the application
process was indispensable for that purpose. The “report on the revision of the trade-
mark system” compiled by the Trademark Subcommittee of the Industrial Property
Council System Reform Committee in December 1974 emphasized that the rapid
76 2 Japan’s Industrial Structure: Forced to Change (1973–1982)
processing of the trademark application systemwas themost urgent task of trademark
administration and that in addition to requiring legal reform and improvements in the
operation of the system, the government should ask industry for cooperation in, for
example, adopting self-restraint when submitting applications for registrations that
are not immediately needed. There were four main revisions of the law, including
revisions to the regulations on renewal registration. Attempts were made to speed up
the process.
5 Policies to Address Structural Depression in Basic
and Consumer Industries: The Large-Scale Retail Stores
Law and Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
5.1 Policies on Industrial Structure Adjustment (The
Industry Stabilization Law and the Law on the Structural
Improvement of the Textile Industry)
5.1.1 Law on Temporary Measures for the Stabilization of Specific
Depressed Industries
Japanese economic growth had been sluggish since the first oil crisis in 1973, and
it was during this period that the issue of “structurally depressed industries”—those
whose capacity utilization rates and profitability were low over the long-term—
became apparent. MITI considered various countermeasures to the problem in new
policies targeted for FY 1978, and in December 1977 Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda,
recognizing the need for legislation, directed the government to enact or amend the
relevant laws. MITI focused on policies to scrap excess capacity and announced a
bill in January 1978 (Imuta and Washizawa 1993, p. 23). Its main points were as
follows:
(1) The competent minister, with reference to the opinion of the Industrial Structure
Council, will prepare a basic stabilization plan for the structurally depressed
industries defined by this law, that will stipulate how facilities are to be scrapped
in a planned manner and how joint projects are to be undertaken.
(2) In the event that the scrapping of facilities stipulated in this plan does not
progress smoothly, the competent minister shall consult the Industrial Struc-
ture Council and direct the relevant business entities in the specified industry to
undertake jointly the scrapping of plants (mandated cartel).
(3) The competent minister, taking into account the opinion of the Industrial
Structure Council, may impose limits or prohibitions on outsiders (those
not participating in the mandated cartel) regarding the establishment of new
facilities.
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(4) Exceptions to the Antimonopoly Law will be made as appropriate to exclude
mergers and business transfers in the case of the mandated cartels of businesses
belonging to the structurally depressed industry under consideration. In this
case, approval of the mandated cartel and mergers must be made in consultation
with the Fair Trade Commission.
(5) The State will establish a credit fund for structurally depressed industries, to
offer credit guarantees on loans and facilitate the financing needed to implement
the scrapping of facilities in accordance with the basic stabilization plan.
As can be seen, the proposal gave MITI great authority, stipulating that the com-
petent minister could issue directives to the relevant industries regarding joint actions
such as the scrapping of facilities, and in some cases could prohibit capital invest-
ment in such industries, impose fines, and authorize exceptions to the application of
the Antimonopoly Law for certain joint actions and mergers.
The Japan Fair Trade Commission (“Fair Trade Commission [FTC]”) strongly
objected to these proposals. This led to the deletion of the portions on prohibitions
of new investment, penalties, and exceptions to the Antimonopoly Law, by decision
of the Chief Cabinet Secretary. The resulting Law on Temporary Measures for Sta-
bilization of Designated Depressed Industries (“Industry Stabilization Law”) was
enacted in May 1978.
The Industry Stabilization Law was intended to be in effect only until 1983.
The depressed industries designated by the law were the targeted manufacturing
industries: open-arc furnaces, aluminum smelting, synthetic fibers, and shipbuilding.
The competent minister prepared a stable basic plan for each designated industry,
and established the scrapping method for each case. Instructions for joint action
were excluded from application of the Antimonopoly Act with the consent of the
FTC. A Trust Fund for Designated Depressed Industries by the Japan Development
Bank and private sector investment provided loan guarantees for scrapping facilities
(Table 14).5
5.1.2 Structural Improvements in the Petrochemical Industry
The oil crisis had a serious impact on the chemical industry and the basic materi-
als sector. The soaring price of naphtha (crude gasoline), which was the main raw
material of basic chemistry, pushed down both exports of and domestic demand for
major chemical products, leading to growing concerns about overcapacity. From the
latter 1970s to the 1980s, therefore, policy became concerned with the scrapping of
industrial facilities and the improvement of the industrial structure (Yamazaki 2011,
p. 60). Meanwhile, the soaring price of crude oil spurred energy-saving investment
5Fourteen industries were designated under this law, and the scrapping of facilities was carried out
almost according to schedule.A statistical examination of the effects onprofitability andproductivity
for 886 companies in the mining and manufacturing sector shows that the companies covered by
the Industry Stabilization Law yielded greater profitability and productivity increases than those
that were not, although the statistical difference remained inadequate.
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and technological innovation, along with the diversification of raw fuel. Under these
circumstances, the chemical industry from the 1970s to 2000 shifted the composition
of its shipments away from bulk chemicals to fine chemicals.
Meanwhile, inNovember 1976,MITI organized a study group on the international
competitiveness of the petrochemical industry in order to put together the necessary
measures concerning it. The final report of July 1978 called for (1) strengthening
the petrochemical companies’ negotiating position on the price of the raw material
naphtha, (2) improving the structure of purchases, for example by turning naphtha
imports into a jointly operated business, and (3) diversifying the raw materials used
by the industry The second of these led in September 1978 to the establishment
of seven chemical ethylene centers by the Petrochemical Feedstock Importing Co.
(PEFIC).
With the second oil crisis, the Japan Petrochemical Industry Association made
structural improvements basedon thefinal report (January 1981) of theRawMaterials
Research Association that was established in October 1979. This will be described
in Chap. 3.
5.1.3 Structural Improvements in the Textile Industry
The 1967 Law on Extraordinary Measures for the Structural Improvement of Des-
ignated Textile Industries (Structural Improvement in Textiles) was due to expire in
June 1974, and the need to consider further policy measures therefore came to the
fore (Matsushima 2012, p. 23). In response to consultations with the Textile Industry
Council and the Industrial Structure Council in October 1972, a report titled “On
textile industry policy in the 1970s” was compiled in October 1973. The report said
first that given the signs of change in the international environment (textile industry
growth in developing countries), Japan must change its traditional method of rely-
ing on lower production costs to enhance competitiveness and instead seek to make
higher-value-added products. The trends in demand suggested that luxury, diversi-
fication, and individualization were progressing due to rising personal income, but
that none of these was expected to increase total demand. The report pointed out the
importance of an accurate grasp of information on consumers and of the means of
responding to them.
Second, with regard to the Structural Improvement in Textiles Law, the scrapping
of excess capacity and the modernization of facilities were still considered neces-
sary tasks. Third, regarding the industry’s new trend of responding to environmental
changes, the report pointed out the growth of the apparel manufacturing industry
and the related fashion industry. In sum, the report located the future of the textile
industry not in the pursuit of modernization (in other words, the merits of scale), but
rather in knowledge-intensity. This required (1) strengthening information-gathering
about consumers, (2) strengthening product development, (3) strengthening inven-
tory management and sales functions, (4) collaborating naturally among industries
and processes, and (5) modernizing and rationalizing logistics systems.
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The Special Textiles Law was partially revised based on the report, and its name
changed to the Law on Extraordinary Measures for the Structural Improvement of
the Textile Industry (Textile Law). It was put into effect in May 1974 for a five-year
period. Whereas the Special Textiles Law had targeted just four industries, the new
law was designed to cover all the textile industries and international competitiveness
was removed as one of the aims of the Law. The Law was characterized in particular
by its promotion of “the development of new products and/or new technologies” and
modernization in order to enable the sound development of the industry. In addition,
the Minister was to establish guidelines for structural improvement, assuming the
existence of an intra-industry knowledge-intensive group to serve as the business
entity. This group would itself formulate a Structural Improvement Program, such
as the development of new products, in accordance with the guidelines, and obtain
the approval of the Minister. The Textile Industry Rationalization Agency had been
established on the basis of the Special Textiles Law and was responsible for pur-
chasing facilities, financing and lending, guaranteeing debt, and other measures. The
promotion of new product development was now added to its tasks.
The outlook for the industry under the Textile Law was not necessarily convinc-
ing to policymakers or industry. Pressures from imports were increasing, and the
textile industry and the small- and medium-sized spinning industries that felt the
greatest impact were intensifying their calls for import restrictions. The Bureau of
Lifestyle and Industry set up a private advisory body known as the Textile Issue
Discussion Group in September 1975 and searched for an appropriate response to
the problem. Its November report, “On immediate measures for textiles,” pointed to
(1) import problems, (2) structural improvement problems, (3) distribution problems,
and (4) industry efforts related to year-end financial problems and the need for policy
measures. In response, the Textile Industry Council issued its own proposals in its
December 1976 “Recommendation on the new textile industry” to the Minister.
The recommendations were intended to adhere to the fundamental direction of the
Textile Law while providing thoroughly detailed plans for: (1) clarifying consumer
trends, (2) strengthening vertical linkages, (3) emphasizing the apparel industry, and
(4) facilitating a smooth transition. These issues were specified in order to reflect the
underlying thinking that Japan would not resort to imposing limits on trade because
to do so would inevitably undermine Japan’s position as a trading nation.
Specific measures for carrying out these recommendations were not immediately
developed. Even so, against a backdrop of rising import pressures, policies on cartel-
based production and pricing coordination, and zero-interest financing of purchasing
funds for excess capacity were advanced in 1979. In addition, based on the Indus-
try Stabilization Law of May 1978, the synthetic textiles industry proceeded with
disposing of its excess capacity.
With the expiration of the Textile Law on the horizon, the Textile Industry Coun-
cil and Industrial Structure Council issued a report in November 1978 titled “On
the future improvement of the structure of the textile industry” (Yamazaki 2011,
p. 52). On the premise that economic recovery was not going well, that domestic
and international environmental requirements were changing, and that the textile
industry in general was obviously experiencing excess capacity, the report urged
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that the textile industry should take the path of: (1) promoting the consolidation of
know-how, (2) developing the apparel industry, (3) collaborating on production and
distribution, and (4) correcting the excessive competitiveness that characterized the
industry. In concrete terms, it suggested that the Textile Law be extended by another
five years. The tasks that had been planned when the law first went into effect had
basically been followed, and more time was needed for complete implementation
of the framework, but the emphasis of the 1979 revision was to shift to promotion
of the apparel industry. Based on these revisions, for example, the Textile Industry
Structure Improvement Business Association (formerly the Textile Industry Ratio-
nalizationAgency) established theApparel Industry Promotion Center and promoted
various measures, including development of human resources.
5.1.4 Structural Improvement of the Pulp and Paper Industry
The Industrial Structure Council issued a committee report on the pulp and paper
industry in October 1972, titled “The paper and pulp industry in the 1970s,” des-
ignating the following as policy issues with respect to this industry: shifting away
from polluting industries, implementing measures to address resources, improving
the supply system and the composition of companies, facilitating distribution, and
other issues (Matsushima 2012, p. 131).
The need to resolve the water-pollution problem arose because of the damage
to fisheries in 1958 caused by wastewater from paper pulp factories. The resource
issue was that, although raw materials were plentiful in the early 1970s, demand
was predicted to increase rapidly in the 1980s, meaning that measures to secure
overseas resources would be important. It was recognized that Japan would need to
participate in the development of resources overseas, through afforestation projects,
for example, and to promote the shift of production to locations overseas. Issues such
as the compositionoffirmswere related to improving international competitiveness in
the face of increasing paper and pulp imports. Many companies were small in scale
and struggled chronically with overcapacity, because the paper and pulp industry
had not yet been able to secure the advantages of scale. It was therefore necessary to
consolidate the investment entities and rationalize investment in capacity, and at the
same time, because demand was beginning to diversify, to facilitate distribution.
However, as a result of the two oil crises, the pulp and paper industry experienced
an increase in energy costs and a decline in demand (meaning a structural downturn).
The Industrial Structure Paper and Paper Industry Committee, in its March 1981
Pulp and Paper Industry Vision for the 1980s, singled out the following needs:
(1) to effect structural improvement, (2) to change management awareness, and
(3) to achieve a stable supply of raw materials. The highest priority in structural
improvement was placed on the problem of excess capacity. Solving the problem,
according to the Vision, would require, firstly, a shift in company consciousness to an
awareness of shared interests andmoderated behavior, and secondly, advancingon the
premise that the companieswould carry out these changes on their own, even if public
intervention turned out to be required. The background to the emphasis on voluntary
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change by the companies was that in the pulp and paper industry, the corrugated
cardboard industry had been designated to receive government directives through the
structural improvement activities that were based on the Industry Stabilization Law,
and had carried out facilities adjustment as a result, but had nevertheless seen their
business deteriorate. From May 1971, wood-free paper, coated paper, and unglazed
grocery paperwere struggling enough that they received approval to formaDepressed
Industry cartel, but the structural improvement in this industry did not achieve the
desired results.
5.2 Measures to Modernize Distribution
5.2.1 Establishment of Large-Scale Retail Store Law
Distribution policy after the war placed a high value on the role of the distribution
industry in providing employment opportunities. Policies were enacted to protect
small and medium-sized retailers, including the Department Store Law (1956) and
the Law on Special Measures for the Adjustment of Retail Business (1959) (“Retail
Law”) (Ishihara 2011, p.27). However, as inflation had become a social problem
since the beginning of the 1960s, MITI began to look to supermarkets to play a role
in lowering prices and therefore was reluctant to apply the Department Store Law to
supermarkets.
In response to the workings of these laws, small andmedium-sized retailers began
in the late 1960s to seek regulation of supermarkets as “pseudo-department stores.”
Department stores, which were subject to restrictions on opening branches, also
were dissatisfied with the inequality in the application of the law. Meanwhile, liber-
alization of capital moved forward in the distribution industry, with retail specialty
stores designated for liberalization in the second round in 1968. Full liberalization of
the retail industry took place in June 1975. This raised concerns about giant foreign
retailers entering themarket. Thus, distribution policy from the late 1960s to the early
1970s faced an array of challenges: deciding on immediate price policies and con-
sumer interests, modernizing of distribution by nurturing supermarkets, addressing
department-store dissatisfaction with the “pseudo-department store” issue, address-
ing the small and medium-sized retailers’ demands for regulations on supermarkets,
capital liberalization, and so on.
In August 1972, the Distribution Committee of the Industrial Structure Council
compiled a report titled “Retail commerce under innovations in distribution—Toward
revision of the Department Store Law,” which called for easing the restrictions in
the Department Store Law with an eye to consumer interests. The report also said it
would be necessary to develop some kind of coordination process given the disparity
in competitiveness between large and small-scale retailers. Reflecting this view, the
Department Store Law was abolished in March 1973 and replaced with the Law
Concerning theAdjustment ofRetailActivities byLarge-ScaleRetail Stores (“Large-
scale Retail Stores Law”).
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The Large-Scale Retail Store Law adopted a building principle according towhich
large-scale retail stores were defined as those with store areas of 1,500 m2 or more
in the building (or over 3,000 m2 in specially designated cities) (see Fig. 5. Note that
it includes later revisions and supplementary measures). A builder planning a new
large-scale retail store was required to notify MITI of a set of stipulated items; the
Minister had to be notified for plans for a retail business at the store four months
prior to the business start date (Article 5 notification). The MITI Minister was then
to judge whether there was any risk of the new store’s affecting the surrounding
small and medium-sized retailers. Where there was such risk, the Minister would
solicit the opinion of the Large-Scale Retail Stores Council, which was composed
of academics and others, and recommend reductions in the number of days the store
could be open, or the size of its floor-space, and othermatters. The Large-Scale Retail
Stores Council also had an obligation to hear the opinions of the local Chamber
of Commerce and Industry, consumers, retailers, and others that submitted them
based on a Ministerial ordinance. The Chamber of Commerce and Industry, when
deliberating, was supposed to consult with the Commercial Activities Coordinating
Committee, which, like the earlier Department Store Law, was established within
the Chamber of Commerce. The Commercial Activities Coordinating Committee
consisted of representatives from commerce, consumers, and academic experts. As
described above, the Large-Scale Retail Store Law was new in that it adopted a
notification system requiring preliminary examination as part of the coordination
policy. The preliminary examination was ordinarily literally a notification system,
but in more extreme cases, it functioned more like a de facto permission system.
5.2.2 Revision of the Large-Scale Retail Store Law
Efforts to open large-scale retail stores after the establishment of the Large Store
Law won local understanding relatively smoothly in districts with few large retail-
ers, which characterized many cases, but intense disputes arose in some areas, grad-
ually highlighting the problems of the Law’s approach to coordination (Ishihara
2011, p. 43). In response to the formal process launched after the Article 5 noti-
fication, merchants had to seek consultations and discussions. In some cases, the
new stores’ opponents did not accept requests for preliminary negotiation, and some
local governments forced them to engage in preliminary negotiations. However,
because preliminary consultations of that kind were not formal procedures under
the Large-Scale Retail Law, negotiations were often prolonged and resolutions were
sometimes reached through the offer of settlement monies. Unofficial coordination
activities took on greater significance.
Moreover, even those large retailers that were not subject to the law (because
their stores were under 1,500 m2 in area) were threatening to general retailers of the
100 m2 range, leading some local governments to enact ordinances and outline addi-
tional controls and regulations. The ordinances calling for voluntary adjustment, pio-
neered by Toyonaka City in April 1976 and Kumamoto City in November, spread to
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Fig. 5 Procedures for processing store openings, based on the Large-Scale Retail Law (LSRL)
(Ishihara 2011, p. 77). Sources Partial revision of Ministry of International Trade and Industry
Policy Bureau Commercial Section, ed., “The Large-Scale Retail Law Henceforth—The Nature of
the Reconsideration of the Revised Law [Report of the Joint Meeting of the Industrial Structure
Council, SME Policy-Making Council]. Trade and Industry Survey Group, 1994, p. 126. In the case
of the second type of large-scale retailers, replace “MITI Minister” with “prefectural governors.”
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many cities after the government in essence approved them in March 1977. Accord-
ing to a survey conducted in 1992, 432 of 1,030 municipalities surveyed enacted
ordinances, outlines, or internal rules. In addition to these, the chiefs of local Cham-
bers of Commerce announced that the opening of large stores would be frozen after
the mid-1970s.
In response to the above problems, in June 1977, the decision was made to revise
and address the commercial law for medium-sized stores that were not subject to
adjustment under the Large Store Law. If small and medium-sized retailer groups
judged that theymight be adversely affectedby the openingof large-scale retail stores,
they could now seek adjustment from their prefectural governor. The governor could
issue recommendations to the large company seeking to open a store, and could also
issue orders if it did not comply with the recommendations.
The Retail Law was a framework targeting markets, but in October 1976 it was
interpreted by the Diet to include supermarkets and shopping centers. However,
because the Retail Law targeted the specially designated cities, regulation applied
only to cases in those cities. The regulation therefore did not treat all cases equally,
and on the occasion of the 1978 revision, supermarkets and shopping centers were
excluded from the Law. The Retail Law framework was limited in this sense, and
policy in the late 1970s was forced to look to an eventual revision of the Large-Scale
Retail Law.
The Retail Issue Group, established in July 1977 as a private advisory body to
the Director General of the Industrial Policy Bureau and the Director General of the
Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) Agency released the “Retail problem discus-
sion report” in February 1978. The SME Policy-Making Council issued its opinions
and recommendations in April, brought the Large-Scale Retail Law and the Retail
Law in line with each other, and urged reconsideration of issues such as floor-space
area and which matters would be subject to coordination.
In response to this statement of opinion and recommendation, a partial amend-
ment plan for the Large-Scale Retail Law and Retail Lawwas submitted in June 1978
and came into effect the followingMay (Ishihara 2011, p. 58). The main points of the
revision were as follows. First, the minimum floor area to be covered by the Lawwas
lowered. Stores of over 1,500 m2 (or 3,000 in government-designated special cities)
became Type 1 Large-Scale Retailers. Stores of between 500 and 1,500 m2 were des-
ignated Type 2 Large-Scale Retailers and subject to coordination, and coordinating
authority over these Type 2 stores was delegated to municipalities. Moreover, the
coordination period was extended, and what had been informal commercial coordi-
nation and pre-qualification consultations became institutionalized and built into the
regular procedures through a system of notifications. Pre-qualification consultations
were thereby positioned as having a role in enabling the smooth progress of the
Commercial Activities Coordinating Committee.
However, problems recurred in the actual operation process of this cooperative
framework. A preliminary briefing session was held before the pre-qualification
Commercial Activities Coordinating Committee, and it became virtually essential to
obtain local approval at this stage. Some municipalities began to require agreement
at preliminary briefing sessions, and the same problems arose as had occurred before
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the revision of the Large-Scale Retail Law. It transpired that where agreement was
not reached at this stage, subsequent coordination would be delayed or faced diffi-
culty. This revealed the problem of the preliminary briefing session. More important,
the preliminary explanatory meeting, which began to play the role of de facto coor-
dination, was the venue for agreement between the applicants for store openings and
the local small and medium-sized retailers. Therefore it gradually came to light that
the interest of the consumer, who was the actual responsibility of the Commercial
Activities Coordinating Committee, might well be hardly reflected at all.
After the revised law came into effect, opposition against the opening of stores
began to gain momentum. In response, MITI showed plans for addressing the prob-
lem in 1981 and entrusted discussion of the issue to the Council on the Large-Store
Problem. The Council’s final report announced in January 1982 sought first of all
to enforce the law in a restrained manner while continuing to consider consumer
interests. It also said that it was necessary to strengthen the functions of the Com-
mercial Activities Coordinating Committee and to devise fair and appropriate delib-
eration and management of it. MITI handled the administrative regulation of the
store-opening process in line with these policies.
However, the opposition movement against store openings quickly made the gov-
ernment aware that coordination through these policies would be difficult. There-
fore, in October 1982, the Industrial Structure Council Distribution Committee and
the SME Policy-Making Council’s Distribution Subcommittee met jointly, releasing
their report in December 1983 titled “The basic direction of the distribution indus-
try and policy in the 1980s.” The report stressed that whereas the basic policy to
this point had been to modernize distribution, treating distribution as an economic
system and seeking “economic efficiency,” it was instead necessary to see it from
the point of view of a social system and to pursue “social effectiveness” as well. It
was hoped that business opportunities for small and medium-sized retailers would
continue to be guaranteed under the retail-industry coordination process. The MITI
Minister’s Ordinance of 1984 likewise urged that the restrictions on store openings
be maintained while considering the possibility that opening a store in an existing
commercial area might enhance the appeal of the area. In other words, it began to
foster an objective reexamination not only of the confrontation between large-scale
and small/medium-sized retailers, but also of the impact that large-scale retailers
might have on a district.
5.2.3 Approaches to Modernizing Distribution
Initiatives for modernizing distribution were based on the Small and Medium Enter-
prise Modernization Promotion Law, which was enacted in March 1963 with the
expectation of improving productivity not only in manufacturing but in distribution
as well. It was assumed that the distribution sector’s productivity could be improved
by rationalizingmanagement, enabling companies to operate on amore optimal scale,
and creating joint operations among businesses. The focus on distribution arose at
this time because the delay in that area was regarded as one reason for rising prices
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and also because the aging of commercial centers in existing urban areas was causing
land-use and congestion issues in dense urban areas (Ishihara 2011, p. 149).
Most important among these was the impact of distribution on prices. The Indus-
trial Structure Council’s Distribution Committee issued successive reports on the
subject, beginning with its first interim report, “The current status and issues of
distribution organizations” (December 1964). The sixth interim report, “Issues in
and the future of the modernization of distribution” (August 1968), stated that the
modernization of underdeveloped sectors continued to be important for sustaining
growth, and that for the foreseeable future, the principal issues were capital liberal-
ization to create a system that could compete with foreign capital and improvements
in distribution productivity as the most powerful approach to the consumer price
problem.
In a similar vein, the third interim report, “On turning retail stores into chains”
(September 1965), pointed to the effectiveness of the voluntary chain for overcoming
the problems of small scale in the retail industry. In “On the distribution activities
system” (July 1969), the Subcommittee on Distribution Policy issued a proposal that
treated distribution as a single system and stressed plans to upgrade the distribution
systemas awhole and to improve its productivity. Thiswas because the basic structure
of the system was defined as management within the company of (1) operations
planning, (2) transactions, (3) physical distribution, (4) finances and financing, and
so on. Creating links among companies enabling them to connect with one another
would require standardization of product codes and transaction codes, various records
and forms, and product packaging. In response, the Committee for Developing the
DistributionSystemwas established inSeptember 1970, and in that fiscal year, budget
measures were adopted for the basic surveys on the standardization of sales slips,
and the Japan Development Bank began financing products related to the distribution
system. The Committee began to explore ways to make maximum use of computers
in distribution and in September 1971 compiled the Basic Policy on the Distribution
System, a set of plans targeted for implementation by 1975.
In addition, the “Distribution in the 1970s” report compiled by the Industrial
Structure Council’s Distribution Committee in July 1971 followed on these policy
priorities and sought (1) an upgrading of the market structure (pursuit of economies
of scale), (2) maintenance and promotion of effective competition (optimization
of transaction conditions and customs), (3) promotion of consumer interests, and
(4) rationalization of the physical aspects of distribution, and so on (Ishihara 2011,
p. 172).
Measures were also taken to address the urban problems related to distribution.
These mainly concerned the wholesale industry because of the concentration of
wholesalers in urban areas. In December 1965, the Distribution Committee of the
Industrial Structure Council proposed the construction of “general wholesale cen-
ters,” facilities where wholesalers could not only share shop-fronts, but also the
receipt, dispatch, shipment, storage, and delivery of merchandise. This was followed
in 1966 by the enactment of the Law Concerning the Improvement of Urban Distri-
bution Centers, which designated certain areas as distribution business districts and
complexes and made it possible to construct truck terminals, freight rail stations,
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Table 15 Number of wholesale associations and complexes established
Number
established
Pre-1965 1966–1970 1971–1975 1976–1980 1981–1985 Post-1986 Total
Distribution
associations




2 20 40 20 14 15 111
Source Ishihara (2011, p. 178). The total number of “complexes completed” also includes four whose
completion date is not known
wholesale markets, warehouses, and other facilities within those areas. As of March
2010, the policy of concentrating and relocating distribution businesses had led to
the operation of such complexes in 18 cities and 27 districts (Table 15).
Furthermore, instead of regulating supermarket businesses, MITI sought to work
with city planning in response to the City Planning Law in 1968 and the Urban
Renewal Law in 1969, which treated retailers as urban facilities. This led to “regional
planning for the modernization of commercial businesses” in the 1970s (Ishihara
2011, p. 182). This planningwas at first delegated to the JapanChamber ofCommerce
and Industry (JCCI) by the Small and Medium Business Administration Agency and
then in FY 1984 was turned into a government-subsidized project. From FY 1991,
it was taken over by the Project for Planning and Implementing the Revitalization
of Shopping Streets and funded by the operating gains of the Small Commercial
Business Revitalization Fund. Plans were formulated for 241 districts over a period
of 21 years.
5.2.4 Policies to Promote Small and Medium-Sized Retail Businesses
The Law on the Promotion of Small and Medium Retail Business (“Small Retail
Law”) was established in September 1973 with the aim of improving shopping dis-
tricts, and was aimed at developing shopping districts, creating joint store areas,
and modernizing business practices. The Minister heard the views of the Small
and Medium Enterprise Modernization Council, on the basis of which he estab-
lished guidelines for the development of projects with policy support (Ishihara 2011,
p. 187). The promotion guidelines aimed to secure consumer interests and mod-
ernize small and medium-sized retailers, and in the case of subsidized businesses,
included improvement projects such as establishing arcades as part of the station-front
infrastructure sought in regional commercial modernization plans.
The Distribution Systems Research Institute was established at the Distribution
Economics Institute of Japan to serve as the parent organization for developing the
measures related to the September 1971 Basic Policy on Distribution System Devel-
opment discussed above. The center’s aim was the modernization of distribution
activities through the development and dissemination of systems related to distri-
bution, and it has since then played a central role in promoting systematization.
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Meanwhile, MITI entrusted the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry with
the task of standardizing sales slips for department stores in 1974, for chain stores
in 1976, and for other kinds of wholesale transactions in 1977. In 1978, an initia-
tive aimed at standardizing the common product code was launched. The number
49 became the international code for Japan when Japan joined the European Article
Number Association. The shift from the use of magnetic tape to communications
lines for the delivery of data on intercompany transactions followed, and in 1980
the Japan Chain Stores Association standardized the process with the JCA Protocol.
In 1982, MITI established the so-called “J-procedure,” a transmission control pro-
cedure that would be common to the entire distribution industry. This encouraged
significant progress in the accuracy and efficiency of distribution transactions.
The Distribution Systems Research Institute mentioned above also played a role
in promoting the development of point of sale (POS) systems. JAN (Japanese Arti-
cle Number) codes were assigned and registered for products, and JAN company
code registration was launched as well. In addition, the symbols for displaying JAN
codes on barcodes were included in the Japanese Industrial Standards, and it became
possible to introduce the POS system. POS experiments were conducted at stores
from 1979 to 1980, and the experiments entrusted to the Institute took place in three
stages. Following a similar process of trial and error, Seven-Eleven Japan Co., Ltd.
introduced the POS system to all stores in 1982, and Ito-Yokado Co., Ltd. followed
in 1985, at which point the use of POS systems at convenience stores and super-
markets had become the decisive trend. In 1986, the Small and Medium Enterprise
Agency conducted a “POS feasibility study for shopping streets” and began focus-
ing on spreading POS systems to small and medium-sized retailers. The use of point
cards in shopping streets also progressed.
With these advances in product management, companies were ready to begin
exchanging information via computers, and EDI (Electronic Data Interchange)
became possible. The spread of POS and EDI greatly changed commercial trans-
actions. Inventory management, rather than something intuitively based on experi-
ence, became based on the objective rendering of the saleability or lack thereof of a
given product. This allowed for smaller orders and delivery units, and more frequent
deliveries, and also encouraged joint deliveries and the integration of distribution
functions. Joint deliveries had already been started by Seven-Eleven in 1976, were
adopted by Ito-Yokado in 1985, and spread from there to the general supermarket
sector.
5.2.5 Revision of the Law to Promote the Modernization of Small
and Medium-Sized Enterprises
Post-WWII policy on small and medium-sized enterprises was based on the Basic
Lawon Small andMedium-Sized Enterprises, and aimed to realize “improvements in
SMEgrowth” and “a rise in the economic and social status of SMEworkers,” by “rec-
tifying the disadvantages that were due to [their] economic and social constraints.”
It developed policies in the following four categories: (1) advancing the structure
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of SMEs (including modernizing facilities, making technical upgrades, rationalizing
business management, and optimizing the scale of enterprises; (2) rectifying nega-
tive business activities (preventing excessive competition, optimizing subcontracting
transactions, and so on); (3) implementing measures for small-scale enterprises; and
(4) implementing financing and taxation systems.
The SME Council presented a summary of “The state of SMEs in the 1970s and
the direction for SME policy” (the 1970s Vision of SME Policy) in August 1972, and
regarding the 1970s as “an era of change and fluidity,” it suggested new policy direc-
tions. The changes cited were (1) internationalization, (2) the growing importance
of respect for all members of society, (3) the deepening of environmental problems,
and (4) the shift to knowledge-intensive industry. The Council’s suggestions called
for greater emphasis to be placed on “the demand side,” “the environment and labor
welfare” (in other words, quality of life), and “SME diversity” (Nakata 2013, p. 17).
However, in response to the yen’s appreciation, the oil crisis, and other dramatic
changes in the business environment that began around that time, Emergency Mea-
sures for SMEs in Response to the Changes in the International Currency Situation
were issued in March 1973, and Comprehensive Measures for the Economy and
Emergency Measures for SMEs Regarding the Yen’s Appreciation (January 1978)
were adopted by Cabinet Decision in September 1977 and January 1978 respectively,
and policy began promoting shifts in business type and sectoral adjustments.
In line with these policies, the SMEModernization Promotion Law was amended
in 1975, introducing three newpoints of view (Nakata 2013, p. 174). First, it added the
perspective of “improving the quality and stability of the people’s lives” to the earlier
aim of strengthening international competitiveness. Second, it sought to include
social needs such as improving the welfare of workers, raising consumer benefits,
preserving the environment, and so on. Third, it encouraged entry into new fields.
This enabled policy to promote industry-wide (including upstream and downstream
operations) and region-wide structural improvements.
Specifically, the competent minister formulated a modernization plan for each
“Designated Industry” based on a survey of its actual situation. The modernization
plan included three areas: (1) time-specific targets for modernization of product per-
formance or quality, as well as production costs, and so on; (2) items necessary for
achieving the goal of modernization, including development of new products or new
technologies, modernization of facilities, optimization of business scale and/or pro-
duction and management methods, normalization of competition or improvements
in business relations; and (3) important items for consideration in the modernization
process, including improvements in worker welfare, the advancement of consumer
interests, and preservation of the environment. These plans served as the foundation
for measures to support SMEs until the Law’s abolition in 1999.
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5.3 A New Emphasis on Quality of Life: Promotion
of Consumer Protection and the Housing Industry
5.3.1 Vision of the Household Goods Industry
In 1968, the Industrial Structure Council’s Committee on Miscellaneous Goods and
Housing Materials issued a report titled “The future of the miscellaneous goods
industry under a liberalized economic system” that emphasized the “export character”
of the industry, and laid out the direction to be taken in order to overcome the various
challenges of the existing situation (Matsushima2012, p. 204).On the production side
were mechanization and mass production in order to enable the industry to escape its
labor-intensive character, and efforts were to be made toward product differentiation.
On the distribution side was promotion of modern linkages between production and
sales and rationalized marketing systems; management would be modernized. The
sectorwas divided into categories according to the level ofmechanization andproduct
differentiation that had been achieved, and policies were considered to address the
needs of each one.
In March 1976, the “Vision of the household goods industry from 1975 and
the appropriate direction of response” (the interim report of the Industrial Struc-
ture Council’s Household Goods Committee) changed the name of the industry in
question from “miscellaneous goods industry” to “household goods industry” and
at the same time shifted the related policy-making aim from promoting exports to
promoting enrichment of the life of the people. Based on this change in orienta-
tion, the following were cited as challenges facing the household goods industry:
(1) stable growth and qualitative changes in people’s needs (requiring upgrading,
higher performance, individualization and the greater demands for social responsi-
bility); (2) the question of how to respond to environmental changes, namely, the
steady advance of international specialization or the rapid growth of developing
economies. Overcoming these challenges would fundamentally require relying on
self-help, complemented where needed by government measures.
The policy issues for the household goods industry, leaving aside those of specific
industries such as Western-style kitchen metal-ware, porcelain, and matches, were
modernization and structural improvement and the elimination of excessive compe-
tition. The policy measures corresponding to the first of these were the 1963 SME
Modernization Promotion Law, based on the 1960 Law on Extraordinary Measures
for Sector-Oriented Promotion, the creation of the Structural Improvement Plan-
ning System based on the 1969s SMEModernization Promotion Law, and following
these, the advancement of plans for knowledge-intensive industries and structural
improvement planning by region (1973), the creation of a system for planning entry
into new sectors (1975), and the introduction of structural improvement plans for
business strategy (1984) and post-structural improvement plans (1992).
Regarding excessive competition, the following frameworks remained in place:
the Law on Temporary Measures Concerning the Stabilization of Designated SMEs
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(1952), the Small Enterprises Stabilization Law (1953), and the Law Concerning the
Organization of SMEs (1957).
Structural improvement projects were implemented using not only the SMEMod-
ernization and Promotion Law but also the July 1979 Law on Extraordinary Mea-
sures for Regional SMEs (“Production Region Law”). The “Production Region Law”
framework was adopted to implement structural improvement projects. The frame-
work of the Production Region Law was such that associations in the production
region would undertake research and development for new products or new tech-
niques, the development of demand, and plans for the promotion of projects for
human resource development, and these would be submitted to the prefectural gov-
ernment and, if approved, could receive subsidies. The range of MITI’s involvement
was therefore limited: the framework relied heavily on the cooperation of industrial
associations. Responsibility for policy management was shifted from the department
of goods affairs to the prefectural governor.
5.3.2 Establishing a Consumer-Oriented System
Following the 1968 establishment of the Fundamental Law on Consumer Protection,
related ministries and agencies decided to expand the administration of consumer
affairs by increasing the budget for it. MITI established the Consumer Protection
Division in 1976, and built up its administration of the area, including through legisla-
tive means (Ishihara 2011, p. 326). These included making administrative responses
more consumer oriented. In 1965, MITI launched a system for handling complaints
related to consumer lifestyle improvement in 1965, setting up a consultation window
for people with complaints. The National Consumer Affairs Center of Japan was
established in 1970. By 1973, at least one Consumer Life Center had been estab-
lished in each prefecture, and systems for consumer consultations and complaints
were being put into place.
The sharing of the collected information and collaboration among organizations
was encouraged, and a network system linking centers for consumer life was estab-
lished at the 16th Consumer Protection Conference in November 1983. (The Confer-
ence was established based on the Basic Law on Consumer Protection, chaired by the
Prime Minister, and with the membership of the heads of the relevant administrative
units,was chargedwith determining basic policy related to consumer administration).
This resulted in the establishment of the Practical Living Information Online Net-
work (PIO-NET) in December 1987. Meanwhile, MITI also sought improvements in
industries’ systems for handling complaints. In 1967 and 1968, it offered guidance
through industry associations on the establishment of “complaint windows.” With
the prospect of an increasing number of complaints from consumers, it issued a notice
in August 1979 urging the further development of a consumer-oriented system and
industry understanding of the need for it.
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5.3.3 Optimizing Business Transactions
Policies were developed on door-to-door sales and installment sales, from the point
of view of optimizing business transactions (Ishihara 2011, p. 360).
First, the Special Subcommittee on Sales, in the Industrial Structure Councils’
Distribution Committee, reviewed special business operations that were on the rise,
including door-to-door sales, mail-order marketing, chain stores, andmultilevel mar-
keting systems, and in March 1975 submitted a report urging legislation on this area.
On the basis of this report, the Law Concerning Door-to-Door Sales was established
in June 1976 with the twin aims of promoting fair business practices and prevent-
ing damage or loss to consumers. The Law, in keeping with the particular needs of
each kind of sales practice, obliged sellers to disclose their name and the type of
merchandise being sold and also introduced a “cooling-off system.” MITI also orga-
nized sales associations to establish the foundations for the sound development of
these new sales methods, including, for example, the Door-to-Door Sales Associa-
tion (established inMarch 1979) and the Japan Direct Sales Association (established
in April 1980), and provided them with administrative guidance.
Consumer issues were mounting, however. In the case of door-to-door sales,
consumers who were uncertain or vacillating could not avoid making contracts. The
law on door-to–door sales was revised in June 1984, and the cooling-off period was
extended from four to seven days. The affected businesses that had initially resisted
the idea also changed their view of the matter, learning to provide products that
consumers would not choose to return and concluding that their own credibility
increased when their sales methods improved. In May 1985, MITI launched an
information system on problems in door-to-door sales and worked to prevent the
occurrence of such problems bywidely disseminating the content of the consultations
to the general public and related government offices.
6 Friction with Foreign Countries
6.1 Trade Imbalances and Negotiations with Europe
and America
6.1.1 US Criticism of Japan
Japan’s trade surplus with the US reached about 10 billion dollars in 1978 and con-
tinued to increase thereafter, to about 60 billion dollars in 1987. Although somewhat
sluggish in the first half of the 1990s, it again increased to 64 billion dollars in 1998,
73 billion dollars in 1999, and 81 billion dollars in 2000. However, since the EU
and China surpluses with the US were growing at the same time, the situation was
different than it had been in the 1980s. The US portion of Japan’s total exports rose
from less than 26% at the end of the 1970s to 35% in 1984 and remained around 30%
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in the 1990s. Meanwhile, the US ratio of Japan’s total imports remained at about
20% from around the 1980s, rising at most to 24% in 1998.
Against this backdrop, US criticism of Japan had been mounting since 1977,
particularly in the US Congress, because imports from Japan were increasing dra-
matically despite the appreciation of the yen (Abe 2013, p. 53). The January 1979
report by the Jones Task Force on US-Japan Trade (US House of Representa-
tivesWays andMeans Committee, Subcommittee on Trade) strongly criticized Japan
for being the only country with an excessive trade surplus at a time when most coun-
tries were suffering from recession, and asked for efforts to be made to open Japan’s
market and improve the trade balance. TheUS also established the TradeAgreements
Act of 1979, which detailed the requirements for the Laws on Countervailing Duties
and Anti-Dumping.
Meanwhile, the Japan–US Summit meeting in May 1979 issued a joint statement
with the subtitle, “A fertile partnership looking to the 1980s.” Japan was called upon
to maintain economic growth through the expansion of domestic demand and open
its market to foreign products. The US would restrict imports if Japan’s exports
soared too rapidly, and Japan would resolve the issue by voluntarily regulating its
own exports. These approaches were maintained into the 1980s.
6.1.2 Full-Scale Trade Friction with Europe
Trade friction also arose between Japan and themembers of theEuropeanCommunity
(EC), beginning around 1970 (Abe 2013, p. 147). In 1971, Europe, like the United
States, was suffering from the rapid increase in steel imports from Japan, and in
January 1972, Japan adopted Voluntary Export Restraints (VER) through the Export
and Import Transaction Law. These voluntary regulations were renewed repeatedly,
continuing in place until the 1990s. In addition to iron and steel, tape recorders and
televisions became the target of VERs on exports to Europe from the early 1970s
on. This was part of the Japanese government’s effort to maintain the international
export order during this time.
However, in 1976, immediately after the first oil crisis, the EC became concerned
by the flood of exports from Japan—specific items such as steel, autos, ships, and
bearings. When a delegation from Japan’s Federation of Economic Organizations
visited Europe in October of that year, the Europeans harshly criticized the influx
of Japanese products. They argued that non-tariff barriers (specifically the technical
obstacles to manufactured imports posed by regulations on exhaust gas, the testing
process for pharmaceuticals and chemicals, and so on) were hindering the export of
European products to Japan and demanded improvement on the part of the Japanese.
While the trade friction between Japan and the EC intensified in this way, the value
of Japanese exports to the EC came to twice that of the EC’s exports to Japan and
Japan posted a trade surplus with Europe exceeding 3 billion dollars.
As a result of the delegation’s request upon its return home, government-level dis-
cussions were held between the ECCommittee and theMinistry of Foreign Affairs in
November 1976. The same month, the Japanese government submitted responses to
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the EC complaints, including (1) restraints on the number of automobile shipments,
(2) the launching of discussions on the shipbuilding issues, and (3) the importation of
agricultural products such as powdered skimmilk. The EC reacted with appreciation.
Japan also sought to improve areas regarded as non-tariff barriers by omitting the
double inspections and certifications. Nevertheless, in February 1977 the EC Com-
mittee took steps against the import of Japanese-made ball bearings by unexpectedly
imposing an anti-dumping tax of 10–20% for up to three months, making it clear that
the EC’s approach of sanctions against Japanese products was not brought entirely
to an end.
6.2 Simplifying Import Procedures and Maintaining
the Export Order
6.2.1 Efforts to Expand Imports
Import promotion policies sought to increase imports not only by developingmarkets
for the sake of leveling the field of competition but also by promoting the penetra-
tion of imported goods and supporting import expansion policies. They also sought
market-opening policies, including the easing of import regulations, reduction of
tariff rates, and the improvement of standards and conformity assessment systems.
The import expansion policies were developed against the background of the
late-1960s trade friction with the US and the early-1970s friction with Europe, and
the 1971 Comprehensive Economic Policy of Japan marked the first clarification of
import promotion policies (Abe 2013, p. 175). Thereafter, export promotion poli-
cies, which had been the focus during the period of high economic growth, were
transformed into import-promotion measures of a kind not seen in other countries
overseas, and energetically advanced until the beginning of the twenty-first century.
The effort put into expanding imports from the latter 1970s resulted in a policy
system as of the fall of 1982. Thememorandum submitted by the general assembly of
the Trade Conference that October was the first comprehensive and detailed descrip-
tion of the system of import promotion policy, and it was carried on and developed in
subsequent measures. It urged the need to encourage import expansion through the
use of JETRO (the Japan External Trade Organization) and MIPRO (Manufactured
Imports Promotion Organization). Events and import fairs were pursued thereafter,
with due consideration for the concerns of the Trade Conference.
6.2.2 Exploring Market-Opening Policies
Among the import-promotion policies were policies to open the market (Abe 2013,
p. 226). The core of these policies was the relaxation of restrictions on imports,
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because of the trade friction discussed above. The trade friction of the latter 1970s for-
ward was new in that macroeconomic economic policies and adjustment of exchange
rates now became diplomatic issues with the aim of resolving the imbalance of the
current account. There is no clear standard on how much of an imbalance causes
problems, but structurally speaking, current account imbalances arise because the
countries with surpluses continuously achieve levels of industrial development that
surpass their domestic demand, while deficit countries continue simply to open their
markets to foreign goods, raising the possibility that their industrial development
will stall as a result. It was from this point of view that Europe and America called
on Japan to increase its domestic demand and open its market from the late 1970s
into the 1990s.
Interestingly, the Japanese side was clearly aware of the existence of an array
of obstacles relating to importing, even as it passively responded to the external
pressures by undertaking market-opening measures. Although Japan’s policies did
not necessarily result in import expansion, the process became an opportunity to
shed light on problems that had been hidden from sight within Japan. Industry cir-
cles, including the Federation of Economic Organizations and others, while strongly
resisting criticism of industry and business, sought the relaxation of government
regulations and hoped to increase their own freedom as corporate actors thereby.
The Japan–US bilateral current account was made an issue in the negotiations
between the two countries, although it has meaning only when there are strong
restrictions on the exchangeability of currency. The reason was that the US could
not deny that the background to the problems was the emotional reaction that arose
from the trade friction in specific, but its complaint was that although Japan had
grown to become the world’s second-largest economy, it did not have a fully open
market. Japan, meanwhile, promoted import expansion and market opening, but the
problem of the current account imbalance was not easily resolved even in the twenty-
first century. To that extent, the measures undertaken by Japan cannot necessarily be
regarded as having achieved sufficient results.
In relation to the EC, meanwhile, Japan started government-level negotiations in
mid-November 1976 and from time to time attempted to relax import restrictions
and voluntarily regulate exports, but these were undeniably ad hoc responses. This
was because MITI, as of 1976–1977, was strongly aware that the Japanese market
was already fully open in systemic terms.
There were, however, cases in which domestic safety regulations in effect proved
disadvantageous for imported goods, and MITI did not go this far into detail in its
deliberations. In the view of MITI in those years, the criticism from Europe and the
US was fundamentally based on a misunderstanding of the Japanese market. MITI’s
policies, therefore, were developed basically as attempts somehow to avoid trade
sanctions.
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6.2.3 Simplifying Import Procedures
Overseas complaints against Japan’s import system persisted, and MITI’s attitude
gradually changed. The change was reflected in the Japanese government’s more
aggressive promotion of the Tokyo Round.
The New Policy issued in 1979 by the International Trade Policy Bureau and
the International Trade Administration Bureau said that, “For the sake of upgrad-
ing and improving the efficiency of our own economy, we should not refuse to
expand imports,” and called for “Eliminating factors that impede the expansion of
imports.” Inhibiting factors included various inspection procedures, the closed nature
of Japanese industry, the practice of cross-shareholding within a conglomeration of
businesses, the areas in which distribution was not modernized, and other factors.
MITI’s stance of simply trying to overcome overseas misunderstandings shifted
slightly, and instead of avoiding a response to the current account imbalance, it began
advancing import-promotion policies and coordination within domestic industry in
order to achieve an equilibrium. In other words, it began firmly pursuing efforts to
raise industry to a still more sophisticated level.
An array of programs for promoting imports to Japan were presented in senior
official-level consultations between the US and Japan in September 1977. A Trade
Facilitation Committee (TFC) was inaugurated to handle problems with trade pro-
cedures and to seek out what might be promising US products for export to Japan.
The TFC also became the organization charged with fully responding, for the first
time, to the complaints made about trade.
The latter 1970s also saw the step-by-step progress on the simplification of import
procedures. The first step was the 1977–1978 implementation of a partial revision
of the Import Trade Control Order. Among the revisions was that made to Article
21 in October 1977: trade contracts with intermediaries, instead of requiring permits
from the MITI Minister as they had previously, now required the submission of
notifications to the Foreign Exchange Bank, and where the payments and price of
cargo received were both under one million yen, the notification requirement was
lifted. The Export Trade Control Order was also revised in October 1978, furthering
the simplification of procedures for handling cargo exports and imports. Because this
series of amendments to protectionist measures targeted regulations what in reality
were hardly implemented, they could not be expected to have a significant effect on
import expansion. Nevertheless, they did have meaning in that they allowed Japan
to assert that it was opening its market.
6.2.4 Policies for Maintaining the Export Order
The basic thinking of policies concerning foreign trade in postwar Japan was that
goods in principle be exported freely,with controls on exports limited to the necessary
minimum. The December 1949 Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law
(“Foreign Exchange Act”) adhered to this thinking, restricting the scope of control
on exports. Even so, the Foreign Exchange Act was partially revised in December
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1980, against a backdrop of rising Japanese exports, to allow for even freer export
trade, and revisions were made to a wide array of ministerial ordinances (Abe 2013,
p. 301). As a result, although approval would still be required for specifically desig-
nated exports and imports, “consignment trade in processed goods” was in principle
liberalized, for example. “Payment method regulations” were also changed from the
“positive list” method to the “negative list method”: that is, where payment meth-
ods had previously had to be positively singled out as not requiring approval, under
the new system, only those payment methods specifically designated as requiring
approval would be subject to controls. However, on the occasion of the Toshiba–
Kongsberg scandal, the Foreign Exchange Act was again revised in September 1987
to strengthen export controls on strategic goods to communist countries.Nonetheless,
MITI decided to establish the Bulk License System in March 1989, and was pro-
moting the simplification of procedures for bulk export licenses exceeding 200,000
annually.
The 1952 Export and Import Transaction Law aimed to prevent unfair export
transactions and to establish an order for import and export transactions (for exam-
ple, eliminating excessive competition), and to this end, recognized the establishment
of export associations and of agreements among businesses. When the law was first
enacted, the questionwas how to deal with problems that occurred in themain export-
ing sectors, which were composed of relatively small-scale companies producing
textiles, miscellaneous goods, light machinery, and so on. Many export agreements
were still being signed in the 1970s, the majority of which were agreements on
quantity or volume of exports.
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of an Economic Superpower (1981–1992)
1 Keynotes of the Japanese Economy and Trade Policy
in the 1980s
1.1 Fiscal Restructuring and Stable Growth
The combination of steep inflation and slow growth rates was a common problem
faced by industrial economies in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Japan responded
to these issues on the micro level by pursuing policies for “streamlining” busi-
nesses, especially through energy conservation, and on the macro level by promoting
financial reform.
Companies cut costs by reducing energy use per unit of production and recov-
ered their international competitiveness in tandem with their progress in conserving
energy.Meanwhile, adjustmentsweremade for employment in the short term through
temporary leaves and transfers as well as the expiration of construction contracts and
the dismissal of temporary workers. As these practices spread, the problem of the
incompatibility of employment adjustment policies and the need for employment
security became evident to both labor and management.
On themacroeconomic side, after the negative real growth of 1974, Japan’s growth
rate slowed dramatically, and the problem emerged ofmounting fiscal dependence on
deficit spending.Dubbed “the first year ofwelfare,” 1973 saw a substantial increase in
the budget for welfare-related expenses such as free medical care for the elderly. This
was followed almost immediately, however, by a focus on “welfare policy review”
and a policy reversal that stressed that “even the welfare budget isn’t off limits [from
cuts]”.
The 1980s Liberal Democratic Party administrations of Prime Minister Zenko
Suzuki and his successor, Yasuhiro Nakasone, prioritized administrative and fiscal
reform. The Provisional Commission for Administrative Reform was established
to formulate policies on administrative reform, while at the same time, a “zero-
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ceiling principle” was adopted with regard to the budget in order to restrain spend-
ing increases, meaning that budgets were to be held to the previous year’s level
(budget for FY 1982) or lower (budget for FY 1983 and beyond). In addition, the
government promoted the division and privatization of three public corporations—
the Japan National Railways, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corp., and
Japan Tobacco and Salt Public Corp.—and “fiscal reform without tax increases.”
Tax increases were considered under names such as “sales tax” and “value-added
tax,” but such measures were judged too difficult to effect at the time, given the
instability of the conservative electoral base. It was only in 1989 that the consump-
tion tax was finally introduced. For this reason, simple administrative reforms were
needed in order to realize cost savings, and reviews were undertaken of the kinds
of authority exercised by the various bureaucratic agencies, along with attempts to
relax unnecessary regulations. In other words, Japan pursued neo-liberal economic
policies aimed at “small government” of the kind then being adopted by the Thatcher
administration in the UK and the Reagan administration in the US.
1.2 Publication of the 1980s Vision
The “Industrial policy for the 1980s” (“1980s Vision”), submitted to the MITI Min-
ister in March 1980 by the Industrial Structure Council, represented an effort to
formulate a new vision, comparable to the Industrial Structure Research Advisory
Council’s 1963 report, “Heavy and Chemical Industrialization” and its “Knowledge-
Intensive Structure” report of 1971 (Okazaki 2012, p. 1). The 1980s Vision pointed
out that Japan (1) had entered an era of “diversified energy use” through its shift from
oil to alternative energy, (2) was developing a multipolar political economic struc-
ture centered on the United States, (3) had completed its “catch-up modernization”
and was in a new phase of economic growth, and (4) now accounted for 10% of the
world’s total gross domestic product. Based on the recognition of these changes, the
report articulated new long-term “national goals” and laid out the issues involved
in realizing these objectives. The new goals were defined as (1) contributing to the
international world as an “economic power,” (2) overcoming the constraints of being
a “resource-poor country,” and (3) achieving a lifestyle balance between “vitality”
and “comfort.”
With these points in mind, Chap. 9 of the 1980s Vision addressed “the kind
of industrial structure demanded by the times,” dividing its requirements into
four categories: (1) dynamic comparative advantage (based on the development
of a technology-intensive, high value-added, technologically autonomous industrial
structure), (2) fulfillment of the needs of the people (responding to growing social
needs arising from the aging of the population and changes in public conscious-
ness, lifestyle, and so on.), (3) Energy- and resource-conservation, and (4) security
(meaning guarantees of economic security). These were combined under the term
“Creative Knowledge Intensity” and defined the fundamental task for industrial pol-
icy as ensuring that the changes that occurred in the industrial structure in the 1970s
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be solidified through the exercise of creativity in the domestic development of tech-
nology, among other areas. Underlying this outlook was the recognition that Japan
had gradually caught up with the advanced economies of Europe and the United
States and therefore had to ask itself how to devise policy for the future when it was
already at the cutting edge technologically. The Vision also reflected an awareness
of the problem of how to cooperate with and contribute to the international com-
munity. Biotechnology, new materials, new energy, and fifth-generation computers,
among others, were suggested as specific new industries that could take the lead in
advancing the necessary shift in the industrial structure.
The 1980s Vision held the premise that these four highlighted needs would be
met by the voluntary efforts of businesses, but also addressed the possibility that it
might not be desirable from a long-term point of view to rely on market mechanisms
alone. It accordingly asserted that industrial policy had a role to play in: (1) realizing
an appropriate international division of labor based on themaintenance and formation
of dynamic comparative advantage, (2) establishing the foundations for long-term
development and economic security, (3) responding to the external diseconomies
that accompany corporate activity, and (4) enabling smooth industrial adjustment.
The 1980s Vision went into detail regarding the concrete measures involved
in these industrial adjustment policies. That is, temporary policy intervention was
regarded as necessary if friction were to mount over such problems as employment
or oversupply in “specific industrial sectors that were shrinking or undergoing con-
version to other sectors.” This “industrial adjustment” was to be applied in a limited
manner and in accordance with the following principles: (1) efficiency, (2) com-
plementarity (complementing the changes taking place through the market mech-
anism), (3) non-permanence (the adjustment phase was to be temporary), and (4)
clarity (the scope of measures were to be limited and the contents clear). The basic
approach, which saw industrial adjustment as occurring through market mechanisms
but invoked policy intervention as merited in specific cases, was in accord with the
Positive Adjustment Policy (PAP) set forth by the OECD in June 1978. In that sense,
it represented an early adoption of OECD policy.
This approach to industrial adjustment policy was based on assumptions about the
basic materials industries (petroleum refining, petrochemicals, vinyl chloride, and
others), the performance of which had been deteriorating due to the increase in raw
fuel and energy costs with the twin oil crises of the 1970s. The transformation of the
industrial structure required addressing expectations both of decline and of growth.
The basic material industries in this period (1) were intensive consumers of energy,
(2) had difficulty with product differentiation given the character of general-purpose
materials, (3) had large fixed costs which meant that any contraction in operations
made the burden of interest payments that much heavier, (4) were at a disadvantage
in their bargaining power over prices because of their many large-scale customers,
and (5) were extremely capital intensive.
Meanwhile, since the 1970s, as resource nationalism began emerging in various
countries, the government had been wary of rises in the basic material industries’
import ratios. For this reason, MITI regarded policy on basic materials industries not
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merely as a set ofmeasures to address recession but as an issue of national importance
with bearing on the entire industrial structure and economic security of Japan.
For these reasons, there was a need for coordination of the basic materials sector
as a whole, and MITI began exploring policy frameworks for the period to follow
the expiration of the Law on Temporary Measures for Stabilization of Specified
Depressed Industries (“Industry Stabilization Law”). As will be explained below,
the resulting Temporary Measures Law for the Structural Adjustment of Specific
Industries (May 1983 “Structural Improvement Law”) represented a plan for a
shift in industrial structure policies and industrial adjustment policies, including
the Antimonopoly Law.
1.3 Yen Appreciation and International Contributions
Prime Minister Nakasone, returning home after his summit meeting with US Pres-
ident Ronald Reagan in January 1985, instructed the Cabinet to set out market-
opening measures for the US and to proceed with simplifying import procedures
and improving standards and conformity assessment systems in the fields of com-
munication equipment, electronics, timber, medical devices, medicines, and so on.
Additionally, on April 9, the Prime Minister issued an unusual “call to the people”
on TV, declaring that, “In order to maintain the free trade system, we must open the
Japanesemarket to the utmost extent, ‘on the principle of freedomwith aminimumof
exceptions.’” He called for a radical reduction in government regulations on imports
and for entrusting choice, and responsibility for that choice, to consumers. He also
called on “each citizen to buy at least $100 worth of foreign products” for the sake
of expanding imports.
In October that year, Nakasone launched the “Study Group on Economic Struc-
tural Adjustment for International Cooperation,” a private advisory group charged
with examining measures for converting Japan’s industrial structure from export
dependence to external cooperation. Its chair was HaruoMaekawa, former Governor
of the Bank of Japan. The groupwas asked to considermeasures for (1)medium-term
structural adjustment to enable harmonization with the demands of the international
economy, (2) maintenance of an appropriate balance of trade, and (3) international
cooperation to stabilize and maintain appropriate currency values. The study group’s
“Maekawa Report” had a significant influence on the subsequent course of economic
policy.
TheMaekawa Report was compiled within the context of Japan’s particular inter-
national position in the 1980s. Western countries, which had maintained tight money
policies for a long time in efforts to curb the inflation caused by high oil prices, were
plagued by zero and negative growth, as well as high unemployment and inflation
rates. Interest rates in the US reached their highest level since World War II. The
official discount rate hit 14%, which in turn led interest rates to reach 18%. High
interest rates worldwide exerted strong deflationary pressures on each economy, hin-
dering economic growth. The burden of high interest payments also had the adverse
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effect of producing high cumulative debt in non-oil-producing developing countries.
The impact on the Japanese economy was also significant: high interest rates in the
US led to the depreciation of the yen, complicating Japan’s efforts to maintain low
interest rates that were designed to stimulate growth, and acting as a drag on the
recovery of domestic demand.
As the gap between domestic and foreign economic conditions widened, Euro-
pean and US criticism of Japan’s growing exports mounted, creating a need for
currency adjustment. In response to the criticism against Japan, the government pro-
moted import expansion andmarket-opening policies. Repeated efforts weremade to
resolve trade problemsbilaterally, including Japan–USnegotiations on steel, automo-
biles, machine tools, and semiconductors, among others, and industrial cooperation
plans with European countries.
However, these measures were not immediately sufficient to resolve the various
problems in the world economy, including the worsening of the US trade balance.
The Conference of Ministers and Governors of the Group of Five (G5) that met at
New York’s Plaza Hotel in September 1985 therefore agreed to undertake a large-
scale currency revaluation, or depreciation of the dollar, in what became known as the
Plaza Accord. The result was a sharp appreciation of the yen. This posed a challenge
to the Japanese economy, but the adjustment phase was not long. Japan gradually
advancedmeasures for expanding domestic demand and the economymade progress
toward recovery. Based on rising personal consumption and capital investment, the
steady growth of this period was the longest in duration after the Iwato boom of
1958–1961 and the Izanagi boom of 1965–1970.
1.4 “The Basic Design of 21st-Century Industrial Society”
Theyen appreciation in the latter half of the 1980s brought newchallenges to Japanese
industry, beginning with the basic materials industries. First, domestic demand stag-
nated due to the relocation overseas of high-demand industries, the expansion of
products and parts imports, and the shift to service industries. Second, domestic
market conditions deteriorated due to changes in both domestic and foreign supply
and demand and in the price structure. The government therefore formulated the
“Law of Temporary Measures to Facilitate Industrial Structural Adjustment” and
other measures to support companies and regions whose economic situation had
deteriorated markedly for the above reasons, and developed new approaches to shifts
in the industrial structure.
Meanwhile, the Planning Subcommittee of the Comprehensive Group on Indus-
trial Structural Adjustment in May 1986 issued a report titled “The basic design of
21st-century industrial society.” The report was a response to these new circum-
stances and pointed out the following new trends (Okazaki 2012, p. 6): (1) The
growing interdependence of the world’s economies meant that the world was mov-
ing from an era centered on the US to one of maintaining order through cooperation
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and solidarity among major countries; (2) technological innovation and an informa-
tion revolution, tantamount to a third industrial revolution, were underway (including
the trend toward “fusion” among disparate industries and diversification of industry);
(3) social consciousness was shifting toward a greater emphasis on a rich spiritual
and cultural life. Given these trends, the report cited three tasks for Japan: “inter-
national cooperation and international contribution,” “the maintenance of industrial
vitality based on the exercise of creativity,” and “creation of a new lifestyle culture.”
Among these, “international cooperation and international contribution” was espe-
cially important in defining the basic approaches of policy-making and industrial
policy. The report called for a fundamental reliance on market mechanisms, much
as the 1980s Vision had, but said that the role of industrial policy was to reduce
the domestic friction accompanying industrial adjustment and to respond promptly
to the international economic environment. The need to respond to external eco-
nomic imbalances and international economic friction was highlighted because of
the mounting urgency of these problems. In that sense, the underlying thinking of
the committee and its policy discussions had much in common with the Maekawa
Report issued by Prime Minister Nakasone’s private advisory body in 1986.
1.5 Progress in Deregulation
The administrative and financial reform promoted by the Second Provisional Com-
mission for Administrative Reform after the early 1980s constituted a review of
policy with an eye to reducing the administrative role. This was symbolized in the
July 1982 announcement in the “Third Report” of a “shift away from guidance, reg-
ulation, and protection of the private sector by civil administration toward a reliance
on the private sector and an administrative emphasis on assisting with the establish-
ment of a direction, and with coordination and complementarity.” In line with this
policy, the final report of March 1983 recommended concrete deregulation measures
concerning banks, property insurance, alcoholic beverage sales, silk threading, the
petroleum industry, the freight-forwarding industry, and others. Such deregulation
would transform the domestic economic structure through regulatory reform, while
also easing international tensions by opening the domestic market.
The Administrative Reform Commission established in July 1983 took over from
theSecondExtraordinary InvestigativeCommittee to deliberate on the role of govern-
ment regulation of private activities. The result of this examination was summarized
in the February 1985 report titled “Administrative reform for promoting the vitality
of the private sector.” On the premise that regulation and protection restricts private
business activity and preserves inefficient enterprises, the report called for a review
of the public sector aimed at promoting “the market and competition principles in the
private sector” and eliminating or reducing permits and subsidies. Deregulation was
divided into two categories: “economic regulation” that regulated business activity
on everything from entry into business, to facilities, quantities, and pricing; and “so-
cial regulation” for safety and sanitation. Deregulation was aimed at minimizing the
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former of the two, but also targeted the latter where administrative divisions had led
to duplication. Deregulation was thus clearly positioned to be one of the key points
of administrative reform.
Additionally, the April 1986 Maekawa Report, seeking to harmonize with the
world on the issue of current account imbalances, advocated limiting exceptions to
the free-market principle. It thereby added new impetus to deregulation as a means
of responding to economic friction with the outside world. The Second Provisional
Council for the Promotion of Administrative Reform, established in April 1987,
formed a Public Regulation Subcommittee for a fundamental regulatory review, and
based on its deliberations, issued a “Report on the relaxation of public regulations”
in December 1988. The Second Reform Council, like its predecessor, had favored
administrative reform and an emphasis on private sector vitality. The Public Reg-
ulations Subcommittee added an emphasis on improving the quality of life of the
Japanese by making structural adjustments of the external imbalances and eliminat-
ing the gap between domestic and foreign prices. Regulatory reviews were carried
out in seven specific areas: distribution, logistics, information and communications,
finance, agricultural products, new businesses, and the inspection certification sys-
tem and qualification systems. In December 1988, a Cabinet Decision was issued
to respect “to the utmost” the report titled “Directions for the Promotion of Dereg-
ulation.” Meanwhile, because US pressure on Japan was a constant feature dur-
ing this period, deregulation took place within the framework for implementing the
1989 Japan–US Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) and the April 1993US–Japan
Framework for a New Economic Partnership. A Third Administrative Reform Coun-
cil was established in October 1990 and its first report, submitted in July 1991, con-
firmed implementation of the final report of the Second Reform Council, and stated
that public regulations would be halved in number within 10 years. Deregulation
therefore remained a consistent feature of policy from this point forward.
2 Economic Superpower Status and International
Contributions: Responses to Economic Friction
2.1 Export Adjustments—From Market-Oriented
Sector-Specific (MOSS) Talks to the Structural
Impediments Initiative (SII)
2.1.1 Japan–US Trade Friction and the MOSS Talks
Economic friction between Japan and the United States worsened significantly in the
early 1980s, extending beyond sector-specific trade issues, and giving rise to criticism
of Japan, such as accusations of unfair trade policy in high-tech industries. While
rebutting such arguments, Japan also responded by implementing market-opening
measures in six stages from December 1981 to March 1985. However, with the US
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Fig. 1 US trade and trade balance with Japan. Source Abe (2013, pp. 54–55)
maintaining its policy of high interest rates and a high dollar value, Japan’s trade
surplus continued to expand, and the trade friction did not subside.
It was in this context that in the late 1980s the MOSS (Market-Oriented Sector-
Selective) talks began.Thiswas an approach to negotiations agreedupon at the Japan–
U.S. Summit meeting of January 1985, with the objective of eliminating barriers to
entry into the Japanese market by relaxing government regulations and reducing tar-
iffs on individual items of interest to the United States. The MOSS talks took up four
industrial sectors: telecommunications, medicines and medical equipment, electron-
ics, and forest products. In October 1986, Japan and the United States announced
an agreement reaffirming the “desirability of these discussions for promoting the
increase of imports to Japan by achieving unrestricted market access for the United
States and other foreign countries.”
MITI was involved in the electronics and forestry talks. In the former, “items
for implementation” included reducing tariffs on electronics by 20%, eliminating
tariffs on telecommunications equipment in which the US had an interest, and other
measures. TheMOSS talks, citing these positive results, added “transport equipment”
as a new sector in May 1986. Auto parts eventually joined the list (Fig. 1).
2.1.2 Responding to US Super-301
In 1988 the United States enacted the Omnibus Foreign Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988. Previously, the US had addressed unfair or unreasonable foreign trade
practices with the harsh measures of Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade Act of 1974.
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Section 301 made it possible to call on the government to adopt retaliatory measures
where negotiations had not yielded the desired results (Abe 2013, p. 66). The US
government had not ever applied Section 301, because depending on how it was
exercised, it could potentially constitute a violation of GATT (the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade). But Congress became more vociferous in calling for it
from 1985 on. In September 1985, therefore, the Reagan administration announced
its “new trade policy” of firmly opposing unfair foreign trade through the utilization
of Section 301. The comprehensive trade law mentioned above, enacted in response
to this “new trade policy,” made numerous changes, including amending Section 301
and establishing the Super 301 Provisions of the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act. Depend-
ing on how they were handled, these changes could have a protectionist impact.
In adopting them, therefore, the United States was showing a stronger inclination
toward unilateral action.
The amended Section 301 enabled the Office of the United States Trade Repre-
sentative (USTR) to initiate investigations, based on appeals from interested parties,
into whether foreign government measures or policies were “unfair,” “irrational,” or
“discriminatory” and in violation of trade agreements, and to apply sanctions where
cause was found. However, because the criteria for judgment were unclear and the
USTRwas in the role of both prosecutor and judge, the new system did not satisfy the
standards of neutrality and fairness. Super 301 required the USTR to submit reports
to Congress about cases of foreign unfair trade practices, to undertake negotiations
with the country in question with the aim of removing the trade barriers, and to adopt
sanctions where the problem could not be resolved within one year.
Super 301 was said to be aimed at Japan, but in May 1989, the USTR designated
India and Brazil, along with Japan, as Super 301 “priority countries.” In Japan’s
case, government procurement of supercomputers and satellites and technical import
restrictions on forest products were singled out for negotiation. Nevertheless, the
decisionwasmade that Japan should not be judged as unfair across the board, and that
negotiations should proceed outside the scope of Super 301. Moreover, the Japanese
government adhered to its position that it could not participate in negotiations based
on a Super 301 designation. As a result, bilateral negotiations were transferred to the
Japan–U.S. Trade Committee, which convened in Hawaii in September 1989.
Supercomputers were among the cases under negotiation (Abe 2013, p. 70).
Underlying this problem was the decline in market share of the US companies that
in 1980 had dominated the world supercomputer market, and the simultaneous rise
in market share of Japan’s general-purpose supercomputers that had swept into the
market in the latter 1980s. Therefore, the main issues under negotiation were (1) the
adoption by the Japanese government of preferential policies for domestic products,
and (2) the US argument that Japanese companies were making substantial discounts
in order to eliminate US companies from the market.
The negotiations resulted in Japan’s undertaking to ameliorate the discount issue.
Beginning with the budget requests for 1990, its budget plans would reflect appro-
priate market prices for supercomputers. It also undertook to promote “computer
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installation procedures” for procurement. There were limits to improving the situa-
tion, as evidenced, for example, in the July 1996 lawsuit against dumping, filed by
US supercomputer maker Cray Inc., but certain improvements were seen as a result
of the bilateral negotiations.
2.1.3 Japan–US Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) Talks
In April 1986, Foreign Affairs Minister Shintaro Abe and US Secretary of State
George Schultz agreed to hold talks on the structural problems affecting the economic
balance between the two nations. Because cooperation on macroeconomic policy
has a limited effect on correcting external imbalances, structural improvements and
adjustment at the microeconomic level were deemed necessary by both sides. The
talks based on this agreement began in October 1986, and because of the overlapping
issues involved, President George H.W. Bush in May 1989 proposed holding Japan–
US talks on structural issues in a framework separate from the Super 301 talks (Abe
2013, p. 77).
The Japan–US talks on structural issues were intended “as a supplement to
macroeconomic policy coordination, wherein the two parties would identify to each
other the structural problems in the two countries that are thought to impede the
adjustment of the trade imbalance, and each take steps to resolve these issues.” The
first meetings were held in September 1989, followed by an interim report issued in
the fourth round of talks in April 1990, and a final report in the fifth round in June
of that year. The report called for Japan to increase public investment, amend its
Anti-Monopoly Law to strengthen it, and other measures.
Not only were the Japan–US SII talks linked to the resolution of specific issues,
they also were greatly significant in generating a change in attitude toward negoti-
ations on the part of the US. At the time, the US had conceived of negotiations in
which the US would seek systematic increases in US exports to Japan. This marked
a change from the Reagan administration approach of regulating Japanese imports.
Japan, however, demanded and achieved two-way talks, in which each country
identified problems in the other. As a result, the US realized that the current-account
imbalance between Japan and theUSwas basically amacroeconomic problem.Given
its earlier assumption that its trade deficit was due to the closed nature of other
markets and that the aim of trade talks was therefore to open those other markets,
this constituted an epochal change in perspective. The talks were founded on the
recognition that the special economic and social structure of Japan hindered US
exports to Japan, but the SII talks of the Bush Administration were limited to seeking
a voluntary improvement of procedures on the part of Japan. This was a significant
feature of the talks and fundamentally different from the Clinton Administration’s
“results-oriented” approach that followed in the 1990s.
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2.2 Negotiations on Specific Issue Areas Across Many
Sectors
2.2.1 The Issue of Voluntary Controls in Automobiles and Auto Parts
The automobile and auto parts issues emerged against a backdrop of structural
changes in the US auto market triggered by the oil crisis (Hasegawa 2013, p. 336).
US manufacturers had maintained an overwhelming advantage within their market
sectors, mainly large passenger cars in the 5,000 cc class, but with the impact of the
second oil crisis in 1979, consumer preferences shifted to fuel-efficient compact cars.
Under these conditions, imports of small Japanese-made cars rose sharply. Automo-
bile imports to the US in 1979 were up 16.4% over the previous year, with Japanese
autos posting a 30.5% increase even as domestic car sales decreased by 10.5%. With
the decline in performance by the Big Three and in particular the crisis faced by the
Chrysler Corp., the US auto industry, labor unions, and Congress were highly critical
of Japan. In 1979, the US Trade Representative (USTR) Rubin Askew indicated that
the US government was ready to impose import restrictions on Japanese-made cars.
At the January 1980 general meeting of the United Automobile Workers (UAW),
UAW president Douglas M. Fraser strongly urged restricting Japanese exports to the
US while at the same time calling on Japanese automakers to manufacture locally in
the US.
Amid strong protectionist pressures domestically, the Carter Administration in
1980 announced its opposition to imposing import restrictions on Japanese cars or
requiring Japan to adopt export restrictions, instead calling for Japanese makers
to invest in the United States and for the expansion of US-made autos and auto
parts exports to Japan. These issues were then left to intergovernmental negotia-
tions between the two countries. Two administrative-level meetings of Japanese and
US auto specialists were held in April 1980. In May, Japan announced voluntary
measures in the form of a “Japan–US Auto Package,” and the US took this as a
positive step. Japan’s automakers had not made any clear expression of intent to
invest in the US. In light of this, the package included the promotion of Japanese
automakers’ investment in the US and measures to liberalize the Japanese market.
This was intended to address the two principal demands of the US: first, that strict
import inspections and standards impeding the export of US-made autos to Japan
be relaxed, and second, that the gap be reduced between the taxes imposed on large
autos and on small. These measures were not enough to resolve the issue, however.
With the recession deepening in the US auto industry, the UAW in June 1980 and
Ford Motor Company in August filed suit with the US International Trade Com-
mission (ITC) based on Section 201 of the 1975 Trade Act. In November, the ITC
rejected the lawsuit,whereupon strong anti-Japanese sentiment emerged inCongress:
the House actively sought enactment of legislation to restrict imported vehicles, and
Congress adopted a joint resolution calling for the US government to respond to the
situation. In April 1981, the newly inaugurated Reagan administration responded to
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the mounting demand for protection by announcing the rebuilding of the automobile
industry through deregulation.
In response to the seriousness of the situation, MITI “requested sensible exports”
of the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA), and given the judg-
ment that legal restrictions on exports would be undesirable, the automakers began
considering plans for self-regulation to restrain exports. On the US side, the ITC
indicated that “the increase in imported cars is not the main cause of the slump in the
US automobile industry,” but the calls for strong regulation persisted nonetheless.
For this reason, the still new Reagan administration clarified that USTR would
be the contact point for consultations with the Japanese government, and that while
some import control measures were necessary for the domestic automobile industry,
the United States should avoid actions that would violate the free-trade principles it
advocated, and unofficially signaled that it would leave the regulation of imported
vehicles to the voluntary judgment of its trade partner. The Japanese government
announced its export projections based on the expected totals of exports of each
vehiclemaker, and through discussionswithMITIMinisterRokusukeTanaka, sought
the reaction of the United States. Based on MITI instructions, it decided to regulate
exports to the US for a three-year period from April 1981 to March 1984, and that
its initial framework would limit the number of automobile exports to 1.68 million.
The second-year numbers would include the first-year numbers plus 16.5% of
whatever growth had been achieved in themarket. The condition of theUSpassenger-
car market as of the end of the second year would be evaluated in the third year, and
the question of whether to continue with the restrictions would be considered. These
Voluntary Export Restraints (VER) continued to be implemented beyond FY 1984,
through FY 1991, while the upper limits on exports were raised. Local production
in the US by Japanese automakers also advanced from 1981 forward (see Table 1).
Regarding the issue of parts procurement, auto parts became subject to theMOSS
talks mentioned above. As the US saw it, even with the premise that auto parts were
not subject to institutional barriers such as tariffs, access to the Japanese market was
a problem. Surveys were therefore conducted of the relationships between Japanese
automakers and auto parts suppliers, and talks followed three times in 1986. The final
report, issued in August 1987, called for JAMA tomake regular disclosures to the US
of procurement data regarding US-made auto parts, to provide US parts suppliers
with clear information about contacts, and to promote plans for the expansion of
trade in imported auto parts, and to follow up on them.
Technical survey teams and auto parts purchasing missions were dispatched from
Japan and US personnel were hired to direct purchasing. Through these means Japan
was able to obtain recognition that the relationships between Japanese automakers
and parts suppliers were neither closed nor unique, and that they were rational and
based on their superiority relative to others in the international market. However, due
to differences between Japan and US in parts-procurement practices, the effect of
measures for expanding purchasing was limited.
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2.2.2 Setting Numerical Targets for Semiconductors
Friction over semiconductors surfaced around 1981, when Japan began adopting vol-
untary restrictions on its automobile exports to the US (Hasegawa 2013, p. 729). The
semiconductor issue arose in the context of Japanese semiconductor manufacturers’
rapid advance into global markets in the latter 1970s, particularly in the industry’s
memory chips sector. The growth was particularly marked in Japan’s exports to the
US. In February 1983 the US Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) launched
various denunciations of Japan’s actions, including a report titled “The Effect of
Government Targeting on World Semiconductor Competition: A Case History of
Japanese Industrial Strategy and Its Costs for Americans.” In June 1985, the SIA
intensified its offensive by filing suit under Article 301 of the 1974 Trade Act.
MITI Minister Michio Watanabe and US Trade Representative Clayton Yeut-
ter reached an agreement in principle at a May 1986 meeting, in accordance with
which the contents for an agreement were put together in July, including expanding
opportunities for entry by foreign semiconductor makers into Japan’s market and
instituting a monitoring system to prevent dumping. These became the core of the
September 1986 US–Japan Semiconductor Agreement. Its most important feature
was not incorporated in the agreement per se, but rather in a side letter saying that,
“TheGovernment of Japan recognizes theU.S. semiconductor industry’s expectation
that semiconductor sales in Japan of foreign capital-affiliated companies will grow
to at least slightly above 20% of the Japanese market in five years. The Government
of Japan considers that this can be realized and welcomes its realization.” The US
side interpreted this to mean that the Japanese government acknowledged numerical
targets, which was to create significant problems in later years.
Following the conclusion of the agreement in March 1987, the United States
announced that it regarded Japan to be in violation of this agreement. Its reasons
were: 1. that entry by foreign semiconductors into Japan’s market was insufficient,
and 2. that dumping by Japanese firms in third-country markets was continuing to
take place. The announcement said that in order to offset the sales opportunities lost
by US industry, the US would impose a 100% tariff (totaling roughly 300 million
dollars) on Japanese-made electronic instruments such as personal computers and
color televisions, triggering the imposition of these measures in April that year.
While continuing discussion with the US, the Japanese government concluded that
the agreement violatedGATT and proposed bilateral negotiations based onArticle 23
Paragraph 1. The US accordingly eliminated the measures that were based on reason
2 above, but those based on Reason 1 remained in place until a new Japan–US
Semiconductor Agreement was concluded in June 1991 (Fig. 2).
2.2.3 Measures to Address Steel Industry Trade Friction with the US
In the early 1980s, the US steel industry, whose profitability was deteriorating due
to a high cost structure based on the high cost of labor, attributed its sluggishness to
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Hasegawa (2013, p. 886).
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unfair trade practices by Japanese steel-makers and inDecember 1982 filed forUSTR
application of relief measures under Article 301 of the Trade Act (Yamazaki 2011,
p. 235). Its complaint was not accepted, but the US steel industry continued to raise
similar issues thereafter. US–Japan Steel talks began in October that year, following
President Reagan’s statements that he would be seeking cuts in steel imports and
improvement in the competitiveness of the US steel industry.
MITI entered the negotiations while in frequent exchanges of information with
trading companies and steelmakers, and in March 1985 concluded the “Japan–
US Steel Trade Agreement, Voluntary Restraint Agreement (VRA). “This limited
imported products (not including semi-finished products) to 18.5% of the volume
of domestic consumption and restricted Japanese steel imports to the US to a 5.8%
market share. In principle, the target items were all steel materials, and the target
period was the five years from October 1984 to September 1989. The same VRAs
were established with other countries, but for Japan, which had sought to maintain
a 6% share of the US market, this represented a major concession. Based on this
arrangement, MITI issued the following instructions to the domestic steel industry
in April 1985: 1. to establish a new export association to cover all the items subject
to regulation, and 2. to establish an export cooperation association for exporters to
the US in order to conclude an agreement among producers that would cover the
items targeted by the regulations. The Association of Exporters of Steel to the US
was established in May 1985, and adopted an Export Approval System based on
the exercise of the outsider regulations of Article 28, paragraph 2 of the Export–
Import Transaction Law, and took responsibility for issuing export certificates and
exchanging information among companies and between companies and MITI. MITI
considered this a short-term measure, and because the US too was concerned that it
constituted a violation of antitrust law in the US, the Antitrust Division of the US
Department of Justice also worked in close cooperation with MITI.
The “Association of Exporters to the US” was responsible for frameworks coor-
dinating the volume of exports allotted to each manufacturer. The export quotas set
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up to control export volumes allowed for the following to some extent: (1) Advance
Use, meaning the advance use of the next fiscal year’s quota for the prior year; (2)
Carry-overs, meaning the carry-over to the following year of export limits which
were not reached in the current year; and (3) substitutions of yearly quotas, product
types, and exporting companies, in instances of quotas not beingmet for certain types
of products. That Japan’s insistence was able to secure this flexibility in operations
helped enable the concessions on quantitative targets. In October 1989, a bilateral
agreement was concluded to extend the VRA for 30 months. Japan’s export quota
would be 5.0% for the first 15 months and 5.3% in the second 15 months. While
the export quotas were reduced from 5.8%, the flexibility was enhanced. The VRA
expired in March 1992.
The above VRA had the following effects, showing the Japan was not simply
bearing the burden of export reduction. Japanese steelmakers’ exports to the USwere
extremely profitable at the time when the agreement was concluded, and securing
stability in that market was of great importance. In fact, Japan was earlier than
other countries to reach agreement with the US in the negotiations for its extension.
Moreover, because of the rapid appreciation of the yen, the dollar-denominated steel
prices remained unable to keep pace with the rise in prices; sustaining the VRA
export quotas was therefore preferable to following the usual path of accusations of
dumping. In these ways, Japan’s steel industry benefitted from the VRA.
Meanwhile, Japanese steelmakers expanded their exports to Asia to offset the
decrease in exports to the US. These included supplying Japanese companies that
were entering Asian markets. In the latter 1980s, Domestic demand expanded as
well in the latter 1980s. Steelmakers therefore found themselves unable even to fill
the quotas set under the VRA, in the final year exporting only just over 50% of the
quota volumes. Thus the VRA didnot prove burdensome to Japan’s steelmakers. The
US steelmakers, however, while standing to benefit from the restrictions on Japanese
exports, were unable to achieve sufficient rationalization of their industry.
2.2.4 Machine Tool Industry and Trade Friction with the US
For about 10 years beginning in the late 1970s, the United States’ increasing reliance
on imported machine tools became an issue (Abe 2013, p. 139; Hasegawa 2013,
p. 729). One reason for this increased reliance on imports was the advance of low-
priced small and medium-sized Japanese goods, centered on numerically controlled
(NC) machine tools, which were well-regarded in the US because of their abil-
ity to respond to specific user needs. For this reason, dissatisfaction and a sense
of crisis gradually increased among US makers and was expressed at the Septem-
ber 1977 National Machine Tool Builders Association (NMTBA) meeting. MITI
was concerned that the dumping issue, already prominent in steel, would spread to
the machine tool industry. While working to overcome the opposition of Japan’s
machine tool industry, MITI implemented an export certification system in February
1978 based on the Export and Import Transactions Law. This “Approval System for
exports of horizontal numerically controlled lathes, horizontal and verticalmachining
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centers, and related numerically controlled accessories” was implemented regard-
ing exports to the US and Canada in March. In response, the NMTBA, which had
been examining the issue, delivered an objective analysis of the competitiveness of
Japan’s machine tool industry in May 1981, finding no sign of unfair trade practices
on Japan’s part or of actions to restrict competition.
US dissatisfaction was not thereby eliminated, however. In 1982, trade friction
between Japan and the US entered the field of machine tools when Houdaille Indus-
tries, Inc. of the US made an appeal to the president, by way of USTR, to exclude
Japanese-made machining centers and numerical control punching machines from
the investment tax credit target, based on Article 103 of the 1971 Revenue Act. The
relevant associations in Japan put together a document arguing against this action,
but letters of opinion continued to be submitted to the USTR. The USTR and US
Department of Commerce thus began focusing on Article 301 of the 1974 Trade
Act with machine tools as a new target. In February 1983, US Trade Representative
Brock expressed to MITI Minister Sadanori Yamanaka his suspicions that Japan’s
industrial policy constituted an unfair trade practice, and hinted that the US might
apply Article 301 in order to rectify the situation.
Meanwhile, the NMTBA continued with its suits. In March 1983, it sought from
the Department of Commerce restrictions on the import of foreign machine tools
based on Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act. Based on a MITI proposal,
a Japan–US Industrial Policy Coordination Committee was established and in mid-
May 1983 held its first meeting.
Through this committee, affiliated Japanese companies argued that the content
of the NMTBA litigation was based on a misunderstanding of industrial policy. No
major developments followed in the case until January 1986. This was because anal-
ysis of Japan’s machine tool industry showing that NC machine tools were a rational
product of innovation, and the US machine-tool industry did not have the political
power to impose constraints on user choice in the US. However, after deliberations
on the NMTBA case resumed in January 1986, President Reagan in May issued
a statement calling for voluntary export controls by Japan. Consultations followed
several times between the US and Japanese governments, and in November 1986, the
two countries came to an agreement on the voluntary regulation of export volumes
of six machine tools for a five-year period beginning in January 1987 (Table 2).
Volume export restraints were applied to three types of NC machine tools in
line with the Export Trade Control Order of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign
Trade Control Law. The three non-NC varieties of machine tools were subject to a
monitoring approach, and the volumeof exports to theUS in fact remained at the same
levels as they were when self-regulation began. The voluntary export restraints saw
some temporary relaxation in 1988 and 1989, but in December 1991, the restraints
on four of the models were extended by agreement for an additional two years, until
1993.
The effect of these restraints was a decline in the volume of NC machine-tools
exports to the US from 1985 forward, and because Japanese production and exports
both increased after 1988, the rate of increase of exports to theUS fell by comparison.
Self-regulation was recognized as effective in the sense that it limited exports to
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Table 2 Voluntary export controls on machine tools, 1987 (Rate of Reduction)
Machine type 1986 number of units Original restrictions July 1987 Revision of
restrictions








NC drilling machines N.A. 250 N.A.
NC numerically controlled
Source Hasegawa (2013, p. 243)
Table 3 Status of implementation of the action program on the assessment process for standards












Standards and certification areas 81 72 80
Reducing government intervention 33 30 33
Reducing the number of applicable items 10 9 10
Moving from government certification to
self-certification
15 13 15
Reducing or relaxing the number of regulations
and standards
5 5 5
Other 3 3 3
Comprehensive determinations by the
coordination headquarters for standards and
conformity
48 42 47
Proactive use of foreign inspection data and
organizations
20 18 20
Assuring transparency 7 7 7




Import process areas 10 10 10
Reducing the scope of procedures’ applicability 3 3 3
Simplifying/speeding up of procedures 7 7 7
Total 91 82 90
Abe (2013, p. 297)
120 3 The Global Responsibilities of an Economic Superpower (1981–1992)
the US. At the same time, however, the per-unit price of US imports of Japanese
machine-tools rose. This was due in part to the yen’s appreciation but also reflected
the Japanese industry’s shift to more sophisticated and higher-value added products.
2.2.5 Japan-Europe Trade Friction and Negotiations
The growth in European imports of general and electric machinery from Japan
became an issue in the early 1980s amid the trade imbalance between Japan and
the EC (European Community) and the recession in EC countries. In July 1980,
the EC Committee issued “EC’s trade policy towards Japan—a reexamination” and
demanded that Japan adopt voluntary restraints on its exports in exchange for the
EC’s eliminating discriminatory restrictions aimed at Japanese products (Abe 2013,
p. 147). Japan responded by adopting voluntary restraints on exports of the products
in questionwhile also continuing to negotiate with Britain’s Department of Trade and
Industry on industrial cooperation. However, the EC Committee in February 1982
issued a report on economic relations with Japan and expressed its intention of filing
suit with GATT on the issue of the openness of the Japanese market. Because the
EC was unable to obtain the desired conclusion from the GATT deliberations, the
EC Committee twice extended its system of monitoring Japanese imports: once in
December 1982 and once in March 1983, adding to its list of “sensitive items” such
products as VTRs, light commercial vehicles, motorcycles, and then forklifts, hi-fi
equipment, and quartz watches. These monitoring measure were maintained until
1985.
Separately, France introduced its own import supervision system and required a
longer period than usual for obtaining model certifications of Japanese-made cars. In
October 1982, it decided on “economic relations measures for improving the trade
balance,” adopting a series of measures that made international access to France’s
market more difficult, such as requiring the use of French in customs documents,
and centralizing in its inland Poitiers office the customs offices handling VTRs.
These measures potentially violated GATT in many ways, but in February 1983,
MITI announced a three-year implementation of minimum export pricing system
on VTRs based on the Export and Import Transaction Law, and released a plan
on voluntary export restraints regarding the EC. In addition, in response to the EC
Committee’s presentation of revisions to its comprehensive list of demands of Japan
in April 1984,MITI announced its projections regarding exports to the EC of specific
items such as VTRs and communicated its intention to maintain voluntary controls.
The so-called Japan Problemmeanwhile deepened in the mid-1980s. Discussions
were sought on such issues as improving Japan’s distribution system and standards
and certification systems, promoting government procurement, simplifying import
procedures, and adopting measures to counter illegal products. In response to these
demands,which camenot only from theUSbut also from theEC, Japan, asmentioned
above, announced in July 1985 a “framework for action programs for improving
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market access.” From November to December that year, Japan and various EC gov-
ernments held talks on industrial cooperation, and the EC–JapanCenter for Industrial
Cooperation was established in Tokyo, as proposed by Japan.
This effort at mutual cooperation was expanded through regular consultations on
Japan–UK industrial cooperation launched in 1981. The first meeting of the Japan–
EC Symposium was held in November 1982 with the theme “Japan–EC Economic
Relations and the World Economy—Exploring Paths to Improved Coordination.”
The EC discussed the trade imbalance and the closed nature of the Japanese market
while Japan pointed out the lack of effort on the part of the EC to develop its market in
Japan and also the need for concrete explanations of the closed nature of the market.
These meetings were to be held about once a year thereafter. At the Second Japan–
EC Symposium, it was agreed that discussions on industrial cooperation would be
held between MITI Minister Yamanaka and EC Committee Deputy Chair Étienne
Davignon on a regular basis. It was in the course of this process that the Japan–EC
Industrial Cooperation Center was established in 1985.
2.3 Liberalization of the Domestic Market and Deregulation
2.3.1 Market Liberalization
In the early 1980s, “non-tariff barriers” became the focus of criticism of Japan,
beginning with issues related to Japan’s import systems. Domestic industry, too, was
beginning to raise criticisms of Japan’s import systems (Abe 2013, p. 246). The
Product Import Measures Council, a new subcommittee of the Import Council at the
July 1979 Trade Convention, discussed reviewing trends in product imports, evalu-
ating existing measures to promote imports, and deliberating on import-promotion
measures for the future. The subcommittee met five times before June of 1980, and
submitted its conclusions as proposals to the Import Council, pointing out problems
in import procedures and also puting together an overview to introduce overseas
audiences to some particular features of the Japanese market. The May 1982 Min-
isterial Conference on Economic Measures decided that issues of Japanese business
practices and Japan’s distribution system would also be taken up by the Product
Import Measures Council, and reviews were launched of systems related to imports.
Meanwhile, the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) issued the
“Request Concerning the Improvement of External Economic Relations” in Decem-
ber 1981, and as “measures to further open the market,” proposed tariff reduction,
the relaxation of unit and volume import restrictions and the elimination of non-tariff
barriers, along with the implementation of “various measures effective for promoting
imports,” such as expansion of product imports and emergency imports.
Keidanren also issued a proposal to the government in December titled “Views
on Import and Export Procedures and Inspections” and called for the simplification
and rationalization of customs procedures and a review of import inspections. At the
same time, the Import Promotion Measures Council established by MITI in October
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issued an interim report citing the necessity of (1) tariff reduction, (2) relaxation of
restrictions on imports, (3) improvement of import inspection procedures, and (4)
improvement of other areas such as non-tariff barriers. In December 1981, the gov-
ernment decided on “external economic measures” at the Ministerial Conference on
Economic Action and called for concrete policies in the five areas of market opening,
import promotion, exports, industrial cooperation, and economic cooperation.
Furthermore, in theMinisterial Conference on Economic Action in January 1982,
the government adopted “market-opening policies” focused on measures to improve
import inspection procedures. Themain content of themeasures for the “first step” of
market opening included implementation of remedial measures on 67 cases selected
from the 99 cases of import inspection procedures that had been under review at
the meetings on measures regarding product imports; the addition of nine further
improvements for consideration; and establishment of an Ombudsman Office of
Trade and Investment (OTO) to handle complaints from other countries related to
import inspection procedures. Particular to these measures was that many of them
were safety standards of the past that were in effect cases of barriers to entry.
These safety standards had been created not as trade policy but because of partic-
ular sectoral needs and were not necessarily intended to shut out foreign products,
but many could easily be criticized as over-regulation. Complaints on imports, which
used to be brought to the US–Japan Trade Facilitation Committee (TFC), the Product
Import Measures Council, and the liaison for each of the agencies and ministries,
were now brought to the OTO, which held its first deliberations in February 1982.
However, the United States continued to exert strong pressure on Japan to open
its market. Keidanren conducted its own independent investigation and in April 1982
put together its “Proposals on Easing Economic Friction with Foreign Countries,”
asserting that “Once protectionism spreads, it cannot fail to shake the free trade
system and even the liberal economic system itself” and “The way our country can
contribute to world peace is by realizing a new role in international society and
cooperating with other countries to maintain and strengthen the free-trade system
and build stable interdependent relationships.” In May, the government decided on
its “second step,” which was “measures to open up the market.”
Import-promotion measures were implemented in the following areas: improve-
ment of import inspection procedures; reduction of tariffs; relaxation of import
restrictions; expansion of imports; improvement of distribution facilities and business
practices; liberalization of trade in services; and cutting-edge technologies. Thus, the
efforts to expand imports, which had been under way since the latter 1970s, were
given the force of policy in the fall of 1982. The written opinion of the General Com-
mittee submitted to the Trade Council in October was the first example of a concrete
and comprehensive system of Import Promotion Policies, which shaped the devel-
opment of subsequent measures. Suggestions were made about the need to promote
foreign countries’ export expansion efforts through JETRO and MIPRO (Manufac-
tured Imports and Investment Promotion Organization), leading to events and import
fairs with input from the Trade Council (Fig. 3).
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Fig. 3 Comprehensive plan for import expansion (Abe 2013 p.191). Note JFC, Japan Financing
Corporation; JASME, Japan Finance Corporation for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises.
Source A similar chart is found in Tsusansho kōhō (October 2, 1990, p. 8)
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Fig. 3 (continued)
2.3.2 Simplification of Standards and Conformity Procedures
The second step, “market-opening policies,” was well-received by the US up to
a point, but the tensions remained. In the closing meetings of the Japan–US
administrative-level trade talks in August 1982, the US said it was ready to ask
Japan for bilateral discussions, based on GATT, on Japan’s inspection procedures
for imports of metal baseball bats. Import systems had previously been a relatively
minor problem between the two countries, but the metal bats issue was related to the
systems, practices, and ways of thinking of the two nations, and proved a trigger for
entering more deeply into each other’s domestic systems.
It was in this context that Keidanren in December 1982 submitted to the gov-
ernment its “Recommendations on Improvement of Trade-related Permissions and
Inspections.” This proposal was noteworthy because rather than adhering to Keidan-
ren’s earlier reactive stance regarding economic friction, it suggested a strong recog-
nition that the comprehensive establishment of the “principles of free trade” would
be positive for private enterprises. It argued that, since procedures and inspections
were “complicated and opaque” and the “confusion around the interpretation and
operation of the law” acted as a “bureaucratic barrier,” “we should abolish excessive
inspections, simplify and unify complicated procedures, and standardize the oper-
ation of laws and ordinances, in order to actively promote smoother and speedier
distribution.”
Against a background of domestic and international criticism, the government
in the January 1983 Ministerial Conference on Economic Measures decided on
“Market-opening policies” in five areas, of which measures on non-tariff barriers
formed a major part. The government also established the Liaison and Coordina-
tion Headquarters on Standards and Certification Systems (Headquarters for Stan-
dards Coordination) to put together a bulk amendment bill by the end of March for
simplifying the standards and conformity assessment system (Abe 2013, p. 270).
Meanwhile, Keidanren submitted to the government its “Opinion concerning the
amendment and improvement of trade-related laws and regulations” in March 1983.
It argued that:
From the general viewpoint of the national economy, not just the limited matter of the
standards and conformity system for import inspections, we should bring about substantive
reform through a change in consciousness regarding trade-related permits and inspections
and seek not only to ease the trade friction but also to reduce the burden on the people and
simplify and rationalize administrative affairs in order to invigorate the private sector.
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The Opinion urged revision and operational improvement of 41 laws and
ordinances to encourage firms to become less passive about US–Japan friction.
After consideration by the Headquarters for Standards Coordination, the govern-
ment decided at theMinisterial Conference onEconomic Policy to apply the principle
of “nondiscrimination between domestic and foreign firms” with a comprehensive
revision of 17 laws including the Electrical Appliance and Materials Control Law
so that foreign firms could apply directly for inspections of import products. Vari-
ous measures, including revision of the law, were undertaken in response to strong
demand from Europe and America. But MITI stressed that the revisions were aimed
at equal treatment for domestic and foreign firms, not at altering fundamental prin-
ciples, and that they would not come at the cost of consumer safety. Because the
revisions did not bring about an immediate rise in imports, they did not eliminate
trade friction either. In February 1984, MITI simplified the standards and confor-
mity procedures so as to accept foreign inspection data, in hopes of gaining the
understanding of those countries that were most critical of Japan.
2.3.3 Advancing the Action Program
In 1983, the Product Import Measures Council began reviewing issues concern-
ing the distribution system. The Japanese government took the position that it was
reasonable that Japan’s distribution mechanisms would be adapted to their home
environment, that non-rational systems were in the process of being improved, that
foreign exporters should show an understanding of Japan’s unique environment, and
that Japan was ready to cooperate in promoting that understanding. This was not an
argument that foreign critics of Japan were ready to accept, but neither did the critics
have a clear position about what precisely was needed to be resolved.
The Product Import Measures Council responded in June 1983 with a report
titled “The Japanese distribution system and business practices: analysis recommen-
dations.” The Council clarified in detail the particularities of the Japanese system
where it differed from European and American systems, and while pointing out a
number of features for improvement, also emphasized those that had a certain ratio-
nality and explained them to those overseas. Because the current account imbalance
was expanding principally as a result of differences in macroeconomic policy, how-
ever, the Council’s market-opening policies could not necessarily result in a direct
expansion in imports.
Prime Minister Nakasone therefore instructed MITI Minister Keijiro Murata in
November 1984 to examine the market-opening policies vis-à-vis the United States
(Abe 2013 p. 283). The US wanted concrete results in the four fields in which high-
level negotiationswere takingplace (communications equipment, timber, electronics,
andmedical equipment andmedicines).With the focus on how to provide relief to the
domestic plywood industry in the face of timber tariff reductions, even weak parts of
the Japanese economy were being viewed in terms of market-opening possibilities.
The March 1985 “Report” of the Government’s External Economic Problems
Advisory Committee” expressed regret that the six-stage market-opening policy of
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the government was a passive response to overseas requests and urged that the basic
“principle of free trade (not including energy and food)” govern economic exchanges
with foreign countries. The frameworks confirmed in July 1985 accordingly consisted
mostly of items that required aggressive policy involvement to promote the expansion
of imports.
The “Framework for an action program for market access improvement” was
officially decided on in July that year. Among the basic principles introduced in
the general discussion were: (1) that the fundamental perspective of “free trade in
principle, with a minimum of exceptions” meant the government should intervene
as little as possible, leaving the outcome to consumer choice and responsibility,
(2) that Japan should be active in conformity with its own stance of pursuing a
new round of talks, and (3) that Japan should be especially concerned to be of
use in promoting the economic development of developing nations. Based on these
principles, the Framework set out various action plans on the three items: concerning
tariffs, restrictions on imports, and standards and conformity in the import process.
Further reforms of the standards and conformity system included: (1) reducing
the number of targeted items, (2) furthering the shift from government certification
to self-certification, and (3) eliminating or relaxing the number of planning and
standards items. This meant that there would be a wide range of regulatory easing for
domestic firms as well. MITI actively pursued these reforms in line with government
policy.
2.4 Progress on the Uruguay Round Negotiations
2.4.1 Moves to Opening a New GATT Round
GATT, which came into force in 1948, provided a trade order based on the principles
of free trade and nondiscrimination and a place for multilateral free-trade negoti-
ations, and contributed to the expansion of world trade in the postwar period. The
TokyoRound of 1973–1979 achieved results in the form of the first real reduction and
elimination of non-tariff measures (Imuta and Washizawa 1994, pp. 215–219) and
agreements were formed in 12 areas, but protectionist trends expanded on a global
scale thereafter. Deregulation therefore remained a consistent feature of policy from
this point forward.
Negotiations were challenging at the November 1982 GATTMinisterial Meeting
in Geneva, but they resulted in a political declaration on the maintenance of the
free-trade system and in the formulation of the “GATT Work Plan” according to
which GATT would take up 17 areas, including safeguards, trade in agricultural
products, textiles and clothing, dispute resolution procedures, trade in illegal goods,
and trade in services (Abe 2013, p. 403). The Williamsburg Summit in May 1983
confirmed the content of the agreement, and Japan began active preparations for a
new round. At the November Japan–US Summit, Japan proposed preparations for a
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new round under Japanese and US leadership and obtained agreement; it also began
strengthening its outreach to theECon the same subject.As these activities proceeded
among advanced economies, however, developing economies sought adjustments in
the balance of interests. They argued that: (1) themerits of a new roundwere not clear,
(2) past rounds had served the interests only of advanced economies, (3) advanced
countrieswere promoting the liberalization of trade in products from tropical regions.
Developing countries were also concerned about negotiations on the liberalization
of services, an area in which they were not competitive. Amidst the standoff between
advanced and developing countries, the US in 1985 proposed a vote based on the
provisions of Article 25.4 to decide whether to hold a special general meeting of
GATT. This was followed by a special general meeting in September at which it was
decided that a preparatory process would begin, and in November by a GATT regular
general meeting decision to establish a preparatory committee. These movements
were said to have been influenced in part by the “New Trade Policy” announced by
the US in September, which represented the US’s expression of intent to continue
pursuing trade agreements at the bilateral and regional level. Subsequent coordination
with developing countries remained difficult, but against the background of the US
“new trade policy” stance, the Uruguay Round began in September 1986.
2.4.2 The Start of the New Round
In previous negotiations, one draft was prepared for the ministerial declaration to ini-
tiate negotiations, but the Uruguay Round saw drafts both from hardline developing
nations such as India and Brazil and from the advanced economies and the moderate
faction of the developing nations. Negotiations were launched with both drafts in
parallel. The two differed on whether or not to include new areas (trade in services,
measures on trade-related investment, trade issues related to intellectual property).
Ultimately, the ministerial declaration (the Punta del Este Declaration) starting nego-
tiations on a new round adopted the new areas, in line with the draft presented by
the advanced economies and the moderate wing of the developing economies. The
declaration said the Uruguay Round would conclude negotiations on 15 areas within
four years, and that it would adopt a “single undertaking” approach. “Single under-
taking” meant comprehensive talks requiring agreement on all areas. If agreement
could not be reached in any one area, the entire agreement would be rendered moot.
Fourteen of the 15 areas under discussion addressed trade in goods, but classified
by content, they covered: (1) improvement in access: tariffs, non-tariff measures,
tropical products, natural resources products, textiles and clothing, agricultural mar-
kets; (2) negotiation matters: GATT provisions, safeguards (SG), multilateral trade
negotiations (MTN), various regulations/provisions (anti-dumping, AD), subsidies
and offset/compensatory measures, dispute management rules; and (3) new areas of
negotiation: services, TRIPS (agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual prop-
erty rights), TRIMs (agreements on trade-related investment measures). Areas of dis-
pute can be categorized as follows: (1) those in which developing countries hadmany
demands to make of advanced economies: tropical goods, natural resource products,
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Fig. 4 Organization of negotiations in the new round (Abe 2013, p. 414)
textiles, and safeguards; (2) thosewith conflicts of interest not only between advanced
and developing economies but also among advanced economies: MTN rules and
dispute resolution; (3) those in which advanced economies had many demands to
make of developing countries, principally regarding the new areas under negotiation
(Fig. 4).
2.4.3 The Reduction of Tariffs on Industrial Goods
The addition of talks on agricultural products and new areas reduced the relative
weight of the talks on tariffs on industrial goods but they still remained highly sig-
nificant (Abe 2013, p. 425). The effectiveness of GATT talks in reducing tariff rates
in advanced economies only highlighted the non-tariff barriers that affected indus-
trial products. Furthermore, these negotiations centered on the advanced economies,
while the percentage of items with a set bound rate in developing countries was low,
causing problems when the tariff rate was also high.
The US opposed using the Formula System of prior rounds as the approach to
lowering tariffs through negotiation, demanding instead the use of the Request Offer
System. The EC proposed using the Formula System for those products on which
tax rates were high, and the Request Offer system where tax rates were in the middle
range. It was agreed at the December 1988 Montreal Ministerial Meeting that there
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would be an overall reduction of tariffs as there had been at the Tokyo Round, or in
other words a reduction of 33% on a trade-weighted average basis. Determination
had not beenmade on the question of how to achieve these reductions, but in February
1990, an agreement was reached allowing countries to pursue their own approaches.
Thereafter, the variousmember countries exploredways of reducing their own tariffs.
The fourth ministerial meeting in Tokyo in July 1993 saw a breakthrough, and four
points of agreement were reached on access to markets for manufactured goods. This
became the catalyst for achieving a final package in December.
The results of the negotiations on the reduction of tariffs on industrial goods
can be categorized as follows: (1) overall reductions, (2) sector approaches, (3) the
treatment of high-tariff items, and (4) developing countries. The average overall rate
of reduction of tariffs in industrialized countries was 38%. Developing countries had
a 20% reduction in the bound tariff rate. Japan’s reduction rate was 56%, representing
the high end. Also, the proportion of items with tariffs bound at zero was 44% for
advanced economies overall: this broke down into 38% for the EU, 40% for the
United States, and the prohibitively high 71% for Japan. Discussions on high-tariff
items did not produce satisfactory results, but the fourth category saw a significant
improvement in the scope of GATT discipline extended to tariffs on developing
countries: the percentage of items with a bound rate in developing countries rose
significantly from 21% to 73%.Nevertheless, tariff reduction in developing countries
remained inadequate.
2.4.4 International Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
The 1974 Multi-Fibre Arrangement (Multi-Fibre Arrangement Regarding Interna-
tional Trade in Textiles (MFA)) separated the framework for trade in textiles from
that for the products subject to GATT’s general principles. This special framework
was developed because the textile industry was highly localized and reflected the
particular interests of each country, such as the need to create abundant upstream,
midstream, and downstream employment. The MFA covered trade in cotton, wool,
and synthetic fibers and permitted more moderate triggering conditions than the
normal safeguards (SG) accepted in Article 19 of the GATT.
Member states had deep-rooted criticisms of MFA, charging that it impeded free
trade in textiles. In 1982, the GATT Ministerial Conference agreed to consider lib-
eralization and approaches to including textiles in GATT (Abe 2013, p. 434). In the
Uruguay Round that began in 1986, the US, EU, Canada, Australia, Norway, and
Finland, all active users of the MFA, urged the GATT integration to be as gradual as
possible. The most difficult negotiations were to be addressed in high-level adminis-
trative meetings in April 1989. The statement that theMinisters “agree that measures
on the process of integration into GATT will cover the elimination of MFA-based
regulations” confirmed an approach to eliminating the MFA. This issue would later
be reviewed as an individual item in WTO negotiations, discussed in Sect. 3 below
in relation to the Uruguay Round negotiations.
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2.4.5 Issues in Trade in Services
The major areas to be newly negotiated were trade-related investment measures,
intellectual property rights, and trade in services. Global trade in services had seen
a remarkable expansion, despite the many domestic regulations that remained in
effect in all countries in the 1970s and 1980s (Abe 2013, p. 484). This area therefore
became part of the agenda for international negotiation for the first time, introduced
by the US at the 1973–1979 Tokyo Round. Subsequently, as discussions continued
at GATT, the conditions for what would be the Uruguay Round negotiations were
also put in place. These included talks on four areas: the application ofMost-Favored
Nation status, National Treatment status, systemic issues such as the definition of
“services,” and how the demands of developing countries should be handled.
In the early stages of the negotiations started in February 1987, the major coun-
tries exchanged various ideas. TheECproposed a universal approach targeting awide
range of services, from the point of view of ensuring effective market access. It also
proposed establishing an organization tomonitor discrimination due to domestic reg-
ulations. The United States initially wanted liberalization of the service sector over-
all, but gradually shifted to a sectoral approach to exclude sectors such as shipping.
Japan supported the US’s orientation, with a position of seeking the liberalization
of transportation, tourism, finance, etc. Meanwhile, developing countries generally
favored the universal approach, but Latin American and Caribbean countries adopted
a sectoral approach. Developing countries also proposed that export promotion and
infant-industry protections should be incorporated into the agreement. One of the
major issues that surfaced in 1989 in the discussion of individual service areas was
whether to adopt a “negative list method,” according to which the obligations under
the agreement would be applied to all service areas except for specified exceptions,
or the “Positive List System” in which the agreement would apply only to those fields
specified in it.
Although the United States advocated the former approach of promoting the prin-
ciple of liberalization, and the EC agreed, developing countries advocated the lat-
ter approach, and negotiations proceeded along parallel lines. Similar stalemates
occurred in other areas of discussion. In December 1991, the results of all the nego-
tiations were presented in the “Draft final act embodying the results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations” (the Dunkel Draft), with a number of
issues in the service sector still outstanding.
As a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the “General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS),” which provided a disciplinary framework for trade in services,
came into force as an annex to theWTOAgreement. However, because the promises
made by member countries did not involve significant changes in existing domestic
regulations, the agreements did not necessarily result in an expansion of market
access. While member countries promised internationally to assure transparency of
their domestic regulations, they were able to offer legal stability by retreating from
the promises made and restricting them thereby.
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2.4.6 Japan-Related GATT Disputes
Before the 1970s, Japan’s trade policy did not make any use of GATT dispute set-
tlement procedures. That changed completely in the 1980s, however (Abe 2013,
p. 503). For example, Japan requested bilateral consultations under Article 23 for
the first time, following on Article 22 consultations, in response to a changes made
in the tariff classification of the cab chassis by the United States in 1981. In this
case, the negotiations did not result in agreement and no panel was set up. Japan also
tried to resolve the 1982 VTR dispute with the French government through GATT
mechanisms, but a panel was not set up in this case either.
The import restrictions on leather goods that began in 1983 marked the first occa-
sion on which Japan was able to ask for a substantive judgment from the panel. Since
Japan had already assumed IMF Article VIII status in 1964, it had no grounds for
maintaining its limitations onquantity, and theUSasserted that Japan’s import restric-
tionmeasures violated GATTArticle 11. Japan tried to justify its quantity restrictions
on the basis of social policy needs but without referring to specific exception clauses
such as GATT Article 20. Although the Panel showed an understanding of Japan’s
situation, it dismissed its defense on the grounds that the Panel was limited to con-
sidering the problem in light of GATT provisions. The report was adopted at the
meeting of the Board of Governors in May 1984, and Japan announced the substan-
tial liberalization of Wet Blue (a semi-finished product of chemical-treated leather).
In March 1985, the United States once again requested consultation based on Article
23 paragraph 1 of GATT. This targeted import restrictions on leather footwear. The
United States announced the suspension of the procedure in December, following
Japan’s November announcement to the Board of Directors that it was abolishing its
quantity restrictions on footwear. This compromise was brought about by a reduction
of tariffs on 149 items by Japan and the US decision to limit its pursuit of sanctions
on Japanese leather products. Other panel consultations occurring against the general
backdrop of Japan–US economic friction included the 1981 EEC (European Eco-
nomic Community) complaints against Japan and the US regarding a third-country
semiconductor export-monitoring incident.
Japan was not necessarily in a situation to actively apply for panel consultations
in the early 1980s, but towards the end of the decade began to refer its disputes
vigorously as the complainant country.
The turning point was an EEC tax case on Parts Anti-Dumping (AD). The panel
that Japan requested in October 1988 met twice in July and September 1989. The
EEC’s new AD tax-bypass deterrence prevention rules, in which taxes were assessed
ex post facto on parts, were intended to prevent AD taxes on finished goods being
bypassed through the so-called “knockdown methods” of importing and then assem-
bling parts. Japan’s argument was that the tax on parts was not applied at the point
of import and therefore constituted domestic taxes, and that the imposition of those
taxes only on imported goods was contrary to Article 3, paragraph 2, 1 of GATT.
Also, the exemptions on the taxation of parts, on the condition of increases in local
procurement, would promote priority being given to EEC products, which Japan
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claimed was contrary to GATT article 3.4. The panel report in March 1990 generally
approved Japan’s claim.
2.4.7 Japan’s Economic Cooperation Policies and Asia
One of the pillars of the economic cooperation policy from 1985 to 1991 was the
Yen Loan System. Based on the June, 1975Memorandum of Understanding between
the relevant ministries and agencies, the system was solely the responsibility of
the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) (Abe 2013, p. 767).
Under this mechanism, the OECF decided on individual lending operations, and
the Economic Planning Agency, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance,
and MITI approved the decisions. MITI advocated the use of yen loan provisions
to promote economic and social development in developing countries, its position
being that such development would benefit Japanese companies and Japan’s national
economic interests.
The benefits to Japanese companies can roughly be classified as follows: (1) pro-
moting exports through loan projects procuring material from Japanese companies,
and (2) providing ODA loans for infrastructure in order to facilitate investment by
Japanese companies. Regarding the first there were two approaches: either secure
or expand yen-loan procurement volumes based on “tied conditions” or raise the
rate of procurement from Japanese companies in the loan provisions through “untied
conditions.” providing ODA loans under untied conditions. Although international
regimes for regulating the use of tied conditions inODA(OfficialDevelopmentAssis-
tance) had been constructed over time, they had little influence on Japan’s economic
cooperation policy before 1985.
However, in 1985 theOECDArrangement onOfficially Supported Export Credits
was revised, and the ODA loan system was forced to change its policy based on the
Wallen Package agreement of 1987. This was because a discount-rate calculation
method was adopted that prohibited many low-interest loans by donor countries,
with Japan as its implicit target. In addition, except for exceptional measures, the
Helsinki Package of 1991 prohibited the ODA loans with any tied conditions for
projects of a potentially commercial nature. MITI strongly argued for maintaining
tied conditions but was unable to win acceptance. Japan made the shift to untied
conditions at the beginning of 1988.
After the G5’s Plaza Agreement of 1985, Japanese companies also began to urge
creation of an environment that would support overseas investment. ASEAN coun-
tries were inspired by the 1980s success of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and
Singapore and were seeking foreign capital-driven development strategies. Improv-
ing the investment climate could involve either the development of new target coun-
tries or advancements in existing infrastructure. An example of an effective case was
the ODA loans advanced to Thailand in the latter 1980s. This case was treated as
“the Japan ODAModel” in the 2005 interim summary of the Economic Cooperation
Subcommittee of the Industrial Structure Council.
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2.5 International Harmonization of Intellectual Property
Rights
2.5.1 The Intellectual Property Strategy of the US and the Japan–US
Problem in the 1980s
Trade in electronics products such as computers, telecommunication equipment, and
electronic components saw particularly marked growth within the overall expansion
of world trade in the 1980s. US President Ronald Reagan, who regarded the loss in
international competitiveness of high-tech products of this kind as amatter of national
security, organized the Presidential Commission on Industrial Competitiveness in
June 1983. The report stated that “US technological strength is still at the highest
level in the world” and that the fact that its strength was not reflected in world trade
was “due to [other countries’] inadequate protections for intellectual property.” The
report therefore proposed promoting enhanced protection of intellectual property
rights (Nakayama 2013, p.72).
This point of view was at the core of the Reagan administration’s September 1985
“New Trade Policy,” and was slated to be pursued in the new Uruguay Round the
following year.
Meanwhile, Japan’s exports to the US increased sharply in the 1980s, and Japan–
US patent disputes were frequent as well. As US industry saw it, the Japanese patent
system and its operations presented the following problems: (1) the Japan Patent
Office delayed the review of patents and thereby interfered with the opportunities of
US companies for entry, (2) the scope of the rights interpreted by the courtwas narrow
and could not be used effectively against infringements of US companies’ patents.
With these dissatisfactions in industry, theUSSenate resolved in July 1989 to demand
that the US government investigate 16 items. The Japanese and US governments
planned intergovernmental talks to address the patent problem and included it on the
agenda of the Japan–USStructural Impediments Initiative talks of 1989–1990 and the
US–Japan Framework for aNewEconomic Partnership in 1993–1994. Japan adopted
the following measures: (1) accepting applications in English, (2) shifting to a post-
grant opposition petition system, (3) improving the operations of the early screening
system, and (4) restricting compulsory licenses on use relations. For its part, America
undertook to (1) optimize the starting dates for patent terms, (2) introduce an early
publication system, (3) introduce a re-examination system and (4) issue compulsory
restrictions on licenses on use relations. However, the necessary revision of the law
was delayed by about five years, and a number of issues remained unresolved.
2.5.2 The Uruguay Round and the TRIPS Agreement
After the announcement of its New Policy on Trade in September 1985, the United
States promoted the creation through GATT of multilateral rules regarding intellec-
tual property (Nakayama 2013, p. 95). The reason GATT was chosen rather than
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the UN’s World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) was first and foremost
because of the difference between the two in enforcement mechanisms: GATT had
economic sanctions. Second, under GATT it was possible to put together a package
deal that included other items of negotiation, and third, America was in an isolated
position in the ongoing WIPO negotiations on a patent harmonization treaty.
In response, Japan concluded that its position was basically the same as that of the
United States, namely, that improving intellectual property protection in developing
countrieswould be beneficial. Themultilateral approachwas also desirable for Japan,
which wanted to resolve its bilateral issues with the United States in a multilateral
forum. Some developing countries, by contrast, strongly opposed the formulation of
international rules and called for utilization of WIPO.
Amidst these various considerations and interests, the TRIPS negotiations were
launched with the Uruguay Round Ministerial Declaration (Punta del Este Declara-
tion) in September 1986. Of the “submissions” made by the end of 1989 by each
country as the starting point of discussion, the US proposal focused on “the develop-
ing countries problem,” Japan’s addressed “the developing countries problem” and
the “US problem,” and the EC stressed all of them (especially the “protection of geo-
graphical indications”). These proposed negotiation items were based on political
considerations.
This means that despite the fact that the main concern of the US regarding Japan
was “review delays caused by the large volume of applications,” it put that issue aside,
and Japan, too, abandoned its “First-to-File System”proposal. Both the submission of
the agenda and the process of coming to agreement were deeply colored by political
resolutions.
Once the overall outcome of the 15 Uruguay Round fields had been agreed upon
at the Morocco Ministerial Meeting in April 1994, the TRIPS agreement came into
force in January 1995. Despite opposition by developing countries, the TRIPS agree-
ment was achieved based on the adoption of the collective consignment method in
the Uruguay Round agreement. Developing countries accepted the agreement as
a whole, and multilateral rules were constructed on intellectual property to corre-
spond to the globalization of the economy. Meanwhile, separate from international
cooperation in WIPO, the Government of Japan agreed that it would cooperate in a
three-way effort with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and
the European Patent Office (EPO) in areas such as development of more advanced
computer systems. The first meeting based on this agreement was held in October
1983, after which repeated discussions were held, mainly on computer-related top-
ics. Concrete policies for cooperative relationships with developing countries were
explored, including (1) bilateral cooperation through the Japan International Cooper-
ationAgency (JICA), (2)multilateral cooperation throughWIPO, and (3) a combined
bilateral and multilateral cooperation using funds contributed by Japan to WIPO.
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2.5.3 Revision of the Industrial Property Rights System
Intellectual property policy from the 1980s on aimed to respond to the explosive
expansion in the use of industrial property systems, and proposed revisions to the sys-
tememphasized the establishment of an institutional infrastructure thatwouldquickly
grant patent rights as a precondition to responding to demands for international
institutional harmonization (Nakayama 2013, p. 216) (Fig. 5).
The Patent Law revisions of 1985 involved mainly the introduction of “Domes-
tic Priority.” The Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial Property (“Paris
Convention”) adopted a “priority rights system” according to which patent applica-
tions submitted first to one Convention member country would not be disadvantaged
so long as they were submitted to other member countries within one year of the
first: their filing would have priority over others made after the “priority date” of
the “basic application.” In addition, where patent applications were being filed in
multiple countries, it would be permitted to incorporate into one application the
multiple applications related to a single invention, in order to take into consideration
differences in the degree to which inventions were regarded as unitary in different
countries. The system was one that would play a tremendous role in the smooth
acquisition of comprehensive rights, covering a series of linked inventions without
leaving gaps between them.
Japan’s domestic application system, by contrast, did not permit reapplication
based on applications made in a home country. For this reason, domestic Japanese
applicants could not acquire comprehensive rights by adding further inventions to the
basic invention,whichmeant that an imbalance arose between themandnon-Japanese
who could use the Priority Rights stipulated by the Paris Convention. In order to
correct this unfairness, Japan explored the introduction of a domestic Priority Rights
system, with the Paris Convention as a model, and ultimately began to recognize
applications that asserted priority rights for comprehensive inventions.
While international harmonization was thus achieved, the contents of the patent
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Fig. 5 Applications under the four laws on industrial property rights, requests for examination
Source Nakayama (2013, p. 412–413)
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Furthermore, there were strong demands that Japan review its procedural provisions
based on international approaches. Following on the December 1986 report of the
General Assembly of the Industrial Property Council, the Patent Law was amended
in May 1987, with improvements such as the Multiple Claims System.
The Unfair Competition Prevention Law was also amended (Nakayama 2013,
p. 249). Japan had no legislation intended exclusively to protect trade secrets, which
fell under general laws such as the Civil, Commercial, and Criminal Laws, but
demand for civil protection of trade secrets mounted in the late 1980s. First, “trade-
related aspects of intellectual property rights including trade in fraudulent goods”
were an important item on theUruguayRound agenda, and included aswell were “in-
formation assets,” at the core of which were trade secrets. In addition to the need for
international harmonization, growing employment mobility heightened the need for
protection domestically as well. From October 1989, therefore, the Industrial Struc-
ture Council’s Information Assets Subcommittee reviewed the protection of trade
secrets and issued a summary report in March 1990. Revisions to the law preventing
unfair competition were enacted in June. The revised law defined trade secrets as
“technical or business measures that are useful for production, sales, and other busi-
ness methods and that are not publicly known.” In other words, the requirements for
characterization as “trade secrets” were the ability to control secrets, the usefulness
of the secrets, and the fact that they were not public. The law established the types of
acts related to trade secrets that would constitute unfair competition, and stipulated
the right to demand damages.
2.5.4 Systematization of Software Protection
There are two approaches to protecting software: the “Patent Approach” and the
“Copyright Approach.” In the discussions that took place from the 1970s on, the
views of the patent approach were predominantly negative (Nakayama 2013, p. 266).
Patent law at the time defined invention as: “the highly advanced creation of technical
ideas utilizing the laws of nature.” It was hard to regard software as using the laws
of nature, which meant that it did not constitute an invention under this definition. In
response to this situation, the JPO created examination criteria in 1975 and decided
that software could be protected in caseswhere natural lawwas used in the processing
content of a computer program. Further efforts at protection were made in 1982,
when the operational guidelines stated that where computer programs were used in
various devices, they would be eligible for patent protection as inventions of “objects
(devices).” However, methods for protecting the programs themselves were not yet
institutionalized. The copyright approach meanwhile drew the attention of WIPO
when US Copyright Law was amended in 1980 to enable the protection of computer
programs. Japan, however, could not resolve the question of whether software could
be regarded as an act of expressing creative thought or feeling, or something of the
same quality.
In December 1983, the Industry Structure Council’s Information Industry Com-
mittee compiled a report regarding the discussions at the JPO and in international
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forums. The report pointed to the increasing importance of software and proposed
establishing a legal mechanism for clarifying the rights protecting programming,
through a modification of the Copyright Law mechanism. The value of a software
program is activated only once it is used, and the concept of usage rights was already
well-established. The idea, therefore, was to place the copyright law at the center of
the new legislation by introducing the concept of usage rights to it.
With the 1984 interim report of the 5th Subcommittee of the Copyright Council,
the Agency for Cultural Affairs asserted the literary nature of computer programs,
regarding it as sufficient to clarify the point. TheAgency for Cultural Affairs garnered
support for its proposal from the US Copyright Law clarifying the protection of
computer programs. MITI pointed out certain issues, such as the short period of
protection, but was unable to generate any support.
Thus, in January 1986, the Act Partially Amending the Copyright Law came into
effect, and software received copyright protection as literary products under copyright
law.Moreover, the TRIPSAgreement, which came into effect in 1995, stipulated that
computer programs “should be protected as literary works prescribed in the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Works of Arts and Literature,” so the matter was
also resolved internationally. Nevertheless, with advances in the sophistication of
computer use, the importance of software has only increased, and copyright law
is being reconsidered as to whether the ideas themselves should come under its
protection.
2.5.5 Improvement of the Operational Foundations of the Intellectual
Property System
The 1980s saw not only an increased number of applications for examination but
also an increase in the number of patent applications for more advanced technical
creations. With the revision of the law in 1987, a multi-item system was adopted to
recognize applications claiming multiple uses because of the diverse uses of a single
invention. The burden on examiners thus expanded, and so the need to improve the
infrastructure for operating the examinations was urgently felt (Nakayama 2013,
p. 411).
To that end, the JPO established the “Industrial Property Long-Term Problem
Review Committee” as an internal committee in the summer of 1982, and in accor-
dance with its report, promoted the “computerization of administrative processing
and searching functions.” Given US dissatisfaction with Japan’s patent process, US
aims were also a factor, so these efforts were also promoted for their applicability
to the goals stated in the final report on Japan–US SII talks, which said: “The Gov-
ernment of Japan will use its best efforts to reduce the average patent examination
period of Japan to 24 months within five years.”
In addition, the Patent Special Account system was put in place in July 1984, and
with the financial foundation for the patent system thus established, the introduction
and expansion of computer systems were aggressively pursued. Specifically, based
on the deliberations of the Headquarters for the Comprehensive Mechanization of
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the Patent Office established in the Agency in October 1983, a “paperless plan”
aimed at the comprehensive computerization of and installation of databases for
Patent Office administration was formulated in 1984. These plans were intended to
(1) increase the efficiency of the screening process, (2) streamline administrative
processing, (3) enhance patent information provision services, and additionally to
(4) actively promote international cooperation. They also took into consideration the
publication of a “searchable database” and electronic filing. Initiatives also began
for outsourcing the application process and otherwise optimizing filing practices. To
ensure that the preliminary examinations were complete and that the applications
did not reflect only the most positive results of the assessment of the invention, the
“public notice ratio”—indicating the degree of efficient acquisition of rights—was
introduced as an important index for business for the patent administration process.
3 Coordination of Industrial Policy and the Antimonopoly
Act
3.1 Coordination of Industrial Policy and the Antimonopoly
Act
3.1.1 Review of Guideline Methods
Until the response to the first oil crisis, MITI and the Japan Fair Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) had maintained a policy of “responding to the short-term production
adjustments that accompanied economic fluctuations with recession cartels based
in principle on the Antimonopoly Law.” In the 1970s, MITI introduced a method
of creating and announcing the outlook for demand in the short term (the “guide-
line method”). MITI also came to use this guideline method as a measure for soft
landings and as a supply-and-demand stabilization measure after the termination of
a recession cartel. The FTC, which became increasingly cautious about approving
recession cartels in the latter half of the 1970s, acknowledged the need for such mea-
sures, but judged that approach would in some cases trigger “synchronous reduction”
(sympathetic production cuts). Thus, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, differences
in opinion began to emerge between MITI and the FTC regarding the appropriate
response to the problem of recession cartels (Okazaki 2012, p. 227).
The background of this issue was an incident in an oil price cartel. In February
1974, the FTC filed criminal charges against 12 oil dealers and 25 of their company
executives, and the Petroleum Association of Japan and four of its officers, for vio-
lating the Antimonopoly Act. The charges targeted: (1) Five price cartels formed in
1973 by 12 wholesale companies (price fixing cases) and (2) the production quan-
tity cartels (production adjustment cases) formed in early November 1972 and April
1973 on the basis of decisions by the Petroleum Association.
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In September 1980, the Tokyo High Court ruled that the price-fixing cases con-
stituted a violation of the law. It found the production cartels in violation as well, but
ruled that the accused were innocent because they were not aware of the illegality
of the cartels and had not deliberately violated the law as they had reasonable cause
for that unawareness. Appeals were brought on the price-fixing cases, and some of
the accused were found innocent by the Supreme Court in February 1984.
In the September 1980 ruling, the point of dispute was the illegality of cooper-
ative measures among companies that took place under “administrative guidance.”
The defense argued that although there were no provisions for exemptions under
the Antimonopoly Act, the Petroleum Industry Law of May 1962 did include con-
tent restricting competition promotion policy, and that if the actions were taken in
response to MITI instruction under this law, a finding of illegality might be blocked.
The ruling said that the actions in this case did not fall in this category while recog-
nizing in general that a “block” of that kind on illegality was possible. In other words,
it showed that there were circumstances in which such action would not be judged
illegal, (1) if the action fell within the range permitted by the Petroleum Business
Law, and (2) if the cooperation measures were conducted under MITI guidance in
order to implement adjustments in supply and demand.
Furthermore, the September 1980 ruling on the price agreement found a degree of
substantive significance in the requirement “Contrary to the public interest” referred
to in Article 2, paragraph 6 of the Antimonopoly Act. With regard to cooperative
action based on administrative guidance, the ruling held that the phrase “contrary to
the public interest” in principle pertained to violations of an economic order based
on free competition protected directly under this law, and that even if the actions
formally corresponded to it, the above interests protected by the law, and the interests
protected by these actions, were in comparative equilibrium. The ruling recognized
exceptional cases in which such actions would not substantively violate the ultimate
aim of the law, which was “to secure the interests of the general consumer and
promote a democratic and healthy development of the national economy” (Article 1),
inasmuch as it indicated the need to interpret the purpose of exempting such actions
from the rules regarding “unfair trade restrictions.” The thinking was that even if an
action constituted a formal violation of the “economic order of free competition,”
there were cases in which the judgment should be made in terms of the equilibrium
with the interests being protected.
With this ruling, the FTC in March 1981 released its “Ways of thinking about
the relationship between the Antimonopoly Act and administrative guidance” and
MITI set forth its basic views in “Ways of thinking about administrative guidance.”
MITI’s opinion was that the Antimonopoly Law regulated the actions of business
operators and was not intended to apply to the acts of administrative agencies, while
the FTC stressed that administrative guidance must be undertaken with due care so
that it is not the businesses in question who violate the Antimonopoly Act. The two
statements revealed the gap between the two parties. The FTC therefore continued
to strengthen its cautions against administrative guidance by MITI. The number of
authorized recession controls therefore decreased substantially in the early 1980s.
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3.1.2 Establishment of the Structural Improvement Law, Based
on the Six Yamanaka Principles
The turning point in the relationship between the Antimonopoly Law and industrial
policy, including those issues accompanying administrative guidance, came with
the coordination that occurred in the process of establishing the Temporary Mea-
sures Law for the Structural Adjustment of Specific Industries (Structural Improve-
ment Law). This law was devised to respond not only to the worsening environment
after the second oil shock, but also to the emergence of new “structurally depressed
industries.”
In 1981, the Aluminum Industry Committee and Chemical Industry Committee of
MITI’s Industrial Structure Council considered measures to rebuild these industries.
Their December report evaluated the role of basic materials industries in economic
security, and pointed out the need for reviewing the laws and regulations related to it.
In February 1982 it presented the idea of enacting a new law on structurally depressed
industries to coincide with the expiration of the Industry Stabilization Law. The new
lawwould expand the number of target industries and would also include exemptions
to the application of the Antimonopoly Act.
However, as discussed above, the FTC since the oil cartel incident was wary
of recession cartels and said that caution was required in expanding the scope of
exemptions beyond that of the Industry Stabilization Law. The Special Committee on
Basic Material Industry Special Measures for the General Conference on Production
Statement and Adjustment established in August 1982 therefore issued an Opinion
Brief in December 1982 titled “On measures for basic materials industries.” Two
aspects of its thinking are revealed in the Opinion Brief. First it advocated shrinking
as quickly and smoothly as possible those parts of the industries that were losing
their economic viability and showed no signs of future recovery. Second, it advocated
measures to address (1) the cost of raw materials and energy, (2) high value-added,
technological development, and (3) the consolidation of firms. It also stated that the
role of government was to facilitate coordination along these lines.
Given the principles of industry self-help, elimination of measures for preserving
industries, and maintenance of the open system, the Opinion Brief emphasized the
limited time available for policy intervention. This accordedwith the PositiveAdjust-
ment Policies (PAP) guidelines of the OECD. Its emphasis on market mechanisms
and PAP guidelines reflected not only a response to FTC criticism but also a change
in MITI opinion that was gradually clarified in the 1980s, namely, its perspective
that industrial policy served as a complement to market mechanisms.
These judgments came together in the principles underlying proposed Industrial
Structure Law, which were introduced by MITI Minister Yamanaka in late January
1983, just before the expiration of the Industry Stabilization Law. Dubbed the “Six
Yamanaka Principles,” these were: (1) contraction and revitalization, (2) mitiga-
tion of the impact on employment and regional economies, (3) implementation of
comprehensive measures, (4) respect for private-sector autonomy, (5) focus on com-
petition policy and adherence to open systems, and (6) time-limited policy responses
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(Okazaki 2012, p. 49). Among these basic principles, the fifth—focusing on com-
petition policy and adherence to open systems—meant “business alliances that did
not require exemption from the application of the Antimonopoly Act, but that aimed
to lower costs through the advantages of scale within a group.” Because MITI rec-
ognized that its preliminary coordination with the FTC on the Industry Stabilization
Law had not gone smoothly, this plan stated clearly that coordination with the FTC
and full discussions between the competent minister and the Fair Trade Commission
were to take place (Table 4).
The Industrial Structure Law (ISL) of May 1983 was limited legislation set to
expire in June 1988. It shared many features with the Industry Stabilization Law but
differed in that it included not only capacity reduction but also optimization of scale
and production methods. The designations under the Cabinet Order also differed
from the ISL, which could be described as “industry-led” in that it was premised on
applications made by business operators to the MITI Minister.
The Minister prepared a basic plan for structural improvement with methods for
capacity reduction. It stipulated that the Minister could direct joint action where
the autonomous efforts of business were not sufficient to reduce capacity, and it
stipulated that the Minister could direct joint action. This instruction was essentially
based on the concept of “exemption from applicability” of the Antimonopoly Act.
However, the approval systemnewly established for business alliances did not exempt
Ministerial approval from the application of the Antimonopoly Act, but rather was
to be carried out within the scope of what was permissible under the Act, determined
through consultation with the FTC.
This “specific industries” category covered 26 industries, 11 of which were the
same as those covered by the Special Law and 15 of which were new designations
(see Table 3). The Industry Stabilization Law had covered shipbuilding, spinning
(including cotton and other fibers), and worsted spinning, but the Industrial Struc-
ture Law did not. Capacity reduction rates (target rate and completion rate) varied
widely from 55–302%. Research confirming the outcomes suggests that the facilities
closures and capacity reduction based on the Industrial Structure Law had a positive
effect on profitability and productivity.
The Industrial Structure Law was related to the Antimonopoly Act in that it
strengthened industrial policy to reflect its complementarity with competition. This
was clear in the explanation provided, which stated: “The national economic signif-
icance of industrial coordination under the open economic system is that it aims at a
shift toward industries that can achieve economic rationalization over the medium-
to-long term through efficiencies inmanagement and advantages of scale. It therefore
can be harmonized with the Antimonopoly Act, which aims to secure competition”
(Okazaki 2012, p. 255). It was thus clarified that industrial policy, while premised
on market mechanisms, had the role of supplementing and occasionally reinforcing
them, and that competition policy and industrial policy could be compatible with
each other on a mid- to long-term basis. The Industrial Structure Law was epochal
in that sense.
Underlying this rethinking was the fact that foreign countries in the 1980s were
harshly critical of administrative guidance, regarding it as a barrier to imports. MITI
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was therefore seeking to explain the concept of Japan’s administrative guidance
and industrial policy through periodic exchanges of views with overseas antitrust
authorities and formal and informal consultations. It was in that context that MITI
made an even further shift going into the 1990s.
3.1.3 Establishment of the Law of Temporary Measures to Facilitate
Industrial Structural Adjustment
Against a backdrop of external trade imbalances and economic friction with other
countries, the Industrial Policy Bureau proposed to the Ministry in May 1986 that
an Industrial Structural Transformation Policy be part of the new policy for FY
1986. This was the starting point of what became the Law of Temporary Measures to
Facilitate Industrial Structural Adjustment (Okazaki 2012, p. 57). The major policies
involvedwere (1) the creation of industry-specific visions, (2) the promotion of large-
scale system development projects, (3) industry-specific administrative guidance
aimed at international cooperation, (4) industry-specific employment and regional
measures, and (5) legal measures pertaining to specific industries. The last of these
aimed to change Japan’s industrial structure to further international cooperation. The
policy was intended to encourage reductions in domestic production capacity and
entry into new business fields for those industries that would be facing significant
increases in imports. The Industrial Structure Council meanwhile responded to the
same situation in a December 1986 report titled “Specific measures for industrial
structural adjustment.” It said that foreign direct investment and domestic industrial
adjustment had followed on the yen appreciation and stabilization after 1985. This
meant the emergence of employment issues and their impact on regional economies,
and therefore of a need for a smoother transition for Japan’s industrial structure.
With these considerations in mind, the Industrial Policy Bureau summarized its
thinking on the new law in January 1987. According to the “Basic Concepts of
Twenty-First-Century Industrial Society,” although it was to be assumed that indus-
trial structural changes would occur autonomously in response to the market, policy
support was needed in those sectors where relying on private-sector efforts alone
would cause delays, such as employment and regional revitalization. Such measures
included (1) supporting the reduction or consolidation of facilities and business tie-
ups where business operators were struggling with a rapid decline in demand due
to the rising yen and therefore with excess capacity; (2) aiding venture businesses
and new businesses that would be linked to an expansion of new industrial sectors
to revitalize areas struggling with employment issues and regional decline.
The specific features of the bill revealed a shift away from the framework of the
Industrial Stabilization Law and the Industrial Structure Law. First, while these two
laws were supposed to designate specific industries and provide policy support to
them, the new law targeted certain kinds of facilities without designating the indus-
tries themselves, and granted policy support to each individual operator using such
facilities. This shift was in part a response to US criticism that the competitiveness
of Japan’s exports to the US was enhanced by Japan’s industry-specific industrial
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policies. It also aimed to implement regional measures. The new law was enacted in
April 1987 as the Temporary Measures for Facilitating a Smooth Transformation in
Industrial Structure (“Facilitation Act”).
The Facilitation Act stipulated measures for “specific business operators” and
“specific regions.” The former referred to mining or manufacturing firms that used
“specific equipment” to produce products for which the demand had declined pre-
cipitously and the excess capacity was therefore extreme, and where such conditions
were expected to persist over the long term. Specific enterprises could receive finan-
cial and tax support if the “business adaptation plan” and “business alliance plan”
they created themselves were approved by the appropriate minister. Because busi-
ness adaptation plans were prepared for individual companies, it was judged that
there was no need to seek exemptions from the Antimonopoly Act as it applied to
business alliances. “Specific regions” meant areas where the closure or contraction
of businesses and business activities had occurred on a considerable scale, and where
such establishments accounted for a substantial part of the business activities of the
region and thus there had been an adverse effect on the local economy and local
employment.
Thirteen types of specific equipment (four kinds of steel, six types of fiber, three
kinds of nonferrous metals) were designated under the law in April 1987. However,
these particular facilities were not necessarily in use by a large number of “specific
business operators” whose business adaptation plans had been approved. A March
1988 survey found seven approvals in the mining and manufacturing industries and
four in the synthetic fibers industry. Forty-three specific regions were designated in
April 1987, and eight more in June. It can be verified that after designation under the
Facilitation Law, the designated areas saw greater improvement than other areas in
the growth rates of employment and real shipment values.
3.1.4 Creating New Industries and Improving the Business
Environment
The Technology Development Policy and Industrial Location Policy were the first of
the 1980s policies to be developed with the aim of creating new industries along the
lines laid out in the 1980s Vision. This was followed by an examination of the actual
conditions and policy issues in new developments in the service industries (Okazaki
2012, p. 93). R&D, for example, not only saw an expansion in related budgets but
also had a role in regional recovery policies (industrial location policy), which led to
the establishment in May 1983 of the Law for Accelerating Regional Development
Based upon High-Technology Industrial Complexes (“Technopolis Law”). This was
followed inMay1985by theLaw for theFacilitation ofResearch inKeyTechnologies
aimed at promoting experimental research and raising the level of basic technology
in the private sector. The law provided, for example, for the use of state-owned
laboratories at low cost.
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Based on “The key concepts for twenty-first-century industrial society,” MITI in
the latter 1980s continued to expand and reorganize its systems of support for tech-
nology development and industrial location policies while also steadily introducing
methods whereby businesses could themselves support the creation and nurturing of
new areas of development. For example, under the May 1986 Private-Sector Partici-
pation Promotion Law, R&D/Research Core Facilities and information infrastructure
began receiving MITI support for the purpose of facilitating experimental research,
technical training, information disclosure, and commercialization of basic research.
The Law to Promote the Group-Siting of Designated Types of Business Contribut-
ing to More Sophisticated Local Industrial Structures (“Key Facilities Siting Law”)
was established in April 1988. Additionally, various financial support measures were
advanced under the Basic Technology Research Facilities Act to support those enter-
prises that were developing new sectors and to concentrate higher-order industrial
functions (“brains”) in non-central regions.
These developments notwithstanding, some policy issues carried over into the
1990s. These included inter-ministerial issues, such as the relaxation and legal regu-
lations and review of the nature of business organizations and management, as well
as the trade policy issues relating to globalization and stimuli for firms’ overseas
business activities. All these awaited the progress of government discussions on
trade policy and on administrative reform. In September 1988, a globalization unit
was established under the Planning Subcommittee of the Industrial Structure Coun-
cil’s General Committee to review these questions, and study groups were organized
within MITI to discuss policy issues concerning the nature of business organizations
and enterprises.
3.1.5 Policy on Small and Medium-Sized Businesses Aimed
at the Transformation and Integration of Operations
“The 1980s and the direction of SMEs and SMEpolicy,” composed by the Small andMedium
Enterprise Policy-Making Council in May 1980, laid out what was desired of SMEs. This
included: (1) a shift in business strategy from quantity to quality, (2) the spurring of creativ-
ity and mobility and the nurturing of human resources to that end, (3) new developments
through regional groups and groups of disparate industries, and (4) a social awareness of
the values and social consciousness of the citizens who sought fairness, stability, and safety
(Nakata 2013, p. 70). It thus emphasized a positive assessment of the active majority and a
recognition of diversity. In these ways, the distinctive aspect of the mid-1980s was that poli-
cies such as these were being developed to support business transformation as an emergency
response to the Plaza Accord. Measures were also expanded to strengthen soft management
resources, including the promotion of technological development, and to support regional
revitalization and concentrations of industry. These policies aimed to steer Japan away from
the export-led economy that until the 1970s had pursued the goal of “strengthening interna-
tional competitiveness,” toward “correcting external imbalances” and “promoting domestic
demand.”
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The policy on interaction and exchanges among different industries began as a
“Technology Exchange Plaza Hosting Project” in 1981 (Nakata 2013, p. 277). The
Small-and-Medium Enterprise Agency also issued a notice in August 1983, titled
“Regarding guidance on the establishment and operation associations of disparate
industries” and sought an elastic use of the Law on Cooperative Associations of
SMEs. These policies became systematized with the April 1988 establishment of the
Extraordinary Law Concerning the Promotion of the Development of New Business
Areas through a Fusion of the Knowledge of SMEs in Different Industries (“Knowl-
edge Fusion Law”). The temporary legislation, with an intended 1995 expiration,
aimed to integrate the knowledge of SMEs in different fields and to open up new
fields, so as to enable the improvement and development of SMEs. It not only con-
ceived of business cooperatives as the initiators of integrated projects, but also made
as targets of its policy the business and industry associations composed of SMEs
and individuals and businesses conforming to them. For the enterprises targeted by
these policies, financing was made available in the form of subsidies from the Gen-
eral Account, special cases of financing for advancement, and special loans for the
promotion of SME fusion (undertaken by the Central Bank for Commercial and
Industrial Associations).
In the seven years of its operation, the “fusion method” did not result in more
than 309 cases of accredited partners, and the number of participating companies
remained under 2300. Considering that 20,000 firms were participating in the inter-
industry exchanges in 1987, it appears that it was hard to proceed beyond the stage of
these exchanges. Even so, however, there were over 300 cases of conversions made
to new fields (Nakata 2013, p. 312).
Meanwhile, the yen appreciated to unprecedented levels. Imports
of textiles and miscellaneous goods, already present from Korea, increased
from Taiwan and Singapore as well, and the action program that followed on the
Plaza Accord began to be felt as well. All of these changes in the environment
in the 1980s had a severe impact on SMEs. The Law on Temporary Measure for
Business Conversion of SMEs had been in effect for 10 years and was approaching
its expiry. MITI therefore announced “Special Adjustment Policies for SMEs” in
November 1985, saying that there was a “need to plan for the business stability
of small and medium-sized enterprises and for a smooth conversion of business
operations.” The SME Agency, too, released a report titled “Special Adjustment
Policies for SMEs” in December, and made clear its intent to forward legal measures
for business conversions. The Small and Medium Enterprise Modernization Council
in December 1986 issued the “On SME policies for responding to changes in the
international economic environment,” in which it pointed out that SME business
conversions would not only contribute to employment, but would also contribute to
the stabilization and revitalization of regional economies and thereby the national
industrial structure as well. A change in perspective was under way, in other
words, such that policies to enable business conversions were not to be regarded
as something unavoidable and backward-looking, but rather as important national
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policies that would contribute to employment and the development of regional
economies.
The February 1986 Law on Temporary Measures for Business Conversion by
Designated SMEs (Business Conversion Law) was time-limited legislation set to
expire in March 1988. Its aim was to serve as an emergency measure to facilitate
the business transformation of SMEs in response to the “remarkable changes in
trade structure and other circumstances in recent years” that had been triggered
by the yen’s appreciation following the Plaza Accord. Specific SMEs covered by
the Business Conversion Law could obtain financial, credit, and tax support if they
devised a “business conversion plan” and received approval from their prefectural
governor. The effectiveness of the mitigation measures was evident in the increased
rate of use: the number of target industries increased from 116 to 203, and loans
totaling about 407.6 billion yen were made in the seven years the law was in effect.
Thesemeasures were in line with development policies aimed at promoting SMEs
as local industries from the vantage point of regional revitalization. SMEs were
regarded as key players in regional economies. It was hoped and expected that they
would have the potential to develop endogenously, and that theywould bring stability
and improved welfare to the lives of people in rural areas.
Attention was therefore also paid to small and micro enterprises. Industries and
occupations in which family and business activities were blended were regarded
as requiring specific support. The distinctive features of this support were (1) that
prefectural governments formulated a vision for local industry promotion in order
to solve regionally specific problems in cooperation with cities, towns, and villages,
(2) that local industrial promotion projects were launched to foster the capability to
develop new products, to develop demand, and to develop human resources, and (3)
that third-sector Local Industry Promotion Centers were established and regarded as
a core institution for SME promotion. The Business Conversion Law took its place
in the development of these new policies.
In addition, the Law on Temporary Measures for SMEs in Specified Areas (“Spe-
cific Regional Law”) was established in November 1986. It applied to SMEs in
specific areas, stipulating that where suppliers carried out projects to adapt to the
new economic environment, it would be possible to provide support subsidies and
thereby to stabilize economic activity in specific areas (Nakata 2013, p. 848).
The Business Conversion Law was revoked in December 1991, and the Special
Regional Lawwas revoked as planned in February 1993. Twelve thousand adaptation
plans were approved under the latter between December 1986 and December 1991.
Of the 216 municipalities designated in the legislation, 134 shipped more industrial
goods in 1991 than they had in 1985. The ratio of job offers to job seekers increased
during the same period in 159 municipalities.
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3.2 Industrial Adjustment and Structural Improvement
3.2.1 Structural Improvement of the Petrochemical Industry
TheMaterial ProblemsStudyGroup, establishedby the JapanPetrochemical Industry
in October 1979, issued its final report in January 1981. The report sought improve-
ments in the following areas: (1) the inability of petrochemical companies, under the
Petroleum Business Law, to import naphtha freely, (2) the imposition of oil taxes
and customs duties on raw materials, namely naphtha, (3) the obligation to stockpile
naphtha. In July 1980, MITI also set up an advisory body to the Director General of
the Basic Industries Bureau to study the problem of raw materials in petrochemicals
from a long-term perspective. Both the public and private sectors explored ways of
avoiding the impact of soaring petroleum rawmaterial prices (Yamazaki 2011, p. 60).
Meanwhile, the precipitous rise in naphtha prices, driven by the second oil cri-
sis, was having a serious impact on the petrochemical industry. Amidst a sharp
decline in domestic demand in 1980–1981, imports of petrochemical products from
North America rose significantly. This was because the price gap between naphtha
and ethane, which is contained in natural gas, began to widen, causing a decline
in the international competitiveness of naphtha-dependent Japanese petrochemical
products relative to resource-rich countries such as the US and Canada, which used
ethane as a rawmaterial. With declining profits because of rising rawmaterial prices,
and rising fixed costs due to lower utilization of capacity, it was inevitable that
Japanese petrochemical companies would respond to the pressure of cheap imported
goods in the domestic market by competing more intensely with each other. The
Basic Industries Bureau issued the “Regarding measures on naphtha, raw material
in petrochemicals” as a Decision of the MITI Departmental Council and pursued the
following measures. (1) Petroleum refining and petrochemical companies were to
decide on quarterly planned quantities and to notify MITI of plans to import any-
thing in excess of them: naphtha imports covering excess in demand would not be
regarded as violating that limit. (2) Domestic naphtha prices would be determined in
conjunction with import prices. (3) After FY 1983, domestically produced naphtha
would be treated as tax-exempt, like imported naphtha.
Regarding the problem of excess capacity, the June 1982 report by the Industrial
StructureCouncil found that the outlook for the petrochemical industrywas harsh and
called for the following systems to address it: (1) Joint production by petrochemical
companies and consignment of production, (2) joint investment, (3) joint purchases
of petrochemical raw materials, (4) joint imports of petrochemical products (5) the
rationalization of logistics, (6) joint sales, (7) establishing rules for the reduction
of excess capacity and capital investment, and (8) joint research and technology
development. The examination of individual products undertaken by the Industrial
StructureCouncil’sChemical IndustryCommitteewas expected to advance corporate
consolidation. The Industrial Systems Subcommittee proposed the following in its
December 1982 submission, “On industrial systems development in the petrochemi-
cal industry”: (1) Set product-specific numerical targets for reducing excess capacity
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and make progress on them by grouping companies; (2) promote rationalization and
concentration based on the grouping of companies; and (3) carry these out under
a new law replacing the Industry Stabilization Law. Petrochemical companies pro-
ceeded to establish product-specific joint sales for the moment. In November 1981,
17 companies divided into four groups to set up joint-sales companies, the establish-
ment of which reflected capital ties and geographical considerations. However, joint
sales was not a sufficient means for resolving the problem of excess capacity.
With the enactment of the Industrial Structure Law in May 1983, the petrochem-
ical, ethylene manufacturing, and polyolefin manufacturing industries sought des-
ignation as “specific industries” and received that designation in June. The vinyl
chloride resin industry received the designation as well. The reduction of excess
capacity was carried out jointly according to government instruction. The ethylene
oxide and styrene monomer industries, by contrast, adopted a policy of pursuing
capacity reduction at the discretion of each company. The industries that pursued
joint capacity reduction saw a high achievement rate. Policy promoted the consoli-
dation into higher-efficiency facilities, leading to a concentration of production into
large plants producing 300,000 tons or more annually. Meanwhile joint sales also
began to be effective in reducing costs, but price competition was unavoidable. Solu-
tions continued to be explored: for example, in December 1986 each company put
together an action program and tried bundling what had been manufacturer-brand
products into one common brand (Tables 5 and 6).
The special designation under the ISLwas lifted in September 1987 in those indus-
tries where the reduction of facilities had borne fruit, but because ethylene demand
increased rapidly beginning just at that time, MITI was concerned about the reemer-
gence of excess capacity. It therefore sought to maintain appropriate investment by
introducing the “Declare System” (advance reporting system). The target industries
Table 5 Overview of petrochemical industry facilities closures under the industrial structure law.























Ethylene 635 229 36.1 202 88.2 433




201 49 24.4 45 91.8 156
Ethylene
oxide
74 20 27.0 12 60.0 62
Styrene
monomer
180 47 26.1 34 72.3 146
Source Yamazaki (2011, p. 76)
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Table 6 Concentration of ethylene production through capacity reduction
Before capacity reduction After capacity reduction
Reported capacity Active capacity Active capacity after
reduction




Number of plants 32 20 14
Over 300,000 tons 11 11 8
200,000–299,999 tons 3 3 5
100,000–199,999 tons 8 4 1




Source Yamazaki (2011, p. 77)
were ethylene and polyolefin, and investment adjustments based on this method were
implemented beginning in November 1987 and March 1988, respectively.
3.2.2 Conversion to Non-mercury Methods in the Soda Industry
The soda or alkali industry was making enormous capital investments to convert to
non-mercury production following the pollution controls laws of the 1970s. Support-
ing this endeavor was regarded as a policy issue (Yamazaki 2011, p. 110). However,
it was becoming difficult to promote these efforts due to the increasing cost of raw
fuel in the oil crisis. In May 1977, MITI provided financial and tax support under the
plan of completing the conversion of all facilities by the end of the fiscal year, but
only two-thirds of the conversion from mercury electrolysis to asbestos diaphragm
electrolysis was completed by the end of that period. This was because businesses
had seen marked deterioration and also because the asbestos diaphragm electrolysis
method was inferior in terms of quality. Faced with these obstacles, MITI presented
a plan to the 1979 Mercury Pollution Control Promotion Meeting to support the
development of the ion exchange membrane method that offered quality at the level
of the mercury method and thereby to complete the conversion by the end of 1984.
The conversion was completed in June 1986. This was an unprecedented achieve-
ment anywhere in the world. In a context of rising public unease and opposition to
pollution and mercury contamination, the soda industry faced deteriorating market
conditions. Offering lateral support to the industry, MITI overcame the friction with
it and was able to induce the industry to make the shift in manufacturing method.
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3.2.3 Structural Improvement of the Aluminum Smelting Business
The aluminum smelting industry was typical of energy-intensive industries, and
based on the November 1977 interim report of the Aluminum Industry Committee
of the Industrial Structure Council, a plan was in place to shrink its production
system through a freeze on its facilities and other measures (Yamazaki 2011, p. 286).
It was therefore designated a “structurally depressed industry” in February 1978,
and measures were adopted for it based on the Industry Stabilization Law. The basic
plan for stabilization was put together in January 1979 and called for scrapping or
suspending 530,000 tons of its domestic smelting capacity (suspension to continue
until June 1983) to reduce capacity to 1.1 million tons by the end of FY 1979. This
constituted a significantly greater reduction than that called for in the 1977 report.
The tariff quota system was also utilized to support structural improvement. The
application of tax-free or low tax rates up to a certain amount of imports guaranteed
a supply of low-priced imported goods in order tomaintain a competitive environment
by applying a high tax rate for imports exceeding this limit. However, it aimed to
allow time for the rationalization of the refining sector by placing the burden for high
tariffs on the aluminum industry as a whole. (The plan was in effect for two years
beginning in FY 1978).
However, the second oil crisis in 1979 aggravated the situation, and the existing
plans were judged inadequate. This was because inexpensive imports were flowing
into Japan from the stagnant world aluminum ingot market, exacerbating the domes-
tic industry’s troubles. The aluminum subcommittee began studying the matter in
April 1981. Its review of structural improvement measures based on an annual pro-
duction capacity of 1.1 million tons was presented in its October report titled “The
Aluminum Smelting Business and Related Measures Going Forward.” The report
held that domestic supply should be maintained from the point of view of maintain-
ing the demand–supply adjustment function and bargaining power, namely, ingot
imports. Furthermore, by maintaining and developing the superior technology that
had been cultivated, the industry was expected to be able to develop new materials
or participate in overseas development projects. It proposed reducing production to
about 700,000 tons a year by 1985, and said that in order to do so, the following
structural improvement policies were necessary: (1) Reduction of electricity costs,
which accounted for 40% of smelting costs, (2) reimplementation of the tariff rebate
system, and (3) promotion of the development and import of semi-domestic products.
The specific countermeasures called for in the report included concentrating pro-
duction in high-efficiency facilities, as proposed in theMay 1983 structural improve-
ment plan formulated under the Industrial Structure Law, and cost reductions through
the elimination of transport complexities on the logistics side. Capital investment for
revitalization included conversion to coal power in order to reduce electricity costs,
and other investment in facilities to reduce the cost of energy and raw materials, as
well as investments leading to higher-quality products such as high-purity aluminum.
The plan went smoothly, with shutdowns covering 9,300 tons in facilities completed
by the end of May 1983, and 530,000 tons worth scrapped as of April 1984. Despite
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the large scale of the scrapping, however, capacity utilization remained stagnant, and
the market environment remained harsh.
InDecember 1984, theNonferrousMetals Industry Committee (renamed from the
Aluminum Committee in April that year) compiled its own report (also titled “The
Aluminum Smelting Business and Related Measures Going Forward”). Determina-
tion of the appropriate capacity for the smelting industry emphasized the following
criteria: (1) that it carry out the minimum production necessary for guaranteeing a
stable supply to the domestic market, (2) that it retain the technical base necessary
for developing overseas projects, and (3) that it secure a supply of the high-purity
bare metal for which import substitutions were not easy to access. This led to a plan
for a 350,000-ton system, and the report called for realizing this by FY 1988.MITI in
response put together a basic plan for structural improvement in line with these rec-
ommendations, and as concrete measures, prohibited the installation or expansion of
electrolytic furnaces excluding those used for experimental research, and promoted
business alliances aimed at concentrating production in high-efficiency facilities and
at joint sales and purchasing, joint transportation, and so on. It also maintained the
tariff regime, but with the market-opening action program announced in July 1985,
the government was forced to cut the 9% tariff on bare metals to the 1% level of the
United States in January 1988. That meant that it would be difficult to maintain the
350,000-ton regime. After this, corporate efforts in the aluminum industry focused
on cost reduction and high added value in the rolling process, and with regard to the
supply of bare metals, sought out stable supplies through long-term import contracts
and development projects intended for import to Japan. However, with the search
for a stable supply of bare metal, the major producers lost their ability to control
prices in the international market of the mid-1980s, and the increase in competitive
suppliers reduced their raison d’etre.
3.2.4 Structural Improvement Policies for the Electric Furnace
and Ferrosilicon Industries
The electric furnace and ferrosilicon industries also implemented structural improve-
ment policies in response to long-term supply and demandproblems (Yamazaki 2011,
p. 220).
In the ordinary steel electric furnace industry, 27 out of 58 companies were oper-
ating one electric furnace as of 1983; in other words most were micro operations and
their facilities were aging. Small bars and small- and medium-sized steel accounted
for 80% of electric furnace industry products and were low value-added products.
Most were intended for the construction industry, which was dominated by on-the-
spot and commercial transactions. In the early 1980s, earnings dropped due to excess
competition, and the industry began exploring structural improvementmeasures. The
“cartel faction” in the industry suggested ways to try to reduce capability across the
industry but also hoped for coordination from the government on capacity reduction,
while others such as Tokyo SteelManufacturing Co. argued that the reduction should
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take place through bankruptcies. Policy coordination was expected to be complicated
in this industry.
Twice before February 1980, the Non-Integrated Steel Producers’ Association
had considered the question of electric furnaces and MITI addressed it as well for
three months beginning in April 1981, through the Flat Electric Furnaces Facili-
ties Subcommittee of the Industrial Structure Council. The subcommittee proposed
extending the “basic stabilization plan” to June 1983. Because the scrapping of plants
under the Industrial Stabilization Law invited if anything an expansion of capacity
through the rationalization efforts of electric furnace makers, the development of
steelmaking technology, plant upgrades, and so on, “corporate restructuring and
consolidation” was added to the plan upon its extension. As a result, the formation
of groups within the electric furnace industry advanced under the initiative of blast
furnace manufacturers.
The ordinary steel electric furnace industry received ISL designation again inMay
1983.MITI convened the Steel Industry Committee of the Industrial Structure Coun-
cil in July that year andproposed a “Basic Plan for Structural Improvement.”Capacity
reduction, business alliances, and capital investment for revitalization aimed to lower
production costs and establish a stable foundation suitable to open economic system.
The business groupings planned a concentration of production in high-efficiency
plants as well as joint sales of products and other measures.
Demand for electric-arc furnace (EAF) steel recovered around 1987 especially
in the construction industry, and although the plan’s extension was postponed due
to the expiration of the Industrial Structure Law, the industry had by then seen a
reduction in personnel and a consolidation of firms, so that the results of structural
improvement were evident. The number of workers in the industry in 1987 was down
to almost 40% of its 1982 levels, while the number of companies had decreased from
78 in 1975 to about 50 in the early 1990s. Likewise, the number of electric furnaces
was down from 146 in 1978 to 93 in 1988. Some electric furnace manufacturers
were thus able to increase their market share rapidly. Since the construction of new
electric furnaces had been frozen for 10 years under the Industrial Stabilization and
Industrial Structure Laws of 1978 and 1983, Tokyo Steel and others that operated the
most advanced electric furnaces were able to acquire a greater share of the market.
3.2.5 Structural Reform of the Cement Industry
The cement industry also suffered serious deterioration in performance after the sec-
ond oil crisis. The Cement Association of Japan set up a Structural Problems Study
Group in October 1982, which conducted repeated investigations. Its February 1983
interim report cited as basic problems: (1) stagnation of demand, (2) excessive pro-
duction capacity, (3) expansion of the distribution sector (posing logistics problems
for cement and related industries), and (4) excessive competition in cement. Recom-
mendations included (1) scrapping of excess capacity, (2) gathering cement makers
into groups, and (3) responding aggressively to the needs of related industries. The
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Association decided in April to adopt the recession cartel formulation and to under-
take structural improvements based on the Industrial Structure Law (Matsushima
2012, p. 302).
A third-sector recession cartel was approved in August 1983. This time, it set
limits not only on production amounts but also on sales quantities. As a result,
improvement progressed most markedly in regions where the price decline had been
particularly sharp. Cement was recognized as a designated industry under the second
Industrial Structure Law inApril 1984, and a basic plan for its structural improvement
was formulated in August. Its contents included (1) reducing capacity by 30 million
tons of equipment, equivalent to 23% of the cement clinkers’ annual production
capacity as of March 1984, with “reduction” in principle, meaning “scrapping,” and
(2) undertaking joint sales and logistics management, through the establishment of
companies for joint operation. Thirty-onemillion tonswere scrapped byMarch 1986.
A plan for company groupings was put together in January 1984 and joint operating
companies were established.
Although some advances were achieved, import pressures increased due to the
appreciation of the yen after 1985, and capacity utilization remained at 72%even after
the scrapping of plants. It was not easy to dispel concerns about excess capacity, so
the cement industry sought the application of the “FacilitationAct” when it came into
being in April 1987. “Cement kilns” were designated as “specific facilities” under
Article 4 in October and capacity reduction continued. Rationalization through the
mechanism of joint operating companies also continued. The plant scrapping and
production freezes proceeded as planned, covering 10.71 million tons by the end of
March 1991. Additionally, the final report of the Japan–US SII talks in February 1990
indicated plans for an increase in public investment, and in May 1991, the Cement
Industry Fundamental Issues Committee, a private advisory body of the Director-
General of the Consumer Goods and Service Industries Bureau, decided to cancel
the industry’s designation under the Facilitation Act.
Regarding the joint venture company, the committee indicated that it was hard
to judge whether the various activities to secure the foundations of the business—
unifying sales systems and organizations, securing profits, and holding assets—were
sufficient. In linewith the committee’s judgment, the joint operating companies chose
either to dissolve or to continue to attempt greater rationalization. Of the five original
groups, two were dissolved. The Committee pointed out in its May 1994 report titled
“The Cement Industry Going Forward” that “unification of sales had not progressed”
since August 1984, that cooperation on reducing costs had not progressed since the
dissolution of the two groups, and that profits were therefore deteriorating further. It
proposed measures for the dissolution and merger of the joint operating companies.
An announcement was made terminating the policy that had envisioned organizing
the entire industry into groups, and thereafter, the industry’s reorganization took
new paths based on the merger of large firms to respond to internationalization,
technological development, and environmental policy.
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3.2.6 The 1980s Vision of the Paper and Pulp Industry
The 1980s Vision of the Paper and Pulp Industry, compiled by the Pulp and Paper
Industry Committee of the Industrial Structure Council in March 1981, said that
because of the two oil crises, the paper and pulp industry was facing rising energy
costs and reduced demand. It pointed out three issues: (1) structural improvement,
(2) reform of business consciousness, and (3) securing stability in raw materials
(costs). The most important area for structural improvement was the issue of excess
capacity (Yamazaki 2011, p. 135). This was linked to the second issue above. It
was understood that the reason excess capacity remained despite the low capacity
utilization rate that followed the first oil crisis was that businesses were adhering to
their rapid growth-era assumption that excess capacity would be resolved through
economic growth and demand recovery. In other words, the assumptions of the rapid-
growth era had become entrenched. The Vision advocated a shift in business attitude
toward sharing and moderation, and said that the change should be voluntary even if
it required some degree of public intervention. A third challenge was the emerging
fears of a raw material shortages, because Japan was dependent on foreign countries
for half its pulpwood in 1980. The Committee called for (1) urgent implementation
of development imports centering on overseas afforestation, (2) stabilization of the
supply of domestic pulp material, (3) and expansion of waste paper collection use
and promotion of supply and demand stabilization.
The fundamental problemwas structural improvement. Although the papermanu-
facturing industry did not meet the requirements of the Industrial Stabilization Law,
businesses were still under pressure from the high cost of raw fuel and reduced
demand. As an emergency measure, wood-free and coated paper were granted per-
mission in May 1981 to form a recession cartels, which remained in place until the
end of February 1982. This was the first such case for printing paper. Unglazed
grocery-paper businesses formed a recession cartel in June 1982, the second in that
sector since 1978. The waves of structural recession were spreading throughout the
paper manufacturing industry.
MITI therefore strengthened its policy of restraining expenditure on capital invest-
ment, and inFebruary 1982, organized aPaper Supply andDemandCouncil (renamed
“Paper Demand Council” in 1992 and abolished in 1996). The Industrial Structure
Law was also applied to the paper industry, because of its substantial excess capac-
ity. In August 1983, 44 companies in the paper manufacturing industry (excluding
the newspaper manufacturing industry) submitted a request to MITI and in Octo-
ber the industry was given the “specified industries” designation, with a basic plan
announced in October that set the goal of structural improvement by FY 1988. The
main content was to reduce facilities and equipment by 950,000 tons (capacity reduc-
tion rate of 10.6%) by September 1986. In November 1983,MITI also issued instruc-
tions under Article 5.1 of the Industrial Structure Law on joint action limiting or
prohibiting new establishments and the expansion or rebuilding of facilities.
Designation under the Industrial Structure Law was not limited to paper manu-
facturing. Corrugated fiberboard manufacturing, already covered by the Industrial
Stabilization Law, was also designated under the Industrial Structure Law in May
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1983. In August, a basic plan was established for structural improvement by 1988
through the suspension of 385,000 tons, focused on papermachinery. Parts of the plan
were revised in March 1984, with production capacity to be reduced by 1,537,000
tons (a reduction rate of 19.8%) by a target date of June 1987.
The paper manufacturing industry’s designation ended in March 1988 due to the
economy’s recovery. The plan for corrugated fiberboard ended in June due to the can-
cellation of the Industrial Structure Law. Adjustment was not abandoned, however.
Against a background of strong demand in 1988, the paper industry saw succes-
sive plans for expansion, but the Paper, Pulp and Printing Industry Division of the
Consumer Industries Bureau required each company to report its capital investment
plans to theMinistry. The “DeclareMethod” referred to these announced plans in the
expectation that each company would adjust its own plans voluntarily. This approach
remained in place until March 1991.
3.3 Basic Industries, Consumer Goods Industries, Coal
Industry, and Others
3.3.1 Introduction of Energy-Saving Equipment and Policy Support
for Technological Development in the Steel Industry
In the early 1980s, the government supported the introduction of energy-saving
plants. The Iron and Steel Industry was subsidized in two ways: through financial
assistance byway of the JapanDevelopment Bank loans and through taxation support
(Yamazaki 2011, p.187). However, since major steel manufacturers’ dependence on
bank loans declined, it was the “investment tax credit” established in 1978 and the
“tax system for energy measure promotion” established in FY 1981 that was most
useful for the investment in equipment. The support aimed at the introduction of
advanced facilities that would enhance energy utilization in accordance with “The
Energy Infrastructure Advanced Facilities Investment Promotion Tax System” of
1986. The support applied to investment in either (1) advanced energy utilization
manufacturing equipment or (2) advanced energy utilization equipment additions.
The first was for the energy-consuming production facilities to introduce machin-
ery and other equipment that would improve the manufacturing function, institute
automated or continuous production processes, or improve manufacturing or assem-
bly methods in other ways. High-performance steelmaking rolling mills are typ-
ical of such facilities, including high-temperature continuous casting equipment,
high-temperature direct-feed rolling equipment, roll-cooling continuous grinding
machines, automatic adjustment thick-plate cooling equipment, and so on. Typical
of the second were equipment for rationalizing fuel combustion as a heat source,
recovering and utilizing waste heat, preventing loss of heat or power, rationaliz-
ing heating, cooling, and electric heat, and low pressure-loss waste-power recovery
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Table 7 Rate of penetration of major energy-saving equipment in the steel industry (1996)
% Japan South Korea United States United Kingdom Germany
Coke dry quenching
equipment
85 50 0 0 33
Top recovery
turbines (TRT)
100 100 12 0 24
Converter gas
recovery facilities
100 25 11 18 0
Source Yamazaki (2011, p. 196)
devices, devices for the storage of by-product gases, and dry coal distillation devices
using waste heat (Table 7).
The introduction of energy conservation equipment through tax system supports
resulted in the active introduction of coke dry quenching equipment (CDQ), top pres-
sure recovery turbines (TRT) in blast furnaces, and converter gas recovery facilities.
The improvement in the rate of penetration of energy-recovery facilities led Japan’s
steel industry to become the world’s leader in energy efficiency.
With regard to technical development support, MITI in the 1980s and 1990s
expected a growing need for (1) product differentiation through superior quality and
cost reduction, and technological development leading to the development of new
demand, (2) basic and creative research and development bringing advances to the
cutting edge worldwide, (3) global environmental measures, alternative energies,
and measures for waste disposal and recycling. In collaboration with manufacturers,
MITI in November 1990 established a Research Group on Steel Production Infor-
mation Infrastructure Technologies and provided support such as the compilation of
development plans in the first two areas.
For more direct technical development support, steel, nonferrous and ferroalloy
manufacturers jointly established a Research Association for New Foundations in
Smelting Technology in 1982 with the aim of developing energy-saving smelting
technology. It received subsidies for basic research under the “Shared Infrastructure
for the Development of Energy Substitutes for Petroleum” adopted by MITI as a
policy target in FY 1982. This Association pursued development in two tracks during
this period: (1) direct steel and iron ore smelting reduction processes, and (2) molten
slag sensible heat recovery technology. The first arose from a recognition of the limits
of the existing blast furnacemethod. The use of coke as a blast-furnace reducing agent
was important both for diversifying energy sources and for addressing the problem
of aging plants. In addition, as capacity reached excessive levels, it was expected that
flexible operations could be realized with the blast-furnace approach, which would
contribute to energy-source diversification by using ore and coal in powder form.
Full-fledged development was triggered by a report from the Basic Materials
Industries Council in 1987. Independent development of smelting reduction tech-
nologies by various makers was supported with national subsidies beginning in 1988
through the Japan Iron and Steel Federation, which established a Committee on the
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Development of Smelting Reduction inApril. In 1993 support went to test plant oper-
ations, and 2000 was chosen as the target year for launching practical applications
of the technologies. From FY 1995, the Japan Research and Development Center
(JRCM) served as the nucleus for collaboration between industry, academia, and
government on technological development, and research on practical applications of
basic technologies was undertaken according to a 10-year plan.
MITI had been issuing guidelines on production volumes since 1966, but these
were abolished with the mounting overseas criticism of Japanese trading practices
and administrative guidance in the latter 1980s.
3.3.2 Conversion of the Textile Industry to an Advanced Industrialized
Industry
As the Law on ExtraordinaryMeasures for the Structural Improvement of the Textile
Industries (“Textile Industry Law”) approached the next expiration date, the contin-
ued slump in domestic demand, excess capacity, high cost of raw fuel, and import
pressures for the most part remained unchanged. A Joint Committee of the Textile
Industries Council’s Coordination Committee and the Industrial Structure Council’s
Textile Committee issued a report in October 1983 titled “About the Textile Industry
in a NewAge.” The report expressed the view that new development of an “advanced
economy-type industry” could be launched through the efforts of the textile industry
(Matsushima 2012, p. 59).
What was meant by “advanced economy-type industry” was that “Advanced
economies have broad markets that are highly sophisticated and diverse, with high
potential for industrial technology and cultural creativity and abundant humancapital,
and the industry that can fully utilize that latent strength can maintain its dominance
internationally.” The report considered the existing production contraction, low prof-
itability, and capacity reduction to be the result of structural factors in the industry.
These included: (1) stagnant demand due to structural changes, and at the same time
rapid progress in individualization, diversification, and upgrading, and ever-shorter
fashion cycles, with the result that the industry was forced to shift to high-variety,
small-lot production; (2) new competition with foreign countries with the emergence
of developing economies; (3) the difficulty of securing young workers.
On the other hand, signs of revitalization were also evident, including: (1) the
advance of vertical linkages among different industries in various forms around the
planning and development of new products, and (2) advances in innovation such as
combining the results of technology developments at each level of the textile industry,
including yarn, woven fabric, dyeing, and so on, to create new products.
Development into an “advanced economy-type industry” offered the industry
new directions: (1) becoming an “information- and technology-intensive industry
that would satisfy lifestyle and cultural needs” supplying “not only the necessities
of daily life but rather social goods and goods that represent value and that satisfy
human sensibility” and (2) becoming a “system-type industry based on utilizing the
industry as a whole…[to] supply products that could meet actual demand through
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the smooth distribution of information, and by linking product planning and high
technology, could meet the consumer needs for high quality.” Besides this, a third
area was discussed, namely, the path to an “international industry based on utiliz-
ing an international division of labor.” Various measures were presented to foster
these types of development, including measures for aggressively promoting struc-
tural improvement in the apparel sector. The decision was made to extend the Textile
Law for five more years and the Law was enacted in May 1984 (Table 8).
Through repeated extensions, the Textile Law was in effect for 15 years from
1974 to 1989 and consistently advanced policies aimed at knowledge consolidation.
The results came in the form of projects for product development centers, equipment
leasing, business improvement, and so on.
Textile firms formed knowledge-consolidation groups, which created business
plans and promoted improvement projects with the Minister’s approval; large com-
panies with planning experience and capability also participated in these groups.
Over the 15-year period, 77 knowledge-consolidation projects and 30 joint-facilities
projects were approved by the Minister. The total cost of these projects was 102.7
billion yen, of which 66.4 billion yen came from upgrade financing and 6.7 billion
in the form of debt guarantees by the Textile Industry Rationalization Agency for
funds raised by the firms themselves.
3.3.3 New Trends in Policies on Consumer Industries
Industrial policy reflected the intensifying calls from the 1980s on for Japan to expand
its domestic demand, and many issues in consumer life and culture were explored
under the heading, “consumer industries policy.” This also reflected the shift in
priorities then taking place in policy making, from production to quality of life. The
establishment of the Life Culture Forum in November 1985 was the opportunity
to make this shift manifest. The Forum, which was distinctive in its use of freely
grouping experts, clarified the basic concepts and significance of a renaissance in
“life culture” and made recommendations to the relevant sectors (Matsushima 2012,
p. 248).
The Forum met in four stages, producing proposals titled “Creating a beauti-
ful, comfortable, and worthwhile lifestyle” (first recommendation, May 1986); “De-
sign: the point of view of fashion” (second recommendation, June 1987); “Toward
a rich information environment—life culture and information” (third recommenda-
tion, June 1988), and “Movement and life culture—towards the creation of a new
lifestyle of mobility” (fourth recommendation, June 1989). The fourth proposal said
that, “The improvement of social infrastructure such as networks andmeans of trans-
portation to accompany increasing social mobility naturally begins with improving
safety measures. Administrative responses appropriate to Japan as a lifestyle power
are needed in other areas of people’s lives as well, namely leisure, education, med-
ical care, welfare, and public services.” It went on to raise concrete issues such as
the reduction of work hours, realization of a long-term leave system, and corporate
support for free-time activities.
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Table 8 Structural improvement projects in the textile industry, industry comparison
1974–1988 1989–1993 1994–1998
Projects by structural improvement groups
➀ Projects related to




➀ Projects related to
development of new projects
or new technologies
➀ Projects related to new
products or new technologies
(including design-related)













➂ Facilities-leasing projects ➂ Facilities-leasing projects ➂ Projects on the
improvement of scale or
mode of production
➃ Projects on the
improvement of scale or
mode of production
➃ Projects on the
improvement of scale or
mode of production
➃ Projects on the




➄ Projects on improvements
of business
➄ Projects on improvements
of trade/transactions
➄ Projects on improving
scale of business
➅ Projects on industrial
relations measures








・Projects related to business
improvement
・Projects for securing or
fostering human resources
Commercial and industrial associations facilitation projects
➀ Projects related to the
development of new products
or new technologies
➀ Projects related to the
development of new products
or new technologies
➁ Projects for the securing or
fostering of human resources
➁ Projects for the securing or
fostering of human resources
➂ Projects related to the
provision of information
➂ Projects related to the
provision of information
➃ Projects related to
establishing facilities to
contribute to the business
rationalization (joint projects




➃ Projects related to
establishing facilities to
contribute to the business
rationalization (joint projects




➄ Other projects related to
the facilitation of structural
improvement
➄ Other projects related to
the facilitation of structural
improvement
Source Matsushima (2012, p. 105)
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Although these recommendations did not immediately result in policies, they
were reflected in the administrative organization of the Consumer Goods and Ser-
vices Industries Bureau. For example, based on the first recommendation, a New
Office Advancement Committee was established in August 1986 in the Household
and Miscellaneous Goods Division, which was in charge of office furniture. The
Committee was to serve as a private advisory body to the Directors General of the
Consumer Goods and Services Industries Bureau, the Industrial Policy Bureau, and
the Machinery and Information Industries Bureau, and to examine ideas for the ideal
new office and policies for promoting it. Its focus was not the production of office
furniture, but rather the office using that furniture. This represented a new, demand-
driven perspective. Its December “Proposal on the promotion of the new office”
treated the office as one of the venues of people’s lives, in other words, or as “a place
for human life,” “a place at the core of the information era,” “a place expressive of
corporate culture,” and “a place at the frontier of internationalization.” “What we
are calling the ‘New Office’ is an office that is comfortable and functional, that is to
say, a place where it is possible for the worker to live an intellectual and comfortable
life, where companies can ensure high-quality production, and where management
attitudes and ways of thinking are manifested. We appeal to the world, including
corporate executives and office workers, to bring it to reality.” In April 1988, the
Committee summarized “Guidelines for making the new office” and put this in con-
crete terms with the key points for realizing a comfortable and functional new office.
This was followed in May 1992 by an interim report by the Daily Goods Division
titled “Creating the ideal office of the future—a people-friendly office is a place
where wisdom can be created.” This report, also known as the “Second Guideline
for New Offices,” represented a shift to a psychological approach, including discus-
sion of the ideal organization. As interest shifted to this direction, MITI withdrew
its involvement and transferred the campaign to a private organization called the
New Office Promotion Association established in June 1987 (incorporated in March
1989).
3.3.4 Promotion of Projects for the Development of New Housing
As a successor to the 1975 “House 55 Plan,” which had been a joint project of the
Ministry of Construction and MITI for high-quality, low-priced industrialized hous-
ing, MITI independently launched the New Housing Development Project in 1979
(Matsushima 2012, p. 347). This plan, which covered seven years from FY 1979 to
FY 1985, consisted of developing (1) systems technologies for the care of the elderly
and physically handicapped, (2) systems technologies for variable living spaces, (3)
systems technologies for the utilization of basements, (4) systems technologies for
natural energy-based housing, and (5) technologies for improving the durability of
building materials for homes. The New Housing Development Committee was set
up as a private advisory body of the Director of Consumer Industries Bureau and
deliberated on possible directions of development. Fourteen groups, composed of 56
companies, participated in the development. Significant results were seen in (1)–(4)
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of the above plans. In addition, MITI established a third project, the New Materi-
als and Equipment System Development Project for Apartment Houses (the “21st
Century Condominium Plan”) in FY 1984.
The Cabinet Decision on the Fourth Comprehensive National Development Plan
in June 1987 aimed for a deconcentration of people and institutions in Tokyo and a
shift to decentralized multipolar land use. The Industrial Council on Housing and the
Urban Industry Committee then conducted a new review. According to the interim
report presented in May 1988, a supply of housing was needed that would be appro-
priate for the era’s diversification of values and individualization of lifestyles, and
that would meet the need for further cost reduction. MITI thereupon launched the
New IndustrializedHousing Industry Technology and SystemsDevelopment Project,
its fourth solo project. With a seven-year plan beginning in FY 1989, it focused on
(1) developing designs for living spaces and performance simulation systems, (2)
developing high-performance building materials, housing equipment, and factory
production technology, and (3) developing comprehensive energy-use systems for
residential use. The first of these targeted the development of methods and systems
capable of predicting and making calculations for moist heat, air, sound, light, and
other environmental and housing functions (Fig. 6).
The publication of the Vision for the 1990s meant that new developments were
sought in housing-industry policy. The Roundtable on Ideals in Housing and the
Housing Industry, a private advisory body of the Director of Consumer Industries
Fig. 6 History of housing technology development projects. Source Study Group on the Housing
Industry of the Future [Kongo no Jyutaku Sangyo no Arikata ni Kansuru Kenkyukai] 2008. New
Paradigms for the Housing Industry (Report for METI)
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Bureau, was established in December 1993 and in June 1994 produced a report titled
“Toward a Decade of Housing Industry Reform.” The report pointed to three direc-
tions for reform: a shift from a “luxury orientation” to an “authenticity orientation,”
from “housing as an asset” to “housing for function,” and from “dispersed housing”
to “housing integrated with the townscape.” A new Development Project for Hous-
ing That Creates Lifestyle Value was launched in FY 1994 to forward technological
developments for the following: (1) improving and creating a housing stock of value,
(2) meeting the needs of new lifestyles, (3) harmonizing with the environment.
The above-mentioned vision and technology development projects targeted pre-
fabricated housing in particular. The ratio of prefab housing to total construction
starts grew steadily from 7.3% in 1973 to 18.0% in 1992 and then remained in the
15.0% range in the latter half of the 1990s,meaning that construction could proceed at
a certain rate. In addition, the development of prefabricated houses was also effective
for triggering the development of a wide range of related material industries.
3.3.5 New Issues in Distribution Policy
The joint deliberations of the Distribution Committee and the SME Policy-Making
Council Distribution Subcommittee fromOctober 1982 forward resulted in aDecem-
ber 1983 report titled “1980s Distribution Industries Vision” (Ishihara 2011, p. 200).
The report pointed out that a variety of retail formats were emerging as regional
communities came to be seen as living spaces or societies with their own distinc-
tive appeal, and as consumer needs became more individualized and diversified. In
this sense small and medium-sized retailers were not losing their competitiveness
in every instance. At the same time, shotengai, or shopping districts, which played
an important role in creating a new commercial culture appropriate to the history
and traditions of their cities, continued to need modernization. The report found that
their functions could be reevaluated and that there were grounds for suppressing the
entry of large stores to those areas. Issues to be addressed by policy included: (1)
responding to the diversification of consumer needs, (2) supporting SME develop-
ment to produce a vigorous majority, (3) strengthening the collaboration between
commercial and urban policy, (4) actively responding to the emerging information
society, (5) securing human resources, and (6) determining the role of distribution
in an internationalized society. The report also recommended actively expressing
the value of local commerce by changing the terminology from “shopping space” to
“living space,” and suggested that this could be put into concrete form with the con-
cept of a community mart. Accordingly, a Community Mart Center was established
in March 1985 with funding from associations of small and medium-sized retailers.
The Forum on 21st Century Distributionwas established in April 1987 as a private
advisory body of the Director of the Industrial Policy Bureau to discuss ideal distri-
bution structures looking ahead to the 21st century. The Forum submitted a report
in July that year. The Forum had considered how the distribution industry could
contribute to the harmonization of foreign economic relations with economic growth
centered on domestic demand, and whether policy support could be given to that
end. It also discussed the expansion of personal consumption, employment creation,
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revitalization of regional economies, the expansion of imports, and contributions to
international society. This report introduced fresh ideas in distilling the challenges
of the distribution industry to two: transforming itself into a creative life industry
and building open distribution mechanisms.
Meanwhile, with escalating economic friction with the US, negotiations were
expected to focus in part on the barrier to imports posed by the laws on large-scale
retail and by distribution practices. The demand for improvement in these areas
became an important factor in setting the direction for distribution policy. This will
be discussed in detail in Chap. 4.
3.3.6 Safety Improvements and Product Standardization
In November 1983, the 16th Consumer Protection Conference (established under
the Consumer Protection Fundamental Law) decided to create a system linking the
various Consumption Life Centers into a network (Ishihara 2011, p. 336).
Another focus of consumer-oriented administrative responseswas product testing.
The product-testing activity of the Industrial Manufacturing Inspection Institute was
enhanced in accordance with the 1973 Consumer Product Safety Law, and in 1984
the Institute was integrated with the Textile Products Inspection Institute, forming
the MITI Inspection Institute. Where the Institute had mainly conducted inspections
of exports in the past, the reorganization accompanied an expansion of work related
to consumer administration. In 1995, the MITI Inspection Institute was renamed
the National Institute of Technology Evaluation, promoting further improvements
in product testing and collaboration with prefectural Consumption Life Centers and
other groups.
The Consumer Products Safety Law designated certain products as requiring
safety regulation. Safety standards were determined at the national level, and those
items could not be sold without the S-mark (for Safety) indicating that they were
in conformity with the standards. Fifty-six items received this designation at the
end of FY 1992. However, the US government, which was criticizing the closed
nature of the Japanese market in the 1980s, raised the issue of this safety standard
system and argued that it should be liberalized to the level of the American market.
Keidanren also wanted simplification and rationalization of the safety requirements
along American lines.
In March 1983, the government’s Standards and Certification System Liaison and
Coordination Headquarters decided on a comprehensive review of the standards and
certification system in response to requests from the GATT Standard Code. As a
result, foreign and domestic companies became able to obtain the same registra-
tion and approvals. With the amendment of the law in December 1985, government
approval was still necessary, as before, for products designated Type 1, meaning
products for which it was hard for business operators alone to guarantee the quality.
Other designated products, however, were classified as Type 2 and were shifted to a
system of self-evaluation and approval based on confirming a product’s conformity
with the standards. This made it possible to affix the S-mark to Type-2 products by
notification to the Minister.
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Meanwhile, with regard to relief for victims of accidents, the Tokyo District
Court’s August 1978 ruling on subacute myelo-optico-neuropathy and the Fukuoka
District Courts Ogura Branch ruling on the Kanemi Rice Oil Disease Incident of
1968 both imposed heavy obligations for care on the manufacturer. The court rulings
made evident the inadequacy of consumer protection laws and the need for such
protection and became amajor influence on the establishment of the Product Liability
Law. At the same time, industry and MITI were both concerned that prioritizing
consumers could endanger the survival of companies, and legislation did not make
much progress. Nevertheless, in the event of an actual accident, there was no choice
but to forward negotiations between the parties. It was becoming clear that there was
a limit to the degree to which enterprises could rely only on judicial precedents and
that the government could not continue to neglect the issue.
3.3.7 Responses to the Growth of Service Industries
Government administration respecting service industries was not so much a matter
of responding to administrative needs as of exploring what the demands on adminis-
tration were in a context of service-sector growth. The Commercial Affairs Division
of the Industrial Policy Bureau was established in July 1973 and its jurisdiction
described in MITI’s Order of Organization included the term “service industries” for
the first time. The Commerce and Service Industries Affairs Office was established
in July 1978. A Study Group on Service Industries was organized immediately after
its establishment to begin considering policy responses (Ishihara 2011, p. 407). The
results of its investigations were summarized in the Industrial Structure Council’s
report,The 1980s Vision, which characterized service industries as supplementing the
production activities of the various industries of the manufacturing sector. That was
the extent of the attention paid them at that time, and no specific policy developments
were made with regard to them.
In October 1984, the Senior Officer for Service Industries was established in the
Commerce Policy Division of the Industrial Policy Bureau, and a Ministerial Office
was established to focus on service industries. The organizational revision followed
on the recommendations in a report by the Service Industry Study Group, a private
advisory body of the Director-General of the Industrial Policy Bureau. The January
1985 report, titled “Hybrid Innovation: A New Era for Service Industries,” made the
point that newly emerging housework and health care services reflected the diversi-
fication of people’s values and attitudes and that significant development was to be
expected in these “new service industries.” MITI began treating this sector as com-
prising “new businesses” that had not appeared in earlier classifications of industry,
and took measures such as forming organizations for the operators, considering pol-
icy, and offering financial support, to give potential for growth to these novel and
innovative industries.
It was after the September 1989 submission of the 1990s Vision that MITI began
to form related measures from this new point of view.
4 Promotion of Domestic Demand … 169
4 Promotion of Domestic Demand and the Vitality
of the Private Sector
4.1 Towards an Advanced Information Society
4.1.1 Problems in the Liberalization of Data Communications
Following theMarch 1980 report “Ideal approaches to industrial policy in the 1980s,”
the Information Industry Committee of the Industrial Structure Council compiled an
interim report in December, which said that a comprehensive and high-grade shift
to information systems was essential to the survival of Japanese industry. It urged
the need to boldly anticipate the next decade or two and recommended the following
measures (Hasegawa 2013, p. 47): (1) development of an information architecture
and the infrastructure necessary to it, (2) proactive advancement of technological
development, and (3) active development in the international arena.
The Information Industry Subcommittee report of June 1991, titled “The infor-
mation society and information industries in the 1980s and approaches to measures
addressing them,” called for “removal of institutional constraints that hamper the
smooth progress of the shift to an information [society and economy]” and called
“the elimination of use restrictions on communication lines… an urgent task.”
In August that year, the Telecommunications Policy Roundtable, a private advi-
sory body of the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), recommended
the liberalization of data communications, the introduction of market principles to
the telecommunications field, and a review of the organizational structure of the
public corporation Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corp. (NTT). In August 1983,
the MPT put together the Value-Added Networks (VAN) Bill for liberalizing the use
of communication lines for data management (Hasegawa 2013, p. 650). There was
strong opposition to the MPT bill, however, beginning with calls for the elimination
of the regulations. Coordination among the parties proved difficult. Ultimately, the
MPT gave up the VAN bill and aimed to prioritize revision of the Public Telecommu-
nications Law, while MITI decided to propose VAN liberalization for SMEs. Based
on coordination between the two ministers, it was decided that the MPT Ordinance
(Second Line Liberalization) would be followed.
Along with this, MITI decided to develop measures to support the practical appli-
cation of newmedia, but because significant restrictions remained on the institutional
infrastructure related to telecommunications, “freedom of entry,” “freedom of busi-
ness activities,” and “freedom of use” were necessary. A review of telecommunica-
tions systems led to the establishment of the three laws of telecommunications reform
in December 1984: the Telecommunications Business Law, the Law on Nippon Tele-
graph and Telephone Corporation, etc., and the Law Concerning the Infrastructure
for the Related Laws.”
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4.1.2 Establishment of the Basic Technology Research Facilitation Act
The Information Industry Committee examined the basic policy on information
industry policy in the latter half of the 1980s in response to new circumstances such
as the privatization of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation and released a
report in January 1985 titled “Recommendations for the Realization of an Advanced
Information Society.” The key issues for addressing the problems expected to arise
with information technology were: (1) human resource development, (2) ensuring
computer security, (3) open information, (4) making the shift to information systems
according to local circumstances, (5) establishing laws for an advanced information
society, and (6) standardizing information equipment and systems.
The framework established by the Law on Temporary Measures for the Promo-
tion of Specified Machinery and Information Industries was nearing its expiration
date in June 1985. At the same time a review of its measures was needed given the
friction with the United States and Europe (Hasegawa 2013, p. 72). The Study Group
on Prospects for Technological Development and the Industrial Structure Council
released reports on Industrial Technical Policies at about the same time. MITI sought
to reflect their recommendations as far as possible and accordingly made budget
requests for the following: (1) to supply risk money, (2) to promote joint research
for the purpose of strengthening collaboration between industry, academia and gov-
ernment, (3) to promote international research cooperation, and (4) to disseminate
research information. MPT also envisioned the establishment of a special corporate
telecommunications promotion organization. After coordination at the government
and ruling party liaison meeting in December 1984, the decision was made to con-
solidate the ideas of both ministries and establish the Japan Key Technology Center
for Special Accredited Corporations, and the Law for the Facilitation of Research in
Key Technologies was enacted in May 1985. New legislative measures were estab-
lished with cooperation between MITI, which acknowledged the need to promote
policy development of high-tech industries based on legislation, and MPT, which
was considering a telecommunications advancement promotion bill.
The pillars of the law included measures such as the low-cost use of state-owned
testing laboratories and the flexible handling of patents in international research
cooperation, and the establishment of a center for promoting basic research on tech-
nology. The main tasks of the center, which was established in October, included
(1) investment, (2) lending, (3) joint research mediation, (4) invitations to foreign
researchers, (5) provision of basic technology information, (6) research.
In FY 1985–1994, the center worked on a total of 99 projects, with expenditures
rising from 2.2 billion yen in FY 1985 to 22.4 billion yen in FY 1991. It handled 305
loans (to 324 companies) totaling 60.9 billion yen between FY 1985 and FY 1994.
However, the number of investment projects adopted remained in the single digits
after FY 1988, and from the same year, the number of mining and manufacturing
projects and telecommunications projects remained at only one to three each fiscal
year. Owing to these circumstances, the center was dissolved in 2003.
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Meanwhile, in October 1986, the Machinery and Information Industries Bureau
established a Roundtable on Future Perspectives on the Machinery and Informa-
tion Industries, which issued an interim report in August 1987 titled “On the ideal
form of the machinery and information industries: Aiming for international cooper-
ation.” The interim report pointed out that the machinery industry had a significant
share of the international market and was heavily dependent on exports and said
that, given the trade friction, declining profits due to the yen’s appreciation, and so
forth, the machinery industry needed to find ways to coexist and share prosperity
with other countries. This required, first, the establishment of appropriate corpo-
rate behavior in the international economy, including exporting in harmony with the
world market, establishing local production, facilitating international partnerships,
and so on, and, second, it meant developing technologies and new business areas,
principally centered on domestic demand, in order to maintain the industry’s vitality.
Concrete measures were considered with the following three principles in mind: (1)
an emphasis on market mechanisms, (2) respect for the concept of progress through
competition, and (3) contributions to realizing free trade.
International cooperation was thus named a policy objective, and the role of the
government was limited to improving the environment so that companies’ volun-
tary efforts could have the desired effect and supplementing corporate activities by
providing timely and appropriate information. This vision of policy was manifest
in the 2000s Vision for the Information Industry put together in June 1987 by the
Information Industry Committee’s Subcommittee on Long-Term Perspectives and in
the June 1989 report of the Machinery Industry Committee of the Industry Structure
Council titled “The future outlook of the machinery industry: Looking to the year
2000.”
4.1.3 Promotion of Fifth-Generation Computer Development Project
The Fifth-Generation Computer Development Project was carried out with a budget
of 57 billion yen over 13 years beginning in FY 1982 (Hasegawa 2013, p. 666).
Because Japanese computer technology had caught up with that of Europe and the
United States, Japan changed its policy goal to spearheading the development of
basic computer technology. The development of the fifth-generation computer was
addressed in the new policy of 1979 and the concept was honed based on a three-
year investigation of the plan. The aim of the plan for the preliminary phase, from
April 1982 to March 1985, was the “the successful development of the world’s first
successive inference machine (inference function in hardware form) and operating
system written in logical programming language.” The results of this research were
presented to the Second International Conference on Fifth-Generation Computers
in November 1984. R&D in the preliminary phase was carried out in four fields
and resulted in such achievements as the Personal Sequential Inference Machine
(PSI), Parallel Relational Database/Machine (Delta), Sequential Inference Machine
Programming and Operating System, SIMPOS), and successive-logic programming
language (Kernel Language, KL 0, Extended Self-Contained Prolog, ESP).
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In the medium-term plan of FY 1988, the emphasis shifted to the development of
parallel-type inference technology, as yet an unexplored technical field. Beginning
in FY 1988, MITI also carried out the Future Personalized Information Environ-
ment Development project (FRIEND 21), for R&D on the human interface, but its
implementation was shifted to private organizations. The TRON (The Real-time
Operating-system Nucleus) project was also launched in June 1984 (Fig. 7).
The Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA) project was drastically
expanded from 1985 on as the core agency responsible for using information technol-
ogy to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of telecommunications. To increase
the efficiency of software production, a budget was assigned to the “Construction of a
system for industrializing software production “( system) and the “ project” was
launched. Thiswas aimed at automating andmechanizing the hitherto labor-intensive
software development process and greatly improving its productivity. The  project
was a five-year plan beginning in FY 1985 with a total budget of 25 billion yen, but
in FY 1989 the project shifted to the commercialization stage and MITI withdrew its
involvement. Sigma System Co., Ltd. was established in 1990 and proceeded with
the effort using IPA-related assets.
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4.1.4 Turning to International Cooperation
The shift towards international cooperation was clarified in the interim report of
August 1987 titled “About information industry mechanisms for International Coop-
eration.” This occurred against a background of Japan–US trade friction on machine
tools and automobiles. The August 1984 interim report of the Industrial Machinery
Policy Roundtable (private advisory body of theMachinery Information Bureau) had
also shown concern for international cooperation and harmony by revising what had
been a strong emphasis on export growth.
In response to the friction with the US on machine tools, MITI implemented an
export approval system in February 1978 based on the Export and Import Transaction
Law. This initially calmed the dissatisfaction of US industry, but not themore general
US frustration. In response to a lawsuit filed by Houdaille Industries in the United
States in 1982, tensions over machine tools entered a new phase.
Ultimately, President Reagan announced in May 1986 that the US was seeking
voluntary export restrictions from Japan, and several talks were held between the two
governments, resulting in a November 1986 agreement that Japan would voluntarily
restrict its exports of six machine tools to the US for a period of five years beginning
in January 1987. The restrictions were temporarily relaxed in 1988 and 1989, but
voluntary restraints were agreed to again in December 1991 at the US request, and
a two-year extension to 1993 was applied to four types of machine tools.
In addition to trade friction over machine tools, the Toshiba–Kongsberg Scan-
dal involving Toshiba Machine Co.’s violations of COCOM and trade friction over
the export of bearings forced policy on industrial machinery to reflect the need for
international cooperation.
Concern over trade friction was also strong in the automobile industry. Industrial
policy in this field was formulated from the point of view of the need for interna-
tional cooperation, based on theRoundtable on the Future Perspective of theMachine
Information Industry’s August 1987 report “Outlook and issues of the automobile
industry.” The report pointed out the need to create a market environment dependent
on domestic demand in order to resolve trade friction and called for reviews of var-
ious regulations involving road infrastructure improvement and automobile-related
taxes. That the shift to a domestic demand-led economy needed to be regarded as a
policy issue was evident in other statements as well, appearing in the reports of the
industry-specific roundtables sponsored by theMachinery and Information Industries
Bureau’s Director General during the process of setting policy for the 1990s.
The July 1989 report titled “Aiming for an advanced automobile society in
the 21st century — Summary of the Roundtable on Automobile Issues” (by the
Roundtable established inNovember 1988) cited development of a domestic demand-
led industrial structure as amid- and long-term challenge.Meanwhile, however, some
machine-industry sectors were struggling due to a lack of international competitive-
ness. Projects addressing domestic demand challenge in the early 1980s included
energy-related engineering projects such as investment in petroleum stockpiling and
in alternative energy. It was anticipated that investment would increase not only in
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national land development but also in fields such as environmental conservation sys-
tems, water-supply and sanitation systems, and medical welfare systems. Regarding
the international challenge, the focus was on engineering sectors that were expected
to invest in production plants and urban development in oil-producing countries.
However, the forecasts for market expansion were revised downwards significantly,
which, in combination with external considerations, meant that aggressive policy
development was not undertaken in these areas.
4.1.5 Promotion of Unmanned Factories and the Robot Industry
One of MITI’s policy emphases regarding industrial machinery in the 1980s was
promotion of the robot industry (Hasegawa 2013, p. 208). MITI had long been
interested in the “development of technology for unmanned machine plants” and
regarded the following as interconnected areas where unmanned technology-based
mechanical systems were related to the machine industry overall: conserving energy,
upgrading safety, and diminishing the need for dirty and difficult work. Functionally
integrated commercialization, the “systematization of industry” taking place in the
industrial structure, and the human costs of overseeing the legal safety requirements
were also considered. Of these, the most serious were the need to improve the work
environment and respond to emerging labor shortages.
MITI therefore prioritized the robot industry as one of the up-and-coming
advanced-technology industries alongside the aircraft, nuclear, and information-
processing industries, and therefore advanced measures were implemented to pro-
mote it. It established a leasing system through the fiscal investment and loan pro-
gram, utilized tax measures to institute a “special depreciation system for important
multi-function machine equipment,” and activated special loan systems for indus-
trial safety and sanitation equipment, as well as a modernization fund loan system for
SME plants and equipment, and so on. On the technical side, it launched a seven-to-
eight-year plan beginning in FY 1983 for the development of a “robots for extreme
environments” through the Large-Project System of the Agency of Industrial Science
and Technology. Interest in the robot industry was due in part to an expectation that
robot use would be applicable not only in manufacturing industries but also in other
industries such as nuclear power and welfare.
4.1.6 Quality Assurance for Nuclear Equipment
Following the Three-Mile Island Nuclear Power Accident in 1979, the Presidential
Special Investigation Committee in the US called for strengthening measures to
improve quality assurance. In Japan, the Nuclear Power Station Quality Assurance
Review Committee was established as a joint advisory body of the Director-General
of the Agency of Natural Resources and Energy and the Director of the Machinery
Information Bureau (Hasegawa 2013, p. 451). The committee analyzed the 154
domestic accidents and failures that were reported between 1966 and 1979 under the
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Electric Utilities Industry Law and the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law (Law on the
Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors), and
found the following. First, while quality assurance activities had definitely improved,
the annual number of accidents or failures remained steady at about 20 with the
increase in the number of nuclear reactors, and there was room for improvement in
order to gain public confidence. Second, the time between periodic inspections had
been lengthened. Third, many imported items in the equipment had failed.
A separate report presented by the Review Committee in September 1981 pointed
out that for further improvement of Japan’s quality assurance system, “it was neces-
sary to refer to the excellent aspects of quality assurance in other countries, and also to
examine the approaches to quality assurance that take advantage of the characteristics
of our country.” The specific suggestions for improvement included: (1) establishing
a denser exchange of information within the industry, (2) strengthening the design
check through verification tests and reliability analyses, (3) strengthening guidance
and management all the way through to the subcontracting company’s level, (4)
strengthening oversight of general commercial products and items purchased from
overseas, (5) strengthening education and training for maintenance workers, and (6)
making comprehensive maintenance manuals and improving and strengthening the
quality assurance diagnosis system. While quality assurance improvement “should
be done by the industry as a whole,” the Committee said that “the nation, too” should
play an active role, and it proposed formulating unified standards and guidelines on
quality assurance activities.
Further measures to prevent problems at power plants were promotion of the
development of nuclear-power generation support systems that could quickly predict
and respond to problems and also of advanced light-water reactor technology. In
April 1987, the Committee for the Promotion of Reactor Advances was established
and “Subsidies for Equipment Development Expenses for ImprovingNuclear Power-
GenerationReliability”were offered for technical development.However, despite the
importance of improving the reliability of nuclear power generation, the development
budget was greatly reduced after FY 1985 due to adverse fiscal circumstances and
not all the funds were allocated.
4.1.7 The YXX Plan and Joint Development in the Aircraft Industry
YXX aircraft development had been under review since the late 1970s (Hasegawa
2013, p. 486). The August 1985 interim report issued by the Aircraft and Machinery
Industry Council in consultation with MITI suggested that portions of the devel-
opment expenses, especially those with high risks, should be subsidized, with the
development entities being supplied with compensation for interest payments. A
draft amendment to the Aircraft Industry Promotion Law was established in April
1986, changing the aim of the law from “the promotion of the aircraft industry
through encouragement of domestic production of aircraft, etc.” to “ the promotion
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of the aircraft industry through the encouragement of international joint develop-
ment.” Concurrently, subsidies were made available through the International Air-
craft Development Fund (IADF) established in May. The main distinguishing points
in its financial support were first, that financing was made available on terms that
required only limited security rather than the full security previously required of each
company. Part of the risk, in other words, was borne by the fund, and the project was
given the character of an initial large-scale venture. Second, the principal would be
recovered in proportion to the volume of sales (the “Fokker system”), and model cer-
tification would be acquired in 1992. Development costs were high, however, even
though fuel prices rose no higher than expected, leading to a review of the project.
In March 1994, Boeing released a development plan for the 737-X development,
forcing the suspension of the YXX. Despite the results, both tangible and intangible,
achieved through joint development, the project made Japanese developers recognize
the risks and difficulties involved in civil aircraft development.
Meanwhile, in July 1990, the Industrial Structure Council released its report on
“Trade and Industry Policy in the 1990s,” which sought aggressive development of
new aircraft industry projects. MITI surveyed the development of supersonic trans-
port machines already under way and of small civilian transport aircraft and consid-
ered upcoming policy issues, along with exploring methods of joint development for
the 1990s. But none of them got underway.
4.1.8 Exploring Space Industry Policy
The history of space development in Japan originated in 1955 with The University of
Tokyo Institute of Industrial Science research on solid rockets and the development
of space observation rockets. Thereafter, the government began promoting space
development, and MITI launched the promotion of the space industry (Hasegawa
2013, p. 53).
However, policies promoting the full-scale and sustainable development of the
space industry began only after the Space Industry Office was established in the
Machine Information Bureau in September 1979. Space-industry policy at this time
did not yet have a specific focus. The Roundtable on the Basic Issues for the Space
Industry was established as a private advisory body of the Mechanical Information
and Commission Director-General in order to develop a vision for space-industry
promotion in line with the realities of the existing industry. The report issued by the
Roundtable inApril 1981pointed out the followingproblems: (1) a fragile technology
base, (2) a limited space-industry market, and (3) institutional issues. Regarding the
first, the Roundtable was concerned that, although Japan had succeeded in launching
a satellite within a short period of time, it was behind in acquiring fundamental
technology, chiefly because it depended on technology from the United States.
The search for a space-industry policy based on these recommendations continued
until FY 1984. However, given the ongoing fiscal reconstruction, the policy planning
lacked precision. It was progress in the commercialization of space that enabled new
possibilities to emerge despite the somewhat stalled policy development, and the fact
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that private enterprises hoped to participate in the use of communication satellites
following the establishment of the new Telecommunications Business Law. Plans for
utilizing spacewere put on the path to realitywith the January 1984USannouncement
of plans for a space station. In the latter 1980s, a comprehensive space industry
was promoted in the following areas: (1) “Promotion of resource remote sensing”
(satellite observation of the ground surface fromspace), (2) development of a resource
exploration observation system for mounting a polar orbit platform, (3) development
of an unmanned space experiment system (space experiments/observation free flyer)
that began in FY 1986, and so on.
4.2 The Challenge of Next-Generation Technology
Development
4.2.1 “The Road to Becoming a Technology Nation”—Vision
for the 1980s”
The March 1980 Vision for the 1980s summarized the results of an examination
of technology policy explained in its Chapter 6, titled “The Road to Becoming a
Technology Nation” (Sawai 2011, p. 31) and cited the following as required for
the technology of the 1980s: (1) overcoming energy restrictions, (2) qualitatively
improving living conditions and enriching regional communities, (3) promotingmore
creativity- and knowledge-intensive industries, and (4) taking on the challenge of
next-generation technological innovation. These were regarded fundamentally as
tasks for the private sector, but there remained areas in which the government was
needed to carry out R&D or to play the role of project organizer. Thus, the goals or
philosophy of industrial-technology policy looking toward the 1980s was “creative
autonomous technological development” to support the country now become an
economic power after overcoming the two oil crises.
Established in December 1983 as a private advisory body of the Director-General
of the Agency of Industrial Science and Technology, the Study Group on Techni-
cal Development Perspectives compiled a report in September 1984 that stressed
stronger collaboration among industry, academia, and government. It also pointed to
the importance of independent technology development. In other words, the deeper
the pursuit of basic research, the greater the uncertainty became, creating a unique
role for the government itself in providing support through measures such as subsi-
dies, loans, and taxation. In 1987, MITI also launched a Research Group to Study
Trends in Technological Innovation and Prospects for NewMarkets, which compiled
its own report in June. A MITI report the same year titled “Liven up, Japan!” said
that fields such as microelectronics, new materials, and biotechnology were under-
going a technological revolution comparable to a “third industrial revolution.” Basic
research would be essential in order for Japan to be at the center of that revolution,
and the role for industrial technology policy was accordingly likely to expand.
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The Industrial Science and Technology Agency published an “Industrial tech-
nology white paper” in 1988, the first since the Agency’s establishment in 1948.
Its aims were as follows. First, as technology development began to expand to the
extent that it no longer remained within the framework of original bureaus and divi-
sions, industrial technology policywould henceforth be developedwithout regard for
interministerial and interagency boundaries. The second aim was to transform Japan
from a “processing center” to a “center of creative knowledge.” With these aims, the
White Paper pointed out issues such as low government investment in R&D, a lack of
research in basic technology fields, and the need to promote international exchange
and international cooperation. The White Paper placed a heavy emphasis on the
impact of basic technology research and on the fact that “the growing accessibility
and resonance of science and technology” were making steady advances.
4.2.2 The Establishment of a New Research and Development System
for Next-Generation Industrial Basic Technology
The importance of basic technology was pointed out in the final report of the
Study Group on Long-Term Planning for Industrial Technology Development in
October 1981, and an R&D Program on Basic Technologies for Future Industries
was established thatOctober to develop concretemeasures for it (Sawai 2011, p. 165).
This system, which aimed to promote R&D with broad cross-sectoral impact, was
based on different principles from those of the Large-Scale, Sunshine, and Moon-
light Projects that had targeted sector-specific technological development. The new
system was intended to cultivate the “buds” of technology until the development
was a “young sapling” that the private sector could research and develop on its own
strength. Using terms like “bud” and “sapling” as slogans, it aimed to promote R&D
based on linkages among industry, academia, and the government. A biotechnol-
ogy roundtable, High-Performance Polymer Materials Council, and Fine Ceramics
Roundtable were established by private corporations. Through repeated discussions
between these roundtables and the related MITI divisions, and with the participa-
tion from the national laboratories and universities, the outlines for next-generation-
themed projects were decided. The roundtables became the parent organizations of
the groups established to implement the technology development (Table 9).
The projects selected in 1981 spanned 12 subjects in three fields: new materials,
biotechnology, and new functional elements. The field of new materials saw R&D
of fine ceramics and other materials; biotech focused on the promotion of bioreac-
tors. The budget increased steadily from 2.7 billion yen in FY 1981 to 6.4 billion
yen in FY 1985, and funds were thereafter maintained in a special account at the
60–70 billion yen range. Many of the first-round projects initiated in FY 1981 were
reaching their end dates in FY 1988, andwere examined by the Planning Subcommit-
tee of the Industrial Structure Council’s Next-Generation Technology Development
Committee established in April 1988. The report issued by the Subcommittee in
June found the following problems: (1) adverse effects on “take-home research”
by private enterprise, (2) insufficient links with university researchers, (3) delays
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Table 9 Next-generation industrial infrastructure projects
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in developing internationally, including participation of overseas companies, and
(4) quantitative evaluations without qualitative or secondary-outcome evaluations.
It also proposed themes for the next round of next-generation technology develop-
ment, including diversification of researchmethods, andways to involve universities.
It suggested enlarging the scope of “bud”(technical seeds) to “sapling” (R&D before
the application stage) to include the “fostering of seeds and seedlings (examining the
possibility of practical applications).” Superconductivity and software were added to
the covered fields, andmore basic research and interdisciplinary and business-related
themes were selected in FY 1988. These included, for example, the development of
superconducting materials and superconducting elements.
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4.2.3 Fostering Bioindustry
Biotechnology includes technologies that advance medical care, improve breeding,
produce useful substances, and clarify biological processes by manipulating the
functions of living organisms, including their substance, information, and energy.
Biotechnology had already been applied to fermentation and brewing, but the dis-
covery of the role of microorganisms expanded its applications to other fields such
as antibiotic production and sewage treatment (Table 10).
Expectations for this field increased in Japan relative to that of the United States,
which was at the forefront of biotechnology development and applications. Accord-
ing to a survey conducted by MITI in FY 1982, several tens of new companies had
launched biotechnology R&D every year since 1980, as compared with three to
five companies each year in the 1970s. In 1988, the MITI Bioindustry Office report
summarized the prevailing situation and the issues in each field. According to that
report, Japan’s chemical industry led the world in amino acid production technology.
Amino acids and their derivatives have various properties (ampholytic, chelating
action, surface activity, bactericidal/antimicrobial, antioxidant, and so on), and their
polymers have properties not found in other substances, such as biocompatibility and
biodegradability. The report anticipated that these characteristics would lead to the
development of new product areas and industrial fields (Yamazaki 2011, p. 344).
With the rising expectations for biotechnology, the Japanese government, too,
began to focus on its development. In July 1982, the Bioindustry Promotion Com-
mittee was established within the Basic Industries Bureau and in July 1983 put
together the following reports: “How to secure biological resources such as microor-
ganisms” and “Safety concepts when using the results of recombinant DNA tech-
nology for industrial production.” The former detailed the requirements for securing
the necessary biological resources for technology development and industrialization
of biotechnology. Since Japan was seeking systematically to secure a large number
of microorganisms, animals, and plants, laboratories needed to be improved to that
end. Concrete support of technical development included the 1981 establishment
of the Next-Generation Basic Industrial Technology R&D System, which covered
biotechnology among other areas. Three projects were initiated in its first year. One
of them, research on glycoconjugates, was established jointly by the Science and
Technology Agency, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the Ministry of Agri-
culture, Forestry and Fisheries, and MITI, and the research was advanced by the
private sector Research Association for Biotechnology with the cooperation of the
Research Institute for Polymers and Textiles, the National Chemistry Laboratory for
Industry, the Fermentation Research Institute, the Electrotechnical Laboratory, and
the National Research Laboratory of Meteorology, as well as joint research from
universities recommissioned by the research associations. R&D projects in MITI’s
National Research and Development Program (“Large-Scale Project”) were also
launched, as was research based on the 1983 Law for Accelerating Regional Devel-
opment Based on High-Technology Industrial Complexes (“Technopolis Law”). A
number of regions received support by using biotechnology as the pillar of their
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Table 10 Economic impact of biotechnology in 2000 (Unit billion yen, %)
Biotechnology areas Production (value) Gross value-added
production
Industrialization rate
Rice, wheat 519 381 9.51




Dairy 327 111 25.00
Beef/cattle products 146 37 22.80
Fisheries 118 71 2.97
Dairy products 590 150 20.70
Bakery, confectionery 1.370 507 32.00
Sugar 108 13 10.00
Seasonings 251 73 15.00
Starch and sugars 177 30 26.02
Mixed feed 637 58 30.00
Alcoholic beverages 1,113 662 19.84







Pesticides 142 33 30.00
Medicine 3,151 1,564 40.00
Surfactant, Cosmetics 466 155 20.00
Other chemicals 479 149 12.37




Computers 188 80 3.00
Electronic appliances 287 103 5.00
Water supply systems 479 303 24.00
Sewer systems 420 238 50.00
Waste systems 471 349 15.63
Total 15,003 6,312 11.80
Industrialization rate = Replacement rate × Realization rate (Replacement rate = ratio of
conventional technology replaced by biotechnology; Realization rate = possibility of developing
alternatives to conventional technology).
Source Yamazaki (2011, p. 369)
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town planning, meaning they used legal frameworks for community development by
integrating industry, academia, and residents around the nucleus of a cutting-edge
technology. From FY 1988, MITI strengthened its emphasis on revitalizing regional
economies through biotechnology: it produced a manual about introducing this tech-
nology, established a Biotechnology Instruction Staff System, and with the aim of
developing the potential of traditional brewing industries, it mediated in obtaining
financing from the Japan Development Bank and others.
With the expansion of the above policy supports, Japan’s R&D expenditures in
the 1980s increased, mainly in advanced technologies. From 6.0 trillion yen in 1981
to 8.9 trillion yen in 1985, the average annual growth rate was 10.4%. Although
the scale itself was small, growth in the field of recombination, in particular, was
remarkable. The number of recombinant DNA experiments increased from 284 in
1980 to 4,813 in 1986. The number of related patents also reached 800 in 1986, 13
times that in 1981.
4.2.4 Development of New Materials
The targets of MITI policy in the new materials category were fine chemicals, new
metallic materials, highly functional polymer materials, composite materials, and
others. By function, these included electrical functional materials, lightweight struc-
tural materials, thermal functional materials such as heat-resistant materials, and
optical functional materials such as optical fibers. In March 1984, the Industrial
Structure Study Group, a private advisory body of the Director-General of the Indus-
trial Policy Bureau, explored the policy issues, including estimating the expansion
of new materials-related markets looking ahead to the year 2000. Regarding fine
ceramics in particular, the Fine Ceramics Basic Problem Council, a private advi-
sory body of the Director-General of the Consumer Goods and Services Industries
Bureau, announced in May 1984 its anticipation of an expansion in the market from
630 billion yen in 1983 to somewhere between 2.8 and 5.0 trillion yen in the year
2000 (Yamazaki 2011, p. 411).
The makers pursued the development of new materials in the 1970s through the
establishment of laboratories and production and processing facilities, and by 1984
the excitement was such that it was dubbed “Year One of the New Materials Age.”
Beginning in 1985, the Basic NewMaterials Policy Office tried every year to capture
the current state of the industry, issuing questionnaires to firms with the possibility
of entering the market. As of 1985, 92 enterprises had entered the market, produc-
ing a total of 556 products; by 1988, the number had risen to 302 companies and
1,882 items. Entry from the chemical industry was the most frequent, followed by
glass and stone, nonferrous metals, and steel. Materials manufacturers accounted for
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about one-third, but in the late 1980s, user industries—general machinery, electrical
machinery, transportation machinery, and precision machinery—were becoming the
core of new materials development. Reflecting these trends and classified by func-
tion, new materials with mechanical functions accounted for 40% or more of the
total. Practical applications found in the 1988 surveys included artificial kidneys, IC
packages, and others, and all were underway for ten to twenty years and were techni-
cally mature fields. There were also delays in practical applications of new materials
such as fiber reinforced metal (FRM), which were less mature technologically and
entering markets where the existing materials were competitive in price and perfor-
mance. The issues highlighted by these materials were the need for differentiation
or market-creative product development.
Meanwhile, the Basic New Materials Study Group, a private advisory body of
the Director-General of the Basic Industries Bureau, in 1988 again summarized the
possibilities for technological innovation in new materials. For example, in aircraft
development, the development of new materials was expected to address the prob-
lems of large size, high efficiency, high speed, improved safety, and noise reduction.
In space development, new materials were being considered for spacecraft, space
stations, and artificial satellites. Possibilities were also being considered for utilizing
new materials in regular consumer goods such as residential, medical, clothing, and
food items.
In October 1989, the Basic Materials Study Group summarized the market size
outlook for 2000 and the promotion challenges of the new materials industry in a
report titled “About the future direction of the new materials industry.” Market size
in each new-materials field was expected to expand greatly and to contribute to high
economic growth for related businesses. The group cited as challenges the further
promotion of technological development in basic research fields, and pointed to the
need to assure the reliability of newmaterials in practical uses, promote joint research
and evaluation by the public and private sectors, and promote research into practical
applications.
Apart from this, in April 1988, MITI launched the Minerva Plan Promotion
Roundtable, which gathered experts to develop common basic technologies across
industries, centered on theNonferrousMetalsDivision of theBasic Industries Bureau
(Yamazaki 2011, p. 322). The Roundtable held that nonferrous metals was a par-
ticularly noteworthy sector that could supply important materials supporting ultra-
advanced innovations for the advanced technology and information society of the
21st century, and the development departments of major companies were brought
together into working groups established for each material. In April 1989, a report
titled “Minerva 21” was compiled as a vision for the development of nonferrous
metals-related technologies in the twenty-first century. Dramatic improvements in
new technologies were anticipated in fields such as optical communication-related
technology, high-speed transportation methods such as high-performance aircraft,
space development, nuclear energy development, advanced medical equipment, and
chemicals, and the report called for advances in the materials to be used in these
areas. Thereafter, in the 1990s, environmental and resource energy problems were
explored, and with regard to the development of nonferrous metal materials, the
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“NewMinerva Metal Materials Future Perspective” compiled in 1991 sought to elu-
cidate those areas for which high social expectations could be predicted and to induce
research and development in those fields (Table 11).
4.2.5 Grant Aid for Private-Sector Technology Development
Meanwhile, various technical subsidies were created in the 1980s even as the number
of government-led projects shrank. These were the Subsidies for the Practical Devel-
opment of Technology for Energy Alternatives to Petroleum in FY 1980, Subsidies
for Practical Development of New Power Generation Technology in FY 1981, and
Subsidies for Industry Revitalizing Technology Research and Development in FY
1983, with the addition in FY 1993 of the Subsidy Program for Practical Applica-
tions of Technology Related to the Rationalization of Energy Use. Overall, however,
from the mid-1980s on, subsidy policies tended to be abolished or reviewed due to
criticism from abroad.
The Tax Program for Promoting R&D of Basic Technologies (“High-tech Tax
System”) was established in 1985. This allowed tax deductions for research and
investment depreciation of assets that companies needed for research if they met
certain requirements.
The Japan Development Bank meanwhile renamed the loans for “turning new
technologies into businesses” as “new technology development” loans, and adopted
improvement measures. These included adding to the JDB’s list of financing targets
facilities construction and acquisitions, the purpose of which was the preliminary
stages of corporate planning for the “commercialization” of new technologies. Also,
in FY 1985, it began to include funding for non-equipment-related loans in its general
financing of corporate technology development (“new technology development”).
However, the loans made by the Bank to advance industrial technology declined
sharply after peaking at 92.8 billion yen in FY 1992.
4.3 New Regional Development Policy
4.3.1 Development of a New Location (Siting) Policy
Location policy in the 1980s developed under new ideas and marked a change from
earlier policy. The new concepts included the Technopolis Plan, the Research Core
Plan, the Key Facilities Siting Plan, the Office Arcadia Plan, and others (Takeda
2011, p. 53).
These new attempts were made because of the limitations that emerged in existing
location policies, which had tried to disperse industry into non-urban regions based
on the Inducement for Industrial Relocation plan. According to a mid-1980s survey,
even though the dispersal plan had led to some relocation out of urban areas into the
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“induction areas,” the industrial sites themselves were in a downturn and beginning
to approach the limit of their viability (Table 12).
The Technopolis Plan (“Technopolis Plan”), which was the first under the new
policy, was based on theMarch 1980 Industrial Structure Council report titled “About
the nature of trade and industrial policy in the 1980s.” The report called for promoting
the introduction of cutting-edge technology industries and raising the technological
level of existing regional companies. The aim in doing so was to foster the autonomy
and revitalization of regional economies as technological cores. This was the “Tech-
nopolis 90 Construction Initiative.” It aimed at “town”-building based on organic
combinations of industry (advanced technology industries such as electronics and
machinery), academia (research institutes such as engineering universities and pri-
vate central research institutes), and living space (“warm” communities). Based on
this concept, and on consultations with the Ministry of Construction, Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the National Land Agency, and others, the Law
for Accelerating Regional Development Based Upon High-Technology Industrial
Complexes (the “Technopolis Law”) was established in April 1983. The purpose
of this law was to promote industrial development based on advanced technology,
mainly by local governments and enterprises in regions that did not have a high
degree of industrial concentration, and to contribute to the revitalization of regional
economies and the balanced development of the national economy. It was distinc-
tive in that it delegated to the prefectures the selection of the areas themselves, and
limited the involvement of the central government.
InAugust 1983,MITI announcedpolicies onHow toProceedwith theTechnopolis
Development Initiative” and on this basis sequentially approved the development
plans formulated by the prefectures. Of the 26 selected regions, 20 were approved
to start by FY 1986. A survey conducted in 1990, which was the target year of
the 20 regions, found that while research projects had been undertaken actively,
the results were not reflected in technological improvements among the SMEs in
those regions. Research institutes such as universities were advancing technological
developments that did not meet the needs of the companies in their regions. In light
of these problems, MITI in March 1991 changed its target year to 1995 and made
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Table 12 Industrial location vision for the 21st Century: plans and actual status
Item Plan Actual status
Annual
growth rate
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p. 12
additions to its guidelines on technology advancement in regional firms that made up
local industries, the establishment of new firms based on advanced technology, the
individuation of regions, and the spread of advanced technology to areas outside the
Technopolis. It also added new functions such as “play” to the categories of industry,
academia, and residential community. The 1999 survey revealed the limits of these
plans, finding that the outcomes of the high-tech industries were not particularly
prominent in the designated areas. Although certain regions had seen their efforts
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bear fruit and were ready to turn those results into businesses, overall the policy
outcomes in the 1990s were not as intended. The Technopolis Act developed into
the Law for Facilitating the Creation of New Business in December 1998 (Fig. 8).
The second Research Core Plan sought to address the economy’s shift to service
industries and the hyper-concentration of economic activities in Tokyo by aiming at
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Fig. 8 Target zones in the technopolis development conceptual study. Source [II-5, p. 59]
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Private Participation Promotion Law, it developed Research Cores, meaning spec-
ified facilities utilizing the capabilities of private-business operators. Although the
project was intended to support the gathering of research and development functions
in regional cities that already had a high degree of urban functions, the development
was limited by the strict conditions that were imposed. In order to shift to a domestic
demand-led economic structure, this concept focused on building regional economic
structures by dispersing service industries and higher-order functions such as manu-
facturers’ R&D projects, and to build regional economic structures responsive to the
economy’s shift to services and software.
The Third Key Facilities Location Plan targeted a wider area than the relatively
large-city focus of the Research Core. The aim was to build regional economic
structures that, by dispersing higher-order functions such as service industry and
manufacturing R&D, would help lead to a demand-led economic structure.
Based on the Key Facilities Location Law, MITI in September 1988 presented
“Guidelines for the promotion of specific project concentrations” on the basis of
which local governments could formulate concentration promotion plans. Many of
the designated areas were close to, or overlapped, areas that had been the targets
of the Technopolis policy. The two location policies were clearly complementary.
According to a survey conducted in March 1994, the three projects involved in R&D
had the largest number of joint R&D promotion projects; human resources projects
were also taken up by many districts. Although there were variations among the
different projects, and although four of the ten types of industry in the specified
projects had already reached their original targets in 1993, the achievement rate of
the natural science labs was only about half the target rate. The “brain location” act
was terminated in 1998 and the projects were passed on to the newBusiness Creation
Promotion Law.
The fourth plan, called the Office Arcadia Plan, was based on theMulti-Polar Pat-
terns National Land Formation Promotion Law for implementing the Fourth Com-
prehensive National Development Plan and was one of the industrial workplace
relocation policies promoted by MITI. This also targeted the over-concentration in
Tokyo and aimed to develop a society in which the people of Tokyo could feel as
relaxed and affluent as those in rural areas. The policy was implemented under the
Law for Comprehensive Development of Regional Core Cities with Relocation of
Office-Work Function (“Local Hubs Act,” February 1992). Based on this law, MITI
decided to construct Office Arcadias to serve as hubs for the regional dispersal of
industry. In principle, these were limited to one business hub district per local hub
city. By 1994, six areas had been targeted under the concept of promoting regional
cores, and six as business core cities, and 16 areas had been developed as business
complexes by February 2002.
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In addition, services such as location information were provided to foreign com-
panies that were considering investment or advances into Japan. This was intended
to contribute to the development of a domestic demand-led economy to ease inter-
national economic tensions. In addition, the Rural Area Industry Promotion Law of
June 1971 had resulted from the fact that the “introduction of industry” had not pro-
duced the results of other industry relocation policies, and with the conviction that
it was necessary to respond to changes in the industrial structure, the 1971 Law was
renamed in June 1988 as the Law on the Promotion of Introduction of Industry into
Agricultural Regions and the range of industries to be thus introduced was expanded.
4.3.2 Review of the Pollution Health Damage Compensation System
Under the Law Concerning Pollution-Related Health Damage Compensation and
Other Measures (“Public Health Law”) enacted in October 1973, the compensation
system for damage to health from pollution targeted the results of air andwater pollu-
tion. People whose health was damaged by pollution were eligible for compensation
if their claims were approved by prefectural governors or the mayors of major cities
(Takeda 2011, p. 303). The compensation system came into effect due to a broad
national consensus that included industry, against the background of the court ruling
in the Yokkaichi Pollution Trial. It was not originally easy to clarify the causal rela-
tionships between pollution and disease for individual patients, so in order to avoid
confusion, such as multiple lawsuits, the policy was adopted of providing relief if
certain requirements were met. It was a system that enabled fairly practical decision
making.
Under this system, compensation was paid to the “victim” with charges levied on
polluters by group according to the degree to which they contributed to the pollution.
However, the problem inherent in the design of the system itself became increasingly
obvious in the course of its operation.
One of the problems was that even in cases in which the air quality improved
markedly due to pollution regulations, the area designated under the Pollution Law
was not removed from the coverage, but rather was expanded. As mentioned above,
environmental regulation had had a considerable impact on air pollution, excluding
nitrogen oxides. Nevertheless, the designated areas were expanded and the number
of certified patients continued to increase. The industries bearing the cost of the
compensation were therefore dissatisfied. There was further dissatisfaction because
mobile units such as automobiles, although believed to be important sources of
pollution, were excused from the funding burden. Needless to say, these views were
opposed by those seeking relief for damages, and opinions were especially strong
on the unresolved issue of nitrogen oxide.
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MITI therefore reviewed the system with a view to improving it. The focus of its
reconsideration was improvement of the certification requirements, clarification of
the requirements for removal of the regional designation, and rationalization of the
cost burden.
The Environmental Health Committee of the Central Council for Environmental
Pollution Control (Central Pollution Council), meeting in November and Decem-
ber 1982, declared the need to reexamine the system from a neutral position, and
momentum for improving it gradually gained strength, until finally in October 1986,
the Environmental Health Committee compiled a report calling for the following:
(1) Complete release of the designated regions, (2) continued compensation to those
already certified, (3) projects related to prevention of health damage based on con-
tributions from the sources of pollution, especially in the old designated areas. The
amended law was enacted accordingly in September 1987. As a result, in March
1988, all Class 1 regional designations were canceled, and the emphasis of the pol-
lution health damage compensation system shifted from offering after-the-fact relief
to seeking means of preventing damage in the first place.
4.3.3 Rationalization of Administrative Regulations on Safety
In the latter 1980s, the High-Pressure Gas Safety Institute, a private corporation,
was established as the core institution for the voluntary adoption of safety practices.
It undertook various projects and made progress in eliminating the duplication of
regulations. The business world, meanwhile, was critical of what it regarded as the
slow pace of reform (Takeda 2011, p. 588).
In September 1989, the Roundtable on High-Pressure Gas Safety Policy, a private
advisory body of the Director-General of the Industrial Location and Environmen-
tal Protection Bureau, undertook a review of the deregulation of safety policy on
high-pressure gas and in July 1991, it advised the High-Pressure Gas and Explo-
sives Safety Council on “How to formulate safety measures for high-pressure gas
in the future.” The November report issued a strong call for a shift to voluntary
safety controls, and the High-Pressure Gas Control Law was revised on this basis.
The revisions strengthened the regulations concerning consumption of high-pressure
gas, enabled prefectural governors to make recommendations and issue orders to
strengthen business safety measures, and advanced the simplification of procedures.
Deregulation was promoted thereafter as well. In April 1997, the Partial Revi-
sion of the High-Pressure Gas Control Law and the Law Concerning the Securing
of Safety and the Optimization of Transaction of Liquefied Petroleum Gas came
into effect, and the High-Pressure Gas Control Law was renamed the High-Pressure
Gas Safety Law. This renaming was in accordance with the rationalization and sim-
plification of various regulations such as permitting self-inspection or inspection by
private companies and shifting portions of the sales business to a notification system.
Regarding liquefied petroleum gas, plans were also made to rationalize regulations
for businesses that established high-level safety systems. Measures included shifting
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from a licensing to a registration system for sales businesses and establishing a cen-
tralized monitoring system. The change, which advanced voluntary safety activities,
represented a major shift in the approach to safety regulation.
4.3.4 Measures to Address Mine Drainage at Metal Mines
The costs of treating mine pollution were in principle to be borne by the mine com-
panies that were the polluters. However, the August 1980 Mining Industry Council’s
proposal titled “Measures for mine drainage in the future” pointed out that these
costs could not be met by raising prices and that the burden would only place greater
pressure on the businesses and reduce the will to develop new mines. Because of
this, the Council suggested that some of the burden be assumed by local govern-
ments (Takeda 2011, p. 647). MITI accordingly revised the system in FY 1981 to
make the cost of treating environmental contamination eligible for subsidies. MITI
also strengthened its measures against pollutant accumulation at mines, based on the
Mining Council’s proposal of September 1982 regarding problems such as increas-
ing construction volumes and the unexpectedly high cost of clean-up at the former
Matsuo Mine. The second Basic Policy Plan on Mine Pollution Prevention Projects
Related to Specified Spent Facilities went into effect in April 1983.
As mentioned above, problems with the new system became evident in the course
of addressing mining pollution. This was especially true because no technologies
emerged that could assure a complete clean-up, and the obligation to bear the burden
of others’ clean-up costs in addition to their own acted as a restraint on mining
businesses and caused problems for the financing system as well. It was in the 1990s
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Fig. 9 Pollution-prevention policies and the role of the mining industry association. Source
JOGMEC (2006, p. 98)
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5 Making Progress on Extrication from Dependence on Oil
5.1 Policies Prioritizing the Stable Supply of Energy
5.1.1 On the Long-Term Outlook for the Supply and Demand
of Energy and an Overall Evaluation of Energy Policy
The energy supply in the 1980s proved different from what had been predicted
immediately after the oil crisis. Oil supply decreased from the 1970s to the first half
of the 1980s, but from the late 1980s into the early 1990s it increased again with
the fall in crude oil prices. The dependence on the Middle East, which had supplied
90% of Japan’s post-crisis crude oil imports, fell to 67.4% of the total in 1987. The
proportion of natural gas in the primary energy supply rose. Domestic coal output
meanwhile declined from 50.0 million tons in 1961 to 1.29 million tons in 2008. The
quantity of imported coal began exceeding that of domestic coal in 1970 and in 1988
passed the 100-million ton mark. From the 1980s on, consumption of coal increased
because of strong demand from the electric utilities.
Stable supply was already on its way to becoming the top priority for natural
resources and energy policy but was pushed evenmore in that direction by the second
oil crisis in 1979. As the impact of the crisis faded, however, new directions began to
be explored. InApril 1983,MITI held anAdvisoryCommittee forEnergyRoundtable
onBasic Issues to undertake a comprehensive examinationof energypolicy, including
the issue of energy costs. The Roundtable summarized its findings in an August 1983
report titled “On the long-term outlook for the supply and demand of energy and an
overall evaluation of energy policy,” in which it declared that “Although it is more
essential than previously to assure a secure supply, we also need to actively address
the demands of the times for cost reduction” (Kikkawa 2011, p. 77). Between 1980
and 2000, the long-term outlook for the supply and demand of energy were revised
in 1982, 1983, 1987, 1990, 1994, and 1997. Some of them are shown in Table 13.
5.1.2 Oil Policy and the Provisional Measures Law on the Importation
of Specific Petroleum Refined Products
The Provisional Measures Law on the Importation of Specific Petroleum Refined
Products (“Special Treatment Law”) was enacted in December 1985 to promote
the importation of gasoline, kerosene, and light oil. The Special Treatment Law
limited the import agents to oil refiners (Kikkawa 2011, p. 166). While the policy
framework strengthened regulations on business operators in this way, the pressure
for deregulation also mounted in the latter 1980s. The first deregulation that was
carried out from 1987 to 1993was triggered by a report of the Committee to Consider
Basic Issues in the Petroleum Industry established in November 1986 under the
Petroleum Council. The Committee’s report was issued in June 1987 under the title
“On the Petroleum Industry and Oil Policy Looking Towards the 1990s.” This led
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to revision of the restrictions on refining and selling that applied even in normal
times on the basis of the Petroleum Industry Law and the Gasoline Retail Business
Law. Thereafter, the process of deregulation remained ongoing. The mid-1990s saw
demands for the further pursuit of a stable supply of petroleum products and for
improvements in efficiency, and attempts were made to introduce the principle of
competition even in import sectors.
In the refining and sales fields, the United States demanded the liberalization
of imports of petroleum products into Japan in the 1980s, and Japanese petroleum
distributors were in fact beginning to try importing petroleum products. In March
1985, the Petroleum Council conducted its first policy review since the end of World
War II of refining methods in oil-consuming areas. The Special Treatment Law
aimed to promote the importation of volatile oils, kerosene, and diesel, and obliged
importers to set up various facilities. For this reason, it restricted import activities
to refineries, and so although it also promoted and liberalized imports, it acted as a
restraint on competition by limiting those who could be engaged in importing. This
area, too, however, saw deregulation after 1987.
Where stockpiling policy was concerned, relaxing the private burden of maintain-
ing oil reserves in the late 1980s proved a challenge. A November 1987 report by
the Comprehensive Energy Survey Group and the Petroleum Issues Subcommittee
of the Petroleum Council called for (1) a 50-million kiloliter stockpile of oil based
on the International Energy Agency’s requirement that all member countries hold
oil stocks equivalent to at least 90 days of net oil use, (2) reduction, in stages, of
private oil reserves by a total of 70 days, and (3) gradual abolition of the stockpiling
of the petroleum raw material naphtha. The second of these recommendations was
implemented in FY 1993, and the national stockpile also reached its target amount
in 1997.
5.1.3 Structural Adjustment of the Domestic Coal Industry
As the supply of overseas coal began to increase, the Seventh Coal Policy (1982–
1986) maintained its earlier target of 20 million tons, but the end of the road for
structural adjustment measures was already beginning to be apparent. Following the
yen appreciation triggered by the September 1985 Plaza Accord, the steel industry in
June 1986 forced a reduction of domestic coal prices to those of imported Australian
coal. The power industry, which was the last to collaborate with the efforts, also
announced in November 1985 that it would cut its purchases to two-thirds as of
November 1985. The structural adjustment measures for domestic coal that had
relied on collective cooperation thus began to approach their end point (Kikkawa
2011, p. 214).
TheEighthCoal Plan (1987–1991) concluded that a gradual reduction of domestic
coal production was inevitable, and that an annual production of about 10 million
tons was appropriate. The Post-Eighth Coal Policy (1992–2001) had in its purview
a phased-out end to the policy.
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5.1.4 Maintaining a Stockpiling System for Rare Metals
“Rare metals” is the generic name for metal elements that either have low crustal
abundance or that are difficult to extract. Because production of rare metals was
limited to a handful of countries such as Russia and South Africa, a rare-metal
stockpiling system was established on the instruction of Prime Minister Zenkou
Suzuki in December 1980, under the supervision of the Economic Security Council-
related Cabinet Meetings established under the Chief Cabinet Secretary. MITI also
took the opportunity to set up a special subcommittee on economic security issues
within the Coordination Committee (Kikkawa 2011, p. 247). The Subcommittee’s
April 1982 report, “Aiming at the establishment of Economic security,” called for the
immediate creation of a rare-metal stockpiling system on a national level. In 1983, a
stockpiling systemwas started for seven of these metals: nickel, chromium, tungsten,
cobalt, molybdenum, manganese, and vanadium.
Policy developed after that from the stockpiling system to a strategy of security
of rare metals. In December 1984, the Special Subcommittee on Comprehensive
Measures for Rare Metals, in the Mining Subcommittee of the Mining Council,
compiled a report titled “The Aims of the Comprehensive Measures on Rare Met-
als: Technological Innovation, Industrial Revitalization, and Economic Security.” In
addition to expanding stockpiling plans and promoting countermeasures to address
supply disorders, the report also suggested promotion of exploration and technology
development.
5.2 Pursuing Non-petroleum Power Supplies
5.2.1 Shifting Away from Petroleum
Declining business performance and serious power supply and environmental issues
weakened the independence of the electric utility industry. As mentioned in Chap. 2,
the initial target values set by the Electric Power Development Coordination Council
in the 1970s and early 1980s did not exceed the actual numbers achieved.Decisions on
utility locations were delayed but the policy itself was expanded and required further
adjustment. This weakened the autonomy of the industry, but despite coordination
at the policy level, decisions on location, as described above, did not always proceed
as planned (Table 14).
While delays arose in developing power-generation sites, progress was made in
shifting the composition of the power supply away from oil. The shift came about
first through a strong emphasis on developing nuclear energy, and second through
curbs on the development of oil-fired power generation and through an aggressive
development of LNG (liquefied natural gas) and coal-fired generation.
It was nuclear power that became the favorite policy approach of the effort tomove
away from oil (Kikkawa 2011, p. 314). Two conditions boosted its development: first,
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1974–1985 23.8 4.0 4.5 25.5 5.6
1986–1994 5.7 2.3 2.5 7.8 3.0




1974–1985 30.2 0.7 1.8 – 3.7
1986–1994 5.9 4.2 −1.8 – 4.1
1995–2000 3.4 0.0 4.2 10.2 1.6
Source Kikkawa (2011, p. 315)
Japan’s nuclear-power generation had entered the stage of full-scale commercializa-
tion in the late 1960s. Second, although uranium imports were necessary at the outset,
expectations for the possibility of gradually lowering that dependency increased with
the establishment of the nuclear fuel cycle. The development of nuclear power had
been hindered, however, by people’s unease and doubts about safety. The govern-
ment and the electric power industrymade efforts to dispel these concerns. InOctober
1978, the Nuclear Safety Commission was established as an entity separate from the
Japan Atomic Energy Commission and became responsible for safety regulations
for nuclear power generation. Meanwhile, in January 1979, MITI became respon-
sible for the administration of safety regulations on nuclear reactors. It adopted an
approach to the establishment of reactors consisting of a first safety review to be con-
ducted when the Ministry was issuing its approval, and a second “double check” by
the Nuclear Safety Commission. The government and the industry also started work-
ing on establishing a nuclear fuel cycle and practical applications for fast-breeder
reactors, which furthered the feasibility of nuclear development.
Attention was also focused on the use of LNG, because no supply issues had
arisen in LNGduring the successive oil crises. Support for the introduction and use of
natural gas as an alternative to oil came in the form of theMay 1980 LawConcerning
Promotion of Development and Introduction of Alternative Energy (hereafter the
“Alternative Energy Law”). The issues in introducing LNG were considered to be
the following: (1) securing a stable supply, (2) developing distribution facilities such
as liquefaction terminals, LNG tankers, and receiving terminals and supply facilities,
and (3) creating and organizing demand. The emphasis was placed on reducing these
barriers to upfront investment. With support in these forms, five companies (Tokyo
Electric, Tohoku Electric, Kyushu Electric, Kansai Electric, and Chubu Electric)
converted a significant portion of their fuel for power generation from petroleum to
LNG between 1974 and 1985.
However, because of the enormous capital investment required by the construction
of receiving terminals for LNG, the use of imported coal was also taken into consider-
ation. The customs CIF (Cost, Insurance, and Freight) price of standard overseas coal
first fell below the standard price of domestic coal for electric power-generation use
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in FY 1977, and from 1983 on, remained consistently cheaper. From the late 1970s
to the early 1980s, five electric power companies (Hokkaido Electric, Chugoku Elec-
tric, Shikoku Electric, Kyushu Electric, and Tohoku Electric) increased coal’s ratio
of the total fuel used for power generation.
5.2.2 Advances in the Development of Nuclear Power
Nuclear power is superior from the point of view of energy security because it is not
much affected by changes in the international situation, and because carbon dioxide
is not emitted in the power generation process, meaning that it helps prevent climate
change. It was also expected to prove less costly than other methods if it operated
steadily at a high rate of capacity utilization. In other words, nuclear power seemed
able to meet the needs of energy, economy, and environment—the “3-Es” of energy
policy. It was, however, highly risky if adequate safety measures were not in place,
and spent nuclear fuel was both difficult and costly to dispose of.
In the early 1980s, nuclear-power generation in Japan advanced rapidly. However,
the March 1978 Three-Mile Island accident in the US and the April 1986 Chernobyl
accident in the Soviet Union made it hard to find sites for nuclear power plants in
the 1980s. Furthermore, between 1986 and 1994, the establishment of the nuclear
fuel cycle did not proceed as planned. Nevertheless, in May 1986, a portion of
the Law on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and
Reactors (Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law) was amended, and in November 1984,
a new Japan–US Atomic Agreement was concluded to establish the foundations for
starting the nuclear fuel cycle. In March 1992, Japan Nuclear Fuel Industry Inc.
began the operation of a uranium enrichment plant.
While these efforts were made to expand the use of nuclear power, safety assur-
ance measures were also added every time a serious accident occurred. Following
the accident at Three-Mile Island, steps were taken to improve safety measures in
52 areas, including safety standards, reviews, and design, as well as operations man-
agement and research on disaster prevention and safety. Following the accident at
Chernobyl, the Nuclear Safety Commission established a special committee in May
1986. It issued a report in May of the following year, which judged prompt revisions
of existing safety regulations unnecessary because Chernobyl’s design and structure
differed from that of Japan’s power plants. The report nevertheless pointed to the
lessons learned and asserted the need to improve nuclear disaster prevention mea-
sures, foster safety awareness, and promote international cooperation to address the
accidents.
5.2.3 Energy Conservation Measures in Every Sector
As part of the effort to realize policy objectives, the 1979 Law Concerning the
Rational Use of Energy (“Energy Conservation Act”) required certain factories and
business sites in the industrial sector to submit periodic reports on energy use, and to
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make and submitmid- and long-termplans and to appoint energymanagers (Kikkawa
2011, p. 403).
The Alternative Energy Law was enacted in May 1980, ushering in the age of
oil-substitution policy. At the time, the policy was aimed at resolving the instability
of Japan’s fragile energy supply base and at addressing the instability of the inter-
national oil situation. The political instability in OPEC countries encouraged these
legislativemeasures, as dependence on oil imports reached nearly 100% in 1977,with
dependence on the Middle East for 80% of that supply. MITI’s thinking on concrete
measures also played a role in the establishment of the Alternative Energy Law. That
is, the Lawwas predicated on expectations of the promotion of the following concrete
steps: (1) alternative energy development including overseas coal, hydropower, and
geothermal, (2) alternative energies in the industrial sector through fuel conversion
and the promotion of coal-fired power plant construction, (3) solar energy in public
facilities, (4) nuclear power development, including the establishment of the nuclear
fuel cycle, and (5) technological development in alternative energies, including coal
liquefaction, solar energy, geothermal energy, and so on.
It was estimated that three trillion yen would be needed to fund these measures
on alternative energy, over a period of 10 years beginning in 1980. The fruits of the
endeavor would ultimately go to the consumer, so it was decided that the funding
should be requested of the consumer. This was accomplished through an expansion
of the uses of the Promotion of the Power Resources Development Tax and the
Petroleum Tax. Ten-year goals were set for alternative energy, and the use of coal,
nuclear power, natural gas, hydropower, and geothermal energywas promoted. These
measures were not accompanied by penalties but took the form of guidelines.
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Chapter 4
Long-Term Depression and Economic
Structural Reform (1991–2000)
1 Keynotes of Japan’s Economy and Trade and Industry
Policy in the 1990s
1.1 The 1990 Trade and Industrial Policy Vision of the 1990s
1.1.1 Collapse of the Bubble and the Prolonged Recession
Betraying the optimistic expectations that had followed on the bursting of Japan’s
economic bubble, the Japanese economy suffered a long-term recession in the 1990s.
Economic growth rates fell to 1.9% in 1992 and below 1% the following year. The
steady growth of exports and the trade surplus (which reached over 100 billion
dollars) during these years suggest that the recessionwas largely the result of amarked
slump in domestic demand. Japan’s solid export record drewmounting criticism from
abroad.Meanwhile, a lackof tax revenues meant fiscal rebuildingwas interrupted and
deficit spending mounted once again. Nonperforming loans, which were aftereffects
of the bubble’s collapse, acted as a drag on the economy, in spite of steep drops
in interest rates. The so-called convoy system of financial administration, which
had accompanied financial liberalization, came under review, while the volatility of
financial institutions and the question of how to manage their bankruptcy became
major issues. If anything, the low interest rates greatly limited the possibility of using
other economic stimulus measures. The economy remained stagnant.
Moreover, in February 1993, Japan saw a growing trade surplus along with rapid
yen appreciation after a long period of stable exchange rates. On August 17, the
currency hit a record of $1 = ¥100.40, after which it depreciated slightly heading
into the new year. This yen appreciation caused a drop in the revenues of corporations
in export industries. In response, firms cut back on employment. Consumer morale
dampened accordingly, spurring a slump in consumption. Large companies were
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forced to restructure, closing factories and reducing staff by the thousands, and
unemployment became a pronounced issue. In April 1993, the government devised
emergency economic measures, investing more heavily in public works, reducing
taxes to promote acquisition of real estate, and taking measures for fiscal expansion.
In September, the official discount rate was reduced to 1.75, a record low.
Although these policies effectively slowed the decline in business conditions,
they had little ripple effect: the first half of 1993 presented promising economic
developments, but the yen’s rise stalled the economy again, leading to a scarcity
of demand on a scale not seen in the postwar period. Production dropped and the
year ended with little prospect of a recovery from the deflationary conditions. Japan
was meanwhile adopting economic policy changes for international reasons: in July
1993, Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa met with US President Bill Clinton, who
agreed to a framework—previously discussed at the April summit—for comprehen-
sive discussions of economic issues between Japan and America. This framework
rested on three pillars: (1) reduction of Japan’s current account surplus andAmerica’s
budget deficit, (2) the opening of negotiations and discussions by sector and struc-
ture, and (3) cooperation on environment and technology. Furthermore, the final draft
agreement of the GATT Uruguay Round was adopted on December 15, and in April
1994, was signed at Marrakesh by 125 countries and regions, replacing GATT and
leading to the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on January 1,
1995. The establishment of theWTOmeant themaintenance and promotion of global
free-trade systems, but America, in matters of economic policy, continued to favor
bilateral negotiations like the above Japan–US economic talks. This inevitably led
to the formation of bloc economies and to trade discrimination against those outside
those blocs.
From 1995–1996, the world economy as a whole continued expanding, due to the
significant growth of developing economies, especially in Asia, but Japan remained
in a slump. Although 1995 appeared to usher in recovery, albeit a slow one, the
Great Hanshin Earthquake of mid-January led to a sharp appreciation of the yen,
which rose to the vicinity of 80 yen to the dollar, and Japan’s economy again lost
its vigor. Imports of products and raw materials soared, accelerating deflation or the
so-called price destruction; the unease about employment continued unabated, and
the specter of deflation began to haunt Japan. The “Survey of economic trends” by
Keidanren indicated that there were many causes for concern after 1994, including
the rise in value of the yen, the stagnation of capital investment, the persistence of
excess employment, and the business world’s negative outlook on the economy.
Moreover, the bad debts held by financial institutions and the fall in land prices that
had given rise to them acted as a heavy drag on economic recovery. The instability
of the financial sector led to the collapse even of financial institutions that had been
regarded as “beyond doubt.” The 1994 failures of the Tokyo Kyowa Bank and very
secure credit cooperatives were followed by the revelation that the city’s largest
credit union, Cosmo, was going bankrupt. One month later, in August, the Ministry
of Finance announced a rescue package forHyogoBank, the largest of the second-tier
regional banks, and for Kizu Shin’yo Kumiai, the largest of the credit cooperatives.
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The yen returned to $1= 100-yen levels in August of 1995, and in September, the
official discount rate was reduced to 0.5%, another record low. These changes, along
with large-scale policies for boosting the economy, enabled Japan to avoid going
deeper than the already historic depths of this business cycle. That same month,
however, the off-the-book losses of Japanese banks’ overseas branches were brought
to light, greatly undermining trust in Japan’s financial system and leading to the
so-called Japan Premium. Thus, Japan’s economy saw many changes, but after the
bursting of the bubble Japan was unable to take advantage of opportunities for recov-
ery. This led in the fall of 1997 to the outright failure of theSanyoSecuritiesCompany,
the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, and Yamaichi Securities.
1.1.2 The Vision of the 1990s
The Vision of the 1990s, compiled by the Industrial Structure Council in July 1990,
summarized the goals of industrial policy as the following: (1) contributing to inter-
national society and undertaking reform on an international scale; (2) realizing a
relaxed and affluent life for the people; and (3) securing the foundations for long-term
economic development (Okazaki 2012, p. 13).
The first goal emphasized structural reformbased on a recognition of the following
realities: (1) emerging friction among Western nations following the collapse of the
socialist sphere in Eastern Europe; (2) emerging friction not only in trade but also in
investment, technology, and finance, as well as in structural areas such as national
systems and customs, due to growing international economic exchange; and (3) the
growing unease about Japan’s economic power owing to Japan’s increased presence
in the world economy and a distrust that extended even to Japan’s social structure and
culture. However, the Vision’s stress on international friction in explaining the need
for structural change indicates that there was a lack of awareness that the industrial
structure would become a hindrance to growth. In other words, Japanwas still subject
to the constraints of the bubble era.
The second goal articulated in the 1990s Vision recognized the so-called paradox
of affluence: that although the consumption of goods and services had become more
sophisticated, basic living conditions, including free time, work environment, living
space, and consumer choice, were deteriorating. The Vision pointed out that the
issue lay in Japan’s “corporate-type society” and its prioritization of production
over lifestyle, and stressed that resolving this problem would require a shift to a
“people-oriented industrial policy.”
The third goal assumed amedium-term shift in Japan’s industrial structure toward
a “service economy,” meaning an increase in the service industry’s share in the
national economy. Another dominant feature of the Vision was its consciousness of
ongoing “globalization,” which had become a clearer trend over the course of the
1980s.
The Vision of the 1990s was therefore significant in that it initiated the call for
a reform of institutions and practices in order to overcome economic friction. The
formation of this Vision, like those stressing heavy and chemical industrialization,
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knowledge intensity in the 1970s, and creative knowledge intensity in the 1980s,
helped create a common understanding of the issues.
Nonetheless, the 1990s Vision was slightly different in character from its prede-
cessors, because of its emphasis on changing lifestyle rather than on new candidates
for growth industries. The new Vision did not attract widespread attention, however.
People may have been unwilling to embrace it because it suggested that the rapid
growth era and the stable growth that had followed were coming to an end. None
of the Visions formulated after the 1980s conveyed a sense of purpose comparable
to that of their predecessors, and the curtain was thus drawn on the era in which
industrial policy meant the development of specific industries.
Changes were evident, too, in the kinds of issues that MITI regarded as policy
priorities. The issues raised in the 1990s Vision crossed bureau lines within the
Ministry, so committees were established for bureaus to study and address these
issues jointly. It therefore became established practice in the 1990s for the various
bureaus to address policy-making collaboratively. Even the Basic Industries Bureau,
which had a particularly strong identity of its own, became open to tackling issues
that cut across bureau boundaries, like the development of advanced technologies
and recycling, with an emphasis on energy conservation, safety, and the environment.
1.1.3 The 1994 “Subcommittee Reports on Basic Issues”
With economic structural reform emerging as the government’s chief goal from
around 1993 and 1994, many policy issues surfaced that transcended basic trade
and industrial administration. MITI began actively developing policies to address
them. The basic purpose of reform was to transform Japan’s economy into a domes-
tic demand-oriented economic structure aimed at rectifying external imbalances, to
which end policy was directed to the development of social capital, deregulation,
and administrative reform. MITI’s tasks were: first, to define the new areas needing
social capital and to clarify the responsibilities and financing involved in that social
infrastructure; second, to formulate a basic direction and principal policy issues from
the point of view of establishing an environment for inter-industry businesses; and
third, to put together a vision of the industrial structure of the future.
The Industrial StructureCouncil’s Fundamental Issues Subcommittee, established
inOctober 1992, issued an “Interim report” in June1993, “Interim recommendations”
in November 1993, and a final report titled “Industrial structure of the 21st Century”
in 1994 (Okazaki 2012, p. 15).
“Interim recommendations” addressed the need to overcome the prolonged eco-
nomic recession, while also acknowledging the fact that Japan was facing mid- to
long-term structural problems in three areas. (1) On the macro side were mount-
ing foreign criticism of Japan’s dramatic current account surplus; concerns about
the hollowing out of industry due to the relocation of industry overseas in response
to the appreciating yen; and the inadequacy of social capital and living standards
even as Japan faced a demographic shift to an aging society, impeding the achieve-
ment of an affluent lifestyle and suppressing the development of new industries.
1 Keynotes of Japan’s Economy and Trade and Industry Policy … 207
(2) On the micro side were government regulations, restrictive business practices,
and the institutional impasses and fatigue of existing mechanisms. These inhibited
entrepreneurial spirit and the growth of new industries and hindered access to the
Japanesemarket, thereby limiting consumer choice for low-cost and diversified prod-
ucts. (3)Regarding Japan’s industrial structure, concern focused on the coexistence of
highly productive industries in highly competitive markets with inefficient, uncom-
petitive industries protected by entry regulations. This was also a factor in the price
differential between the domestic and overseas markets.
The following were needed to address the microeconomic issues: (1) relaxation
of government regulations, putting in concrete terms the suggestions of the Interim
Report on Deregulation (“Hiraiwa Report”), produced by the Economic Reform
Study Group under Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa; (2) a review of private-
sector practices restricting competition, which meant strengthening the enforcement
of cartel and unfair trade regulations under theAntimonopoly Law and expanding the
system of litigation by private parties; and a new institutional framework appropri-
ate for the twenty-first century, involving reform of the corporate, employment, and
financial- and capital-market systems. Specifically, this would require (1) “bring-
ing partial fluidity to employment” through reform of the Commercial Code, the
introduction of multiple tracks for the labor market within corporations, and expan-
sion of the broader labor market; and (2) reform of the financial system based on
the recognition that Japan’s huge savings were not being effectively utilized for the
potential demand for funds, due to insufficient diversity of financial services, com-
petition among financial institutions, and the poor functioning of the corporate bond
and stock markets.
As is evident, the Interim Recommendations saw the economy as a system
composed of several subsystems and, recognizing the diversity of international
economies, called for comprehensive reform of Japan’s economic systems.
The InterimRecommendationswere significant first for their fundamental point of
view that the relaxation or elimination of regulations would not suffice for improving
market functions, and that an institutional framework supportingmarket mechanisms
was therefore required; they urged the implementation of policies to that end. In other
words, the Interim Recommendations represented a position fundamentally different
from those that called for correcting market failures through a partial substitution
of policy measures for market functions. The Recommendations also expressed a
new approach to policies on industrial structure. The premises underlying the Rec-
ommendations differed from those of the oil crisis and the high-yen recession eras.
First, whereas policy had previously targeted capital-intensive basic materials indus-
tries, a wider range of industries, includingmachinery and non-manufacturing indus-
tries, were now included in its scope. Second, because the assumption had been of
a domestic market with low import-penetration levels, the previous approaches to
price recovery were joint operations and the elimination of excess capacity, but as
the premise shifted to an internationally open market, companies were seen as hav-
ing to come to their own judgments about making adjustments to production. Third,
whereas it had been possible in the past to anticipate which growth industries might
replace declining industries, it was no longer clear what such growth industrieswould
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be. The policies on industrial structure adjustment therefore did not call for direct
government participation as they had in the past but instead emphasized the need for
corporate restructuring and the establishment of an environment that would enable
the creation of new industries.
The September 1994 “Industrial structure of the 21st century” was based on these
Interim Recommendations and served as a manifesto on industrial policy from the
1990s to the 2000s. The report clarified the new position as follows:
Henceforth, rather than accepting various systems and regulations as given, we must
strengthen market functions by bringing neutrality to the system. This requires an emphasis
on setting general rules, deregulating, and rectifying practices in the private sector, and then
implementing various assistance measures as necessary. We must also strengthen the idea
of actively engaging in the formation of an efficient market based on principles of self-help.
The perspective of the Industrial Structure Council andMITI on the role of indus-
trial policy had clearly shifted from an approach of responding to market failures to
one of enhancing market functioning through institutional reform.
2 Changes in Economic Structure and Regulatory Reform
2.1 The Revised Antimonopoly Act and the System
of Business Laws
The June 1993 Interim Report by the Fundamental Issues Subcommittee marked a
major shift in the issues addressed by policies on industrial organization. As men-
tioned in the previous section, the Report pointed out that in order to promote creative
business activities, an environment had to be created that would do away with obsta-
cles to market competition, or that would strengthen the capital market’s function of
curbing such obstacles. International issues, specifically the Structural Impediments
Initiative (SII) talks, also generated a need for policies on industrial organization, and
MITI pursued organizational restructuring and established various research groups
to strengthen research, analysis, policy planning, and design functions in order to
address the desired economic structural reform (Okazaki 2012, p. 291).
The first of these involved a review of the holding-company regulations under the
Antimonopoly Act (AMA) and of the regulatory system pertaining to shareholding
by large companies. Successive proposals in the mid-1990s called for abolishing or
reviewing Sect. 9 of the Antimonopoly Law (regulations on pure holding companies)
and 9–2 (restrictions on stock-holding by large companies) on the grounds that they
were obstacles to business strategy development. From around 1994, theGovernment
planned a review of antitrust policies as part of its overall policy of deregulation, and
the Cabinet Decision titled “On the promotion of deregulation” included a review of
appropriate regulations of holding companies and guidelines on venture capital in FY
1994. Furthermore, in response to the “deregulation action program” scheduled for
formulation by the end of FY 1994, the business community demanded the abolition
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of Sects. 9-2 of the AMA, arguing that it constrained the development of domestic
business by restricting acquisitions of companies through mergers and acquisitions
of shares and by limiting the establishment and nurturing of subsidiaries with the
aim of diversification.
Following a review of Sects. 9 and 9-2, the Corporate Law Study Group, estab-
lished byMITI, submitted the “Recommendations on the pure holding- company reg-
ulation and the review of holding regulations on large-scale companies” in February
1995, including: (1) the realization of efficient corporate organization appropriate for
diversification andmultinational development, as well as smooth personnel and labor
management, (2) harmonization with international legal systems, and (3) expecta-
tions that corporate governance would avoid friction in organization and personnel
matters. It also stated that the elimination of regulations on large companies’ share-
holding would (a) facilitate investment in new businesses, and (b) enable the smooth
restructuring of industry. The report accordingly concluded with a strong call for the
revision of existing articles that hindered these effects.
The government issued a Cabinet Decision on a “deregulation promotion plan”
in March 1995, and the Antitrust Law Enforcement Order was revised in April,
limiting the number of large-scale corporations subject to Article 9-2 shareholding
restrictions. In November, the FTC also established the AMA Chapter 4 Revision
Review Committee and started discussing the holding company problem, producing
a report in December with reconsiderations it regarded as appropriate. Although
the FTC bill formulated at this time was not realized, the government’s interest
in economic structural reform grew rapidly with the establishment of the Ryutaro
Hashimoto Cabinet in November 1996, including MITI’s program for realizing the
reform of corporate organization. A cabinet decision to that effect was made in
December and the revised bill was enacted in June 1997.
Although Article 9’s general rules on excessive concentration remained, the types
of prohibited holding companies were clearly delineated in the amended AMA. Pro-
hibitions were imposed in cases where there were (1) large-scale corporate groups
or separate large-scale companies in each of a sizable number of major business
sectors; (2) businesses with close non-business financial ties to large-scale financial
companies; or (3) different powerful operators in each of a considerable number of
major business fields that had mutual relevance to one another. Additionally, regu-
lations under Sect. 9.2 were considerably relaxed. Specifically, holding companies
were exempted from the provisions applied to large companies. In other words, the
“total stockholding rule”was not applied to holding companies and their subsidiaries.
Also expanded were the types of shares exempted from application of the law.
These two revisions had the following significance from the point of view of com-
pany group management. First, while Article 9 applied only to holding companies,
holding companies were excluded under Article 9.2 and the stocks of wholly owned
subsidiaries were newly exempted. This meant that in cases where large-scale com-
panies expanded their enterprises through the establishment or acquisition of wholly
owned subsidiaries, they might not be subject to either section. Exceptions were also
made in cases where joint venture companies were established for purposes such as
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joint research and where venture capital lists acquired shares from entrepreneurs in
the form of subsidiary businesses.
The FTC pointed out that the lifting of restrictions on holding companies was an
“amendment designed to turn certain types of excessive regulation into the minimum
regulation necessary under the Antimonopoly Act,” expressing its interpretation of
the AMA revision as consistent with overall deregulation. From MITI’s perspec-
tive, the lifting of restrictions on holding companies was intended to contribute to
the promotion of economic structural reform by expanding the range of possible
types of corporate organizations, thereby creating new businesses and improving the
efficiency of existing businesses. In addition, the review of the regulations on share-
holding by large-scale companies was regarded as contributing to the revitalization
of the economy by eliminating the restrictions on large companies and generating
the growth of venture businesses. Underlying these ideas was an awareness of the
decline in Japan’s economic vitality due to declining competitiveness and a reduced
labor force accompanying a low birth rate and an aging society; and of the need to
create an environment for businesses that would be internationally appealing and
that would enhance corporate creativity and vitality.
Among efforts to reform the economic structure was the need for a review of
Commercial Law regulations on merging and splitting companies. This was to be
separate from the AMA amendment review and would include the review of provi-
sions for splitting off companies and establishing the so-called company split system
(Okazaki 2012, p. 318).
The Industrial Structure Council’s Basic Issues Subcommittee report published in
June 1994 included the following as policy issues: “policies providing for corporate
splits,” “simplification ofmerger procedures” and “simplification of business transfer
procedures” under Commercial Law. In response to this report, MITI established a
Commercial Law Study Group, which met for discussion repeatedly. In July 1996,
MITI issued a “Research Report on theMerger System under Commercial Law” and
a “Research Report on Issues Relating to Corporate Splits.” The former (1) called for
the abolition of the general meetings to report mergers and, in order to compensate
for any insufficiency of information that would result, considered to require more
thorough disclosures about mergers; (2) highlighted the need for advertisement of
the contents of the merger so as to enable creditors to decide whether there were any
points of dispute, but the process would be simplified; (3) considered the introduction
of simplified merger procedures, and so on. These points were realized beginning in
1997with the amendedCommercial Law (adopted in June, implemented inOctober).
Meanwhile, the Study Group on Corporate Law, reestablished in September 1996,
reported on the results of its deliberations in July 1997 in “Towards the reform of
systems related to corporate organization: Report of the Study Group on Corporate
Law.” Some of its recommendations led to the establishment of a share exchange
system through the August 1999 amendment of the Commercial Code.
As shown in Table 1, the changes made in the direction of MITI policy in order to
harmonize industrial policy with the AMA led to a decrease in the number of cases
of “exempted cartels,” previously a major means of exercising industrial policy. Few
rationalization cartels were instituted as of 1980, and in parallel with this, cases
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of Exclusions of Application of the Antimonopoly Law outlined in the Temporary
Measures for the Promotion of the Machine Industry and Temporary Measures Law
for the Structural Adjustment of Specific Industries (“Structural Improvement Law”)
were completely absent as of 1990. Cartels relating to small business relationships
and Export and Import Transaction Law were also abolished by 2000. The relation-
ship to the AMA is clear in the fact that the principle of competition became the
underlying philosophy guiding policy.
2.2 Respect for Corporate Autonomy and the Role
of Government
2.2.1 “New Market Creation Program (Program 21)”
Promoting the creation of new industries became a pillar of comprehensive eco-
nomic policy in February 1994, and MITI in response announced the “New Market
Creation Program (Program 21)” in March (Okazaki 2012, p. 128). The basic con-
cepts were: (1) to respect the subjective judgments made by economic entities under
market mechanisms, (2) to administer cross-sectorial policy responses to problems
not resolved by the efforts of individual enterprises, and (3) to define “market sec-
tors responding to social needs.” These referred to sectors where potential domestic
demand might be strong, but where either autonomous development pathways were
lacking, or the market mechanism was imperfect due to external factors or the pub-
lic nature of the sector. The task was to develop policies to support these sectors.
Programs were presented in concrete terms for eight promising fields, based on
projections of the future and related measures. These programs were steadily imple-
mented, with an emphasis on actively connecting and cooperating with the other
related ministries and agencies.
The June 1994 “Report of the Subcommittee on Basic Issues,” issued a decision
to devise prototypes for the policy system for creating new industries and improving
the business environment, with the “Program 21” concept in mind. The number of
promising fields was expanded to 12, and the cross-sectorial issues facing Japanese
industry were presented as follows: (1) the need to pursue systematization, with
an aim at mutual and synergistic development of hardware and software services;
planning, development, procurement, production, sales, and distribution; public and
private sector, and so on, (2) the need to pursue a global division of labor, and (3) the
need to increase productivity in non-tradable goods and to reduce the domestic and
foreign price gap. The foundations for this thinking date back to the July 1990 Vision
of the 1990s. The ideas of “emphasizing market principles and self-responsibility”
and “developing integrated policies internally and externally” aimed at international
expansion were the inheritance of the basic stance of the Vision, and the inevitable
need for the extension of industrial policy administration had, moreover, already
been pointed out in the Vision as well.
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The new business support measures emphasized as policy issues were promoted
through the expansion of loan systems by government financial institutions, improve-
ments in the operation of the Law on TemporaryMeasures to Facilitate Specific New
Businesses, and improvements of the environment for funds through a strengthening
of the operations of various support organizations. To strengthen support for research
and development, theMinistry of Education and the Science and TechnologyAgency
cooperated on budget increases in FY 1995. Efforts to develop new industrial infras-
tructure to serve as the foundation for new business and new industry development
were carried out through improvements in the operation of related laws, beginning
with the Private Participation Promotional Law (hereafter, the “Private Promotion
Law”). In addition, the Science and Technology Basic Lawwas enacted in November
1995, aiming at planned support for science and technology, while support for ven-
ture companies was procured through financing, the securing of human resources,
and similar measures.
2.2.2 The Law on Temporary Measures to Facilitate Business
Innovation
In response to concerns over the growing gap between domestic and foreign prices
and about the hollowing out of industry in the first half of the 1990s, the Industrial
Policy Bureau began, aroundOctober 1994, to conceive a new law aimed at structural
adjustment. The project pointed out that overseas relocation was advancing even in
key industries such as processing and assembly, in which Japan had previously been
internationally competitive in productivity and technical capability. This change had
come about because of (1) increases in basic costs due to poor regulation and trading
practices, the appreciation of the yen, and the persistence of inefficient industries,
and (2) the rapid growth of Asian countries and severity of international competition.
The Industrial Structure Council’s Subcommittee on Basic Issues echoed the view
that regulations and institutions were impeding the shift of the industrial structure.
Based on this recognition, the Law on TemporaryMeasures to Facilitate Business
Innovation (“Business Innovation Law”) was enacted inMarch 1995 (Okazaki 2012,
p. 74). The core of this law was the Business Innovation Plan. “Designated enterpris-
es” were able to obtain approval by submitting business innovation plans alone or
jointly to the appropriate minister. Specific business operators were classified within
“specific industries,” meaning industries belonging to mining or manufacturing sec-
tors where production and employment were likely to decrease due to changes in
the domestic and foreign economic environments, or due to retailers or wholesalers
closely related to them, or in other words those engaged in a business specified
by Cabinet order. As in the facilitation law, companies were eligible for support,
and the rates of increase in performance (Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and labor
productivity) of designated companies increased from 1996 on, showing rates of
improvement different from those of non-designated companies.
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2.2.3 Action Plan for the Reform and Creation of Economic Structures,
and the Creation of New Industries
Subsequently, the second Hashimoto Cabinet, established in November 1996, made
the “five reforms” its top priority (Okazaki 2012, p. 155). The five were: (1) adminis-
trative reform, (2) economic structural reform, (3) financial system reform, (4) social
security structural reform, and (5) fiscal structural reform. Education was later added
as a sixth area for reform. Importantly, economic structural reform emphasized the
creation of new industry sectors as the key to dealing with hollowing out of indus-
try. Prime Minister Hashimoto instructed MITI Minister Shinji Sato to formulate
and promote economic structural reform plans to restore the vitality of the Japanese
economy in order to put this policy in concrete terms. MITI was to be at the cen-
ter of this effort and to give instructions for coordinating with the other ministries
and agencies. Minister Sato accordingly gathered the staff of the Headquarters for
Industrial Structural Conversion and instructed them on coordinating their work with
the other ministries. Through these efforts, the Program for Change and Creation of
Economic Structure was created by Cabinet Decision in December.
This program acknowledged the need for institutional reform, and with regard
especially to the imminent aging of Japanese society, conceived of 15 new indus-
trial fields, and presented an overall view of economic structural reform as a means
for creating these. The contents of the program were: (1) rectification of the high-
cost structure, (2) reform of various systems relating to corporations, (3) reform
of the labor and employment system, (4) improvement of social infrastructure that
contributed to economic structural reform and improvement of efficiency in its uti-
lization, and (5) maintenance and development of regional industry and of the skills
needed to support manufacturing. Among these, the first required drastic deregu-
lation, improvements in the commodity futures market, improvements in business
practices, and systems reform for standardization. The second emphasized the need
for optimization of managerial resources such as human resources and capital, by
strengthening the development of spin-offs and group management, and reorganiz-
ing corporate structures through business restructuring such as mergers and joint
ventures, which required reconsideration of the Antimonopoly Act’s regulations on
business combinations and of company merger procedures.
In line with this Cabinet Decision, a further Cabinet Decision was taken in May
1997 called the “Action Plan for Innovation and Creation of Economic Structure,”
in which concrete projections and policies were presented regarding each of the
15 new industries (Okazaki 2012, p. 159). It was assumed that these fields, which
employed approximately 10.66 million people at that time and had a market size
of approximately 198 trillion yen, would grow to 18.27 million employed and 561
trillion yen by 2010. The three sectors related to medicine and welfare, lifestyle, and
information and communications were expected in particular to contribute greatly
to the expansion of employment (Table 2).
The Keizo Obuchi administration, established in July 1998, froze the Special
Measures Law on Promotion of Fiscal Structural Reform approved by the Hashimoto
Cabinet in December 1997 but carried on other reforms. The Economic Strategy
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Current 2010 Current 2010
Medical, welfare 348 480 38 91
Lifestyle 220 355 20 43
Information and communications 125 245 38 126
New product technologies 73 155 14 41
Distribution, logistics 49 145 36 132
Environment 64 140 15 37
Business support 92 140 17 33
Oceans 59 80 4 7
Biotechnology 3 15 1 10
Urban environmental improvement 6 15 5 16
Aerospace (private sector) 8 14 4 8
New energy, energy conservation 4 13 2 7
Human resources 6 11 2 4
Internationalization 6 10 1 2
Housing 3 9 1 4
Total 1066 1827 198 561
Source Okazaki (2012, p. 166). Source data from theCabinet decision titled “Programs for changing
and creating the economic structure” 1996
Council, reporting directly to the Prime Minister, was established in August, and
decided on a policy of drawing up “plans for doubling living space” and “plans for
revitalizing industry.” To this end, deregulation was needed in the 15 new sectors
that were to lead the Japanese economy, as well as support for new businesses.
MITI played a central role in formulating the industrial revitalization plan. As far as
economic structural reform was concerned, MITI would therefore be responsible for
a cross-sectional approach to the various sectors administered by each department
in the Ministry.
The industry-related legislation for creating and developing new business was
based on the May 1998 Law Promoting Technology Transfer from Universities to
Industry (“TLO Law”), and support measures were devised with the aim of transfer-
ring the results of research, as the law’s name suggests. Meanwhile, the December
1998 Law for Facilitating the Creation of New Business led to (1) direct support for
the establishment of individual businesses and companies, (2) promotion of busi-
ness activities by SMEs using new technologies, and (3) measures based on three
points of improvement of the business environment, utilizing regional industrial
resources. The same lawwas amended to add supportmeasures for venture companies
in December 1999.
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Meanwhile, the economic revival plan stressed the need to raise productivity.
The lack of improvement in productivity was ascribed to distortions in the corpo-
rate production and accumulation structure that had resulted from the inefficient
investments of the bubble era. The supply side needed to be addressed and systemic
reforms posed to support the processing of excess capacity and to bring innovation
to business organization. Following deliberations by the Council for Industrial Com-
petitiveness established in March 1999, the Law on Special Measures for Industrial
Revitalization was enacted in August. Its aim was to raise productivity through the
efficient utilization of existing management resources in Japan. To achieve this, the
decision was made to support business restructuring, the opening of new areas of
business (targeting entrepreneurs and SMEs), and research activities. Designated
businesses would be able to receive special exceptions to the Commercial Law and
special measures on financing and taxation.
2.3 Promoting Deregulation
2.3.1 Implementing Plans to Promote Deregulation
Deregulation proceeded also under the pressure from the United States in the
form of the Structural Impediments Initiative of 1989 and the US–Japan Frame-
work for a New Economic Partnership established in April 1993. The Provisional
Council for the Promotion of Administrative Reform, established in July 1990, con-
firmed the implementation of the Second Administrative Reform Council’s Final
Report, and proposed to reduce public regulation by half over a period of 10 years
(Okazaki 2012, p. 196).
Deregulation was sought also from the point of view of reforming Japan’s long-
stagnant economic structure. Following the Third Administrative Reform Council
Report of January 1994, the government established the Administrative Reform Pro-
motion Office in the Cabinet to undertake important matters concerning implemen-
tation of administrative reform in government and other necessary related matters.
Based on the same report, an Administrative Reform Committee was established in
the PrimeMinister’s Office in December 1994 with the role of monitoring the imple-
mentation of policies aimed at (1) promoting regulatory improvements related to
private sector activities, and (2) promoting improvements in administrative systems
and operations. The administrative reform councils of the Extraordinary Administra-
tive Investigative Committee and Third Council were in the position of responding
as advisers to the Prime Minister, whereas this committee was an organization that
actively and autonomously carried out monitoring and deliberations.
With the support of powerful organs such as these, a medium-term deregulation
promotion action planwas formulated. InMarch 1995, theCabinet issued the “Dereg-
ulation Action Program” Decision, a five-year plan covering 1995–1999. This plan
addressed 11 sectors, establishing a deregulation implementation schedule for each:
(1) housing and land, (2) information and communication, (3) distribution and related
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activities, (4) transportation, (5) standards, certifications, imports, and so on, (6)
finance, securities, and insurance, (7) energy, (8) employment and labor, (9) pollu-
tion andwaste products, (10) environmental protection and dangerous goods, disaster
prevention, and security, and (11) others. Deregulation was applied to a total of 1,091
items, and with the establishment of new regulations, a fixed period for review was
sought. However, the planning period was revised within three years, by FY 1997,
because of the rapid appreciation of the yen (Fig. 1).
The administrative reform committee issued a “Final opinion” ahead of the
December 1997 expiration of the planning period, which the Cabinet adhered to
in its decision entitled “Promotion of Deregulation.” This dictated the continua-
tion of the deregulation plan. Another Cabinet Decision, “Three-year Program for
the Promotion of Deregulation” (“New Plan”) was released in March 1998. Two
months earlier, a deregulation committee composed of private-sector experts was
established under the Administrative Reform Promotion Headquarters. The “New
Plan” was distinctive in that it included the idea of switching from administration
based on “regulation in advance” to one of “after-checks.” Whereas the former was
characterized by “direct regulation of citizens and businesses,” the latter was a form
of administration in which “the government establishes clear and concrete rules and
the private sector is permitted to act creatively and freely as long as it observes those
rules.” Deregulation did not end with this shift, but the plan was significant in show-
ing the need to clarify the rules and strengthening the system of after-checks based
on them; and as suggested by the Deregulation Committee, which in April 1999 was
renamed the Regulatory Reform Committee, it aimed to advance the thrust of policy
from deregulation to regulatory reform.
The deregulation policy described above led to changes in the number of licenses
as shown in Tables 3 and 4.
2.3.2 Product Standardization and Safety Improvements
Based on the December 1997 Cabinet Decision titled “Follow-up on the ‘Action
Plan for Innovation and Creation of Economic Structure,’” which sought to mini-
mize government regulations, the Standard Certification Committee was established
the following June in the Industrial Structure Council. The Committee prepared a
report in January 1999, which sought to utilize the power of the private sector for
inspection and verification work (Okazaki 2012, p. 196; Ishihara 2011, p. 341). In
August, revised versions of 11 of the 18 laws using MITI’s Standards and Confor-
mityAssessment Systemwere established, and the government’s certification system
based on the Consumer Product Safety Law was abolished. Preliminary regulations
were minimized while emergency orders regarding the distribution of dangerous
products were maintained, and measures for post-checks were enhanced, whereby
businesses became responsible in principle for ensuring the safety of their products.
Government’s role was to form the safety rules.
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On the laws revising portions of MITI-related laws to improve regulations on private
activities and rationalize administrative affairs 
1. Purpose of the laws
Aiming to relax regulations on private-sector activity and simplify and rationalize
administration:  
Undertake a general review of MITI-
related laws 
Promote deregulation
Reform the economic structure
  . Content: 16 laws including 14 revisions and 2 
repeals○ Review of export procedures
Repeal of two laws -- the Export Inspection Law and the Export Design Law --
based on the improvements in Japan's technical level○ Rationalization of regulations on changes in corporate organization
Establishment of regulations on approval of status of licenced business
operators in cases of mergers or the establishment of businesses so as to
reduce burden pertaining to changes of corporate organization.  
•   Laws concerning the establishment of pollution-prevention
   organizations for designated factories (status of those filing notifications
on pollution prevention, etc.)  
High-Pressure Gas Safety Law ("Class 2" producer status and others) 
Laws related to confirming the safety of liquefied petroleum gas and 
the optimization of the transactions (LPG dealer status)
Aircraft manufacturing business law (approved businesses status)
Arms manufacturing law (arms producer status)
Gravel Sampling Law (gravel sampling businesses status)
Quarrying Law (quarry business status)
Law on securing gasoline quality etc. (gasoline distributor status)
Electricity Business Law (status of installers of electric facilities for business
use) 
Electrical Appliances and Materials Control Law (Class B electric appliance 
producer status, etc.)
Gas Business Law (Class 2 gas equipment producer status) ○ Review of regulations
Law Related to Rationalization of Energy Use (Energy Conservation Law )  
(review of obligation to submit report of energy administrator appointment)
Electricity Business Law (review of the required period within which an electric 
utility must commence business) 
Electricity Business Law (abolition of Minister's approval of licenses for chief 
engineers)
Electricity Business Law (delegating to the private sector the task of licensing  
chief electrical technicians)
Electricity Heat Supply Business Act (review of pre-use inspection of pipelines)

















Fig. 1 Laws on Deregulation. Source Tsusansho Koho, Fig. 3.1, April 1, 1995 [II-2, p. 327]
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Table 4 Number of licenses,
by Ministry/Agency
Ministry or agency Number of licenses
Dec., 1985 Mar., 1999
Prime minister’s office 27 32
Fair trade commission 26 28








Defense agency 26 31
Economic planning agency 26 45
Science and technology agency 218 308
Environment agency 149 221
Okinawa development agency 27 34
National land agency 81 100
Justice ministry 146 196
Foreign ministry 37 47
Finance ministry 1116 844
Education ministry 310 394
Health ministry 936 1322
Agriculture, forests, and fisheries
ministry
1263 1376
Ministry of international trade and
industry
1870 1726
Transport ministry 2017 1505
Postal ministry 265 381
Labor ministry 532 682
Construction ministry 742 976
Home affairs ministry 104 125
Total 10054 11581
Source Okazaki (2012, p. 203)
Regarding the issue of business responsibility and redress for victims of accidents,
as mentioned in Chap. 2, the Consumer Protection Committee had repeated discus-
sions since the 1970s on product liability from the perspective of consumer redress.
Some in industry and in MITI regarded any priority given by administration to con-
sumers as jeopardizing business, and little progress was made on legislation, but the
government could not continue to neglect the issue, as it was forced to handle actual
accidents. The result was the 1990s Vision’s recommendation that a product liability
system be taken under consideration, and when the Product Safety Division of the
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Industrial Structure Council recommended introducing the product liability system
as a comprehensive product safety measure in November 1993, MITI decided to
proceed with preparations for legislation. Discussions were carried on for two years
within the Ministry and by the Product Safety Division on such difficult issues as
what constituted corporate responsibility, the extent of consumer responsibility, and
how to set the standards. Rulings gradually became more objective, which spurred
further legislation. The Product Liability Law was established in July 1994, stipu-
lating that product liability claims could be brought where there was (1) a defect
regardless of intent or negligence, (2) damage, and (3) a causal relationship between
the two. This constituted a major revision of the principle of negligence established
in the 1896 Civil Law, but given the increased likelihood that product quality label-
ing would receive greater emphasis due to the law, product liability law proceeded
without government regulation, on the principle that responsibility resided with the
business operator.
Seen as part of the deregulatory trend, this formof consumer administration did not
regard consumers as weak players in need of protection, but rather positioned them as
economic entities equivalent in strength to business entities, and thereforeminimized
preliminary regulation and instead called for consumers to take responsibility for
themselves. It therefore also increased the need for information disclosure so that
consumers could make appropriate decisions. This became a driving factor in the
establishment of the Consumer Affairs Agency in September 2009.
2.3.3 Service Industries
The 1990s Vision released in September 1989 reiterated the importance of the service
industry (Ishihara 2011, p. 430). The goals for the service industry in the 1990s were
defined as: (1) the upgrade of labor productivity, (2) promotion of human resource
development infields such as the information service industry and the leasing industry
that contribute to advances in manufacturing as well as improving labor productivity,
and (3) establishing the environment for development to respond to the upgrade and
diversification of the lifestyle needs of the public. The latter included services to
support women, such as elder care and child and household care services.
In connection with the deregulation presented by the Hiraiwa Report of the Eco-
nomic Reform Study Group in November 1993, MITI in 1995 established a Soft
Industry Roundtable under the Director-General for Commerce and Distribution
Policy, which issued its report in May 1996. It defined “soft industries” as a group
of industries with the main objective of providing intellectual value and services.
According to the report, the specific fields where growth could be expected were (1)
business support, (2) information and communications, (3) human resources, (4)
welfare, (5) lifestyle and culture, and for these to develop, development of a market
environment based on the principle of competition. MITI was thus seeking ways
to contribute to the development of the service industry outside the jurisdiction of
the Ministries and Agencies, while adhering to the government policy of deregula-
tion and regulatory reform. However, while these administrative processes promoted
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a competitive market approach, they also had limitations in that they delayed the
development of policies for improving productivity.
2.4 Abolition of the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law
2.4.1 Negotiations with the United States and the Large-Scale Retail
Stores Law Issue
Amidst worsening economic friction with the United States, the Office of the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) asserted the existence of non-tariff barriers in
Japan. Regarding distribution, the US urged improvements in the Law Concern-
ing the Adjustment of Retail Business Activities by Large-Scale Retail Stores and
in business practices that were seen as barriers to import expansion. The “Report
on relaxation of public regulations, etc.,” submitted by the Temporary Administra-
tive Reform Promotion Council in December 1988, included the following findings
on the Large-Store Law: (1) that “preliminary explanations” should be limited to
preliminary explanation of the plan for opening a store, (2) that the Commercial
Activities Coordinating Committee, composed of the commercial businesses, con-
sumers, and experts, should adopt standard time limits for preliminary deliberations,
(3) that criteria for closing times and number of days off should be determined from
the point of view of improving convenience for consumers, and (4) that excessive
regulation by local governments should be alleviated. In December 1988, the Cab-
inet issued a decision to undertake implementation of these suggestions, but in the
1990s Vision on Distribution compiled by the Distribution Committee and the SME
Policy-Making Council in June 1989,MITI decided to incorporate recommendations
concerning distribution into its new administrative reform proposal and to work out
countermeasures (Ishihara 2011, p. 99).
While this review of the Large-Store Law proceeded domestically, the question of
how to optimize operation of theLarge-StoreLawwas also taken up in the discussions
on the Structural Impediments Initiative (“Structural Consultations”) that began in
July 1989. In the final report of the Structural Consultations submitted in June 1990,
the Large-Store Law was addressed as the first among the items for deregulation,
with the decision that deregulation measures would be undertaken in the following
three stages: (1) immediate measures (measures for optimization of operations and
so on), (2) legislative reform for submission in the next ordinary Diet session, and
(3) review after the revision in the Law stipulated in (2) above. The first stage,
launched in May 1990, included: shortening the coordination and processing period
of establishing newshops, specialmeasures on spaces for buying and selling imported
goods, establishment of store area limits in which coordination was not required,
relaxation of the scope of regulation related to closing hours and number of holidays,
and improvements in the transparency of the coordination and processing procedures
for opening stores. These measures, mainly intended to shorten the coordination
process, constituted a concrete form of the policy suggested in the 1990s Vision on
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Distribution, but, with the incorporation of the content on imported items, were also
a response to the Structural Impediments Initiative.
Another joint meeting was held between the Industrial Structure Council’s Com-
mittee on Distribution and the Subcommittee on Distribution of the SME Policy-
MakingCouncil to discuss revision of the law. TheirDecember InterimReport sought
the following revisions: that store-opening coordination should take place within one
year and that the store-opening notification and preliminary explanations contained
in the store-opening coordination and processing procedures should be abolished.
The Report further urged that the goal of “local explanations” should no longer be
to reach agreement with the community, but rather to notify the community of the
content of the plans. Other suggested revisions included abolishing the Commer-
cial Activities Coordinating Committee, replacing it with hearings of opinions from
consumers, retailers, academic experts, and others by the Large-Scale Retail Stores
Council (Large-Store Hearings), and making it allowable to ask local chambers of
commerce and other organizations to consolidate the opinions of local stakehold-
ers as needed. The recommendations also called for relaxing special measures on
places where imported goods could be sold and for urging local government bodies
to exercise restraint in issuing regulations.
The revised lawwas promulgated inMay1991 (and implemented in January 1992)
based on the interim report and was divided into three categories: (1) expanding the
area (space) limits for each type of store, (2) expanding the scope of the Large-Store
Hearings, and (3) undertaking a review after two years (Ishihara 2011, p. 110). The
abolition of theCommercialActivitiesCoordinatingCommitteemeant that aweighty
responsibility was imposed on the judgments issued by the Large-Store Council. For
this reason, the Large-StoreCouncil revised its reviewprocedures inNovember 1991.
The revisions maintained the aim of protecting small and medium-sized retailers, as
before, but also sought to respond to the diversification and internationalization of
consumer needs. In addition to the revised law, the Special Law on Exceptional
Measures Concerning Floor Space for Import Sales was established, according to
which the Large-Store Lawwould not apply when the total selling space for imported
goods was 1,000 square meters or less (Fig. 2).
The Industrial StructureCouncil established aBasic Issues Subcommittee inOcto-
ber 1992 to launch a review of the revised law, submitted the final report in June
1994, and sought further relaxation of the regulatory standards in the Large-Store
Law. These decisions were based on the mounting view that the reduction of small
and medium-sized retailers was due increasingly to structural problems rather than
to the advancement of large-scale stores. Moreover, the abolition of the Commercial
Activities Coordinating Committee meant that the opposition movement of small
and medium-sized retailers lost its home base and that calls for stronger regulations
were increasingly eclipsed. Meanwhile, before the two-year review required by the
revised law, the joint conference meeting in November 1993 issued an interim report
in January 1994 titled “How to undertake the review of the revised Large-Store Law.”
Many different views were reportedly presented in the joint conference on the need,
or lack thereof, for the Large-Store Law, but given that the coordination procedures
under the Law were proceeding smoothly after the revision, it was judged that there
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Changes to the Large-Scale Retail Store Law
(1) Increase in retail space area for each type of store (related to Article 3)
(2) Expansion of range of opinions to be heard by the Large-Store Council (related to Article 7)
(3) Optimization of self-regulation by local public entities (related to Article 15-5)
(4) Review to be undertaken after 2 years (related to Article 2 of Supplementary Provisions)
Notification by the party establishing the large-scale retail store



















Source: Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Industrial Policy Bureau, Distribution 
Industry Division , ed., "The future of the Large-Scale Retail Store Law -- How to consider
its revision [Industrial Structure Council and SME Policy-Making Council Joint Conference
Report]." Industrial Research Council Foundation, 1994, p. 127.  Regarding cases of Type II 
Large-Scale Retail Stores, "Prefectural Governor" replaces "MITI Minister."
Deliberations in the Council on the Large-Scale Retail Store Law
Opinions of prefectural governors and municipal mayors
Recommendations by the MITI Minister
MITI Minister instructions
Notification of retailers
Consumers and consumer associations
Retailers and retail associations
Scholars/experts
Presentation of the opinions of the 
Chamber of Commerce and consolidation
of opinions of local stakeholders       
Large-Scale Retail 
Store Law Council 
hearing opinions
Fig. 2 Store-opening procedures under the Large-Scale Retail Store Law for Type 1 Large-Scale
Retail Stores (January 31, 1992 to May 3, 2000). Source [II-4, p. 114]
would be little merit in abolishing the framework itself. Although the coordination
issue had receded, the choice was made to retain the legal framework itself. Even so,
in part because of Japan–US friction, the Large-Store Lawwas gradually dismantled.
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2.4.2 Shifts in the Direction of Distribution Policy
The 1990s Vision on Distribution calling for the deregulation of the Large-Store
Law defined the goals of distribution policy as: (1) realization of a truly affluent
consumer life, (2) contribution to the development of the international economic
society, (3) contribution to the construction of vibrant local economic society, and
(4) securing management resources for an appealing distribution industry (Ishihara
2011, p. 229). The last of these involved both making the competition mechanism
work effectively and recognizing the need to consider business opportunities for
small and medium-sized businesses. Nine specific areas of policy administration
were stipulated to achieve these policy goals: (1) rationalization of the distribution
system, (2) promotion of structural reform, (3) development of visions for revital-
izing shopping streets (shotengai) and for community-building, (4) expansion of
imports, (5) promotion of globalization, (6) improvement in convenience for con-
sumers, (7) creation of high-quality life and the HighMart 2000 concept, (8) securing
and training of human resources, and (9) improvement in the environment for labor.
Among these, “promotion of structural reform” included suggestions on minimizing
regulations on liquor, rice, and pharmaceutical products in the review of systems
and practices. “Revitalizing shopping streets” meant actively supporting ambitious
small and medium-sized retailers and enabling a smooth exit for older businesses.
This indicates the Vision’s recognition of the fact that retailers who were aging and
not interested in investing in the future were hindering the revitalization of regional
commerce, particularly local shotengai.
The 1990s Distribution Vision retained the spirit of its 1980s version precursor
with its emphasis on regional commerce, but rather than relying on restrictions on
large stores, it sought to actively develop regional economies while also encouraging
the recovery of small andmedium-sized retailers. The clear decrease in the number of
small-scale retail stores raised doubts about the effect of the regulations based on the
Large-Store Law and suggested that new support measures for regional commerce
were needed.
Policy changes developed more rapidly after the SII talks. These changes were
evident in the 1991 revision to the Large-Scale Retail Store Law and the Special
Law on Floor Space for Import Sales, but also in the establishment of the Law on
Special Measures Concerning the Promotion of Commercial Zone Improvement,
the Private Participation Promotion Law, and the Law on the Promotion of Small
and Medium-Sized Retailers. The third of these was conceived as seeking a new
cooperative relationship between large stores and small and medium-sized retailers,
with large-scale shopping centers as the paradigm. This aim was realized all at
once after the final report on the SII talks sought significant increases in Japanese
public investment. “Commercial zones” regulated “facilities offered for the use of
entities that run a considerable number of businesses” (commercial facilities) and
“a variety of facilities that promote the convenience of customers and other local
residents” (commercial infrastructure) as “integrated facilities.” Municipalities were
to formulate a concept, submit it for the approval of the prefectural governor and
report it to the appropriate minister, and then receive support. This approach gave
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municipalities the initiative in formulating the basic concept. It represented a new
approach that would later be carried over into the City Core Revitalization Law and
other policies. However, inasmuch as the basic direction of policy was determined by
specificMinisters (ofMITI, Construction, orHomeAffairs), it focused on developing
large-scale facilities, attracting an array of businesses, and maintaining roads and
parks and so on. In other words, the national government envisioned plans for the
major remodeling of urban areas through large-scale investments in “hardware,” but
it was hard for municipalities to conceive plans on so large a scale. Thus, from the
very planning stage, national government assistance in budget-planning and expert
assistance proved indispensable.
The commercial zones defined under the Act were classified as either “Advanced
Commercial” or “Regional Commercial Revitalization” zones. In July 1996, a third
type was added, namely, the “City Core Revitalization Zone.” Regional Commercial
Revitalization Zones received the greatest number of approvals, and the physical
infrastructure intended to underpin not only retail but also commerce more generally,
aimed in part at modernization of the retail sector. Nevertheless, understanding of the
problems facing cities was as yet undeveloped and the tendency persisted to promote
conventional approaches to retail.
2.4.3 Revision of Business Practices and Structural Reform
As mentioned earlier, business practices were also among the non-tariff barriers
emphasized by the United States as contributing to the trade imbalance (Ishihara
2011, p. 240). In June 1990, the Joint Meeting of the Industrial Structure Council’s
Distribution Committee and the SME Policy-Making Council issued recommenda-
tions on reviewing business practices. Thesewere based on the principles of (1) trans-
parency of business practices, (2) the elimination of business practices that impeded
the rationalization of business operations, and (3) a consideration of international
perspectives. Specific items for review covered a broad array of issues, including
rebates, returned goods, suggested retail prices and manufacturer’s invoice prices,
and retail field service staff.
The report reflected not only a consideration of US concerns, but also the expec-
tation that distribution businesses in Japan would be better able to expand interna-
tionally it they improved their business practices. In June, MITI announced a “Policy
for the Improvement of Business Practices.” According to FY 1995 surveys, about
30–40% of companies were working on improving business practices before the
introduction of the guidelines, while only 10–20% decided to do so afterwards. It
was in this context that the changes to business practices such as “ex post facto” price
setting by resin makers and processors, described below, were undertaken.
Meanwhile, in February 1991, the Joint Committee of the Industrial Structure
Council Distribution Committee and the SME Policy-Making Council’s Subcom-
mittee on Distribution established a Planning and Research Subcommittee Logistics
Working Group to consider the problem of small-lot deliveries of consumer goods.
In September that year, the Joint Committee established a Logistics Subcommittee
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for the comprehensive discussion of logistics issues, and in October, it created a
working group on SMEs to examine logistical problems particular to SMEs. The
working group’s report pointed out that small and medium-sized wholesalers were
losing strength vis-à-vis their business partners because of the growing emphasis on
flexibility, which meant demands for more frequent deliveries, shorter lead times,
smaller orders, and stricter delivery times. The report suggested the need for policy
measures such as infrastructure improvements and subsidies to improve the effi-
ciency of individual business operators. The resulting May 1992 Law Concerning
the Promotion of Efficient Distribution Systems in SMEs stipulated that cooperatives
and other commercial groups were to prepare efficiency plans according to the basic
guidelines set by the appropriate minister, and that grants and loans for their sup-
port would be provided to those that were approved. These efficiency improvements
were limited to physical distribution operations such as the receipt of goods, storage,
distribution processing, shipping, and ground shipping, because logistics was now
recognized as fundamental to the process of making distribution more systematic.
As compared with the policies on retail, these policies aimed to induce businesses
to participate in these endeavors, something that was itself understood as a means to
modernization.
Thereafter, in June 1995, the Joint Committee compiled a summary of “the current
situation and issues in Japan’s distribution” and presented a distribution vision for
the twenty-first century. The post-bubble recession only strengthened the demand for
internationalization, and although deregulation was making progress, the hollowing
out of core urban areas was becoming more pronounced. The report pointed out that
this was a problem that transcended the issues of commerce and related directly to
maintaining the vitality and liveliness of urban areas. The report called for policies
both “from the point of view of seeking greater efficiency” and “from the point of
view of social needs.”
2.4.4 Abolition of the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law
In June 1996, the US government expressed dissatisfaction with the direction of
Japan–US negotiations on photographic film. In January 1995 it asked the WTO to
consider whether the Large-Scale Retail Law was a violation of the General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services (GATS), which had come into effect in January 1995 after
the establishment of theWTO.Although the Japanese government attempted counter-
arguments, a May 1997 Cabinet Decision called for investigation of the Large-Store
Law, based on the fact that over two years had elapsed since the review of the latest
revision (Ishihara 2011, p. 131). It is not clearwhen the policy of abolishing theLarge-
Store Law was adopted in the joint meeting of the ISC Distribution Committee and
the SME Policy-Making Council’s Subcommittee held that month, but the remarks
published in October implied that the law should be abolished. The memo raised the
question of whether the current legal framework could respond to the diversification
of consumption activities accompanying changes in lifestyle. It also discussed how
to respond to transportation and environmental problems caused by the opening of
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large stores, and how to take decentralization into account in coordinating the issues
related to the opening of large stores.
Underlying the exploration of a new framework was the idea that complete lib-
eralization of large-store openings would be undesirable but that on the European
and US model, location regulations could be implemented from the point of view of
urban planning and land use (the guidance method). This can thus be interpreted as
replacing the Large-Store Law’s aim by securing business opportunities for small and
medium-sized retailers through urban planning while continuing to maintain some
degree of regulation on the opening of new stores. This shift to an urban-planning aim
required the understanding and cooperation of the Ministry of Construction. Daily
negotiations ensued at the secretariat level, while MITI considered concrete policies
for finalizing the abolition of the Large-Store Law, revising the City Planning Act,
and addressing environmental and other issues. A report requesting the abolition
of the Large-Store Law was submitted in December. Although commercial associa-
tions initially submitted dissenting opinions, industry opinion gradually accepted the
premise that the Law would be abolished and shifted toward assuring that the new
framework function effectively. The Partial Revision of the City Planning Act was
passed in May 1998, and the Law Concerning the Measures by Large-Scale Retail
Stores for Preservation of Living Environment and the Law on Improvement and
Revitalization of City Centers were enacted in June. With the enactment of the first
of these, the Large-Store Law and the Special Law on Selling Space for Imported
Goods were both abolished.
2.4.5 Three Laws on Community Development
The City Center Revitalization Law, Revised City Planning Act, and Act on the
Measures by Large-Scale Retail Stores for Preservation of Living Environment, all
established in 1998, aimed to promote a shift away from the Large-Store Law’s con-
trols on competition, toward a greater reliance on the principle of market competition
(Ishihara 2011, p. 261).
The City Center Revitalization Law was based on a report compiled in August
1997 by the Joint Committee of the ISC’s Distribution Committee and SME Policy-
Making Subcommittee on Distribution, which emphasized the need for legal mea-
sures to address the hollowing out of city centers. It cited the need for multifaceted
measures involving multiple government agencies, approaches that extended beyond
isolated targets to address the links between them, respect for the distinctive character
and autonomy of different places, and development of entities responsible for urban
planning rather than the existing more scattershot approach. The law was imple-
mented under the joint administration of 13 ministries and agencies. Its framework
was as follows: the appropriate minister was to establish basic policy, municipalities
to prepare basic plans based on that policy, and those implementing the projects stip-
ulated in the plan to submit “specific project plans” and apply for certification by the
appropriate minister. The “implementer” was to be a “certified initiative promoter,”
meaning a “Town Management Organization (TMO).” These would be funded by
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commercial and industrial associations or the Chamber of Commerce, by special
companies or local public associations composed chiefly of SMEs based on Cabinet
Orders, or by contributions from a public service corporation. By obtaining certi-
fication, the TMO could obtain support from the national government. However,
there were problems with this approach. Although municipalities launched TMOs
to compete to obtain subsidies, many proposals were merely summaries of the exist-
ing business plans of various departments and had little new autonomous input. The
framework of the law, while in step with the trend toward decentralization, increased
the burden on local governments rather than otherwise. In some cases, therefore,
local governments devised makeshift plans that could not produce any outstanding
results. In April 2003, the TMO Roundtable of the SME Agency acknowledged that
the TMOs were not necessarily making smooth progress; the Board of Audit also
took up this issue in FY 2003. It was pointed out that neither the financial basis nor
the necessary human resources for TMOs were sufficiently well developed and that
TMO principles were not yet well understood.
The revisedCity PlanningAct put into concrete form the policy goals that followed
on the abolition of the Large-Scale Retail Law, namely those of encouraging and
locating large-scale stores in accordance with urban planning methods. Based on
this concept, the designation of special-use districts by Cabinet Order was liberalized
to allow local public organizations to make the determinations for themselves, the
point being to introduce large stores based on the actual circumstances of the area.
The special-use areas, however, were not included in the purview of the suburban
siting of large-scale stores in the model of the suburban shopping center promoted in
the 1980s. The special-use area concept was therefore ineffective in suburban areas.
In 2000, the Ministry of Construction revised the City Planning Act again to limit
development not only in agricultural districts but also in areas not subject to land-
use zoning. It was hard for municipalities to impose strict regulations on their own,
however, and the advance of suburban development continued.
Although the Large-Scale Retail Store Location Lawmay be understood as a suc-
cessor to the Large-Store Law, its purpose was completely different. The aim of the
new law was not the securing of business opportunities for small and medium-sized
retailers, but the maintenance of the living environment of area residents. MITI was
asked to indicate what criteria should be included for the operation of this law, and
SMEs asked that it incorporate in its consideration the matter of supply-and-demand
adjustments. These expectations were not met, however; it was clear that the guide-
lines for criteria were not adjustment measures. At the Joint Committee meeting in
November 1998where the draft of the guidelineswas compiled, twoother pointswere
at issue: how far the “living environment” extended, and the extent of traffic prob-
lems. Both were questions of how to require new stores to take the local environment
into consideration. Joint Committee documents show that the emphasis was on mak-
ing it the obligation of store owners to consider, on a voluntary basis, factors beyond
just the three that were clearly regulated, namely traffic, waste, and noise. Compa-
nies were to develop their own responses to the issues. The new Large-Scale Store
Location Law completely eliminated supply-demand adjustment measures, instead
encouraging new shops to take environmental problems into consideration and to
actively take on not only legal obligations but also issues of social responsibility and
social contribution.
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2.4.6 Review of the Three Laws on Community Development
The Joint Committee began evaluating and reviewing the three laws that comprised
the community development system in April 1998 soon after their establishment
(Ishihara 2011, p. 291). The further decline of central city areas spurred their work.
Their December report indicates their viewpoint in reviewing the three laws and
the direction of future town planning. The concerns highlighted by the Committee
included: lack of attention in the Revitalization Law to the consolidation of urban
functions, problems inherent in the basic planning and operations of the TMOs,
the tendency under the City Planning Act to overlook broad regional perspectives
while readily approving suburban development. The report accordingly stated that
“sustainablemunicipal finance” and “preservation of the community”were important
elements of the so-calledmachi, meaning “town” or “community,” and to these ends,
called for efforts aimed at “developing compact and vibrant communities.” This
thinking emphasized consolidation in urban cores rather than suburban development.
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT)
also held a conference in November 2004 on the revitalization of city centers, and
in February 2006, the Council for Social Infrastructure issued a report titled “Urban
planning for a new era.” These recognized the need to review policies, and favored
suppressing suburban development in terms of both urban planning and building
regulation, as well as consolidating urban functions, including residential functions,
in city centers.
Thus, in May 2006, bills revising the City Planning Act and the City Core Revi-
talization Law were passed. Land-use principles that had attracted facilities for
large numbers of customers were changed; recognition was given to basing loca-
tion decisions on urban-planning procedures that reflected local decision-making. In
the amendment to the City Core Revitalization Law, approval for basic plans was
to come from a higher level, namely the Prime Minister; a City Core Revitalization
Headquarters was established in the Cabinet, and the government took the initiative
as a whole. This symbolically indicated that the age had ended in which urban com-
mercial policy, a major pillar of distribution policy, was developed in isolation from
plans for ideal urban areas.
2.5 The End of the Textile Policy
2.5.1 New Developments in the Textile Industry Toward a “Lifestyle
Culture” Model
Areviewof the role of theLawonExtraordinaryMeasures for theStructural Improve-
ment of the Textile Industries (“Textile Law”) was undertaken by the Textile Indus-
tries Council and the Industrial Structure Council before the Law’s third expiration
date, which was set for 1989. The report entitled “Ideal Policies for the Future of
the Textile Industry” (November 1988) showed how the situation was understood
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(Matsushima 2012, p. 73). First, the report pointed out that imports were increasing
rapidly amidst a slump in exports, due to (1) “the upgrading of demand, diversifi-
cation, short cycles, and spread of textile uses to all aspects of life,” (2) the yen’s
appreciation and the advance of Asia’s newly industrialized economies (NIEs), and
(3) the continued advances in technological innovation and the shift to information
systems. The report argued that the direction the textile industry needed to take was
“to build a new demand-oriented response system and to shift toward a “lifestyle-
culture” industrial model.” To this end, three problems needed to be overcome: (1)
progress needed to be made in structural improvements to build a new demand-
oriented supply system; (2) the industry needed to upgrade its product planning,
information gathering, and dissemination capacity in order to respond to the trend
toward fashion that was evident in more sophisticated demand and in diversification;
(3) the industry needed to boldly make the most of the fruits of the rapid devel-
opments in technological innovation and the importance of information systems.
A demand-oriented supply system is a rapid-response system that highlights actual
demand and shortens the lead-time in delivering supplies. It is designed to enable
the supply of products to correspond to actual demand at low cost in a timely and
flexible manner.
This report represented a change in that it did not use the term “structural improve-
ment,” but instead called for “active promotion of structural adjustment.” It was
expected to promote both structural improvement and a smooth “industrial adjust-
ment” at the same time. Structural improvement itself took on a new meaning. That
is, it pointed to the “importance of forming groups, through links among multiple
firms, that could complement each other with the various functions (linkage pro-
duction units (LPUs)) needed for a system of supply-chain management in order to
respond flexibly and aggressively to a market characterized by diversification and
large-variety, small-lot, short-cycle production (Matsushima 2012, p. 78).
Previously, the stress had been on enhancing the distribution of information in
industrieswhosemanufacturing processeswere divided from each other, but this con-
cept envisioned cases in which companies that had already created vertical linkages
among different industries would now go further and play mutually complementary
roles. The “Textile Resource Center” was conceived as a means to support infrastruc-
ture improvements for building systems of demand-oriented supply. It was expected
to gather information on textile materials, designs, and related areas and to enhance
the function of transmitting information to textile production regions. This consti-
tuted a new understanding of the need for policy responses to the problems facing
the textile industry. The lawwas revised inMarch 1989 and came into effect in April.
The Textile Law was extended for a further five years.
The 1989 amendment featured the establishment of a Textile Resource Center to
help build a system for demand-oriented supply. Measures promoted by the Textile
IndustryRationalizationAgency included the building of a database in the association
and the provision of information to a network of textile resource centers based in
each of the regions. This method, called “SR-NET Tokyo,” was completed in March
1990. Even so, the costs of collecting information on ever-changing fashion were
high, and the networks were not able to adequately meet the demands of industry.
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The SR-NET Tokyo accordingly lost its role when in 1997 the “Textile Fashion
Information Avenue” took its place. LPUs were designed to be reform enterprises
based on group linkages and Minister approval, but Commercial Associations used
the framework as well, and carried out plans for a smooth structural reform. From
1989 until 1994, there were 47 structural reform enterprises based on LPUs, and 9
Commercial Association plans. There was also one plan for joint facilities, adding
up to a total of 57 projects underway with Ministry approval. The total cost of the
projects was 47.8 billion yen. Moreover, under this fourth Textile Law, the facilities
registration system was abolished, and as of December 1991, the certificates in use
were slated for abolition by October 1995.
2.5.2 Policies for Expanding the Textile Industry Market
In advance of the expiration date of the fourth Textile Law, the General Affairs
Committee of the Textile Industry Council and the Textile Subcommittee of the
Industrial Structure Council compiled a report titled “Ideal policies for the future of
the textile industry” in December 1993 (Matsushima 2012, p. 95). While ongoing
reductions in the production were observable in response to increasing imports, the
industry still employed about 2.8 million people, was the core industry in some
regions, and enjoyed a surplus in trade. The report took note of this.
Specifically, the report pointed out that (1) among “its many problematic ele-
ments” were the difficulty of acquiring a highly skilled labor force, and as a sector
reliant on manual labor, land, and energy, the textile industry in Japan was not cost-
competitive compared with those of other countries. However, (2) it was “blessed in
demand terms,” the Japanese market’s being not only large but also highly sophisti-
cated in its demand for quality and design. Finally, (3) industries that were closely
related to textiles, namely the textile machineries and the electronics industries,
were world class. However, (4) it faced the problems of “an industrial structure
that encouraged price-based competition.” Accordingly, in order to discover a new
direction for creative development while making the most of conditions 2 and 3, the
Japanese textile industry needed to aggressively build markets “by undergoing struc-
tural reform to shift the paradigm from price competition to product differentiation.”
This would also enable the expansion of international markets, in the view of the
councils. The report proposed three strategies to this end. The first was “structural
reform for market-driven rather than producer-driven manufacturing. Second was an
industrial structure that would nurture creativity, and third was strategy on a global
scale. The first of these was comprised of concrete measures to develop, produce,
and sell the products the market was seeking. Realization of these strategies would
require complementary measures by the government, and while continuing to men-
tion the need for structural improvement in areas including distribution, the report
also recommended extension of the Textile Law. The revised law was thus passed in
March 1994 and came into effect in April. The name of the law was changed on this
occasion to the Law on Extraordinary Measures for the Structural Improvement of
the Textile Industries (“Textile Industry Law”).
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The Textile Industry Law, again extended for five years and almost tantamount
to a fifth Textile Law, carried on the basic framework of the fourth Textile Law,
and structural reform projects were carried out by linked groups and groups like
Commercial Associations. However, the measures that were focused on production
sectors, such as the establishment of demand-oriented supply chains, also took into
account the reflections on the system that were added in the process of reviewing
the law. Market-driven policies took greater priority, along with the need for struc-
tural improvement, including in the distribution sector. The points that were revised
through the Textile Industry Law included: (1) the addition of design development
to new product development, (2) the addition of facilities or equipment leasing to
facilities modernization, and (3) the addition of projects for the rationalization of
marketing or inventory control. These revisions were intended to respond to the
needs of enterprise groups. Furthermore, assistance measures had previously been
limited to finance and debt guarantees, but to these were now added subsidies for
developing information networks and new aid systems including subsidies for the
promotion of local industry. With the expansion of structural improvement projects
and subsidy measures, the number of structural improvement projects came to 96
under the Textile Industry Law, while the number of projects to facilitate structural
improvement came to 24, for a total of 120 projects. Total costs,meanwhile, including
private procurement, were reduced to 15.1 billion yen.
2.5.3 A Vision for the Textile Industry of the Twenty-First Century
The administration of textile policy began to change little by little as the date of the
Law’s expiry approached. That was because the Hashimoto Cabinet, established in
January 1996, sought a move from industry-specific administration to cross-industry
policy frameworks, which meant that the report issued by the general meeting of
the committees of the Textile Industry Council and the ISC’s Textile Committee
differed from those that had previously sought extensions of the law (Matsushima
2012, p. 113).
The report understood the changes in the competitive environment to mean the
advent of a new age defined in three ways: a market-led era, an era of competition
on a global scale, and an era of new frontiers. “Market-led” meant that the initiative
in industrial activities would shift from the supply side to the demand side, and that
the development of industries could be secured only through completely rational and
innovative activity in themarket. According to the report, the existing textile industry
was not as yet responding as needed to the advent of this new age, and four problems
in this area were only becoming more serious. First was the failure to respond to
the market-led era: due to the “lack of clarity in risk-taking, a divided, multi-step
structure, and the synergism of both of these,” the high-cost supply structure was
being preserved as was. The industry was moving appropriately in the “market-in”
direction, but “rapid response” remained an issue. Second, the response to large-scale
global competition was inadequate, and the need for development on an international
level was becoming manifest. While Japan was a key center for high-cost planning
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and development, the report found thatAsiawas already in the process of acquiring an
enhanced role as a production and development base through international expansion.
Third was the need to take on the challenge of new frontiers, as discussed above, and
fourth was the slow pace at which reform was under way in textile-production areas.
The report pointedout the reforms considerednecessary to resolve these issues, but
its most important feature was its premise that these reforms would to a considerable
degree be realized through the actions of individual firms in the market. At the same
time, the report also pointed out that “given that themarket itself is a system, a certain
degree of policy intervention is needed to correct the weaknesses in that system or
to upgrade that system,” and that policy was needed in a complementary role. It was
therefore judged that textile-industry policy should not be carried out in the form of
individual measures but rather as an overall policy approach.
The impact of the existing Textile Industry Law over the four-year period from
FY 1994 was that roughly 1% (1,000 enterprises) out of all textile businesses. Judg-
ments such as the above were based on the fact that the ripple effects were limited
in reforming the industrial structure of the industry as a whole, and that “the cur-
rent issues of the textile industry are widespread, reform methods correspondingly
diverse, and the a priori preparation of fixed packages of particular long-term reform
measures would have the effect of limiting the potential for policy support for the
textile industry.” The decision was therefore made not to extend the framework of
the existing law but rather to abolish it.
In response, the government decided in February 1999 on the Bill of the Law
Concerning the Abolition of the SME Corporation and submitted it to the Diet. The
Law, which came into effect in July, was aimed at strengthening SME policy so as
to comprehensively and efficiently promote measures for small and medium-sized
enterprises, and aimed to establish a comprehensive SME corporation team including
the Small Business Credit Insurance Corporation, the Small Business Corporation,
and the Textile Industry Structural Improvement Business Association. The entity
promoting structural improvement was restructured into this, and textile industry
policy would henceforth be developed within the framework of SME policy and
cross-industry industrial policy.
2.6 Revision of the Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise
Basic Law
The premise of the Small andMedium-SizedEnterprise Basic Law (“theBasic Law”)
enacted in 1963 was that the disparities among small and medium-sized enterprises
and the changes brought about by trade liberalization were affecting small busi-
nesses and that SMEs needed to plan for growth and development through their own
autonomous efforts. At the same time, the directions for policy were deemed to be
“to rectify the disadvantage of economic and social constraints” (improve the busi-
ness environment) and to “promote the voluntary efforts of the SMEs” (support for
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improvement of management). Through these approaches, both “improved produc-
tivity” (raising physical productivity) and “improved trading conditions” (upgrading
of actual value) could be achieved. Improvements in productivity were expected
through such measures as the modernization of equipment and expansion of scale,
whereby transaction terms and subcontracting could be improved and excessive
competition prevented.
However, the economic and social environment surrounding small and medium-
sized enterprises had changed greatly since the establishment of the Basic Law
(Nakata 2013, p. 72, p. 1207). The May 1990 interim report “SME policy in
the 1990s” issued by the Small Business Policy Council Planning Subcommittee
addressed (1) “the role expected of small and medium-sized enterprises,” (2) “small
and medium-sized enterprises in the 1990s,” and (3) “directions for SME policy.”
The first of these stressed “small business as the source of creativity” and the second
stressed the need for SMEs to reflect and serve potential demand. These ideas were
new in that they suggested that small andmedium-sized enterprisesmight themselves
foster the creation of new markets. The third called for policy to support enterprises’
self-help efforts and for a review of the question of whether competition-restricting
cartels were not resulting in protection for vulnerable sectors. The Basic Measures
Review Subcommittee, established at the SME Policy Council in October 1992, also
presented the “Issues and future directions for SME Policy” in June 1993. It sought a
policy system that would (1) strengthen the management base, (2) support structural
reform, and (3) develop measures for small-scale businesses, and these in them-
selves were not a clear expression of a change in policy, but presented what would
be part of the discussion that later led to the revision of the Basic Law. Apart from
this, a report on industrial structure reform (“21st-century industrial policy report”),
conducted by the Basic Issues Subcommittee of the Industrial Structure Council’s
General Committee in June 1994, made two important points regarding SME policy.
First, regarding the debate over the hollowing out of industry, the report stated that
changes in the domestic and foreign economic environment and in the comparative
advantages of the industry were leading to overseas relocation and import substi-
tution. These in and of themselves should not necessarily be regarded as problems,
according to the report, because theymeant that the industrial structurewas becoming
optimized in a global sense. Second, it strongly urged the promotion of deregulation.
In other words, new movements were being made to reform the protective policies
that had previously prevailed regarding SMEs.
Based on these arguments, the SME Policy Study Group was established as a pri-
vate advisory group to the Director-General of the Small and Medium-sized Enter-
prise Agency in July 1998, issuing a mid-term report in November 1999 and a final
report inMay that called for a review of policy ideals and systems. It cited the follow-
ing as problems in the former Basic Law system. The first problem was the variance
between the reality and the policy concept, which had been based on the idea of
correcting the disparities in the so-called dual structure. Second, the policy approach
that had been effective in the past had been maintained, hindering the flexible or
effective allocation of funds. Third, new policies had been added to existing poli-
cies, leading to complex and highly segmented measures that were hard for users to
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understand. The report also stated that it was no longer inappropriate to treat SMEs
uniformly as weak players. Rather, they should be expected to play an active role
in creating a dynamic Japanese economy by demonstrating mobility, flexibility, and
creativity. This, too, called for a shift in perception. The active roles SMEs could
play were envisioned as incubators for market competition, innovators, creators of
attractive job opportunities, and developers of regional economies. The first of these
referred to stimulation of market competition through the business activities of many
small and medium-sized enterprises, which would promote “economic metabolism,”
or an organic self-sustaining process. Specific policy goals to give these roles real
significance were the improvement in the conditions of competition, assistance for
SMEs’ self-help efforts toward founding businesses and introducing innovations to
management, and finally, maintenance of the safety net.
Then-SME Agency Minister Katsuhiko Tokita said that, “MITI was pursuing
rationality in policy. The SME Agency, too, was intent on clarifying principles and
policies that would shift our footing both officially and substantively from a so-called
social policy-driven SME policy toward a forward-looking industrial policy.”
In June 1996, the SMEPolicy-Making Council, with enquiry from PrimeMinister
Obuchi, established a cross-sectorial subcommittee and proceeded with a review. Its
interim report came out in August, and its final report, “A new SME Policy for the
21st century” (the 1999 Report) in September. Fundamentally, this aligned with the
final report of the SME Policy Study Group cited above and strongly reflected the
concepts of a market orientation and of deregulation. The content, which addressed
the changes of the 1990s with policies oriented to the twenty-first century, included:
(1) changes in themacro-economic environment, (2) changes in values and lifestyles,
(3) the advance of globalization and changes in industrial structure, (4) changes in
relationships among enterprises, and (5) changes in industrial integration and in
distribution structures. The first of these pointed out that the income levels of those
working in SMEs had risen alongside the overall rise in income levels, and that gaps
in income were no longer evident, but that at the same time, with the maturation of
the economy, growth itself had fallen, and that increases in added value, efficient
use of capital, and upgrades in the quality of labor had all become important for the
new age. The fourth focused on the growing fluidity of the division of labor among
subcontractors and the trend toward decreasing numbers of subcontractors. The fifth
presented the constraints on the autonomous development of regional localities, and
concerns about the increasing weakness of industrial integration, which was at the
foundation of monozukuri, or Japan’s distinct manufacturing craftsmanship. It was
expected that SMEswould serve as incubators for market competition, as innovators,
as creators of appealing jobs, and as developers of local economies and society. The
policy concepts for putting this into concrete form were to be based on “respecting
and activating the market mechanism,” meaning first, to facilitate the conditions for
competition in which SMEs would play an active part; second, to reinforce progress
by SMEs toward innovation and creativity; and third, to establish a safety net. The
second and third points were especially recognized as expressing something new.
The New Basic Law was based on the above circumstances. In broad outline,
it carried on the new philosophy laid out by the council’s report: (1) the shift in
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principle, (2) the change in policy systems, (3) the diversification of policy methods,
and (4) the expansion of the range included in SMEs. The first shifted away from
rectifying the gaps amongSMEs to expectations that theSMEswould serve as sources
of economic development and economic strength. The second called for shifting to
the pursuit of advantages of scale, and from compensating for disadvantages to
pursuing novelty and originality, as well as for the strengthening of the foundations
of management, and maintenance of a safety net. The third represented a shift from
loans and organization-building to greater diversity in policy approaches, including
methods that stressed direct financing and supplementing soft resources. The fourth
included a review of definitions to bring them into line with economic realities and
measures for raising capital standards.
Thus the policy principles regarding SMEs advanced in keeping with the goals of
economic structural reform.
3 Pursuing Rules-Based Multilateral Coordination
3.1 The Conclusion of the Uruguay Round and Launching
of the WTO
3.1.1 Uruguay Round Negotiations
The Uruguay Round agreement was reached in December 1993 after seven years
of talks. The outcomes of the round were the following (Abe 2013, p. 403). First,
whereas previous rounds had centered on tariffs negotiations, the Uruguay Round
formulated rules in new areas such as intellectual property rights and trade in services.
It also broadened the scope of discussion to include the textile and agricultural sectors,
which were not yet sufficiently covered by GATT rules. Second, resisting the tides
of protectionism, bilateralism, and regionalism that emerged in the latter 1980s,
the Uruguay Round supported the idea of free trade as the fundamental principle
of international commerce. Third, the scope of dispute settlement was expanded
and expedited under the WTO, dramatically improving the functioning of dispute
resolution. Fourth, due to the role played by the WTO, the following changes in the
resolution of international disputes were observed: whereas GATT’s procedure for
dispute resolution was fundamentally a political one, the WTO’s approach placed a
relatively high priority on resolving disputes by interpreting the law, meaning a shift
from political to judicial decisions.
The specific issues discussed during this period (Abe 2013, p. 425) included the
Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA). As noted in the previous chapter, the meeting of
senior officials in April 1989 stated that “[Ministers] agree that measures on the
process of integration into GATT cover the abolition of regulations based on the
multilateral textile agreement (MFA)….” In other words, it established a path to the
elimination of theMFA. Additionally, theWTOAgreement on Textiles and Clothing
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recognized “transitional safeguards” (TSGs). These differed from the safeguards
(SGs) of the 10-year period when textiles were integrated into GATT. They were
intended to address market confusion in domestic textile industries that resulted
from surges in imports during a transitional period. In 1993–1994, MITI rapidly
developed procedural rules on TSG-triggering measures. This was because, whereas
the SGs had never been triggered before, the textile industry was now beginning to
suffer from import pressures to a degree that MITI policies had to be changed.
In March 1995 the industry requested that TSG measures be implemented and
MITI judged that there was sufficient evidence to do so, but as of the November
decision, imports of the target items were stabilizing and even appeared to be con-
tracting. The TSG measures were therefore put off. Japan in fact never launched the
TSGs, and when the Textile Agreement expired at the end of 2004, textile trade was
integrated into GATT.
From the mid-term review to the final stage, anti-dumping (AD) also emerged as
an issue that could affect the success of the entire round. Interest in anti-dumping
began to build internationally after the summer of 1989. This was because of mount-
ing conflict over how to make the international rules of the 1979 Tokyo Round’s
Anti-Dumping Code (1979) function in light of the national laws of the member
countries. At the end of the negotiations in December 1991, the GATT director-
general presented the Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiation (“Dunkel Draft”), which emphasized the director-
general’s arbitration solutions to individual points of contention. Although the draft
was accepted because of the prioritymember countries placed on theUruguayRound,
the contents of the Draft AD Agreement became a political controversy within the
US from 1992–1993, and a number of amendments were made before agreement
was ultimately reached.
The rules governing the various entity requirements and procedural requirements
for invokingADmeasures were also given specificity and clarity. Because Japanwas,
among developed countries, exceptionally subject to anti-dumping complaints, it was
particularly concerned to see the international rules strengthened with regard to the
operation of AD laws, and its contributions to the realization of the new agreement
were significant.
3.1.2 Developments and Setbacks in the WTO System
The Uruguay Round presented new issues. Where previously trade issues had domi-
nated, the Uruguay Round raisedmatters that were entangled with domestic systems,
and with the dramatic increase in the number of parties participating, the multilateral
negotiations that were to follow on the inauguration of the WTO were expected to
be challenging (Abe 2013, p. 535).
The main roles of the WTO, launched in January 1995, were: (1) to forward the
implementation of theUruguayRound consensus, (2) to provide a forum formultilat-
eral trade negotiations, (3) tomanage dispute settlement procedures, (4) to administer
the trade policy review mechanism, and (5) to coordinate global economic policy
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planning with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The first
was the biggest task for the WTO immediately after its inauguration. The WTO
was involved with the implementation of the obligations incurred under the WTO
Agreement, including member state compliance with reporting obligations, imple-
mentation of concrete promises (the revision of domestic laws and tariff reduction),
and matters on which member states had agreed to ongoing negotiations. Efforts
were therefore made to introduce highly transparent institutional mechanisms so as
to enable monitoring, and this was achieved.
In accordance with the regulations set by the Marrakesh Agreement establishing
the World Trade Organization, an inaugural ministerial conference in Singapore was
scheduled, and from early 1996, WTO member states began coordination on what
that meeting would address. Japan had four items on its agenda: (1) inspection of the
implementation status of the Uruguay Round agreement, (2) further liberalization,
(3) the introduction of new areas for discussion, and (4) deliberations on admit-
ting China, Taiwan, Russia, and other countries to the WTO. Japan’s position on
expanding WTO target areas was in common with that of other developed countries,
producing a heated battle with the developing countries that opposed expansion.
The developing countries firmly maintained the stance that the Singapore Ministe-
rial Meeting was an opportunity to discuss implementation of the Uruguay Round
Agreement. Through the negotiations on the content of the ministerial conference,
agreement was finally reached on launching discussions of investment and competi-
tion, and it was confirmed that the WTO would not begin work on labor standards.
This was in line with Japan’s expectations and represented a significant achieve-
ment. The greatest achievement of the Singapore Ministerial Conference was the
WTO Information Technology Agreement (ITA), which resulted in the December
1996 Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products. In prin-
ciple, tariffs would be reduced in four stages, affecting 200 products according to
tariff classification such as semiconductors, computers, computer software, telecom-
munications equipment, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and others. The
reductions would begin in July 1997 and the tariffs would be completely abolished
by January 2000. The ITA negotiations differed slightly from prior tariff negotiations
in that they did not have a mercantilist character. Rather, there was general agree-
ment on the idea that tariff elimination would be desirable for all member states, and
negotiations were concluded quickly.
The Seattle Ministerial Conference of November 1999 aimed to launch a new
roundbeginning in the year 2000 and to agree on the scope andmethod for those nego-
tiations, but this was not achieved. This was because “problems with the decision-
making mechanism” arose in the preparatory process, and because compromise was
not reached either among the leading developed countries or between the developed
and developing countries on “conflicts over specific points at issue.” The “prob-
lems with the decision-making mechanism” arose because the increasing presence
of developing countries in the preparatory process meant more time spent on coor-
dinating among the member states. There was a backlash against the traditional
mode of determining the agenda through small-group “Green Room” discussions
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led by the advanced and newly emerging nations. In addition was the fact that anti-
liberalization and anti-globalization protests by NGOs, labor unions, and others
grew more extensive than anticipated. This, too, contributed to the failure of the
negotiations.
The Doha Ministerial Conference that followed in November 2001 succeeded,
after various difficulties, in launching a new round. It narrowed its objectives and
gave greater consideration to transparency and efficiency in the format of the meet-
ings. The Declaration released in November represented agreement on achieving a
new round on a wide range of areas, including (1) improvements to market access
(agriculture services, tariff negotiations on industrial goods, and so on), (2) improve-
ments to existing WTO rules (strengthening discipline of anti-dumping and other
measures.), (3) responses to various twenty-first-century issues (rules on investment
and competition, trade and the environment, e-commerce, and other measures.). The
declaration said that this broad agenda would be subject to the consensus rule and
that the Round would be completed by January 2005.
The new Round was named the “Doha Development Agenda” to show the impor-
tance ascribed to developing countries. The negotiation aimed at outcomes for reduc-
ing poverty and achieving economic growth. By eliminating such items as the WTO
Agreement’s “implementation issues,” protection of intellectual property rights with
the TRIPSAgreement (Agreement on Trade-RelatedAspects of Intellectual Property
Rights), and the advanced nations’ high tariffs and export subsidies on agricultural
goods, the Doha Round was intended to do away with impediments to development.
Investment and the environment were therefore added to the areas discussed in earlier
rounds, including agriculture, non-agricultural products, and anti-dumping, resulting
in extensive and comprehensive negotiations to respond to new needs such as the
needs of developing countries. However, negotiations stalled at the 5th Ministerial
Conference in Cancún, Mexico, in September 2003, and extension of the original
January 2005 deadline became unavoidable. The WTO General Council in August
2004 sharply narrowed the negotiating agenda, and the sixth Ministerial Conference
in Hong Kong that followed in December 2005 adopted a declaration that took full
account of developing countries. Nevertheless, the WTO was forced to extend the
negotiation deadline once again. The lack ofmomentum among the negotiating coun-
tries, the standoffs on individual areas of negotiation, and the difficulties in coming
to decisions have all been attributed to these repeated deadline extensions, and the
cumulative effect was to cast doubt on the workings of a world trade system centered
on the WTO.
3.1.3 Advancing Rule-Based Criteria in Trade Policy
Throughout the Uruguay Round negotiations, an International Economic Affairs
Division, Tariff Division, and Temporary General Trade Negotiation Office dubbed
the “GATT Office” were placed in the International Economic Affairs Department
of the MITI’s International Trade Policy Bureau (Abe 2013, p. 529). In 1990, the
Office for Trade Policy Reviewwas established in the International EconomicAffairs
Division. It was tasked with responding to such matters as the US National Trade
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Estimate Report on Foreign TradeBarriers. It aimed to point out foreign practices and
customs that from Japan’s point of view acted as barriers to trade, not by establishing
arbitrary standards asAmerica had done, but by citing international rules underGATT
and other agreements. The Report on Compliance by Major Trading Partners with
TradeAgreements (“Unfair Trade Report”) published in June 1992was epochal in its
clear rejection of the US’s results-oriented criteria in favor of “rules-based criteria.”
In addition, a Fair Trade Center was established as an affiliate of the Japan Foreign
Trade Council, Inc.’s Trade Research Center just prior to the start of the Uruguay
Round. The Center built close cooperative relationships with the Tariff Division of
the International Economic Affairs Department and provided a place for informa-
tion sharing and the exchange of opinions with domestic export industries. It also
endeavored to build cooperative relationships with academia.
The shift to a rules-based trade policy by MITI and others and the cooperative
system developed with domestic industry and academia were organically linked to
each other and offered the systemic underpinnings for active participation in WTO
negotiations and utilization of WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures.
Regarding specific issues, the panels that Japan requested of GATT on the EEC’s
AD parts and components regulations were held twice, in July and September 1989.
The Panel Report was distributed to the parties in March 1990, mostly approving
Japan’s claims. The EEC’s new rules were intended to prevent the avoidance of
AD taxation on finished goods by imposing a retroactive tax on parts that were
imported and assembled using the so-called knockdown method. Japan argued that
the EEC’s parts taxation was a domestic tax because it was not imposed at the point
of importation, and that to apply it only to imported products constituted a violation
of GATT Article 3, paragraph 2, Sect. 1. Additionally, the exemption from the parts
tax based on local procurement rates would give priority to the use of EEC products
and was therefore contrary to GATT Article 3.4.
Additionally, in May 1991, the EC Board of Directors approved AD taxation on
audiocassette tapes, and Japan consulted with the ADP Committee (Committee on
Anti-Dumping Practices) but the consultations did not result in an agreement. Japan
therefore requested the establishment of a panel in October 1992. During this period,
MITI made it clear that it would steer its trade policy toward multilateral, rule-based
criteria, away from bilateral trade management through so-called gray measures, and
it showed no hesitation in doing so in this audiocassette case.
3.1.4 Conditions for Utilizing WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures
The first time Japan appealed to the WTO’s dispute settlement procedures was with
regard to US automobile customs duties (Abe 2013, p. 589). This was part of a long-
standing dispute between the two nations regarding autos and auto parts. The New
Economic Partnership Framework talks of July 1993 had not come to terms on the
interpretation of numerical targets, and following the repeated breakdown of negoti-
ations, the US announced a proposed list of sanctions in May 1995. Japan responded
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immediately by requesting WTO consultations in May, based on GATT Articles 4
and 22-1 (Understanding on the rules and procedures governing the settlement of
disputes). In June, bilateral talks between Japan and the US began in Geneva based
on WTO dispute settlement procedures. Here, too, there was no agreement in the
two positions, but MITI Minister Hashimoto asked US trade representative Mickey
Kantor to push back the US deadline for sanctions, and with the presentation of an
“overview” of a voluntary plan by five Japanese automakers, the Japan–US autos
and auto parts negotiations reached agreement.
Japan thus rejected “result-oriented standards” and pursued “rules-oriented stan-
dards” as had already been declared in the “unfair trade report.” This showed both the
domestic world and Japan’s trade partners that Japanwould adhere to this stance even
in specific cases, which had great significance for Japan’s trade policy. It also made
a strong impact by showing that the negotiations were to Japan’s advantage because
the dispute settlement procedures that had been strengthened by the establishment
of the WTO proved effective against the US position of pursuing negotiations based
on Sect. 301 trade sanctions. Subsequent negotiations confirmed the value of Japan’s
stance. For example, in May 1995, America’s Eastman Kodak Company filed suit
under Sect. 301 over a film case, but Japan succeeded through WTO proceedings in
having these claims dismissed. These results were significant for Japan’s trade policy
in that they demonstrated that legal procedures could offer protection. From 1997
forward, the number of US demands for unilateral market opening shrank drastically,
and economic friction between the two countries diminished.
There were many other examples of anti-dumping incidents, but the resolutions
that were based on WTO dispute settlement procedures represented a shift from
reliance on conventional bilateral diplomacy to legal approaches basedonmultilateral
procedures. The cases that went to the WTO were by and large AD-related issues
with the steel and auto industries as the principal targets and the US as the main
country in dispute. This was because Japan used the WTO’s procedures to curb
such US protectionist tactics as AD measures. It also reflected the fact that Japan
was utilizing the WTO’s procedures to monitor industrial policy measures related to
automobiles.
3.1.5 Activating the Import Relief Law—Japan’s Transition
from Target to Petitioner
GATT’s trade liberalization, centered on tariff reduction, gave rise to domestic pro-
tectionist pressures in developed countries, whichmanifested themselves in the quest
for trade barriers that could replace the tariffs (Abe 2013, p. 657). The active use
of trade remedy actions (principally AD measures) and voluntary export restraints
(VERs) were found especially useful. It was easier to use AD measures to develop
technical methods for calculating higher duty rates than to invoke the Countervailing
Duties (CVD) Law. This made protectionist action easier, and whereas safeguard
measures had to comply with the WTO’s non-discrimination rules, AD measures
could be used to target imports only from specified countries.
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From 1980 to 1989, the number of AD investigations worldwide totaled 1,648;
Japanese products were the targets of the highest number of these, at 161. Between
1990 and 1993, however, Japan was the target of 38 cases out of a total of 683, and of
61 out of 1,253 cases from 1995 to 1999. In other words, Japan’s position vis-à-vis
AD petitions changed around 1990.
Meanwhile, Japan had held back on initiating import relief measures until the
late 1990s. This reflected Japan’s position as an exporting nation, as well as the
facts that agricultural and textile products were excluded from GATT’s trade liber-
alization framework and that Japan preferred resolutions based on voluntary export
restraints vis-à-vis its partner countries. Early in the twenty-first century, however,
reformsweremadewith a view to increasing the initiation of petitions. The shift came
with the 2001 petition for safeguards on three agricultural products (green onions,
shiitake mushrooms, and tatami mats). That Japan sought to protect agriculture by
pursuing safeguard investigations and interim measures was new in and of itself, but
it also became the catalyst for the reform of Japan’s domestic systems. This series
of amendments demonstrated the penetration of a legalistic attitude on these issues,
with an emphasis not only on the transparency and predictability of the investigative
procedures but also on their efficiency and timeliness.
3.2 Regionalism and Japan
3.2.1 The Alteration of APEC
In principle, the GATT framework included most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment,
but some exceptionswere allowed, including two types of Regional TradeAgreement
(RTA): Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and Customs Unions. The number of FTAs
gradually increased, and began to threaten the relevance of the WTO. This regional-
ism, emergent from the late 1950s to the 1970s, began expanding in the 1990s (Abe
2013, p. 712).
For example, the United States’ basic trade policy from immediately after World
War II to the 1980swas to construct a non-discriminatorymultilateral trading system.
The US only permitted the 1950s establishment of the EEC and EFTA (European
Free Trade Agreement) in Europe due to the Cold War priority of promoting the
economic development of Western countries. However, the US’s negative attitude
toward regionalism began weakening in the 1980s. The United States signed an FTA
with Israel in 1985 and with Canada in 1989, signaling a shift from multilateral and
gradual liberalization utilizing GATT to regional liberalization using FTAs. Thus,
in the mid-1980s, the United States pursued three courses: multilateral and gradual
liberalization through GATT, regional liberalization using FTAs, and the unilateralist
improvement of access to specific markets in specific countries. The United States
also sought to conclude an FTAwithAsian countries including Japan. It was unable to
do so, however, because Japan was cautious about the impact of bilateral agreements
on GATT and on the position of Asian countries. Nevertheless, the US continued to
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maintain a regionalist course and concluded NAFTA (North American Free Trade
Agreement) with Mexico and Canada in the first half of the 1990s.
East Asia did not do much to follow the regionalist course of Europe and the
US until the late 1990s, instead defending the non-discriminatory and multilateral
GATT trade regime. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was an example
of this stance. APEC, the concrete form of which was based on deliberations in
the Japanese and Australian governments, declared a principle of “open regional
cooperation” at its first Ministerial Conference in November 1989 and announced its
intent of curbing the move to bloc economies. APEC was originally formed on the
understanding that European and American regionalismwere functioning as de facto
forms of protectionism and that steps needed to be taken to avoid Asian markets’
shrinking as a result. In other words, APEC was not conceived as either an FTA or
a customs union.
However, APEC members did not necessarily share this philosophy. APEC’s role
therefore began changing around 1993 and 1994. The United States showed a strong
interest in expanding the East Asian market and liberalizing trade, but its suggested
approach as APEC Chair in 1993 was that of an FTA rather than adherence to the
GATT framework. Thereafter, although the Bogor Declaration issued at the Novem-
ber 1994 Indonesia summit still confirmed an anti-regionalist stance, APEC lost its
role as a venue for negotiating collective liberalization. Instead, at the Osaka Minis-
terial and Leaders Meetings of 1995, APEC adopted the concerted unilateral action
(CUA) approach. CUA was the product of a compromise between the United States,
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, which sought binding liberalization, and the
countries ofAsia, which preferred greater national autonomy. Japan, though arguably
an advocate of further liberalization, struggled because the Agriculture Ministry did
not want to liberalize beyond the levels agreed to in the Uruguay Round. Nonethe-
less, the 1996 meeting in the Philippines issued a positive message with regard to the
ITA (Information Technology Agreement) that spurred member countries to work on
advancing the EarlyVoluntary Sectoral Liberalization (EVSL) originally raised at the
Osaka meeting of 1995. Still, negotiations remained extremely difficult, and by 1998
any possibility of achieving agreement had vanished. On the contrary, doubts were
raised about promoting liberalization based on an APEC framework. Nevertheless,
the APEC meetings continued, and in the early twenty-first century, a wide range of
issues such as countermeasures against terrorism, global warming, and energy were
added to the scope of its deliberations.
Meanwhile, the EVSL’s failure in 1998 led East Asian countries to seek out an
FTA approach. Japan’s stance on FTAs was negative on the whole because it placed
its confidence in the GATT/WTO regime and on rules-based negotiations. However,
with the conclusion of Japan–US semiconductor talks in 1996 and the easing of
the trade friction between the two nations, there was less need to adhere to a rules-
oriented trade policy. Japan accordingly held FTA consultations in 1998. Despite
Japan’s emphasis on GATT, MITI concluded that it should actively pursue not only
multi- but bilateral relationships as well, because themost active developments of the
period were occurring in the FTAs and customs unions advanced by the US and the
EU. Japan’s FTA with Singapore marked the first concrete result of the new policy.
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Based on consultations held in March 1999, MITI actively pursued the agreement,
which was concluded in January 2002. It then reached an agreement in principle with
Mexico in March 2004 and established a path to advancing an FTA there.
3.2.2 The Asian Industries Development Plan Based on Economic
Cooperation
The Asian Industries Development Plan, adopted as an economic cooperation mea-
sure, aimed to transmit toASEAN(AssociationofSoutheastAsianNations) countries
the Japanese development strategies that had given rise to industrial policy. It was dis-
tinctive in that it existed outside the constraints of the ODA (Overseas Development
Assistance) framework. MITI promoted the so-called New Aid Plan of 1985–1991,
which emphasized technical cooperation, and from 1992–1996, advanced policies
for upgrading ASEAN industries.
The latter differed from the earlier New Aid Plan in several ways. First, it devel-
oped amethod called policy cooperation that sought continuous dialogue between the
governments; second, it did not rest on bilateral assistance but on turning policy into
concrete forms through links with the ASEANEconomicMinistersMeeting (AEM),
anASEANmultilateral organ; and third, while the “NewAIDPlan” in reality covered
the so-called ASEAN 4—Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines—the
later version aimed to promote ASEAN market integration.
According to MITI’s 1993 report, “ASEAN industrial development vision—
industry policy recommendations,” the need to upgrade ASEAN industry arose
because the ASEAN 4 were losing their competitiveness to China and Vietnam
in labor-intensive sectors. Even though the policy covered countries other than the
ASEAN 4, it aimed to increase the ratio of capital-intensive fields that would realize
high added value in these four countries as a whole. Specifically this meant (1) fos-
tering supporting industries, meaning the parts industries required for assembly-type
manufacturing; (2) implementing a development-oriented industrial policy; and (3)
improving the systems for intellectual property rights.
Policies targeting areas outside these four countries were advanced through the
ASEAN Economic Ministers, with an annual AEM–MITI meeting established in
November 1991. Although the meetings involved multiple negotiating partners, the
most important parts of theAEM–MITImechanismwere (1) the bilateral policy talks
at the vice-ministerial level, and (2) theWorking Group on Economic Cooperation in
Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar (CLM–WG). The second of these reflected ASEAN
ideas of building a production network of assembly-related manufacturing indus-
tries in other countries centered on the ASEAN 4, which were making the shift to
so-called supporting industries. Thismade it difficult to coordinate among the various
interests regarding which production sectors should be introduced to which country.
The CLM–WG, which was established as an AEM–MITI organ in 1994, held many
talks, and in 1998 evolved into the AEM–MITI Economic and Industrial Coopera-
tion Committee (AMEICC) or Japan–ASEANEconomic and Industrial Cooperation
Committee). Ultimately, a division of labor was developed between the region and
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the Japanese companies, which boasted an overwhelming share of assembly-related
manufacturing in ASEAN.
Following the 1997 Asian monetary crisis, the system of untied yen loans was
revised. Japanese-company exportswere promoted throughuntied yen loans based on
international bidding, and a new system of tied loans was created. The first consisted
of two policies: (1) dividing the consulting portions of the infrastructure construc-
tion project, such as decisions on design and use, from the provision of the yen loan,
whichwould have no conditions attached to it; and (2) treating the yen loans as untied
but using diplomatic efforts to urge that Japanese companies win the bids. However,
from 1999 forward, this second approach came under criticism, principally from the
US, at the OECDWorking Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees and other
meetings, and in 2004 Japanwas forced to agree to arrangements formore transparent
information sharing. The tied loans, meanwhile, were based on the Hashimoto Cabi-
net’s promotion of “special interest-rate loans for environmental projects” after 1997.
This approach was adopted because environmental issues were assuming importance
in developing countries. The loans supported proposals with little commercial appli-
cation, and to which the OECD Arrangement on Official Supported Export Credits
(the “Helsinki Package”) would not apply.
3.3 Trade Friction and Multilateral Coordination
3.3.1 US–Japan Framework for a New Economic Partnership
With the drastic international changes that followed on the end of the Cold War in
1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States found it harder
to sustain the generous stance toward Japan’s policies that had prevailed during the
years of greater East–West tension. The Clinton administration, while maintaining
the traditional route of pursuing free-trade ideals and strongly determined to open
markets in other countries, pursued a “results-oriented” trade policy with respect to
Japan.
The shift from the “procedural emphasis” of the Reagan and Bush eras reportedly
tookplace at the directionofPresidentClintonhimself at the beginningofMarch1993
in preparation for the Japan–US summit meeting the following month. At the talks,
Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa clearly opposed the new approach as an example
of managed trade. Deputy Assistant to the President Bowman W. Cutter reviewed
the policy, including it in May’s “Japan Paper.” In June, it was presented to Japan as
a draft for the comprehensive economic consultations that were to become the US–
Japan Framework for a New Economic Partnership (Abe 2013, p. 89). The “Japan
Paper” enumerated macroeconomic objectives, including the reduction of Japan’s
current account surplus based on GDP ratios and “sector-specific and structural
negotiations.”MITI and the Japanese government completely rejected this approach,
especially the setting of numerical targets. However, in July, the “Miyazawa Letter”
suggested a compromise, which led to the announcement later that month of the Joint
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Statement on the Framework for a New Economic Partnership Between Japan and
the United States.
The new US–Japan Framework consisted of three pillars. The first concerned
macroeconomic issues, the area regarding which the US, in the July agreement, had
requested a clarification of concrete goals. The Framework called for Japan to reduce
its current account surplus by promoting domestic demand-led economic growth and
market opening. Ultimately, this did not become part of the negotiations on specific
items. The second pillar was a proposal for sector-by-sector discussions and nego-
tiations, or “sector-specific agreements.” These addressed five areas: “government
procurement,” “regulatory reform and competitiveness,” “other major sectors (auto-
mobiles and auto parts),” “economic harmonization,” and the implementation of
“existing agreements.” The sector-specific talks were the centerpiece of the nego-
tiations. The third pillar was “cooperation on a global scale.” This was aimed at
formulating 15 action groups in the five fields of environment, technology, human
resources development, population, and AIDS, with action plans for Japan and the
United States to respondwith a shared understanding of the problems at hand (Fig. 3).
The talks were wide-ranging, but certain basic principles emerged: First, the Clin-
ton administration maintained its “results-oriented approach” and “objective crite-
ria” to the end. Second, the talks required compromise by both countries. In this
sense, the Framework followed the direction set by the SII talks, and some of the
items reflected Japan’s interests. However, the US consistently saw the Framework
talks as intended to seek action from the Japanese. America therefore insisted, with
regard to certain USmeasures that Japan considered problematic, that they were non-
negotiable despite the principle of resolving disputes through negotiation. Third, the
scope of negotiations was limited to those areas to which government could respond.
Like the second attribute above, this reflected Japan’s stance and was often opposed
by the US.
3.3.2 Difficulties in the Auto Negotiations
At follow-up discussions to the high-levelMarket-OrientedSector-Selective (MOSS)
talks that started July 24, 1991, the US proposed replacing the MOSS Agreement-
based surveys of auto parts with a new survey of sales opportunities for automobiles
in the Japanese market. The decision was made to implement this as a type of vol-
untary purchase expansion plan (Abe 2013, p. 109; Hasegawa 2013, p. 357) because
even by the early 1990s, the US automobile industry’s predicament and the trade
imbalance between Japan and the United States had not improved. The plan did not
satisfy the US, however, but became one of the issues addressed in the later Frame-
work talks. The focus of the Framework talks was the large gap between the two sides
on what constituted “government reach” and “objective criteria.” Both governments
were supposed to endeavor to agree on “appropriate objective criteria” to evaluate
the achievement of the goals, but the US had proposed that the Japanese government
adopt numerical targets. The Japanese government, however, only encouraged vol-
untary action by the automobile industry, and remained opposed to setting concrete
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numerical targets, because a basic principle of the negotiations had been to limit
“the talks to matters of government responsibility,” and the Japanese government
regarded numerical targets as beyond its reach.
Talks were suspended due to this disagreement, and with the repeated breakdown
in negotiations, US Trade Representative Kantor launched investigative procedures
aimed at imposing sanctions on auto repair parts under Sect. 301 of the 1974 Trade
Act. The Clinton administration decided to impose sanctions against Japan on May
10, 1995, and at the same time announced that it would file a complaint with theWTO
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accusing Japan of discriminating against American products in Japan’s automobile
and auto parts market. Regarding the investigation of the repair parts market, the
USTR determined that “a number of Japanese behaviors, policies, and practices
regulate or deny American auto parts suppliers access to Japan’s repair parts market,
and this is irrational and discriminatory and imposes a burden on or restricts US
commerce” and that it would “announce a list of retaliatory measures within a few
days.”
MITI Minister Hashimoto expressed regret regarding the list, and Japan decided
to seek resolution through the WTO dispute settlement system. On May 17th, it
requested discussionswith theUnitedStates underGATTArticle 22-1. Japan asserted
that application of sanctions in the form of a 100% customs duty only on Japanese
products violated GATT Article 1 on most-favored-nation treatment and violated
Article 2, although Article 2 exempted tariffs exceeding the 2.5% bound rate the
US imposed on auto imports. Japan further argued that the US announcement of
sanctions could be regarded as a unilateral measure by the US in violation of Article
23 of the WTO Agreement on dispute settlement consent; that Kantor’s request that
the US Customs Service determine the customs duties on Japanese-made luxury
cars violated GATT Article 11, which prohibited bans or restrictions (quantitative
restrictions) other than tariffs on imports and exports, and GATT Article 13, which
regulated the application of non-discriminatory measures; and so on.
The 34th OECD Ministerial Council held in Paris May 23–24, just after Japan
filed suit with the WTO, addressed the Japan–US issue of trade in autos and auto
parts and the participating nations adopted a joint statement criticizing the unilateral
measures of the United States. The Japanese government hoped that it would receive
international support by bringing the talks to the WTO, and that the problem would
be resolved without its having to yield to the hardline stance of the United States.
Meanwhile,MITI prepared for the initiation of sanctions and considered how itmight
take countermeasures in response.
The two countries gradually explored possible breakthroughs for the negotiations
through the formulation of voluntary plans, however, and ultimately five automotive
manufacturers submitted new voluntary plans. The plans did not include any pur-
chasing targets for US-made auto parts or local procurement rates, and MITI never
committed to the contents of the plans. The United States showed some dissatis-
faction with the absence of clear numerical values for automotive parts, but MITI
adhered to its refusal to provide any further information. Ultimately, the US inter-
preted the plans on its own, enabling settlement of the issue for the time being. MITI
succeeded in avoiding triggering sanctions under Sect. 301 of the Trade Act, main-
taining the principle of confining negotiations to areas for which the government was
responsible.
The auto- and auto-parts negotiations proved difficult because the US remained
fixed on setting numerical targets as against Japan’s proposed “corporation approach”
of promoting inter-industry cooperation. Agreement was reached in June 1995 based
on a voluntary plan by Japan’s leading auto manufacturers. The plan allowed for a
five-year term for such Japan–US measures as expansion of foreign automobiles’
access to the Japanesemarket, expansion of purchases of foreign-made auto parts, and
deregulation of inspections and procedures, based on confirmation of (1) compliance
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with international trade rules including the WTO Agreement and (2) elimination of
numerical targets and the establishment of the principles of free trade and free-
market economics. After the agreement, the number of imported cars sold in the
Japanese market steadily increased. The US remained dissatisfied, however, because
in the economic downturn after 1997, European car sales increased. Concerned about
the decline in exports of foreign-made automobile parts to Japan and about the
repair parts market, the US requested further deregulation. Although Japan proposed
launching new talks in December 1999 before the expiry of the 1995 measures, the
United States demanded the measures’ expansion and extension, and the two sides
failed to reach an accord. The 1995 agreement expired in the year 2000.
3.3.3 Numerical Targets and Semiconductor Negotiations
Japan and the US concluded a five-year agreement in June 1991 concerning market-
opening measures for semiconductors, which was one of the major issues between
the two nations (Abe 2013, p. 122; Hasegawa 2013, p. 146). The two pillars of the
agreement remained the same as those in the old Semiconductor Agreement: (1)
expansion of access to the Japanese market for foreign semiconductors and (2) pre-
vention of the dumping of Japanese semiconductors in the US market. There were
changes in content, however. Specifically, the US industry “hoped” that the market
share of foreign semiconductors in Japan would exceed 20% by the end of 1992,
and the Japanese government recognized this expectation, but the two governments
agreed that this did not constitute a guarantee of market share or a target range of
maximums and minimums. The US interpreted this to mean a de facto acknowledg-
ment of undisclosed numerical targets, and repeatedly asserting that sanctions would
be imposed in the event of non-fulfillment of the “promise,” hinted that Sect. 301
would be applied. Nonetheless, under the new agreement, foreign semiconductor
access to the Japanese market steadily improved. The share of foreign semiconduc-
tors increased from 16.5% in the third quarter of 1991 to approximately 30% in the
fourth quarter of 1995.When the agreement’s deadline approached, the United States
sought another new agreement, but Japan insisted on the termination of the agree-
ments. Meanwhile, in May 1996, the Japan Electronics and Information Technology
Industries Association presented a proposal titled “Future industrial cooperation on
semiconductors” to the US Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), in which it
advocated the establishment of a World Semiconductor Council (WSC). In June,
the Japanese government proposed to the US government the establishment of a
Global Government Forum (GGF) regarding semiconductors. Japan had, that same
month, obtained agreement for a multilateral forum from the EU, which was criti-
cal of Japan–US bilateralism. Japan’s approach was successful, and when the new
semiconductor agreement expired in late July 1996, it was replaced by a framework
of multilateral cooperation built chiefly on the support of Japan’s public and private
sectors. Japan and the United States agreed to the establishment of the WSC and
called on other countries to establish the GGF. A decade of bilateral agreements on
managed trade ended amid the shift toward multilateral cooperation based on WTO
rules and market principles.
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3.3.4 Steel and Anti-Dumping Suits
At the beginning of the 1990s, negotiations were pursued on establishing a multi-
lateral steel agreement (MSA) through the GATT Uruguay Round, but the talks that
started in July 1990 ended in stalemate (Abe 2013, p. 107; Yamazaki 2011, p. 258).
With the failure of theMSA and the revocation of the Voluntary Restraint Agreement
(VRA), US steelmakers, faced with deteriorating earnings, reasserted their protec-
tionist stance on trade and from January to June 1992, the major US steelmakers
filed 84 large anti-dumping and countervailing duties complaints. Complaints and
appeals continued thereafter, and in February 1999, theUSDepartment of Commerce
issued a provisional decision on dumping that in reality initiated sanctions against
Japanese steel products. The following April, following its determination that illegal
dumping was occurring, the US imposed anti-dumping duties on Japanese steel. The
Japanese government regarded these measures as violating WTO rules in that they
(1) overestimated the injury to US industry, (2) overvalued the dumping margin, and
(3) were based on unfair investigative procedures. In October 1999, Japan submit-
ted an appeal to the WTO. The Final Report of the WTO Panel in February 2001
basically accepted Japan’s argument and found the US dumping margin and damage
determination in violation of the Agreement. Nevertheless, US companies continued
to file complaints in the 2000s.
As mentioned above, Japan had ultimately acceded to America’s demands in the
negotiations that predated the “results-oriented model,” although remaining opposed
to them. Nevertheless, in the Framework talks from 1993 forward, Japan took the
stance that it would not enter negotiations on issues raised in the context of Sect. 301
and strongly opposed the introduction of “objective criteria.” The difference in inter-
pretation between the US and Japan over numerical targets in the US–Japan Semi-
conductor Agreements of 1986 and 1991 generated strong resistance on Japan’s
part. Still, the auto and auto parts settlement had a significant impact because the
announcement of a purchasing plan by Japanesemanufacturers completewith numer-
ical values had enabled the US to save face, and in that sense, the Framework talks
followed a pattern of reaching agreements that were deliberately ambiguous.
Furthermore, the Clinton administration’s unilateral (Sect. 301-based) and bilat-
eral (negotiation-based) approaches to trade negotiations were in clear contradiction
to the multilateral (GATT Uruguay Round) thinking that the US was advocating in
other spheres. The 1995 reorganization of GATT into the WTOwas a blow to Amer-
ica’s unilateral and bilateral approaches. However, it was just at that time that the
trade friction between Japan and the US began to subside.
3.3.5 Japan–EU Trade Friction Subsides
The integration of the European Union (EU), which was launched when the Febru-
ary 1992 Maastricht Treaty went into effect, strengthened Europe’s international
negotiating power. Economic relations with Japan moved from confrontation toward
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cooperation, with trade friction between Europe and Japan gradually subsiding. This
was in part because of the prolonged recession in Japan that followed the bursting
of the bubble (Abe 2013, p. 166).
A good example was the resolution of the issue of auto exports. Since before the
integration, the EU had been apprehensive that the import of Japanese-made auto-
mobiles would disrupt European markets, and sought Japanese cooperation during
the period leading up to complete liberalization (up to 1999). The EC Committee
andMITI came to agreement in July 1991: the EU committee promised that it would
not impose measures restricting the import of Japanese automobiles, and MITI in
turn undertook (1) to monitor export trends during the period of transition, and
(2) to clarify that, of the total projected demand for automobiles in the EC market
(including former East Germany) as of 1999, Japan expected exports of 1.23 million
automobiles, and that it would monitor auto exports to align with this expectation.
Japan–EC cooperation advanced rapidly. In 1994, the EU abolished discrimina-
tory quantitative restrictions (QR) against Japan, and Japan and the EU commenced
talks on regulatory reform and on aMutual Recognition Agreement (MRA). The EU
Ministerial Conference of May 1995 adopted new policies regarding Japan (Europe
and Japan: The Next Steps) and announced the building of a relationship based on
“political dialogue and cooperation,” but on the economic front most noteworthy
was the “Joint report on Japan–EU trade promotion measures” presented by the EC
Committee and MITI at the November 1994 EU Ministerial Conference. It was a
summary of trade promotion measures being advanced by Japan and the EU, and
represented recognition on the EU’s part that Japan’s import promotion policies
were contributing to imports from the EU. Further, the report on joint promotion of
industrial cooperation made clear the contributions of (1) the Japan–EU industrial
policy/industrial cooperation dialogue ([a] industrial cooperation on such existing
sectors as household appliances, office machinery and computers, and auto parts; [b]
the exchange of policy opinions regarding markets with promise for the future and
deregulation; and [c] the establishment of an information policy working group); (2)
JETRO’s work on industrial cooperation; and (3) the establishment of the Foreign
Investment in Japan Development Corporation (FIND). In this way, the economic
relationship between Japan andEUadvanced firmly on the path toward improvement.
3.4 Import Expansion and Market Opening
3.4.1 Import Expansion Policies
The July 1989 G7 Grande Arche Summit in Paris sought new responses to trade
friction, including the clear statement in its declaration that trade surplus coun-
tries had a responsibility to increase imports. In January 1990, the Japanese govern-
ment announced a three-year comprehensive import expansion policy and it began
implementing this plan beginning in April (Abe 2013, p. 190). The pillars of
the planwere: (1) implementation of tax incentives to promotemanufactured imports;
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(2) elimination of tariffs on 1,004 industrial products; (3) substantial expansion of
policy financing to expand imports, (4) a “$100 million grass-roots import pro-
motion project” sending experts overseas through JETRO for long- and short-term
periods through JETRO and expanding the national budget to establish and maintain
economic internationalization centers in every prefecture.
The first of these had been consideredwithinMITI from about themid-1980s. The
FinanceMinistry opposed the idea, saying that it would not benefit consumers to give
preferential treatment to trading companies and import agents. It further argued that
by favoring the importation of semi-finished products and machinery, Japan might
be unable to avoid their being processed and re-exported, in which case the tax
incentives for imports would become a tax system for expanding exports. However,
the final report of the Japan–USSII talks cited “creation of a tax system for promoting
manufactured imports” and because this was a de facto “international commitment,”
the Finance Ministry softened its stance. In business circles, the trading companies
involved in expanding imports and the auto and electric industries with the greatest
competitiveness showed an inclination to agree with the idea, but the textile, steel,
and chemical industries that were then being overtaken by the newly industrialized
economies (NIEs) were concerned about the negative impact of import expansion.
As the specifics of the plan became clearer, however, greater consideration was given
to those burdened by the obligation, and the relative interests of the more advantaged
sectors were curtailed.
Even so, a tax system to promote imports of manufactured goods was initiated
fromApril 1990 to apply for a period of three years. Items subject to import promotion
were those “imported by the importers themselves (including on consignment)” and
designated by “MITI Notification” as machinery, electrical equipment, and chemical
industry products suitable for import promotion, in accordance with Cabinet Order.
With regard mainly to items not subject to customs duties, the importer was allowed
to reserve funds within 20% of the increase in imports in a system called the “re-
serve fund for developing a domestic market for imported products.” Additionally,
preferential treatment measures were adopted, such as tax deductions and bonus
depreciation systems. The plan was extended by two years in 1993, and the condi-
tions were relaxed and preferential policies expanded. A further two-year extension
was made in 1995, and clothing items and automobile parts were added to the list.
In 1995, MITI evaluated the import promotion system as follows: “In FY 1990
and 1991, the value of products imported under this tax system expanded by 5%more
than imports overall, and this tax system was effective.” In fact, the ratio of targeted
products to total imports increased from 20.4% in FY1989 to 26.6% in FY 1994,
amidst an overall decrease in imports. But because tax reductions based on these
measures in this period were falling, the causal relationship with import expansion
was not necessarily clear. Rather, the significance of the import promotion tax system
should be seen in the impact of announcing overseas that the Japanese government
was aggressive about expanding imports.
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3.4.2 JETRO’s Import Promotion Projects
JETRO, which was founded in July 1958 to promote exports, expanded its role
to import promotion from the late 1980s on and began managing exchanges on
investment and technology with developed countries in Europe and with the United
States, aswell as economic cooperationwith developing countries (Abe2013, p. 210).
Prior to that, JETRO was undertaking such projects on a small scale based on the
government’s budget for import promotion projects. With the approval of a large
supplementary budget of 6.7 billion yen for import promotion measures in FY 1989,
import promotion became amajor pillar of JETRO activity. Its activities included: (1)
supporting foreign exporters to Japan, (2) establishing import promotionhubs, and (3)
providing information.Thefirst of these involveddispatching specialists overseas and
sponsoring exhibitions of samples. For example, in FY 1990, JETRO put together a
project in which private-sector representatives with international business experience
were publicly invited to go to Europe and the United States for periods of two to four
years to unearth promising prospective export products. At the same time, JETRO
dispatched import specialists on a short-term basis. They made purchases of samples
of promising products and promoted their exhibition at conventions in various parts
of Japan. The import promotion projects pursued by JETRO from around 1990 came
to an end in November 2002, but in the meantime their main aim was to support
the exports to Japan of products from the Western countries with which Japan was
experiencing the greatest friction.
Another organization also had the mission of promoting imports: the Manufac-
tured Imports Promotion Organization (MIPRO) was established in February 1978,
and focused on exhibitions, information provision, and the sale of merchandise
(Abe 2013, p. 222). Going into the 1990s, MIPRO jointed JETRO in expanding
its import-promotion activities.
As MITI stated in its evaluation of the import promotion tax system, the primary
significance of these measures lay in their showing the Japanese government’s com-
mitment to import expansion and in thereby allaying some of the friction on trade. For
Japanese consumers, the perception of high-cost imported goods from the advanced
economies of Europe and America changed with the advance of the bubble economy,
as brand items and the like became familiar objects to affluent buyers. Cheaper goods
imported fromChina were also coming into use. Imported products thus became part
of daily life, and in that sense these import promotion measures had a widespread
impact.
3.4.3 Action Programs for Market Opening
In the 1990s, the emphasis began to shift to import promotion policies giving direct
incentives to expanding imports through JETRO and othermeans, as discussed above
(Abe 2013, p. 283). However, because it was not easy to dispel the image that the
Japanese market was closed, efforts to open up the market continued. At the Trade
Conference in November 1995, (1) the further promotion of deregulation and (2)
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“Guidelines for Improving Access to Japan Markets” were established to serve as a
pillar in the improvement of business practices.
These steps were based on the Deregulation Action Program decided on inMarch,
which asserted that: “The regulations on entry and on facilities, which were instituted
with an eye to coordinating supply and demand in competitive industries, require a
radical reassessment, even including the possibility of abolition, while taking into
account the content and nature of the business in question.” In place of more exter-
nally oriented market-opening policies, it was stressed that the standards and confor-
mity assessment systems and labeling systems would “be brought into international
conformity” in line with overseas demands. Furthermore, the Trade Conference pro-
posed assessment surveys of the actual situation regarding access to the Japanese
market.
With the presentation of these policies and the results of the surveys that fol-
lowed, the government announced a Cabinet Decision in April 1999 on a bill titled
Law on the Consolidation and Streamlining of Standards and Certification Systems
Relating to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. The law recognized
the development and introduction of new technologies and improvements in quality
control, and expressed the intent to review the division of roles between the public
and private sectors and to build a system that would utilize private-sector capabilities
and streamline regulation. In concrete terms, it permitted the entry of private sector
companies into the government-designated agencies that conducted inspections and
certifications. With the passage of this bill in August, the deregulation that accom-
panied further legal reform in various sectors continued, and the reform of public
regulation in the standards and conformity system progressed as well.
3.5 Security Trade Controls and the Transformation
of Policies on Exports
3.5.1 Changes in Security Trade Controls
The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls (COCOM)
was a gentlemen’s agreement among nations of the free world, aimed at preventing
cutting-edge technology from flowing out to the Communist sphere. Its regulations
consisted mainly of objective checks of the destination countries and technical spec-
ifications of the export items, based on the so-called COCOM List of controls (Abe
2013, p. 336). The Japanese government issued export licenses under this agreement,
but in 1987, when the Toshiba Machine Co. was found to have exported machine
tools to the Soviet Union in violation of the rules (Toshiba–Kongsberg Scandal), the
government was forced to consider measures to prevent a recurrence of such viola-
tions.MITI respondedwith the “Measures to prevent the recurrence of illegal exports
of strategic materials (interim report)” in July and expanded and strengthened the
examination and inspection systems. In addition, the Foreign Exchange and Foreign
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Trade Control Law was partially revised in September to include stronger sanctions.
The Bulk License System was inaugurated in April 1989 and procedures were sim-
plified such that repeat transactions by exporters who undertook appropriate internal
oversight would receive maximum two-year licenses rather than having to reapply
with every transaction.
In the latter 1980s, however, due to political democratization and economic liber-
alization in Eastern Europe, the function of COCOM’s export controls receded, and
COCOMwas abolished inMarch 1994. Nevertheless, with the emergence of regional
ethnic and religious conflicts, a cautious stance was still needed for the transferal of
weapons. Rather than restricting sales to certain countries, as COCOM had done, it
became necessary to examine the end users and end use of the cargo. The abolition
of COCOM was completed after agreement was reached to establish a new export
control system to replace it.
Japan, which had based its administration of COCOM regulations on the
“three fundamental rules concerning weapons exports,” was familiar with the non-
proliferation approach to export controls that were now being explored anew. The
government therefore decided to participate actively in the new approach (Table 5).
International efforts in this area included the December 1995Wassenaar Arrange-
ment on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Tech-
nologies (Wassenaar Arrangement, WA), agreed upon by 28 countries. In 2002,
Table 5 Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) and the former COCOM
Item WA Former COCOM
How the export controls work Establishment of cooperative
regulations based on detailed
information exchange
/Judgment regarding approval
of individual projects is at the
discretion of each country
Unanimous agreement
Regulated products Both weapons and
weapons-related
general-purpose goods
Both weapons and related
general-purpose goods (in
reality only the latter)
Regulated regions Exports to all regions (see
note)
Communist countries





In WA’s operations, developed countries shared a concern about exports to four countries (Iran,
Iraq, Libya, and North Korea), so Japan, too, decided to impose strict regulations on exports to
these areas.
Source Abe (2013, p. 353)
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33 countries were signatory to the Arrangement. It was a non-binding gentlemen’s
agreement among countries that were able to manufacture and supply conventional
weapons and related items and that were willing to strive for their nonprolifera-
tion. The WA placed export controls on a wide range of general-purpose items that
could be used for military purposes, and participating countries were asked to submit
reports on any transfer of these items.
A new framework was also added regarding weapons of mass destruction, includ-
ing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and the missiles carrying them, using
the international framework that predated the collapse of the ColdWar regime. Japan,
following the use of chemical weapons in the Iran–Iraq War, had already chosen on
its own in 1984 to require MITI licenses for the export of substances that could be
used for chemical weapons. Actual management of the materials took place through
a method called a warning or “heads up,” but in March 1993 the Know Regula-
tion (catch-all regulation) in use in other countries was introduced to the Industrial
Structure Council’s Security Trade Controls Committee and was recommended for
use in Japan. Catchall regulations target the export of all goods and technologies
except wood products and food and were called “Know Regulations” (“knowing”
that the exports were being used in weapons development). MITI revised the For-
eign Exchange Control Order, Export Controls, and other regulations in October
1996, and was proceeding to make the shift to catchall regulations. However, the
new method was also called a “catch-some regulation” due to the limited number of
items covered, and these were modest measures compared with catchall regulations.
Subsequently, in April 2002, almost all of the target items were shifted into a full-
fledged catchall regulation system, and many companies involved in exports became
subject to regulation and had to seek Security Export Control assessment of whether
permission would or would not be required.
3.5.2 Changes in Export Policy
As mentioned in Chap. 1, the Export and Import Transaction Law (“Transactions
Law”) of 1952 was aimed at preventing unfair export transactions, but in the 1980s,
its purpose expanded to countering economic friction with other countries and it
thus became a powerful policy tool for carrying out voluntary export restraints. In
November 1983, the government revised portions of the Transactions Law Enforce-
mentOrder, but thiswas because in July, theUSgovernment had imposed curbs on the
import quantity of three specialty steel products. Japan decided to make these items
subject to the export approval system so that they would not exceed US regulatory
limits.
Simplification or abolition of the agreements based on this law was sought in the
1990s, however, from the point of view of deregulation (Abe 2013, p. 325). The
number of agreements was reduced, and by January 1996, only eight such cases
remained. In the latter 1990s, deregulation advanced with the March 1996 Cabinet
Decision titled “On revision of the plan for promoting deregulation,” and in 1998, the
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requirement for the MITI Minister’s approval of exports based on the Transactions
Law was abolished.
Meanwhile, the 1957 Export Inspection Law, which had functioned to support
the reputation of export goods, was gradually brought under review. What had been
more than 400 designated cargo items in 1973 was halved in 1980, and drastically
reduced to 72 in 1990 and 39 in 1995.
The deregulation of export control procedures that had been progressing since the
late 1970s was, in the mid-1990s, implemented through the revision or elimination
of laws and regulations, or in other words, as part of a regulatory reform that itself
significantly changed the policy system. In April 1994, the Export and Import Trans-
action Council of April decided on the early termination of the Law on the Unified
Trademark for Export-Oriented Products by Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises,
which had been established in May 1970 to help exports recover. The Council also
resolved to “abolish, likely in about three years,” the Export Goods Design Law. In
May, the Export Inspection and Design Promotion Council reported its findings that
the Export Inspection Act should be abolished in about three years. MITI’s March
1995 Deregulation Promotion Plan, which covered 148 items, did not make its main
focus the items addressed by either of these laws, but stated clearly that these decom-
missioning bills should be submitted, the target timing being the regular Diet session
in FY 1996. The Export Inspection Law and Export Design Law were thus brought
to an end.
MITI also reviewed the Export/Import Transaction Law on the principle that
its abolition was desirable now that exemptions to the Antimonopoly Act required
review. In accordance with the guidelines of the Deregulation Promotion Plan, the
Export/Import Council in March 1996 reported the abolition of all except a portion
of its provisions. MITI, from the standpoint of actively promoting deregulation,
submitted an amendment bill to the FY 1996 Diet session.
This led to the abolition of Export–Import Associations, and the only cartels that
remained were those whose impact on the domestic market was neutral and those
charged with implementing the WTO Agreement. In November 1995, the Council
on Foreign Exchange and Other Transactions, which had been discussing changes
to the Foreign Exchange Law, issued a final report in January 1997 that highlighted
simplification of the system. Amendment of the Foreign Exchange Law became the
front runner in the Japanese-style big bang (financial system reform) ordered by
Prime Minister Hashimoto in November 1996, and the “foreign exchange” frame-
work shifted from a “managed” system to a system based on the “principle of free-
dom.” With the significant changes underway in the principles underlying currency
trading, simplification of MITI’s export control system also became inevitable, and
in December 1997, MITI responded by revising portions of the Export Trade Control
Order.
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4 Measures for an Affluent Society
4.1 Promoting an Advanced Information
and Telecommunications Society, IMS Programs,
and the Home Health Care and Rehabilitation
Equipment Industry
4.1.1 Toward an Advanced Information and Telecommunications
Society
The Information Superhighway (National Information Infrastructure, NII) initiative
announced in September 1993 by the Clinton administration acted as a stimulus
for Japan’s preparations for its information infrastructure. MITI and the Ministry of
Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) explored policies for developing an advanced
information society, not from the point of view of the suppliers, meaning networks,
but with an emphasis on the user and therefore on content, or the content of infor-
mation (Hasegawa 2013, p. 127, p. 755). This view was reflected in the May 1994
announcement of MITI’s “Program for the shift to an advanced information society”
and the MPT Telecommunications Council’s “Toward reforms for a 21st-century
knowledge-based society.”
TheTsutomuHataAdministration in June1994established aHigh-Level Informa-
tion Transmission Promotion Headquarters; the Tomiichi Murayama Administration
in August that year did the same and began developing concepts for a Japanese ver-
sion of the superhighway.Murayama’s Information PromotionHeadquarters decided
in February 1995 on “Basic guidelines on the Promotion of an Advanced Informa-
tion and Telecommunications Society.” The ministries and agencies began advanc-
ing policies to this end, which were implemented by the Information Promotion
Headquarters and councils of specialists. These basic plans understood “advanced
information and telecommunications society” to mean the realization of a new socio-
economic system for the free creation, distribution, and sharing of information and
knowledge, and for harmonizing lifestyle and culture, industry and economy, nature
and environment as a whole. They said that these goals required the prompt construc-
tion of information and telecommunications infrastructure. Furthermore, the plans
also stressed that this process needed to be advanced under private sector leadership
with only a limited range of government activity. Government policies were needed
to (1) make the public sector information-based, (2) review the various systems for
upgrading information transmission, (3) establish network infrastructures, (4) adopt
measures on copyrights to respond to the shift to an information base, (5) adopt
measures on security and privacy, (6) assure joint operability and joint connectivity,
(7) supply the software, (8) undertake basic technological development, (9) nurture
human resources, and other measures. Based on these concepts and their associated
policies, 1995 was called “the first year of the internet,” indicating the intent of
upgrading information networks going forward.
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Previously, based on the “Urgent recommendations: the new software age” issued
byMITI in December 1992, policy priorities focused on “facilitating an environment
for a software market” (Hasegawa 2013, p. 758). The “Urgent recommendations”
included (1) establishing market mechanisms based on raising the level of soft-
ware independence, (2) establishing basic conditions for the establishment of a mar-
ket mechanism, (3) making an efficient supply system (through nurturing human
resources and other means), (4) expanding the supply of packaged software, (5)
developing user responses (such that users think of software not as an accessory to
hardware, but as having value in and of itself), (6) enabling fair relationships between
hardware and software vendors, and (7) developing government responses (statistical
infrastructure, improvement of government procurement market, and so on).
MITI promoted this shift to an information economy in the hopes that it would
act as an engine for economic recovery. Public projects for information transmission
meant the construction of research facilities, the provision of computers and other
information transmission equipment, and the promotion of cutting-edge technology
and R&D by new industries as part of economic recovery plans. Further, from FY
1996, the government gradually expanded the areas it addressed and began promoting
an “information industry policy” that would assure the interoperability of systems.
It also took on the promotion of the software industry. Prior to FY 2000, MITI had
thus devoted a large budget to information-related policies, and the supplementary
budget related to software in particular emphasized demand through the offices of
the Information-Technology Promotion Agency.
4.1.2 Promotion of e-commerce
MITI’s above-mentioned “Program for the shift to an advanced information soci-
ety” complemented and strengthened the role of government in private sector ini-
tiatives. Specifically, this meant promotion of an advanced information society in
both the public and the private sector. The future industrial information systems
as envisioned by this program were electronic commerce (EC) and computer-aided
logistical support (CALS) (Hasegawa 2013, p. 780).
As part of its EC promotion projects, MITI established the Study Group for
Improving the Environment for EC as a private advisory body of theDirector-General
for the Machinery and Information Industries Bureau and the Director-General for
Commerce and Distribution Policy. In April 1995, the Study Group compiled an
interim report on the legal issues surrounding e-commerce. The ECPromotion Coun-
cil of Japan (ECOM) was established in January 1996 as a voluntary private sector
organization for supporting experiments in e-commerce. Its activities included stud-
ies of technological development to improve the common infrastructure for EC,
support and coordination of experiments in EC, and studies of institutional issues
in e-commerce. Meanwhile, inter-company e-commerce was also promoted, with
public offerings and expanded support for such projects by the Electronics Policy
Division and the IPA (Information-technology Promotion Agency) in January 1996.
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The CALS advanced in the 1990s had been devised by the US Department of
Defense (DOD) in September 1985 as a measure for rationalizing DOD procure-
ment of equipment. To promote CALS, MITI assigned approximately 400 million
yen in its FY 1995 budget to R&D on integrated information systems for produc-
tion, procurement, and operations support and established a technical association
specifically focused on production, distribution and operations of thermal power
plants.
Policies for advancing the information basis of the public sector were also pro-
moted in the 1990s. Thesewere in part economic stimulus projects included in the FY
1993 third supplementary budget and the FY 1994 budget in response to the weak-
ening of the private sector due to the collapse of the bubble economy. Based on these
plans, MITI formulated its own “Administrative Information Technology Promotion
Plan (FY 1995–1999 Five-Year Plan)” and promoted improvements in the efficiency
and sophistication of administration, including improved public access for citizens
and paperless administrative services. These MITI-specific projects were regarded
as pilot projects that could result in models for the government at large and led to
the government’s establishment in January 1997 of the “Kasumigaseki Wide Area
Network (Kasumigaseki WAN),” a communication network enabling ministries and
agencies to exchange e-mail.
4.1.3 Promotion of IMS Programs
In August 1989, the Factory Automation (FA) Vision Council, a private body under
the Director-General of the Machinery and Information Industries Bureau, compiled
a report on the outlook for factory automation. The report found that the conventional
interpretation of FA as meaning the automation and integration of all business activ-
ities did not adequately convey the range of innovation in production technologies.
The report called for planning for the coordination of people and machinery and for
viewing the production activities of industry in their entirety as an integrated sys-
tem. Intelligent Manufacturing Systems (IMS) accordingly became the first policy
priority (Hasegawa 2013, p. 258).
The IMS policy was notable in its promotion of collaborative research programs
internationally, an approach that flowed from separate strands of development. First
was the existing industrial machinery policy, which led to policy involvement in the
development of unmanned factories, the robotics industry, and mechanical system-
atization. Second was the ongoing trade friction with the outside world, which made
forwarding systems for international cooperation a policy priority. While utilizing
a range of intelligent activities in manufacturing industries and integrating intelli-
gent machines with people, IMS could flexibly integrate and coordinate all corporate
activities from order entry to design, production, and sales: it was thus defined as
a system for improving productivity. In order to achieve this goal, MITI urged that
Japan become an advocate for international collaborative research and development
in the field of production technology.
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This joint research was based on an awareness of the need to address problems
sharedby industrialized countries, including the hollowingout of industry anddecline
in manufacturing technology, changes in the working environment and the loss of
manufacturing industries, the diversification of consumer needs, the emergence of
“isolated islands of automation” (partial automation) at manufacturing sites, the
globalization of existing technologies, the insufficient systematization of current
technologies, and other issues. Joint research was expected to contribute to the effort
to overcome these challenges by (1) avoiding duplicate investment in development
resources, (2) developing dream technologies, and (3) unifying international under-
standing of production technologies. Essential to the smooth development of this
joint research was the handling of intellectual property rights, and here, too, the IMS
programs created international regulations and required that all participants abide by
them.
With these conditions, IMS steadily added more projects year by year, and in
1999, the program’s fourth year, 16 R&D projects were underway (Japan partici-
pated in 12 of these), with a total of about 400 participating enterprises, universities,
and research institutes, including over 100 Japanese companies and universities. In
addition, participating countries submitted proposals for over 30 new projects.
However, following the reforms of the public benefit corporation system in the
2000s, national budget allocations to public interest corporations like the IMS Cen-
ter were deemed inappropriate. This made various changes necessary, such as the
replacement of IMS Center leadership by the New Energy and Industrial Technol-
ogy Development Organization (NEDO). It also became apparent with Phase II that
the projects taking place abroad were not necessarily active. In April 2010 it was
determined that IMS had sufficiently fulfilled its original aims, and the curtain was
closed on its historic role.
The Council on Basic Issues in the Space Industry compiled a summary report in
July 1996. Entitled “Toward the takeoff of the space industry,” it proposed measures
for promotion of the space industry. However, despite the hopes expressed in the
report, budget allocations depend heavily on public demand in Japan, meaning that
budget increases, and therefore development of the space industry, faced significant
financial constraints.
4.1.4 Promotion of the Home Care and Rehabilitation Equipment
(“Welfare Equipment”) Industry
AmongMITI’s policy initiatives in themid-1970swere subsidies and leasing systems
for R&D in welfare equipment, launched in FY 1976 (Hasegawa 2013, p. 573). The
subsidies began as an R&D consignment system with a budget of 300 million yen,
with measures such as establishing venues for joint research by creating a Research
Laboratory for the Medical and Rehabilitation Technology Research Association
under the Law for Mining and Manufacturing Technology Research Associations.
The leasing systems arose from the understanding that the generally high cost of
welfare equipment would act as a barrier to its spread. Methods were explored by
264 4 Long-Term Depression and Economic Structural Reform (1991–2000)
which users would not be required to make large outlays of capital on purchasing
the equipment, by making it available on a leased basis at relatively low cost. Since
the leasing companies would be making bulk purchases from the producers, it was
anticipated that a leasing system could increase sales as well. The leasing enterprises’
purchases of the equipment were financed through the Development Bank. While
this forced a large reduction in the 1980s scale of operations, the financing system
continued until 1991 and thereafter as well, although the headings of the line items
changed.
New developments arose in the 1990s on policies for the welfare equipment
industry. One of the triggers for these developments was the June 1992 report of the
Agency of Industrial Science and Technology, which took up the issue of supporting
practical developments to address aging, and which also proposed that such subsidy
policies be promoted to “enlarge measures complementary to the market principle.”
The February 1993 report by the Industrial Technology Council’s Subcommittee on
Policies onWelfare Equipment Technology pointed out problems in the research and
development of such equipment and, significantly, urged that “it was necessary to
consider appropriate legal measures.” Accordingly, the Law Concerning the Promo-
tion of Research and Development and the Diffusion of Social Welfare Equipment,
jointly sponsored byMITI and the Ministry of Welfare, was passed in May 1993 and
came into effect in October.
After the implementation of theWelfareEquipmentLaw, theMachine Information
Bureau in FY 1995 began seeking data on conditions in the industry, for example
with its “Survey on development trends in welfare equipment.” In April 1996, a
consultation groupwas established as a private advisory body to the Director General
of the Machine Information and Commerce Bureau, and carried out surveys with the
aim of better organizing the basic direction of industrial policy. It concluded that
new markets could be developed through the effective use of market principles, to
prompt the industry to exploit the potential for industrial development and compete to
develop products oriented to consumer needs. Based on the survey results compiled
by MITI’s Commerce and Information Policy Bureau in March 2002, the market
grew steadily from its FY 1993 level of 773.1 billion yen, but FY 2000, at 1,138.9
billion yen, was the first year to show a decrease (0.3%) from the previous year.
Although expectations had been high for this new sector of industrial policy given
the aging society of the twenty-first century, satisfactory results were still proving
hard to come by.
4.1.5 The Promotion of Biotechnology
The Bio-industry Office of the Basic Industries Bureau believed that advances in
biotechnologywould contribute to the development of ecologically friendly products
that use raw materials derived from renewable organisms, and from the late 1980s
promoted R&D with the expectation that applications would soon be forthcoming
(Yamazaki 2011, p. 370). With this aim, MITI gave its support to projects in DNA
analysis, the development of biodegradable plastics, and bioremediation.
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For the DNA analysis project, the Kazusa DNAResearch Institute was founded in
March 1991, in coordination with Chiba Prefecture plans based on the Technopolis
Plan. It was intended to develop analyses of the structure of DNA, research on
analytical techniques, research on DNA functions and their applications, and the
collection and provision of data pertaining toDNA. It alsowould promote the creation
of new industries, advancements in the industrial structure, and advances in chemical
technologies. The research facility was completed in October 1994, and the first
project was an analysis of cyanobacteria. In April 1996, the Helix Research Institute
Corporation was established within the laboratory to analyze complementary DNA
(cDNA) and its functions. Part of the research could not be expected to yield useful
functions in the near term because of numerous international patent applications.
Actively publicizing that research beginning in February 2000 played an important
role by preventing further patenting. Other DNA analyses of microorganisms and
related items were promoted as well, and these were boosted by policies to establish
laboratories and present R&D plans that took into account the needs of people and
the environment.
The October 1998 “Report of the Council on becoming a bio-industry nation in
the 21st Century” recognized that, in the field of biotech research, the US domi-
nated in human genome analysis and that Europe and the US between them dom-
inated such intellectual property rights as gene patents, and that therefore the gap
between Japan’s bio-industry and that of Europe and America was only widening.
The cause was understood to be the inadequacy of many systems, including R&D,
human resources, technology transfer, and financing, and also the lack of organic
collaboration. Thus, although the level of basic research was not inferior to that of
Europe and the US, the gap was great when it came to turning that research into
enterprises and industries. To reduce the disparity would require strengthening col-
laboration between industry, academia and government, integrating research and
industry geographically, improving financing methods, and so on.
4.1.6 Efforts to Create a Biotech Industry
Efforts to make basic research commercially viable were accelerated, based on the
December 1998 interim report and February 1999 final report by the Economic
Strategy Council (established in August 1998 directly under the Prime Minister),
which said that nurturing the biotech industry was a principal target for Japan’s
twenty-first-century national technological development (Yamazaki 2011, p. 391).
The “Industrial Revitalization Plan” decided by the Cabinet in January 1999
entailed the provision of support for venture businesses’ technological development.
In this connection, MITI strongly recommended biotechnology-related projects, and
its policy was reflected in the Industrial Revitalization Plan itself. The Director-
General of the Science and Technology Agency and the Ministers of MITI, Edu-
cation, Welfare, and Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, produced the “Basic Plan
for Creating a Biotechnology Industry.” The “Basic Plan,” although acknowledging
that the biotech sector could be expected to increase high-quality employment and
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opportunities for new business, addressed biotech businesses that faced delays and
called for (1) accelerating basic research on genome analysis, (2) strengthening sup-
port for commercializing research, (3) strengthening R&D aimed at biotechnology
applications, and (4) promoting the advancement and utilization of biotechnology
in universities. On this basis, the five ministries and agencies developed the “Basic
strategy for creating a biotechnology industry” in July 1999. This included propos-
als to expand competitive financing, upgrade incentives, and facilitate the efforts of
national university faculty members to engage in business, in order to strengthen
research and development systems that produced creative outcomes.
Safety guidelines were reviewed in parallel with these efforts. With regard to
safety in biotech industrialization, MITI announced guidelines for Recombinant
DNA Technology in 1986, and the Chemical Products Council deliberated on the
safety of industrialization plans formulated and planned by business operators. In
September 1997, MITI established a Guidelines Examination Subcommittee report-
ing to the Recombinant DNA Technology Subcommittee of the Chemical Products
Council to review the subject.
Its March 1998 report titled “On an ideal plan for the future industrialization of
recombinant DNA” called for the following: (1) avoiding duplication in the safety
assessments and examinations found in the existing guidelines and simplifying proce-
dures, (2) alleviating the burden on businesses that were unsure how to evaluate their
position because the Good Industrial Large-Scale Practices (GILSP) were designed
principally to “minimize leakage,” and (3) reviewing the scope of the government’s
certifications and simplifying those procedures as well. Deregulation of the industry
was advanced based on these proposals.
4.1.7 Globalization of the Petrochemicals Industry
In the latter 1980s, the petrochemical industry faced the question of how to respond
to changes in its immediate environment, including the plans for new development
of large-scale petrochemical plants in the Asian NIEs, Saudi Arabia, and Central and
South America, uncertainty about the future of the global economy, and fluidity in
the conditions surrounding raw materials.
In January 1989, MITI consulted the Chemical Industry Committee about “the
petrochemical industry of the 1990s and ideal strategies” and received the Com-
mittee’s report in June 1989. Based on the three principles of internationalization,
cooperation, and individuation, the report cited seven issues for policy to address: (1)
raw materials, (2) demand, (3) sales and distribution, (4) security, (5) environment,
(6) R&D, and (7) internationalization (Yamazaki 2011, p. 87).
Policy on raw materials included an extension of the tax exemption for naphtha
that had been in effect since the 1980s and the addition of a tax exemption for
heavy LNG fromApril 1992. Additionally, with deregulation in 1995, petrochemical
businesses were permitted to import oil. Not only were raw material procurement
costs rationalized through tax exemptions and deregulation, but also the foundations
were laid for diversifying the raw materials in use.
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Internationalization issues included the promotion of free trade through progress
in tariff reductions and the issue of yen appreciation. Based on the report of the Inter-
national Subcommittee of the Petrochemical Products Demand and Supply Council,
the Basic Chemicals Division focused on the factors driving the domestic and inter-
national price gap in petrochemical products. These included the large number of
product grades (varieties), services to customers, just-in-time delivery, and details
of logistical services such as frequent, small-lot deliveries. This led to the decision
to consider countermeasures for those market environments where price preferences
were strengthening.As indicated in the February 1996Report of theCouncil onBasic
Issues in the Petrochemical Industry, “The cost competitiveness of Japanese petro-
chemical companies is not internationally inferior at the production stage.” Based,
therefore, on the recognition that “if the government improves the business envi-
ronment and adopts appropriate measures, [Japanese petrochemical companies] will
be able to reach a par with overseas enterprises,” the decision was made to pursue
efforts to establish core businesses for the global market environment.
Regarding sales and distribution, concerns were mounting in the 1990s about the
commercial system, specifically such areas as logistical costs and business practices.
In 1990,MITI issued guidelines for improving business practices, and in 1992, it for-
mulated guidelines for rationalizing logistics in 21 industries, such as raw materials.
These sought to assure transparency, to remove impediments to the rationalization
of business operations, and to improve international harmonization. For example,
when, based on the 1994 results of FY1993 survey data, improvements were sought
in the commercial practices related to resins for polyolefin film, a Commercial Prac-
tices Committee was established in the Council on Basic Issues in the Petrochemical
Industry in February 1995. The Committee issued a report saying that reliance on the
price mechanism would be the most efficient approach to strengthening the competi-
tiveness of resin and resin-processingmanufacturers. To that end, theCommittee took
up the issue of correcting the commercial practice of “ex post facto pricing.” Ex post
facto pricing was a trading method in which the price was not finalized at the selling
stage, but after the fact. The purpose of the system was to support the many medium-
sized, small, and very small resin manufacturers that made up the industry. The
practice was deemed to be restrictive, however, and to be hindering reasonable cor-
porate management in that it made it hard to forecast revenue and thereby increased
the cost of price negotiations. Reform therefore became desirable. By reaching out
to the industry’s companies through the Petrochemical Industry Association, it was
possible to revise the practice, and as a result, “pre-pricing,” which in 1995 was used
in only 67% of low-concentration polyethylene transactions, accounted for 94.4%
of transactions by 2001.
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4.2 Establishment of the Environment Law and Promotion
of Recycling
4.2.1 The UN Environment Programme and International Cooperation
A number of developments in the 1970s continued to determine the framework of
response to international environmental problems (Takeda 2011, p. 475). In 1972, the
International Environmental Action Plan was formulated based on the decision of the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. In May of the same year,
the OECD confirmed the Polluter-Pays Principle (PPP), and in November 1974,
it adopted the “Declaration on Environmental Policy” and a 10-point action plan.
Multilateral cooperative systemsof this kindwere also advanced on the bilateral level.
For example, the Japan–US Environmental Protection Cooperation Agreement was
signed in August 1975, and a joint planning coordination committee was established.
With the global economic downturn from the latter 1970s into the early 1980s,
international efforts on environmental issues lagged. However, in July 1980 under
US President Jimmy Carter, the Council on Environmental Quality and the State
Department issued a report titled The Earth in 2000, triggering the call for renewed
movement in this area. Japan’s Environment Agency produced a report emphasizing
an international approach and presented this in May 1982 at the UN Conference on
the Human Environment. This led to the establishment of the World Commission
on Environment and Development, which was charged with laying out an ideal
vision of the global environment. The Declaration issued by the Commission in
Tokyo in February 1987 pointed out the importance of sustainable development,
meaning that the upgrading and improvement of the environment and resource base
should take place through development, which would give rise to further progress
and development.
Meanwhile, within Japan, regulatory measures were sought to address chloroflu-
orocarbons (CFCs), which had already become a problem in the US in the 1970s.
MITI took a cautious stance towards CFC regulation by the Environment Agency.
The September 1980 Basic Industries Bureau report “On Freon gas” opposed regula-
tion on the argument that the sciencewas not yet sufficiently clear. The Bureau’s view
that a clear scientific basis was needed to enact regulation was much the same as that
of the Industrial Location and Environmental Protection Bureau on pollution regu-
lations. Even so, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
was adopted in September 1987 by the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP), a United Nations subsidiary body, and because Japan was a signatory to
the Protocol, MITI and the Environment Ministry proceeded in 1988 to work on
writing the necessary legislation. Thus the Law Concerning the Protection of the
Ozone Layer through the Regulation of Specified Substances and Other Measures
was established in May that year, and initiatives were launched to eliminate the use
of CFCs.
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4.2.2 Responses to Global Environmental Problems
MITI did not necessarily regard global environmental problems as a priority issue
for policy until the latter 1980s, but in May 1990, the Regional Promotion and
Environment Policy Subcommittee of the Industrial Structure Council’s 1990s Policy
Committee issued an interim report saying that the delays caused by waiting for
clarification of the science would be harmful and because delay in such a matter
could prove decisive, it urged both improved scientific understanding of the issues
and the development of concrete measures to address them (Takeda 2011, p. 486).
MITI’s position was that economic development needed to be balanced with
global environmental conservation, and that industrial activities should be carefully
regulated with due priority given to environmental policy. This approach, articu-
lated in the MITI’s “Earth Revitalization Plan,” was adopted in the consultations
on global environment conservation at the ministerial meeting one month after the
above interim report.
Negotiations on the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change opened in
May 1992, and along with agreeing to an international treaty on the control of emis-
sions such as carbon dioxide, the UN Conference on Environment and Development
(Earth Summit) was launched in Rio de Janeiro in June. In response to these develop-
ments, the Industrial Structure Council’s Global Environment Committee prepared
a report in May that cited the need for (1) efforts with a comprehensive point of
view that addressed economic growth, energy, and environmental conservation as
a trio of related issues, (2) acceleration of technological responses from a long-
term view, and (3) promotion of international cooperation and related measures. In
addition, the November Joint Meeting of the Industrial Structure Council, General
Energy Research Committee, and Industrial Technology Council issued the report,
“On future energy and environment measures.” The report, with the subtitle, “Four-
teen earth restoration proposals aimed at harmonizing environment, economics, and
energy,” confirmed the government’s intent of treating economic growth, energy, and
environmental protection together, and therefore stressed the need for technological
breakthroughs; moreover, as this was by its nature uncertain, the report urged the
importance of changing each individual person’s lifestyle. The autonomy of business
activities in environmental measures was also stressed.
Referring to the First Conference of the Parties (COP) held in 1995, Japan estab-
lished the “Japan Program for Joint Implementation of the Framework Convention
on Climate Change,” and on the premise that the first projects based on the pro-
gram would be certified by late March 1996, held repeated discussions among the
ministries and agencies in the Ministry–Agency Liaison Meeting for Joint Imple-
mentation Activities. Based on the results of these meetings, it was decided that
MITI would actively advance projects for joint implementation, with a special focus
on the Asian region.
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4.2.3 Responses to the Kyoto Conference
To formulate Japan’s response to the Kyoto Protocol Climate Conference sched-
uled for 1997 (Takeda 2011, p. 503), the Global Environment Subcommittee of the
Industrial Structure Council began in April 1996 to examine the issues involved in
the Framework Convention on Climate Change. Its July “Issue Memo” pointed out
the difficulty of fulfilling an international commitment to maintain per capita carbon
dioxide emissions in the year 2000 at their 1990 level. According to the Memo, what
was needed was (1) to strengthen the operation of the Law Concerning the Rational
Use of Energy (“Energy Conservation Law”), (2) to follow up on the Vision for the
Industrial Environment, and (3) to provide measures, technological development,
and technical aid for developing nations directed at the years beyond the year-2000
target. The results of the examination of these issues and others were compiled in
the 1997 COP3 Kyoto Conference Guidelines. Measures on energy conservation,
new energy, and nuclear energy were strengthened, and the means most emphasized
were those intended to stimulate the voluntary efforts of corporate enterprises. The
Guidelines also pointed out the importance of recognizing that climate change is not
just an environmental issue but an energy and economic issue as well, and that it is
an issue that affects every individual.
COP3 took account of the demands of developing countries such that the agree-
ment limited the mandatory cuts only to advanced nations. This was in part because
of the severity of the conflicts of interest among the nations, but despite calls for
caution from within the government, Prime Minister Hashimoto gave strong support
to establishing the Kyoto Protocol, and the Prime Minister’s Office took the lead in
July 1997 to create a draft. Beginning in August, the government also organized the
“Joint Meeting on the Relationship of Domestic Countermeasures to Global Warm-
ing Issues” to give ongoing consideration to the Protocol. At the Conference, a strong
confrontation emerged between the Environment Agency and MITI on setting tar-
gets. AlthoughMITI’s proposal was deemed realistic, the proposal for standards was
based on the government proposal, which prioritized the view of other participating
countries. The report of the Joint Meeting pointed out that addressing global warm-
ing was a long-term task requiring efforts to reduce greenhouse gas over a period
of 100 years or longer, and that the measures that were needed by 2010 included
the use of new energy and nuclear power to help reduce CO2 emissions, as well as
energy conservation efforts on the demand side to meet the targets. The government
attended the Kyoto Conference with these studies in hand and sought agreement on
the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto
Protocol). The content of the agreement set targets for the reduction of six types of
gases causing the greenhouse effect, requiring a reduction in emissions in the 2008–
2012 period of at least 5% from 1990 levels—8% for the EU, 7% for the US, and
6% for Japan. The Industrial Structure Council’s Global Environment Committee’s
views were evident in the setting of different targets for different countries, but com-
pared with the views of the Joint Conference, and given the Committee’s projections
that even maintaining 1990 levels would be hard, these represented very stringent
targets.
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4.2.4 Efforts Toward Achieving the Kyoto Protocol
On December 12, 1997, after the conclusion of the Kyoto Conference, MITI issued
“On futuremeasures regarding globalwarming” in the formof aDecision of theMITI
Departmental Council (Takeda 2011, p. 515). It included revisions to the Energy
Conservation Law, follow-up on Keidanren’s Voluntary Environmental Action Plan
and supplementary measures, promoting the introduction of energy conservation
technologies, and furthering the development and introduction of non-petroleum-
based energy. In June 1998, the government formulated an “Outline on the promotion
of measures to combat global warming,” which urged a series of domestic measures.
However, criticismgraduallymounted in Japan against theKyotoProtocol’s impo-
sition of the cuts only on specific countries. The economic downturn that began in
autumn 1997 strengthened business opposition to the requirements. Furthermore,
the COP6 talks broke down in 2000 without producing actual results, and the US
withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in March 2001, making it hard to form consensus
for its ratification even in Japan.
Keidanren had taken a cautious stance against an excessive strengthening of reg-
ulations, favoring a voluntary action plan for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. It
stressed two points: first, that with the US withdrawal and the failure of diplomatic
efforts to add developing countries to the framework, the treaty imposed an unfair
burden, and the rush to ratify it was too hasty; and second, that measures imposed
on the commercial sector were inadequate. METI (successor to MITI since 2001)
accordingly reoriented its basic position to favor domestic measures with minimal
impact on the economy. MITI/METI’s fundamental thinking was consistent in its
emphasis on balancing the needs of the environment and the economy while impos-
ing the burden fairly on both the industrial and the commercial sectors. Agreement
on an international framework for the Kyoto Protocol was reached at Marrakesh in
October 2001, and the Japanese government decided to ratify it in 2002, issuing a
new Decision, “Outline on Promoting Measures on Global Warming,” in 2003.
Although METI adhered to its basic principles, it nevertheless shifted to the new
framework in the 1990s. That is, while it hesitated to prioritize environmental con-
servation, which it saw as running counter to energy supply stability and sustainable
economic development, it also tried to maximize voluntary action by companies
and achieve the objectives where essential measures were concerned. The December
1994 Cabinet Decision on the Basic Environmental Plan (which was based on the
Environmental Basic Law, to be discussed below) gave greatest stress to measures
to promote consideration for the environment in corporate behavior. The envisioned
measures were summarized in “Project to promote environmentally friendly corpo-
rate behavior,” which was an important pillar of environmental policy in the latter
1990s.
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4.2.5 Establishment of the Environmental Impact Assessment Law
The following problems were later raised in the implementation process of the Envi-
ronmental Impact Assessment Act that resulted from the Cabinet Decision of August
1984: (1) the environmental assessors lacked sufficient skills, (2) businesses also
lacked the technical capabilities to evaluate the survey results, and (3) the methods
were not yet established. As a result of these issues, calls mounted for legal support
and for institutionalizing the participation of local residents (Takeda 2011, p. 381).
Making global environmental concerns a policy issue in the 1990s necessitated
a review of the existing legal framework of the Environmental Pollution Prevention
Law. At the request of Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, a review was launched in
March 1993 to establish the legal underpinnings for an era of global environment con-
cerns. Business organizations such as Keidanren responded by deciding that business
should undertake voluntary action rather than be subject to government regulation.
The Environmental Basic Law established in November 1993 said that in order to
assure a healthy and cultured life for present and future citizens and to contribute to the
welfare of humanity, it was the duty of every type of business to take the environment
into account and to do so in every type of business activity. The Basic Environment
Plan (December 1994 Cabinet Decision)made environmental impact assessment one
of the fundamental measures for environmental conservation. Further, the June 1996
report of the Comprehensive Study Group on Environmental Impact Assessment
(composed of the ministries and agencies concerned) called for legislation on the
environmental impact assessment law. MITI took the stance that there was little need
for legislation on power generation plants; industry did not raise much objection,
because factories fell outside the scope of the new law, and because there was little
anticipation of the large-scale factory sites that would later become targets of the
law.
The general principle of environmental impact assessment was deemed applicable
to power plants, and the revision of the Electric Utility Industry Law addressed
special procedures that distinguished power plants from other enterprises. With the
June1997Environmental ImpactAssessmentLawandPartialRevisionof theElectric
Utility Industry Law, assessments of power plants, previously carried out byMinistry
Decision, became subject to legal procedure.
4.2.6 Full-Scale Development of Recycling Policy
In early-1990s responses to illegal dumping, existing waste regulation emphasized
the issue of disposal but lacked ways to curb waste generation itself. Once it was
understood that the distinction between non-industrial and industrial waste no longer
conformed to actual conditions of disposal, the need to address the problem became
clear (Takeda 2011, p. 421). In August 1990, MITI created the Recycling Promo-
tion Office and established a Committee on Waste Disposal and Resource Recycling
within the Industrial Structure Council. The Committee issued a report in Decem-
ber 1990 titled “On future waste disposal and resource recycling measures” that
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laid out the direction for a number of measures for implementing waste reduction,
resource recycling, and ease of processing in production, distribution, and consump-
tion processes. Especially significant was its emphasis on the effectiveness of issuing
concrete guidelines on waste products, by type, to businesses. The report envisioned
a shift to an economic society that would naturally absorb resource conservation and
reuse.
Based on this report, the Law for the Promotion of Utilization of Recycled
Resources (“Recycling Law”) was adopted in April 1991. The Law (1) stipulated
that the appropriate minister was to formulate and announce basic policy for the
comprehensive promotion of the use of recycled resources; (2) determined the gen-
eral responsibilities of business operators, consumers, and national and local public
bodies; (3) stated that recommendations would be made to businesses and dealers
in industries and products specified by the government, with the aim of promoting
the use of recycled resources as raw materials. In this way the bill on recycling raw
materials, first conceived in the mid-1970s, was realized after more than 15 years
through legal measures to encourage voluntary efforts by businesses in accordance
with established guidelines.
Prior to the implementation of the Recycling Law, the Environmental Policy
Division of the Industrial Location and Environmental Protection Bureau designated
target industries and products and formulated and announced its basic policy on them.
In September 1992, the Industrial Structure Council Waste Disposal and Recycling
Subcommittee conducted a comprehensive inspection of the progress beingmade and
urged the addition of further target areas. The Committee again studied the progress
of the policy in 1993 and issued recommendations in July 1994. These investigations
found that the Recycling Law and the June 1993 Law on Temporary Measures to
Promote Business Activities for the Rational Use of Energy and the Utilization of
Recycled Resources had achieved certain results in the use of recycled resources,
but also pointed out the following issues: that waste emissions were not showing any
remarkable decline, that existing disposal capacity was nearing its limit, and that the
costs of disposal in general were increasing year by year. The Committee proposed
a significant expansion of usage-based processing fees and of municipal sorting
systems for waste, and also urged that consumers and businesses cooperate with the
separation and collection of waste by municipalities and used-paper collectors. MITI
added target areas and revised its guidelines in April 1996.
Through the above measures, the glass bottle and can recycling rates increased
from immediately after the laws’ establishment, and recyclingof usedpaper increased
from the latter 1990s on.The administrative effort to promote themunicipal collection
and recycling of separated items contributed greatly to these outcomes.
4.2.7 Reorganization of the Environmental Protection and Industrial
Location Bureau and Promotion of Recycling
In July 1993, MITI reorganized the Industrial Location and Pollution Bureau into the
Environmental Protection and Industrial LocationBureau (Takeda 2011, p. 441). This
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meant that industrial pollution issues came to be considered within the framework for
environmental measures, and the Environmental Protection and Industrial Location
Bureau thereafter advanced policies on recycling industrial waste into rawmaterials.
The first step was taken with the establishment of the Law for the Promotion of
Sorted Collection and Recycling of Containers and Packaging in June 1995, which
promoted the sorted recycling and repurposing of bottles, cans, paper, and plastic
containers and packaging. The appropriate minister was to prepare and publish basic
recycling policies and plans, which would take specific form in municipal and pre-
fectural plans for sorted collection. At the same time, it became mandatory for those
disposing of containers and packaging to properly sort and dispose of them and to
meet set volumes for the recycling of particular types of containers. Businesses were
permitted to pass the cost burden on to consumers and to use public relations efforts
to seek consumers’ understanding of the higher prices. The aim of this law was to
change people’s outlook on waste, so that waste would be curtailed and reuse max-
imized at each stage—product development, manufacturing, and consumption. The
ultimate aim was to build economic and social systems based on recycling and on
reduced environmental impact. Beginning with glass bottles and PET bottles in April
1997, items slated for recycling were added as needed. As a result of the Container
Recycling Law, the volume of glass bottles in landfill was reduced by 55% as of FY
1999.
While the containers and packaging issue showed progress, recycling measures
for cars, household appliances, and other such products were carried forward into the
late 1990s. The disposal of cars had previously rested on buy-back payments but the
cost burdenwas nowshifted to the person disposing of the car. But newproblemswere
emerging, such as the securing of landfill disposal sites and reducing the amount of
shredder dust, which was hard to process. The Industrial Structure Council’s Waste
Disposal and Raw Materials Recycling Committee therefore launched studies in
October 1995, and with the revision of the Recycling Law in 2000, automakers
were called upon not only to reduce (reduce raw materials; increase longevity) and
reuse, but also to absorb recycling into the manufacturing stage itself. The Central
Environment Council’s March 2002 report called for legislation, and METI and the
Ministry of the Environment (successor of the Environment Agency since 2001) took
up the task of creating that legislation. July saw the promulgation of the Law for the
Recycling of End-of-Life Vehicles, which (1) determined the division of roles of the
stakeholders, and (2) made car owners responsible for the cost of recycling. Addi-
tionally, the June 1998 Law for the Recycling of Specified Kinds of Home Appli-
ances required manufacturers to take back and recycle their products and retailers to
receive and pass them on, and for consumers to cooperate by bearing the cost burden
of collecting and recycling the used products (Table 6).
While these efforts produced results for a specified period, their limits were also
becoming clear. In particular, used paper, for which recycling had been instituted
especially early, was designated under the Recycling Law, and its target reuse rate
was raised to 55% by FY 1994, but the target was not met. At MITI’s request, The
Japan Papermaking Association established a new target of 56% by FY 2000, and
met that goal by FY 1999, but this constituted an improvement in recycling rates of
no more than 1%.
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In January 1997, the Waste Disposal and Resource Recycling Committee issued
a report titled “On future measures for industrial waste products”; because of the
context of constraints on final disposal sites, the stalling of reductions and recycling,
and the problem of illegal dumping, it proposed shifting to a “recycling-oriented
economic system” in many major industries, involving numerical targets for the
reduction and recycling of industrial waste and strengthening the waste producer’s
responsibility for proper disposal.
This line of thinking, and that in the July 1999 report of the Joint Subcommit-
tee on Basic Problems (of the Waste Products and Recycling Committee in the
Global Environment Committee of the Industrial Structure Council), made clear
the urgency of establishing a “recycling-oriented economic system” that called for
maximizing energy efficiency, and strengthening the partnership between enterprise,
consumer, and administration. The result was the June 2000 Basic Law for Estab-
lishing a Recycling-Based Society as well as a Recycling Law for raw materials
needed in construction and for food products. The Basic Law, aimed at forming a
“recycling-oriented society,” regarded all target products as “waste” products regard-
less of whether they had value or not, and it aimed to curb waste disposal and focus
on the potential usefulness of waste products as recyclable resources.
4.2.8 Responding to Minamata Disease
In March 1973, the Kumamoto District Court ordered Chisso Corporation to pay
compensation to Minamata Disease victims. This caused an immediate threat to
Chisso’s commercial survival. The government’s response, seen in the June 1978
CabinetAgreement titled “OnMinamataDiseaseCountermeasures,”was tomaintain
financial support until a fundamental review to be undertaken in 1999. Kumamoto
Prefecture issued prefectural bonds in order to assist Chissowith the financing needed
for the required compensation. This approach aimed to maintain the polluter pays,
principle while at the same time ensuring, bymaintaining and strengthening Chisso’s
ability to operate, that the payments themselves would not be impeded. For the same
reason, the JapanDevelopmentBankoffered capital investmentfinancing for aChisso
subsidiary beginning in 1981, while in 1994 other measures were taken to mitigate
Chisso’s interest burden and to establish a fund for promoting the revitalization of
the Minamata–Ashikita region (Yamazaki 2011, p. 144). Despite these measures,
however, Chisso’s accumulated debt including the prefectural bonds exceeded 200
billion yen in 1999, and it became obvious that repayment was no longer possible.
With a Cabinet Decision in February 2002, the framework decided upon in 1978
was changed to partially exempt Chisso from repayment of both the government’s
subsidies and its debts to financial institutions.
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4.2.9 Safety Management for Chemical Substances
Safety management for chemical substances shifted toward deregulation from the
1990s forward (Yamazaki 2011, p. 485). The October 1973 Law Concerning the
Examination and Regulation of Manufacture of Chemical Substances (Act on the
Evaluation of Chemical Substances and Regulation of Their Manufacture) stipu-
lated, first, that all new chemical substances, other than those publicly pronounced
safe according to existing chemical rosters or examination procedures, must obtain
a government determination of its safeness before being manufactured or imported;
and second, that chemical substances that do not readily decompose but tend to
accumulate and are toxic when absorbed over the long-term would be specifically
designated by Cabinet Order and subject to regulations stipulated in the law. The for-
mer stipulation represented the first attempt to introduce the preliminary reviews that
subsequently became the common approach to global chemical safety management.
In May 1986, the regulation was strengthened with enhancements to the preliminary
examination system and an expansion of the range of specified chemical substances.
At the same time, categories were established for designated chemical substances
and second-class specified chemical substances, and a post hoc management system
was put in place.
With the UN in the lead, attempts were made in the 1990s to deploy on a global
scale the chemical substance control efforts made in advanced economies. Agenda
21, adopted at the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit (UNConference on Environment and
Development) in June 1992, called for adequatemanagement of hazardous chemicals
and a wide range of measures to be achieved by the year 2000. Meanwhile, the
Japan Chemical Industry Association (JCIA) adopted the “Basic policy of the Japan
Chemical Industry Association on environment and safety” in 1990 and began to
develop projects for the voluntary management of chemical substances. Policies
governing projects up to the year 2000 were compiled in March 1994, including
the standards and guidelines needed for implementing “responsible care.” Where
the conventional approach to safety management required compliance with certain
regulations, this sought the voluntary control of the impacts on the environment and
on people across the entire life cycle of the substances, including their production,
consumption, and disposal.
With the mounting pressure for safety management from global efforts and the
exploration of voluntary action by industry, the Japanese government began to rec-
ognize the limits of administrative responses. When the Chemical Substance Control
Law was first established, only about 700 new chemical substances needed annual
evaluation, but by 1988, the number had grown to 5,000, and by 1989, to over
6,000. The load exceeded administrative capacity, and MITI concluded that self-
management and the principle of responsibility would be an appropriate supplement
to legal and regulatory measures for risk management. The February 1996 Interim
Report of the SafetyMeasures Committee of the Chemicals Council (titled “The pro-
motion of comprehensive safety management for chemical substances”) suggested
the importance of voluntary management, and the July 1999 Act on Confirmation of
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Release Amounts of Specific Chemical Substances in the Environment and Promo-
tion of Improvements to the Management Thereof also promoted not only regulation
but also improved voluntary control by businesses. Specifically, it introduced the
Pollutant Release and Transfer Register system and required reports on capturing
the quantity of emissions and submission of an Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS)
with contents, properties, handling and other data pertaining to designated chemi-
cal substances. It was also the responsibility of business operators to follow to the
chemical substance management guidelines formulated by the government, to man-
age the manufacture, use, and other handling of designated chemical substances, and
also to work to deepen local residents’ understanding of how chemical substances
were managed within business operations. Based on this framework, methods were
adopted to encourage businesses to undertake voluntary management.
4.3 Industrial Location Policy and Promotion of Regions
4.3.1 Reconsidering Industrial Location Policy
In May 1990, the Regional Promotion and Environment Policy Subcommittee of the
Industrial StructureCouncil’s 1990sPolicySubcommittee compiled an interim report
on regional promotion and global environmental policy for the 1990s (Takeda 2011,
p. 193). The report pointed out land issues, including the accelerating concentration
of population and functions in Tokyo and the corollary of skyrocketing land prices,
and the declining population and vitality of rural areas. These issues were the basis
for the direction recommended by the report for industrial location policies in the
twenty-first century, which stressed the need to (1) construct policies centered on
people, (2) rebuild social frameworks, and (3) develop comprehensive, long-term,
and consistent policies.
The report cited the need (1) to foster major regional centers and regional city
centers and promote links among them, and (2) to strengthen administrative func-
tions to promote regional coordination across prefectural boundaries so as to enable
regional formulations with a broader perspective. But it also represented an extension
of existing policy inasmuch as it once again presented the same issues in regional
development.
This policy stance reflected a growing concern in the 1990s about the hollowing
out of industry, when the imminent decline of factory sites forced a review of the
issues. This was because, although industrial compounds had been built as planned,
municipalities were left with unsold parcels of land and the heated competition to
attract projects resulted in the burden of enormous subsidies.
It was in this context that the Law On Temporary Measures for Activation of
Specific Regional Industrial Agglomerations was established in 1997 to address the
hollowingout of industry. Its purposewas to build on theLawonTemporaryMeasures
to Revitalize Designated Clusters of Small andMedium-Sized Enterprises (“Clusters
Revitalization Act,”May 1992). It also treated regional industrial clusters, which had
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become the foundation of monozukuri, as “clusters of basic technology industries,”
and both of them as “specially designated industrial clusters” and therefore targets
for revitalization. To this end, measures were put in place to support small and
medium-sized regional enterprises moving into designated fields by (1) upgrading
the technology of designated businesses in the basic technology industries, and (2)
enabling the revitalization of specially designated industrial clusters.
MITI had put off planning nationwide location policies to accompany the regional
designations until the final 1992 Law for the Comprehensive Development of
Regional Core Cities with Relocation of Office–Work Functions. In 1995, the New
Industry Location StudyGroup, a private advisory body of the Environmental Affairs
Bureau, compiled a “Report of the new Industry Location Policy Study Group:
Toward enhancing attractive industrial location environments in the global economy”
that laid out the direction of the new policy. The report raised the issue of changes in
the form of advancing globalization, upgraded industrial structures, changing values
and social environment issues in metropolitan areas, and regional urbanization. The
most important point stressed here was the need to rectify the various regulations
and practices that restricted potential industrial sites and to ensure greater freedom
for business development.
In response to this recommendation, the interim report compiled by the Industrial
Structure Council’s Industrial Location Subcommittee in May 1997 emphasized the
need to ease the regulations that prevented companies from locating in metropolitan
areas, which led to a review of the Factory Location Law (Table 7).
Industrial location policy thus changed significantly. The prior Technopolis Law
and Key Facilities Siting Law that had underpinned regional designations were
replaced by the Law for Facilitating the Creation of New Business. As the new
law’s name suggests, these policies emphasized business creation rather than indus-
trial location policy. Policy changes advanced even further with the 2001 abolition of
the system of New Industrial Cities and Special Areas for Industrial Consolidation
that had been promoted ever since the 1960s and with the lapsing of the Law on
Extraordinary Measures for the Development of Coal Mining Areas. This meant the
end of an industrial location policy under which the government designated certain
regions and offered incentives to attract businesses to them, and a shift to regional
development spearheaded by the regions themselves.
4.3.2 Advances into New Sectors for Small And Medium-Sized
Enterprises and Regional Promotion
This shift in location policy was in keeping with the trajectory of change in MITI
policies on small and medium-sized enterprises, which were considered key players
in regional industrial development. Regarding post-bubble support for SME moves
into new business sectors, the September 1993 Ministerial Conference on Economic
Measures decided, as part of its emergency economic countermeasures, to “support
small andmedium-sized enterprises’ restructuring efforts, such as entering newfields
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4 Measures for an Affluent Society 281
and developing overseas markets, so that SMEs can remain vital while overcoming
[the challenges of] structural changes in the Japanese economy.” It was on this basis
that the Temporary Law Concerning Measures for Smooth Adaptation to Structural
Changes in Economy by Advancement of Specific Small and Medium-Sized Enter-
prises toNewFields (“NewFields Law”)was established inNovember (Nakata 2013,
p. 323). As the Ministerial Conference showed, the new law discarded the earlier
feature of seeking to facilitate business conversions that were either unavoidable or
urgent, and instead sought to “develop SME vitality in keeping with the new eco-
nomic environment” through business conversions to meet changes in the economic
structure. The new policies (1) treated expansion into new business sectors as “some-
thing that should be actively supported and advanced,” (2) dramatically expanded the
range of industries targeted by this policy, (3) gave support to expansion overseas, and
(4) enabled SMEs that did not yet belong to the “designated industries” and individ-
uals not yet running businesses to become eligible for support upon entry into those
industries. Four industries were designated under the New Fields Law in November
1993: manufacturing, printing, software, and information management services. The
number of approvals for expansion into new fields at the end of 1995 was 1,028 for
manufacturing and 93 for software; 219 plans were approved for expansion overseas
and 11 for opening new businesses, for a total of 1,338. However, the use of support
policies in the form of loans and special tax exemptions remained at a low level.
Because the Law on Temporary Measures for Small and Medium-Sized Enter-
prises in Specified Areas would expire in February 1993, a Law on Temporary
Measures for the Revitalization of Specified SME Clusters (“Cluster Revitalization
Law”) was established in May 1992. Its aim was “to strengthen the foundations of
autonomous development of regional SMEs throughmeasures to promote the revital-
ization of designated SMEclusters, thereby contributing to the balanced development
of the national economy.” Its significance lay in its stress on clusters. That is, the SME
Modernization Council’s discussions of the Cluster Revitalization Law said that the
significance of clustering SMEs lay in efficiencies in promoting joint operations,
shifts to higher value-added production, and the development of new fields, and that
the clusters would serve as nuclei for regional economies and society. Furthermore,
the maintenance and development of these functions were themselves the concern
of the entire country.
Under the framework of the law, the MITI Minister would issue revitalization
guidelines according to which the prefectures were to prepare implementation plans
with concrete designated areas, business goals, support project details, and other
aspects for each approved SME cluster. SMEs intending to enter a specific field
within an industry designated in the revitalization plan could prepare their plans for
entry and submit applications to the prefectural governor. Commercial and industrial
associations could also submit plans in the same way. Plans that were approved by
the governor would be eligible for support measures. This meant that there were
two routes of entry—by the businesses themselves and through the commercial and
industrial associations.
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Due to rapid globalization, however, theClusterRevitalizationLawproved to have
a limited role. Although it was originally set to expire in ten years, it was abolished
after just three years, in 1997. This was because a new legal framework was needed.
The New Cluster Revitalization Law was enacted in 1997 (Nakata 2013, p. 863)
because of great concern about the destruction of basic technology industry clus-
ters and production regions due to hollowing out. The new law aimed to promote
vitality in regional industrial clusters by establishing new industrial infrastructure
and upgrading the R&D environment. It was intended to extend the Cluster concept
and also to provide support measures similar to those given designated SMEs by the
Cluster Revitalization Act. The basic technology industry cluster was envisioned as a
cluster district for machine industries, such as that in Tokyo’s Ota Ward. The “Basic
Technology Industry Cluster Revitalization Plans” were formulated in 25 regions
around the country based on the new law, and by FY 2005, a total of 473 “Advanced
Plans” and “Improvement Facilitation Plans” had received approval. “Specific Small
Business Cluster Revitalization Plans” were also formulated in 118 areas nationwide
for a cumulative total of 715 “Advancement Plans” and “Entry Facilitation Plans”
approved between FY 1997 and FY 2005.MITI’s December 2006 ex-post facto eval-
uation of the promotion of regional industrial cluster revitalization measures found
that although certain results had been achieved, regional economic measures needed
to apply more closely to the economic environment of the region itself. Thus the
hollowing out problem had not necessarily been resolved.
The 1995 Temporary LawConcerningMeasures for the Promotion of the Creative
Business Activities of SMEs (“Creative SME Law”) was a chance to develop new
kinds of SMEpolicies including theDecember 1998Law for Facilitating theCreation
of New Business (“New Business Creation Law”), which aimed to promote the
development of new businesses and new products and services, as well as the Law
on Supporting Business Innovation of SMEs (“Business Innovation Law”), which
sought to develop policies for promoting innovation in the regions. These three laws
were absorbed with the prior two into the Enterprise Innovation Law in 2005, the
name of which was changed to the Law for Facilitating New Business Activities of
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises.
In order to respond to the hollowing out of some industries and the maturation
of others, it was important for the Creative SME Law to work boldly on new fields
based on original and superior technologies and to create new markets and develop
them. The Law assumed that SMEs with a flexible and entrepreneurial spirit would
play this role (Nakata 2013, p. 243). The need for policies to be implemented in
a coherent manner and to be consistent with the life-stage of the SME formed the
background for the enactment of the Creation Law based on the December 1994
report of the SME Modernization Council. The law was given a 10-year period.
The law aimed to “promote creative business activities of SMEs by supporting
and promoting their R&D and thereby opening up new fields of business, to facil-
itate the transformation of Japan’s industrial structure and the sound development
of the people’s lives” (Article 1). “Creative business activities” were understood as
“aggressive efforts to develop new products and new services based on the creative
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ingenuity of SMEs and to develop new markets themselves.” The targets for assis-
tance were (1) SMEs, (2) incorporated associations in which two-thirds or more of
the members were SMEs, and (3) individuals not yet engaged in business but expect-
ing to found businesses in the future. Approved R&D plans would be eligible for
capital investment tax cuts, as well as various specific support measures under the
Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Investment Business Corporation Act and the
Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Credit Insurance Act.
According to the results and evaluations compiled by the SMEAgency in October
2004, the number of accredited R&D plans under the Creation Act was 10,734 at
the end of July 2004, of which 36% were R&D-type SMEs. The greatest number
was in Kanto (52.3%) and Kinki (17.0%), and 59.8% were in manufacturing and
25.4% in service industries. A survey commissioned in 2003 found that 40.3% of
the plans that received approval had already been commercialized, 20.6% were in
the process of developing the market, 16.4% were in the R&D phase, and 15.2% had
been suspended or cancelled. This was considered a high rate of commercialization.
4.3.3 New Business Creation Law and Business Innovation Law
The New Business Creation Law materialized as part of the “emergency economic
measures” decided by the Cabinet in November 1998 (Nakata 2013, p. 646). Its pur-
pose was “to utilize our country’s industrial resources, including human resources,
and to promote the establishment of new industries and creation of new products and
provision of new services, to improve business methods, and so on. In addition to
giving direct support to new businesses established by individuals and companies,
measures would also be taken to promote business activities using the new tech-
nologies of SMEs in addition to effectively utilizing local industrial resources, and
by thus encouraging the autonomous development of regional industries, thereby
establishing a vital economic society” (Article 1).
The support would take three forms: (1) support for creating new industries, (2)
implementation of a Japanese version of Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR)
in order to raise the technological level of SMEs, and (3) formulation of regional
platforms. The targets of the support would be projects newly launched by individu-
als, company projects newly launched by individuals, and company projects newly
launched by companies, with each version receiving support such as the designated
SMEEnterprise Credit Insurance. TheNewBusiness Creation Lawwas revised three
times, of which the December 1999 revision added provisions for “New Business
Development Sectors.”
According to results compiled by theSmall andMedium-SizedEnterpriseAgency,
246 plans had been approved as of July 1, 2004, under the new designation of “new
business development fields.” This was regarded as a good result.
“Support for innovative SMEs” had formed part of the emergency measures that
followed on the 1997 financial crisis, and the Business Innovation Law was estab-
lished in that context, with SMEs as its target. The Law regarded business innovation
as “the development or production of new products, the development or provision
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of new services, and the introduction of new methods of producing goods or selling
them,” and did not stipulate that the support would go only to certain industry desig-
nations, or industry associations or organizations, but instead required of individual
companies that they provide numerical targets. Furthermore, it aimed not only at
“business innovation” but also at “strengthening the foundations of business.” If a
plan was approved, financial support and special tax measures became available.
According to a survey by the Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Agency, the num-
ber of approvals reached 14,774 between July 1999 and July 2004. Kanto accounted
for 38.0% of these, and Kinki for 17.5%, meaning about 50% between the two
regions. Manufacturing industries accounted for almost half the approvals, at 48.5%.
Although the business innovation support plan set its indicator of success at 3% or
more annual increase in added value, only 35.7% of the approved companies met this
target. Nevertheless, since the value-added rate achieved by the target companies was
high compared with non-target companies, the outcome was considered positive.
4.3.4 Measures to Address Pit and Wastewater Mine Pollution
New systemic problems were revealed in the measures taken against mine pollution.
Since no particular technology had been found to enable the complete disposal of
mining waste, the cost burden of processing waste caused by earlier developers
became a drag on mining operations, which also faced problems with the capital
financing system (Takeda 2011 p. 647).
In March 1992, the mining industry called for an expansion and strengthening
of subsidies and funds to prevent pollution from abandoned mines. In February
the Mining Industry Council had pointed out the need to address the problem of
permanent mine drainage treatment and the fact that the funds of those responsible
were not fully secure.MITI began revising the Act on SpecialMeasures for Pollution
Caused by the Metal Mining Industry, which was passed in May and implemented in
November. The main points in the amended Act were that the financial resources for
permanent mine wastewater treatment could be secured by establishing a fund on the
polluter-pays principle and that a system for implementing reliable and permanent
mine wastewater treatment could be established through designated institutions. A
mine pollution control fund was accordingly established on the following basis: (1)
theMITIMinister would designate a mine pollution control organization responsible
for running the fund, (2) the Metal Mining Agency of Japan (MMAJ) would pay
the cost of pollution prevention from the fund’s profits on investment, and (3) to
the extent that the organization designated by the MITI Minister was engaged in
mine pollution control, those companies with mining rights that were implementing
prevention operations would be released from the pollution prevention obligation.
The basic plan was revised inMarch 1993 based on the revised Law, and new policies
were developed accordingly.
On coal mining pollution measures, the legal framework consisted of the August
1952ExtraordinaryLawonCoalMineDamageRecovery, the June 1963Act onTem-
porary Measures Concerning Compensation for Coal Mine Damage, which aimed
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to ensure the smooth delivery of compensation in pollution cases, and the Two Basic
Laws on Mining Pollution. These laws were given repeated 10-year extensions after
1972. However, with the June 1991 report of the Coal Mining Council, beginning
in 1992, the aim shifted to promoting measures to counter mine pollution, in tan-
dem with the structural adjustment of the coal industry. The aim also was for the
complete elimination of accumulated damage from mining by the end of FY 2001,
or in other words, within the coal mining structural adjustment period. The mea-
sures were reworked in December 1992 based on long-term plans for recovery from
mining damage, and as a result, the elimination of accumulated mine pollution was
announced successively in 1993 in Iwate, Aichi, andGifu Prefectures.With the report
of the Coal Mining Council in July 1999, additional measures were taken including
the abolition of related laws and regulations under the expectation that the measures
would be brought to completion at the end of FY 2001.
4.4 Harmonizing Energy Development and the Environment
4.4.1 Comprehensive Development of Energy Policy
From 1989 forward, the environment began to emerge as a policy issue alongside
energy security and the economy. Triggering this development was the June 1989
report titled “Toward harmonization of the economy, energy, and the environment
on a global level” compiled by the Roundtable on Long-term Energy Issues from a
Global Perspective, a private council under the Director-General of the Agency of
Natural Resources and Energy (Kikkawa 2011, p. 82).
The report held that the measures adopted by America, the Soviet Union, and
China, all of which were high-CO2 emissions nations, were inadequate and also
pointed out the need to support and cooperate with the other advanced nations with
respect to measures in developing countries, where energy demand was expected
to increase. Proceeding with these would require (1) energy conservation, (2) fuel
selection, and (3) CO2 immobilization, which meant that a heavy emphasis needed
to be placed on technological development.
In June 1990, the Coordination Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee for
Energy compiled “The challenges of new trends in global energy.” The report had
three notable features. First, it called for developing energy policies on a global scale.
Second, it gave new meaning to raising utilization rates through systematization, by
making it part of energy conservation policy. This was the idea of raising efficiency
rates by extending the target of policy to include the entire energy system from the
supply stage through the final user stage, and even to the social system itself. The
aimwas a conceptual change from “energy conservation meaning savings or reduced
use” to “energy conservation as compatible with affluence.” Third, regarding the
selection of energy sources, the report highlighted the idea of an energy mix, urged
avoiding excessive dependence on any particular source of energy and for appropriate
combinations of all kinds of energy, while at the same time maintained that these
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approaches be advanced while taking the environment into account. Looking ahead
to the June Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, in April 1992 the Japanese government
began to take on global environmental issues more systematically. In this way, the
three E’s became the basis of energy policy.
The economy once again took center stage in the 1990s. In December 1993, the
Fundamental Policies Subcommittee of the Comprehensive Energy Research Com-
mittee produced an interim report entitled “Aiming for a strong and flexible energy
supply system” (Kikkawa 2011, p. 92). The report promoted the liberalization of
the electric power and gas businesses, pointing out the need for (1) measures to
stabilize energy supply and demand and (2) a review of the regulations concerning
the energy supply system and the importance of introducing market principles to it.
Meanwhile, a more concerted emphasis was placed on the environment. Especially
after about 1997, with the COP3 Kyoto Conference just ahead, the tone of policy
showed increased consideration for global environmental problems. The Law Con-
cerning Promotion of the Use of New Energy (“New Energy Law”) was announced
in April 1997, stipulating systematization based on the need to assure energy secu-
rity and the growing need to respond to the issue of global warming. The focus was
on accelerating the introduction of new energy that was ready for practical appli-
cations but that had not yet progressed due, for example, to economic limitations.
The targets of this thinking were solar, wind, and waste power generation, as well
as clean-energy vehicles. The Special Measures Law Concerning the Use of New
Forms of Energy by the Electric Power Industry (“Renewable Portfolio Standard
[PRS] Law”) was passed in June 2002 and came into effect the following April. This
required that a fixed ratio of the electricity bought by retailers had to be new energy.
Targets of the policy included wind, solar, geothermal, small and medium hydraulic,
and biomass power. In this way, Japan’s policy on new energy in the early 2000s
strengthened the drive to promote recyclable energy use from the points of view of
both the environment and energy security (Fig. 4).
Entering the twenty-first century, further emphasis was placed on simultaneously
achieving the three E’s. The Energy Research Commission’s Coordination Subcom-
mittee and Energy Supply and Demand Subcommittee issued a joint report in July
2001 titled “On future energy policy,” which pointed out the stringency of the goal
and the need for the citizenry as a whole to take on the effort and burden required to
meet that goal. The Basic Law on Energy Policy, promulgated and enforced in June
2002, carried on with this approach. Based on the provisions of Article 24, para-
graph 4 of the same law, the Basic Energy Plan presented in October 2003 clarified
the goals of securing a stable supply of energy, adapting to the environment, and
utilizing market principles.
4.4.2 Promotion of Deregulation: Petroleum and Natural Gas Policy
The first deregulation in the energy policy field was developed from 1987 to 1993.
The trigger was the report titled “On the petroleum industry and petroleum policy
in the 1990s,” which was compiled in June 1987 by the Committee to Review the
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1. Need for comprehensive efforts with a long-term perspective
2. Need for responses by every entity
3. Need for technological responses (technological breakthroughs)
4. Need for international efforts
5. Need to address environment, economy, and energy together
(Law) Improvements in energy saving, improvement of legal framework to promote environmentally harmonious economic activities
(Organization) Enhancement of the functions of the New Energy Industrial Technology Development Organizations (NEDO) 
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Fig. 4 Harmonizing energy development and the environment in the 1990s. Source Minami Ryo,
“Tsusho sangyo sho no kankyo taisaku” Jurist 1015. 1993, p. 19. [II-5, p. 520]
Basic Issues of the Petroleum Industry that had been newly established under the
Petroleum Council’s Petroleum Subcommittee in November 1986 (Kikkawa 2011,
p. 121). It led to revision of the restrictions on refining and sales activities that had
been imposed by the Petroleum Industry and Gasoline Retail Business Laws. The
move to deregulation proceededwithout interruption, andwith themid-1990s call for
stabilization and greater efficiency in the supply of petroleum products, the principle
of competition was introduced in the import sector as well.
Further review was promoted from 1997 onwards, in what might be called a
second stage of deregulation. Based on recommendations made in 1993 by the Eco-
nomic Reform Study Group, which was charged with considering deregulation, the
Petroleum Council in December 1994 compiled a report titled “On future ways to
supply petroleum products.” The Law on Establishing Related Laws to Secure a
Stable and Efficient Supply of Petroleum Products was passed in April 1995, as
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part of the abolition of the Provisional Measures Law on the Importation of Specific
PetroleumRefined Products (“Specific Petroleum Law”). The Volatile Oil Sales Law
was also revised to become the Act on the Quality Control of Gasoline and Other
Fuels.
Thereafter, the Petroleum Council continued to consider deregulation measures,
revising the petroleum products export approval system in 1997 and abolishing
the service station supplier certification system. In December 2001, the Petroleum
Business Law was abolished, which marked the complete liberalization of the oil
industry.
Liberalization generated entry into petroleum import and service station busi-
nesses. The price system, under which gasoline was the only high-priced petroleum
product, was corrected. The result was the deterioration of operator earnings, and in
particular a decline in the gross margin on regular gasoline, which led to a decrease
in the number of gas stations after 1995.
The Gulf crisis of 1991 led to a reexamination of stockpiling policy, and the June
1992 suggestion by the LPG Subcommittee of the Petroleum Council’s Petroleum
Committee that a national LPG stockpile be introduced. The decision was made to
establish a 1.5-million ton stockpile by FY 2010 (about one month’s worth of annual
imports) (Kikkawa 2011, p. 194). In the latter 1990s, market-based responses to
stockpiling came under consideration. The Petroleum Council’s Subcommittee on
PetroleumStockpiling andEmergencyMeasures issued a report inAugust 1999 titled
“Basic thinking on future emergency responses,” which highlighted five points: (1)
maximummaintenance and utilization of market functions; (2) emergency responses
basedon limits tomarket functions; (3) improvement of the information infrastructure
so that the ability to respond to emergency conditions would become part of regular
operations; (4) ideal approaches to releasing and holding petroleum stockpiles; and
(5) international cooperation. This meant revisiting the question of how to handle
stockpiles and included in its scope the reevaluation and active utilization of the
cooperative exchange functions of the International Energy Agency (IEA). However,
due to the emphasis on Energy Security after the 2000s, the environment was not
one in which the report’s recommendations could immediately be realized.
Regarding coal policy, the Eighth Coal Policy covering 1986–1991 had con-
cluded that an annual production of about 10 million tons was appropriate given
the inevitability of the gradual reduction of domestic coal production, whereas the
Post-Eighth Coal Policy (1992–2001) considered the possibility of a phased end
to production. In November 1990, the Coal Mining Areas Development Council
reported that the November 1981 Law On Extraordinary Measures for the Develop-
ment of Coal Mining Areas would be extended for a further 10 years until November
2001.
4.4.3 Liberalization of the Electricity Market
Liberalization of the electricity market also made progress (Kikkawa 2011, p. 284).
The Electric Utility Industry Law of 1965 was completely revised in 1995. The main
points of the revisionwere: (1) to expand new entrants to the power generation sector,
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(2) to create a system related to specified electricity businesses, (3) to improve and
mitigate price regulation, and (4) to clarify the responsibilities of electric power
companies and rationalize safety regulations. For the first, the approval system for
new entrants to electricity wholesaling was in principle abolished and a bidding
system introduced. This enabled the entry of independent power producers (IPP).
Improving and mitigating price regulation meant the shift to a notification system
from the former set price menu aimed at load leveling. It also introduced ways of
assessing the fees so as to easily compare businesses in terms of their efficiency.
Finally, clarifying the responsibilities of electric power companies was an effort to
limit government involvement to the minimum level necessary (Fig. 5).
The “Electricity Business Act” was also revised significantly in 1999. Its main
points were: (1) to partially liberalize electricity retailers and fully introduce the prin-
ciple of competition in the retail sector for special high-pressure customers receiving
20,000 V (high-voltage) electric power of 2,000 kilowatts or more, (2) to establish a
consignment system permitting electric power companies to open their networks to
other electricity providers, (3) to shift from an approval system to a notification sys-
tem with regard to reductions in electricity prices, and (4) to abolish the regulations
on electricity businesses’ being involved in other businesses at the same time. These
revisions brought new entrants to retail electricity and encouraged the emergence
of specified electric utilities called PPS, or power producers and suppliers. They
also stimulated competition among the nine electric power companies. For example,
TokyoElectric PowerCompany (TEPCO) establishedMyEnergyCo. inMarch 2000,
began to supply electricity in the Tohoku and Chubu Electric power districts, and par-
ticipated in the bidding on electricity provision in Sendai City (in Tohoku Electric’s
district). The liberalization was not complete, however, and ordinary households and
small and medium-sized factories were still operating in a regulated environment
and supplied by their electric utilities as before.
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Fig. 5 Changes in the electricity supply system due to the 1990 Electricity Enterprise Reform.
Source METI, Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (2004, p. 118); Kikkawa (2011, p. 301)
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The trend toward liberalization continued. The February 2002 “Report of the
Electricity Industry Committee” by the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources
and Energy (established in January 2001) examined the experience of electricity
liberalization thus far and took on the role of laying out new directions for deregula-
tion. These included (1) further liberalizing the retail electricity sector, (2) reviewing
the electricity retail consignment system (abolishing the transfer supply system in
which charges were added for the use of transmission lines bymultiple electric power
companies), (3) establishing a nationwide wholesale power trading market (for PPS)
and (4) reviewing the backup rules of the electric utilities (to reduce the burden
on PPS by abolishing backup fees when accidents occur). These recommendations
were reflected in the revised Electricity Business Law promulgated in June 2003 and
implemented in April 2004 (Fig. 6).
Due to liberalization from the mid-1990s on, electricity rates declined steadily,
reaching a reduction of 18% between FY 1995 and FY 2005. When liberalization of
electricity retailing began in 2000, price cuts were observed not only in the sectors
being liberalized but also in electricity rates for households. Despite soaring fuel
costs, electricity rates declined by about 10% from FY 2000 to FY 2005. A report
compiled by the Institutional Reform Evaluation Subcommittee, which was estab-
lished within the Electricity Works Subcommittee in 2006, interpreted this to mean
that the improvements in efficiency in the liberalized parts of the utility business
were having an effect on the markets that remained regulated as well.
After introducing partial liberalization (new 


























(about 30% of the 
total)
Price Regulation
• Introduction of rate 
reduction reporting
Electric utility
companies notify  
METI about 
Power Power 
Power lines of electric utility Companies
Electric utility 
New entrants (power producer and supplier, 
PPS), including out-of-district power 
METI and Fair Trade 
Commission "Guidelines on 
Independent pricing
Before introducing partial liberalization
Fig. 6 Changes in the electricity supply system due to the 1999 electricity enterprise reform. Source
Enerugi hakusho 2004 nenban, p. 118. [II-10, p. 303]
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By contrast, no significant results were apparent in the realm of stimulating com-
petition. PPSmarket share remained low, and almost no power company competition
developed across supply districts.
4.4.4 Emphasis on Developing Nuclear Power
It was in this context that interest mounted in nuclear power as a measure to address
global environmental problems, and as other new developments were not making
progress, nuclear power assumed greater weight in the overall composition of energy
sources for power generation. It also took on more significance as an energy security
policy to alleviate the effects of higher crude-oil prices, such that nuclear power
began to be regarded as effective for both environmental and energy security reasons
(Kikkawa 2011, p. 317).
However, other sorts of problems arose. First, trust in the safety of nuclear power
began to waver due to a number of accidents in nuclear power plants at home and
abroad. Second, establishment of the nuclear fuel cycle was not progressing as had
been hoped.
Regarding the first of these issues, new safety enhancements were added every
time a serious accident occurred. After the damage to the steam generation heat trans-
fer tube at Kansai Electric’s Mihama Power Station #2 in February 1991, electric
utilities strengthened their quality assurance activities, improved the reliability of
heat transfer tubes, and strengthened their voluntary security measures, for example
by improving their maintenance management measures. MITI also reviewed con-
struction plans and revised its list of items requiring inspection, as well as strength-
ening its guidance on and supervision of quality assurance measures. In response
to the criticality accident at the Tokaimura JCO Company uranium processing plant
in September 1999, the Law on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness was enacted in December, with the aim of strengthening and enhancing
nuclear safety and disaster preventionmeasures by establishing aNuclear Emergency
Response Headquarters headed by the PrimeMinister. At the same time, the revision
of the Law on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material,
and Reactors placed Nuclear Safety Inspectors at nuclear facilities and established a
system to check whether business operators were complying with safety regulations.
An organizational restructuring that contributed to a significant strengthening of
safety regulations was implemented as part of the 2001 reorganization of ministries
and agencies. The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) was established in
the Agency of Natural Resources and Energy, uniting the nuclear safety adminis-
trations variously under the jurisdiction of the Science and Technology Agency and
MITI. Just after NISAwas established, it was discovered inAugust 2002 that TEPCO
had concealed a problem, and this became a significant social issue. In December
2002, the Electricity Utilities Industry Act and the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law
were revised in order to prevent the recurrence of fraud and to introduce far-reaching
reform to nuclear safety regulations. The revisions were expected to enhance the
292 4 Long-Term Depression and Economic Structural Reform (1991–2000)
activities taken by businesses to ensure security and to bolster the effectiveness of
the safety regulations themselves.
4.4.5 Promotion of the Use of Natural Gas
In the 1990s, the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy brought a new approach
to promoting the introduction of natural gas. The “IGF (Integrated Gas Family)
21 Plan” proposed in January 1990 called for municipal gas utilities to shift from
supplying low-calorific reformed gas such as naphtha or butane, to a high-calorific
natural gas (Kikkawa 2011, p. 352). This would require modifying equipment and
establishing plants for receiving and supplying natural gas, which in turn would
require financial support. The Hokkaido Kitami City gas leak and carbon monoxide
poisoning accident in January 2007 hastened the need to shift to high-calorific gas.
The decision to increase the use of natural gas was initially due to energy security
concerns, but from the latter 1990s it was also seen as necessary from an environ-
mental point of view. The New Energy Law of April 1997 is a clear indication of
this view. In the mid-2000s, natural gas also attracted notice for economic reasons,
because the price of LNG was not rising much compared with the soaring price of
crude oil. The shift to natural gas was therefore occurring globally at this time.
Institutional reforms to promote liberalization progressed in the gas industry in
general, beginning with the revision of the Gas Utility Industry Law in June 1994.
Liberalization in the retail sector was promoted for large-scale customers whose
annual contract gas consumption exceeded 2 million cubic meters with a calorific
value of 46MJ. Large customers could choose gas suppliers, and charges and services
were left to negotiations between the parties. The scope of liberalization continued
to expand thereafter.
In November 1999, liberalization was applied to customers with annual contracts
for gas consumption of 1 million cubic meters or more and a calorific value of 46MJ,
and it became possible for the gas delivery conduits of general gas providers to also
be used by other gas suppliers.With the 1999 amendment, competition began to cross
industry barriers—the line between gas and electric or oil companies, for example—
as well as increasing among gas companies themselves. The effect of this promotion
of competition became evident in the 1995–2002 period when major gas companies
cut rates by about 8–12%. A Partial Revision of the Electric Utility Industry Law
and the Gas Utility Industry Law was made in June 2003, as part of the Electricity
Business Law and the Gas Utility Act, and institutional reform continued to advance.
The policies promoting gas liberalization were characterized by an emphasis on (1)
more active participation of new entrants and (2) general gas companies’ actively pro-
viding large-scale supply outside their own supply districts. Gas liberalization was
more successful than electric power liberalization in promoting competition. In fact,
regarding point (2), general gas providers steadily increased their large-scale supply
to areas outside their supply districts both in the number of such cases and in the
amount supplied. General gas charges began decreasing in 2002 as well.
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4.4.6 Establishment and Revision of the Act on Rationalizing Energy
Use
The Act on Rationalizing Energy Use (“Energy Conservation Act”) was revised
several times to respond to changing conditions. The second amendment, made in
March 1993, was added for the purpose of promoting energy conservation for envi-
ronmental reasons (Kikkawa 2011, p. 373). The third amendment, made in June
1998, followed on the conclusion of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and more strongly
reflected the emergence of the global warming problem. Behind MITI’s decision to
revise the Energy Conservation Act in December 1997 was the aim of strengthening
measures to secure strict energy efficiency standards in the automobile and electri-
cal equipment sectors and to encourage rationalization in the planned use of energy
in energy-consuming factories. In May 1998, the New Energy Department of the
Agency for Natural Resources and Energy called for even greater energy rationaliza-
tion in its LawsConcerning Rationalization of EnergyUse and promoted amendment
of the law in accordance with the Decision of the MITI Departmental Council.
Particularly significant in the private sector was the 1998 revision of the so-
called Top-Runner System. In principle, this established the criterion that energy
consumption efficiency be equal to or higher than the performance of themost energy-
efficient equipment among the products on the market at that time, obliging everyone
to comply with that standard.
4.5 Technology Policy: A Shift in Emphasis from Basic
Technology to Practical Applications
4.5.1 Vision of the 1990s and Industrial Technology Policy
Industrial technology policy began to focus on basic research in the 1980s. Questions
began to be raised in the 1990s about approaches to the national research institutions
and change became inevitable as subsidy systems and plans for international con-
tributions came under review. These changes took on clarity in the 1990s. That is,
because of the creation of new industries and employment issues it had prioritized
as policy issues, the tone of policy changed from “shifting to basics” to “shifting to
practical applications” (Sawai 2011, p. 43).
The Industrial Structure Council report that laid out the industrial policy vision
for the 1990s (1990s Policy Vision) proposed techno-globalism as the philosophy
to which Japan should aspire. That is, in contrast with the growing protectionist
approaches to technology (so-called techno-nationalism), Japan would now “work
to cooperate with other countries to stimulate creative activities and distribution and
relocation activities at the international level, with the goal of [contributing] the
greatest utility that science and technology can bring to humankind.” Thus the trend
toward international contributions was further strengthened.
294 4 Long-Term Depression and Economic Structural Reform (1991–2000)
“Trends and issues in industrial science and technology: towards technological
symbiosis on a global scale,” a MITI publication of 1992, asserted the importance
of promoting not only techno-globalism but also human- and environment-friendly
technology systems. Alongside the continued promotion of basic research and inter-
national contributions, environmental concerns were added to policy thinking. The
title does not refer to “industrial technology” but rather to “industrial science and
technology,” meaning that its contents focused on the relationship between science
and technology with scientific advances encouraging the development of industrial
technology and technology stimulating scientific research. The industrial technol-
ogy white paper of 1988 emphasized the close relationship between science and
technology, and given that the report saw industrial technology policy as referring
to industrial science and technology, it is evident that policy was emphasizing the
development of paths to the application of basic research. But it was in the late 1990s
that the practical applications were made a clear priority.
The Innovation Study Group, established in July 1997 as a private research group
of the MITI Industrial Policy Bureau’s Director-General, compiled an interim report
in June 1998. It suggested that technology policy should aim for a society in which
innovations follow one after another. For “a new perspective on future technology
policy,” it highlighted the following: (1) developing of technology policy aimed at
businesses and individuals; (2) restructuring the technology policy system based on
implementing innovation; (3) expanding policy targets to respond to the development
of information and services; and (4) improving research to support the formulation
of new strategies for government and enterprises. In addition, it emphasized the
importance of reflecting market needs, and “the need to move from a ‘development-
centric’ technology policy system to a focus on aspects besides technology ‘R&D’
and to develop and expand policy systems that prioritize, more than before, accurate
feedback of information from society.” In this way, the focus of industrial technology
policy shifted to applied research and practical applications.
4.5.2 The Advance of Techno-Globalism
The 1990s was marked by debate over changing the existing approaches to industrial
technology policy with an emphasis in the late 1990s on the role of government in
applied research. For example, the Planning Committee of the Industrial Technol-
ogy Council issued a report in June 1992 titled “Techno-globalism promotion and
multifaceted promotion of COE,” notable for its use of the term “COE” or “Center
of Excellence” (Sawai 2011, p. 72). COE refers to “a research hub that naturally
draws the greatest minds from around the world, and the achievements of which
are recognized globally.” The aim was to promote techno-globalism by fostering
COEs and international contributions in the fields of industrial science and technol-
ogy. Among the concrete measures were “reforms to enable original basic research,”
which referred to reform of the so-called national projects. This led to a review of
existing R&D projects in industrial science and technology and to bringing the FY
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1993 Industrial Science and Technology Frontier Program and the New Sunshine
Project to fruition.
Successive reports in the latter 1990s reflected the trend of emphasizing practical
applications. For example, the July 1996 Secretariat of the General Subcommittee
on Industrial Technology Council report titled “On issues for review in industrial
technology policy” was based on examination of the serious problems arising from
three consecutive years of decreased R&D investment. Specific industrial technology
policies included (1) strategic promotion of private R&D, (2) creation of industrial
“seeds” to bring together the strengths of industry, academia and government, (3)
institutional reform of the national research institutions, and (4) institutional reform
of the national universities. Meanwhile, another debate unfolded in the Industrial
Technology Council, on the reflections or doubts that had gradually emerged about
the “shift to basic research.” In the 31st Coordination Subcommittee in July 1996, for
example, committee members argued that “MITI had unconsciously been avoiding
government involvement in applied technology over the past ten years, due to criti-
cism from abroad, especially the US. It made its selections based on a bias toward
the assumption that basic technological development was needed…. [and] given the
sense of crisis in industry, which means that technological development is needed,
the question should actually be whether the potential for commercial applications
should be the evaluation criteria.” At the 34th Coordination Subcommittee meeting
in August 1997, the Secretariat went so far as to say, “The main emphasis should be
the forceful promotion of R&D for the creation of new industries…. The priority,
which had shifted to basic research, needs to return to industrial R&D.”
Based on discussions in the Council for Industrial Competitiveness, established
under Prime Minister Obuchi in March 1999, the Headquarters for Industrial Struc-
tural Reform compiled its report, “On emergency measures for employment and for
strengthening industrial competition.” The National Industrial Technology Strategy
Review Committee followed with the “National industrial technology strategy” in
April 2000. Based on the Industrial Technology Council’s recommendation set forth
in August 1998 in “Constructing a new industrial technology policy,” the Agency of
Industrial Science and Technology proceeded with its exploration of an “industrial
technology strategy,” the outcome of which was in turn reflected in the Industrial
Technology Council’s April 2000 report, “Industrial technology strategy (Future
directions for industrial technology policy).” The Strategy included the following
specificmeasures for building a system for internationally competitive “new-frontier”
innovation: (1) nurturing the human resources and venture businesses that are the
driving force behind technological innovation, (2) reforming the institutions that are
the starting point of technological innovation, (3) strengthening true collaboration
among industry, academia, and government to promote technological innovation, (4)
building a flexible government system to accelerate innovation, (5) developing the
foundation for support of technological innovation, and (6) forming an intellectual
society capable of technological innovation. The Strategy also called for industry,
academia and government to collaborate on industrial technology policy outside
the framework of ministries and agencies. The proposal can be seen as a plan for
establishing the necessary foundations for promoting industrial technologies linked
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to practical use. The “National Industrial Technology Strategy” was developed in
this spirit and was reflected in the Second Science and Technology Basic Plan (FY
2001–2005).
4.5.3 Intra-Governmental Coordination with the Enactment
of the Science and Technology Basic Law
In the latter 1990s, the industrial technology policy-making process was changed by
the enactment of the Science and Technology Basic Law in November 1995 (Sawai
2011, p. 106). The Law charged the government with preparing a Science and Tech-
nology Basic Plan based on Council of Science and Technology deliberations in
order to comprehensively and systematically advance policies on promoting sci-
ence and technology. The legislative measures and the plans based on them reflected
both the requests coming from university and national laboratory researchers seek-
ing improvements in the research environment and more funds for research, and the
high expectations of industry for public-sector R&D. They were concrete policies
linked with the shift to practical applications and drew on views from across the
government’s ministries. This direction was also given support in December 1996
by the Hashimoto cabinet, which presided over a change from a bottom-up to a top-
down process in policy-making. Policy developed by single ministries and agencies
in response to the prolonged and severe recession had not had much effect, lead-
ing to moves to review the bureaucracy’s traditional vertical divisions. MITI was
already collaborating with the Ministry of Education and the Science and Technol-
ogy Agency, but further intra-governmental coordination was required even from
MITI to make progress in creating new industries that would maintain and expand
employment.
4.5.4 Renewal of the Industrial Science and Technology Development
System
The early 1990s also saw continued review of the R&D project system. National
projects were examined as part of the debate on new policies for FY 1993, and
the following points emerged: (1) The system needed reorganization because the
differences were receding between the R&D of the Large-scale Research and Devel-
opment Project system (system-oriented, LRDP) and the Next-Generation Research
and Development system (elements- and materials-oriented, NGRDP); (2) active
implementation of government projects was needed for technological development
aimed at achieving comfort and affluence because of difficulties with the private sec-
tor actively taking the lead; and (3) comprehensive implementation of R&D in new
energy (Sunshine Project), energy conservation technology (Moonlight Project), and
environmental technology (especially CO2-related technology) was needed because
of the intimate relationship among these technologies. This definition of the issues
meant fundamental reform of the LRDP and NGRDP programs and comprehensive
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promotion of technology development in energy and the environment. Domestic and
international criticism formed the backdrop for these changes. In Japan, the criti-
cism was based on the awareness that Japan was lagging in its effort to catch up with
the R&D taking place in the West. Overseas, the existing approach was regarded as
unfair, because it involved subsidies to specific industries.
It was in this context that the LRDP, NGRDP, and Medical-and-Welfare Techno-
logical Development systems were integrated into the Industrial Science and Tech-
nology Frontier Program (“Industrial Technology System”) (Sawai 2011, p. 206).
The requirements for R&D targets were (1) that they involve areas of basic or inno-
vative research, or (2) that they were public, social, or welfare needs. These require-
ments were based on the idea of “shifting to basic and innovative research and to
mission-oriented technological development (for public needs).” The first was aimed
at “R&D that would provide basic technologies with significant spillover possibil-
ities for industry 20 or 30 years down the line, and at organizing the foundations
needed for promoting science and technology.” Among the approaches adopted was
a method in which R&D officers would be placed in their separate fields as defined
by existing projects. This was aimed at making it easier to reduce or scrap research
projects based on priority fields, thus reducing the significance given to the particular
framework in which the project had been carried out.
As described above, the reorganized industrial technology system was once
again reorganized in FY 1998 in line with the May 1997 “Action Plan for Eco-
nomic Structural Change and Creation” Cabinet Decision. The industrial technol-
ogy system referred to basic technology, and two new systems—“applied indus-
trial technology” and “university-linked”—were added. These three projects were
conceived of as “new industrial creation-oriented industrial science and technol-
ogy R&D.” The applied technology project was expected to support R&D at the
applied research stage, where the private sector was deterred by the high risks and
costs involved, even where the development of new creative technologies could be
expected. University-linked R&D aimed at discoveries that could lead to a flow-
ering of new industrialization. R&D under the new system applied to six sectors,
including new materials, biotechnology, electronics–information–communications,
machinery–aviation–space, people–life–society, and medical care and welfare.
Eight new projects were undertaken in the industrial technology system described
above from FY 1994–1997 (until the reorganization), in the fields of new materials,
biotechnology, electronics, information, communications, machinery, aerospace and
space. Despite the vigorous development of these projects, it was clear from a survey
of 500 companies conducted in 1999 that most companies that participated in the
national projects had higher hopes of the subsidies than of the collaborative research.
4.5.5 Reform of the National Innovation System
From the late 1990s, the national innovation system underwent a major transforma-
tion due to greater industry–academia collaboration, itself the result of the sense of
crisis at the decline of international industrial competitiveness (Sawai 2011, p. 226).
The change was also an example of the priority placed on practical application.
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TheAgencyof Industrial Science andTechnologybelieved that the key to respond-
ing to the hollowing out of the industry was to create new industrial fields. It had
been promoting a “regional consortium R&D system” since 1997 to foster regional
enterprises that could be relevant around the world. Utilizing the existing technol-
ogy “seeds”—national laboratories, universities and others—to promote R&Daimed
at commercialization, these institutions and private companies together constituted
a regional consortium. The recipient of government subsidies was not a specific
business operator but the consortium itself, called New Energy and Industrial Tech-
nology Development Organization (NEDO), and a committee of outside judges was
established to provide expert evaluation of the projects (Table 8).
The Law on Promotion of Transfer of Research Results on Technologies at
Universities to Private Business Operators (“Technology Licensing Organization
























1980 17,138 111,430 128,568
1981 38,160 220,019 258,179
1982 53,262 109,559 5,538 168,359
1983 55,152 89,859 13,046 158,057
1984 54,425 85,924 15,994 156,343
1985 60,263 79,696 12,893 152,852
1986 63,158 76,883 13,935 153,976
1987 67,322 194,311 9,212 270,845
1988 63,335 4,725 1,500 193,358 8,048 270,966
1989 67,499 15,137 2,200 161,996 9,334 256,166
1990 70,241 20,336 2,200 129,061 10,303 232,141
1991 60,884 25,536 2,400 97,432 10,843 197,095
1992 66,200 30,144 700 126,246 11,658 234,948
1993 79,808 36,421 2,400 99,034 11,635 229,298
1994 78,684 36,627 700 98,117 10,315 224,443
1995 97,506 24,877 92,850 9,544 224,777
1996 97,623 32,183 91,931 79,978 10,155 311,870
1997 95,203 41,056 92,240 81,937 11,796 322,232
1998 123,284 55,247 31,603 82,819 12,282 305,235
1999 147,007 68,908 24,760 59,209 12,602 312,486
2000 152,570 92,862 23,039 89,928 13,041 371,440
Source Sawai (2011, pp. 282–283)
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(TLO) Law”) was passed in May 1998 and came into effect in August. It set out
government support for Technology Licensing Organizations acting as intermedi-
aries for transferring the technology and research results of universities and other
institutions to private enterprises. Support measures included: (1) utilizing the Facili-
tation Fund for Industrial Structural Adjustment to give debt guarantees, issue grants,
and provide information for university technology-transfer projects, and (2) utiliz-
ing the special measures of investment by Small and Medium Business Investment
and Consultation Co., Ltd. for venture- and small and medium-sized enterprises to
make use of the results of university research. Previously, when university research
was put into practical use, the private enterprise involved in a collaborative research
exchange with the university applied for its own patent for the invention, and the
research lab accepted the company’s researchers into the lab and offered technical
advice on the invention, receiving donations of scholarship funds from the compa-
nies in exchange. However, this framework invited criticism because its methods of
transferring research were not systematic and SMEs could find themselves excluded.
The TLO Law sought to address such concerns.
Evaluation of the National Projects also became stricter in the 1990s. A techni-
cal evaluation office was established in the General Coordination Division of the
Agency of Industrial Science and Technology in October 1996 to pull together the
post-project evaluations issued by the various departments. This was reorganized in
July 1997 into the Evaluation Division, and added to its duties were the operation
andmanagement of the technical evaluation system covering the entireministry. This
was intended to clarify even further the distinction between the promotion and the
evaluation departments. Meanwhile, in August 1997, MITI issued “Technical Evalu-
ation Guidelines” in accordance with the “Guidelines for Implementing Evaluations
Common to All National R&D” compiled by the Science and Technology Council in
July. Formulated in January, the Guidelines promoted stricter evaluation. The Guide-
lines were based on (1) transparency, (2) neutrality, (3) continuity, (4) effectiveness,
and so on. The intermediate evaluation to be conducted byAugust 1998was designed
to stop technically obsolete development and to establish priorities for development
goals.
4.5.6 Promotion of the New Sunshine Project
In addition to the Sunshine andMoonlight Projects, each laboratory of the Agency of
Industrial Science and Technology launched “Research and Development on Global
Environmental Technology” beginning in 1989, to address carbon dioxide problems.
Since the result was the emergence of parallel technologies, the National Institute
of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology on May 25, 1992, suggested the
following: “Because energy and environmental technology development (especially
CO2-related) are closely related, our new energy (Sunshine Project), energy con-
servation (Moonlight Project) and global environmental technology development
projects should be integrated and a comprehensive R&D program promoted for
basic and applied research.” In December, the Industrial Technology Council’s New
300 4 Long-Term Depression and Economic Structural Reform (1991–2000)
Energy Technology Development and Energy Conservation Technology Develop-
ment subcommittees, and the Joint Planning Committee of the Global Environment
Technology Committee held a “Mid-term Seminar” that compiled a report titled
“Comprehensive Development of the New Sunshine Project to Support the 21st
Century.” This led to the establishment of the integrated “New Sunshine Project” in
FY 1993 (Sawai 2011, p. 267).
The plan consisted of (1) innovative technology development: steadily acceler-
ating promotion, in an internationally open regime, of innovative energy and envi-
ronmental technology development projects aimed at realizing the “Action Plan for
Preventing Global Warming,” (2) large-scale international research: promotion of
large-scale international collaborative research aimed at advancing the “New Earth
21” Program, and (3) collaborative research on appropriate technologies: advancing
collaborative research programs on energy and environment-related technologies to
support the easing of energy and environmental constraints in developing countries
neighboring Japan. From FY 1993–2000, a total of 3.547 billion yen of national
funds went into the projects. Among the largest research areas were coal liquefac-
tion and gasification technology (838 million yen), solar energy (648 million yen),
and geothermal energy (289 million yen). The system underwent reform in FY 1997
to stipulate: (1) an R&D period limited in principle to five years, (2) maintenance of
a competitive and efficient research implementation system, and (3) the construction
of a strict evaluation system (Table 9).
4.5.7 Reorganization of the New Energy Development Organization
The New Energy Development Organization (NEDO) was reorganized based on the
May 1988 Law Concerning the Improvement of the System of Research and Devel-
opment in the Field of Industrial Technology (effective December 1989) (Sawai
2011, p. 281). As a result, management and operations, international industrial
technology-related businesses, and research infrastructure improvement projects that
had been variously part of the Large Projects, Next-Generation Technology, and
Welfare Equipment Technology R&D were brought into the Industrial Technol-
ogy R&D Department. The Industrial Technology Department was composed of
an R&D Section, an International Collaborative Research Section, and a Research
Infrastructure Development Section.
Industrial technology-related tasks were added to NEDO, which was respon-
sible for the development of new energy, and NEDO became the New Energy and
Industrial TechnologyDevelopment Organization (theNEDOabbreviation remained
unchanged). The reorganization occurred because the management burden of the
National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology was excessive
given the large number of research associations. Given also that the majority of these
involved joint research with the private sector, NEDO was given responsibility for
coordinating among them. A further aim involved lifting the research funds for the
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national projects outside the “ceiling” framework. The Industrial TechnologyDepart-
ment, having overcome the initial problem of securing human resources, added new
projects in the 1990s as well as integrating existing R&D projects with one another,
and promoted a range of R&D.
Among the above measures on energy, the promotion of new energy had the
following results: The ratio of “new energy, etc.” to the total primary energy supply
did not meet the targets of 1.0% in 1980, 1.3% in 1990, or 1.1% in 2000. However,
as evident in the spread of solar power, it is clear that efforts to develop new energy
have seen steady progress.
4.5.8 Aligning Japanese Industrial Standards (JIS) with International
Standards
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) came into effect
in January 1995 as part of the WTO Agreements (Sawai 2011, p. 388). This Agree-
ment, which inherited and built on the GATT Code of Conduct, aimed to ensure
than any given country’s standards and conformity assessment systems are not more
trade restrictive than necessary to achieve a legitimate objective. Countries were
required to adhere to the principle of non-discrimination between domestic and for-
eign businesses in applying systems, such as ensuring transparencywhen formulating
standards or using international standards. Inevitably it became necessary to abide
by the TBT agreement, and therefore ensuring Japanese Industrial Standards’ (JIS)
consistency with international standards became an urgent matter. Meanwhile, the
US–European summit meeting of December 1995 triggered many proposals from
US and European industries regarding standardization policy.
Against this backdrop, Japan revised its Industrial Standardization Law again in
March 1997. The revision entailed a zero-based review of JIS enactment procedures
and of certification systems such as the JIS mark, and so on. The first involved
a comprehensive inspection of standards from FY 1997–1999 based on the Japan
Industrial Standards Committee’s December 1996 report titled “On reviewing the
industrial standards system.” For all 5,200 standards under review, a zero-based
review was conducted regarding the relevant ministries, bureaus, industrial associa-
tions and users. This led to the abolition of 465 standards by FY 1999. The change
was based not only on the international harmonization, but also on changes in the
emphasis on standardization in the 1990s that led policy to reflect the points of view
not only of efficiency and quality improvements in production but also of an aging and
welfare-oriented society, consumers, the global environment, advanced technology,
and so on.
4.5.9 Toward an Ideal National Examination Research Institution
In January 1990, the Agency of Industrial Science and Technology decided to review
the system of test laboratories with an eye to the future (Sawai 2011, p. 408). The
decisionwas taken because basic and original researchwere expected to become only
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more important, and “The need is growing for a review of the research system from
the long-term point of view, so that the Research Institutes of theAgency of Industrial
Science and Technology, which are not only a venue for promoting industry for the
21st century, but are also backed by basic and original research, can serve as a base
for providing the seeds of research in our country.” The Agency Decision called
for (1) improvement of the system in the areas of goods and materials research and
biological and ergonomic research, (2) improvement of research related to global
environmental issues and to resources, security, and so on. A Review Committee
was established in April and its final report, also issued in April 1992, called for a
reorganization of the National Chemical Laboratory for Industry, the Fermentation
Research Institute, theResearch Institute for Polymers andTextiles, and the Industrial
Products Research Institute. Three new institutes were proposed for establishment
by January 1993: the Institute for Materials Science, the Institute for Biotechnology,
and the Institute for Industrial Science and Technology.
Along with these reforms, a “Competitive R&D System” was established for
industrial technology in 1997. Researchers at national research institutes were asked
for research themes, and based on review by outside experts, research funds were
allocated to the proposals deemed most effective for research. In 1999, the “in-
dustry–academia–government collaborative competitive R&D system” was estab-
lished in recognition of the need for collaborative research by the three sectors.
These represented the search for ways to utilize research resources more effectively.
Meanwhile, the December 1997 “Final Report” by the Hashimoto Cabinet’s
Administrative Reform Council determined that the 15 laboratories and the five labs
under the Science and Technology Agency could become administratively indepen-
dent. The Agency of Industrial Science and Technology responded immediately and
in July 1998 established the “Industrial Technology Research Deliberation Office” to
explore ideal approaches to a post-administrative-reform industrial technology sys-
tem and to the establishment of a system for independent administrative corporations.
In 1999, the office was reorganized into the “Industrial Technology Research Organi-
zation Development Promotion Office.” The promotion office set up seven working
groups, including a Basic Principles Working Group to advance these propositions.
The Basic PrinciplesWorkingGroup issued its final report inMarch 2001. The report
pointed out seven broad problems with the Institute of Advanced Industrial Science
and Technology. The main issues were that: (1) the social role and mission of the
institute was not clear, (2) the Institute’s selection of appropriate research subjects,
setting of goals, and intensive introduction of research resources were inadequate,
(3) it did not adequately understand the needs of the citizens and industry that should
be the beneficiaries of a national institute, and the cases of research with no vision
of an exit was increasing, and (4) the R&D capacity of industry had improved and
the role of the research institute as a core for R&D was ambiguous, and so on.
The report suggested various ways of overcoming these issues, based on the
following thinking:
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To have a clear division of labor as expressed in our very terminology—academic, mean-
ing basic research, government (National Institute), meaning applied research, and industry,
meaning research on practical uses—is inefficient from the point of view of national invest-
ment in research. For this reason, we believe that the need will grow greater and greater for
[someone] to assume the role of overseeing R&D from the entry point of technology (in
former wording, “basic research”) to the exit (practical use). The national laboratory, which
formerly served as a bridge between academia and industry, is in the optimal position to fill
this role.
The National Institute was thus expected to help bring vitality to the national
innovation system by acting as a link among academia, industry, and government
and keeping an eye on the entire process from basic research to practical application,
or entry to exit. In concrete terms, this meant changing the framework of the National
Institute. The 15 research labs under the old Institute and the 16 organizations of the
Weights and Measures Training Institute together became the National Institute of
Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST).
As discussed above, R&D activities had either been conducted by the national
government itself at national laboratories or commissioned. Collaborative research in
commissioned research was conducted under the Large-scale Research andDevelop-
ment Project system, the Next-Generation Research and Development system, Sun-
shine, and Moonlight Projects, and financed by subsidies, investment and financing
systems, tax credit systems, and other means.
However, these various policy tools had to change after the 1980s. Low inter-
est rates persisted, but their significance declined as companies diversified their
sources of financing; meanwhile, subsidy administration declined greatly due to seri-
ous technical conflicts. In addition, the methods governing commissioned research
also came under review, and the overall restructuring of the industrial technology sys-
tem, including the New Sunshine Project and others, was forwarded. The catch-up
period ended in many sectors as did the era of high-speed growth, and as expressed
in the Industrial Structure Council’s call for “original and autonomous technological
development” in its Vision of the 1980s, industrial technology policy as a feature of
a developed country came into question.
In such an environment, it was not easy to decide on a set of “national” principles
for industrial technology policy. Around 1999, the shift to “basic technology” pro-
moted in the 1980s was recognized to have little chance of succeeding, first, because
of the unavoidable inadequacy of basic research in a period of persistent trade fric-
tion and second, because the research could not immediately help in creating new
products. This led to the question of what direction should be given the national
projects, which had been selected through intricate information exchanges with sep-
arate industries. In other words, it revealed the difficulty of deriving a “national”
point of view by bundling individual projects together.
In fact, the same problems arose even in the later stage when the emphasis had
shifted to practical applications. For example, the “Public Application System for
Proposals to Create New Industries” aimed to maintain and expand employment in
the latter 1990s, but it proved difficult to devise concrete measures for its princi-
ples. Conversely, even programs like the Sunshine Project, which were linked with
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resources and energy policy and therefore had clear strategic importance, proved lim-
ited as seen in the gap between the results and the original aims. Precisely because
its goals were clear, its results were subject to harsh questions and left an impression
of inadequacy. In that sense, just discovering “national” tasks was not necessarily
enough.
As the trend in policy continued to shift from basic research to research for
practical use, various reforms were sought such as the reorganization of the national
institutes, as well as subsidies for joint research and plans for research cooperatives
However, the significance of collaborative research itself was not lost just because
of changes in the systems of collaborative research. Rather, strategic technologies
were decided on through joint research. Most private enterprises were not blessed
with resources enough to pursue strategic technologies on their own. Therefore,
although reviewing policy measures was important, it was also important to continue
to question the role of industrial technology policy in response to the changing
international environment and science and technology. Strategies were needed for
finding Japanese institutions’ comparative advantages for maintaining employment
and creatively expanding it, and the ideal nature of the industrial technology policy
was therefore a matter of debate.
4.6 New Trends in Pro-Patent Policy
4.6.1 Patent Law Revision
The intellectual property system was subject to mounting demands in the 1990s,
and its role expanded as a result. Japan’s position as a leading economy was only
getting stronger, and if it intended to develop its competitiveness further, it would
have to launch state-of-the-art technology and ideas on its own. The importance of
intellectual innovation in technology was increasing dramatically, along with the
importance of “information” and the advance of “globalization.” This recognition
was strengthened by the fact that the TRIPS Agreement came into force in 1995 and
various domestic reforms thereupon came to an end (Nakayama 2013, p. 26).
The Roundtable to Consider Intellectual Property Rights in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury was established as a private advisory body to the Commissioner of the Patent
Office in December 1996. Its April 1997 report said that innovation in “information”
systems and “globalization” were the two forces that would be key in the twenty-
first century and pointed out that, in order to overcome the problems that would arise
from the development of science and technology in this environment, intellectual
property, beginning with technology, needed to be “created,” that creation needed to
be “protected” as a clear right, and that intellectual property needed to be sufficiently
“used.” Furthermore, the profits acquired through that use needed to be invested to
create new intellectual property, in order to build an “intellectual creation cycle.”
The report also noted that although theUnited States had emphasized “intellectual
property rights” since the 1980s, Japan’s recognition of the idea remained poor, and
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that a shift to a “pro-patent” policy, meaning a policy of active support for patents,
was needed. Eight recommendations were made to define “a direction for future
intellectual property rights”: (1) “broad protection” for intellectual property rights,
(2) “strong protection,” (3) “promotion of the intellectual property rights” of univer-
sities and laboratories, (4) the establishment of a “patent market,” (5) realization
of “electronic patents,” (6) promotion of “cooperation with developing countries,”
(7) establishment of a path to “a common world patent,” and (8) national efforts on
“intellectual property rights policy.”
Based on this report, various reforms were pursued. First, the Patent Law was
amended twice in the late 1990s (Nakayama 2013, p. 227) and with the amendments,
the Patent Law and Utility Model Law differed greatly in character from the prior
laws. This was because their purpose nowwas not only to ensure the prompt granting
of rights and protection, but also to increase the value of the intellectual property
right itself. The change reflected Japan’s status as a front-runner and the emerging
policy issue of how to raise the value of intellectual property rights and thereby
promote innovation for the country as awhole. InApril 1997, theSystemCommittee’s
Subcommittee for Damages in the Industrial Property Council began deliberating
on these questions and in December issued a report that led to systemic reform
(Nakayama 2013, p. 283). The chief revision in theMay 1998 amended law involved
review of the question of civil remedies. The aim was to address those situations
where infringement of patent rights was hard to prove. In the system as designed, a
person who took actions that might be infringement but continued business as usual
as long as the infringement was not discovered might even upon discovery only have
to pay the amount equivalent to the usual royalty fee, although after the fact. Revision
of the rule would make it easier to prove a loss of profits and determine an amount
equivalent to the implementation costs under the specific circumstances in question,
but this would also require a review of criminal penalties.
Thus even where the legal provisions on acts of infringement and on damages
were eased, it was not actually easy to collect evidence from the infringing party.
The need arose, therefore, for ways to enable plaintiffs to gather proof for legal
proceedings. Under the revised law of March 1999, rules were established to make
it harder for “infringers” to deny redress by pleading the right to maintain trade
secrets. The period for requesting an appeal was also reduced from a maximum of
seven years to three years. The aim was to shorten the grace period in which the
patent applicant could consider whether to review the right under which the patent
application was filed so as to minimize the length of time during which the rights
themselves were uncertain. This was intended to pave the way for third parties to
utilize the technology in question.
Revisions continued to bemade to the PatentAct andUtilityModel Lawafter 2000
as well. The “pro-patent” policy meant reforms to enable a strong, broad, and rapid
means of protecting technological inventions and ideas, including a 2002 expan-
sion of provisions for indirect infringement and 2004 rules strengthening criminal
penalties for infringement.
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4.6.2 Revision of the Design and Trademark Laws
Second was revision of the Design Law. In the late 1990s, “design” came to be
regarded as an important element in a product’s appeal and competitiveness. How-
ever, the existing laws on design had not undergone significant revision since 1984,
and not only were they inadequate for addressing the diversification of design devel-
opment, but skillful imitations had also become a concern as having a deleterious
effect on investment in design (Nakayama 2013, p. 311). For this reason, the Design
Subcommittee was added to the Industrial Property Council in April 1997. Based on
the Subcommittee’s report, the revised Patent Law of May 1998 included protection
of partial designs. Design development had shifted increasingly to the creation of
parts of products. This enabled greater added value and product differentiation. Imi-
tations of partial designs had increased, too, creating a greater need for protection.
The requirements were made more stringent to ensure that the products were not
something that anyone could easily make. The revisions went further, attempting to
improve protection so as to conform to the “pro-patent” policy. A revised law was
announced in June 2006 that extended the duration of design rights and expanded
protection to include on-screen design, among other measures.
Third was amendment of the Trademark Law (Nakayama 2013, p. 321). With
the growing internationalization of economic activity in the 1990s, harmonization
and simplification of the trademark system became an important issue. At the Diplo-
matic Conference for Adoption of the Amended Convention on Trademark Law held
in Geneva in 1994, the Trademark Law Treaty (TLT) was adopted with the aim of
overcoming these issues, and Japan had to respond accordingly. At the same time,
the problem emerged in Japan of a narrowed range of trademark options due to
the accumulation of unused trademarks. A revised Law was published in December
1996 taking these issues into account. The following revisions were made to respond
to the Treaty on Trademark Law. (1) The introduction of a multi-division applica-
tion system: Japanese Trademark Law prescribed the principle of a single application
specifying the designated goods or services “within the classes of goods and services
specified by Cabinet Order,” and any number of products or services could be desig-
nated so long as they fell within that class. The Trademark Law Treaty, by contrast,
required permitting the use of multi-class applications, making revision of Japanese
law necessary. This simplified the procedure so that the applicant did not need to pre-
pare a separate application for each classification.Other revisions to theLaw involved
(2) simplifying the items to be written in the application form, (3) eliminating the
substantive examination formerly required upon renewal and of the confirmation of
the use of the registered trademark, and (4) simplifying proxy procedures. The revi-
sions of measures to address inactive trademarks included an improvement in the
trial system for removing unused trademarks that aimed to strengthen procedures for
checking on possession of inactive trademarks from the point of view of the public
interest. Other improvements included ensuring the prompt granting of trademark
rights, which was made necessary by the shortened life cycle of goods and services;
improved protections for “well-known trademarks” (nationally known trademarks
308 4 Long-Term Depression and Economic Structural Reform (1991–2000)
with high credibility); introduction of the three-dimensional trademark system; and
introduction of the collective trademark system.
The Trademark Law was revised again in 1999. The aim was to promote the cre-
ation of a domestic mechanism to align with the Madrid Protocol, which established
an international trademark registration system. The Protocol Relating to the Madrid
Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks (“Madrid Protocol”)
was the result of a growing call for the international protection of trademarks and,
adopted in June 1989, it came into effect in December 1995. Institutional measures
were launched in April 1996. In response, preparations were made for the provi-
sions accompanying the Treaty and for legislation on the trademark review period.
Additionally, a system of Regional Organization Trademarks was introduced and
revisions were made to protect regional branding.
Amendments to the Unfair Competition Prevention Law were also made in the
latter 1990s to improve the intellectual property system, and software protection was
promoted as well. Regarding protections for software, the Patent Office formulated
“Operational Guidelines for Computer/Software Related Inventions” in February
1997, so that “recording Media for recording computer programs” became subject
to patent. Furthermore, in December 2000, the “Criteria for Inventions Relating
to Computer/Software” were revised, and it was clearly stated that those computer
programs thatwere not recorded on recordedmediawould also be treated as “invented
things.” This judgment was given legal clarification by the 2002 revision of the Patent
Law. Intellectual property rights pertaining to software were thus improved within
the framework of the Patent Law.
In February 2002, Prime Minister Jun’ichiro Koizumi announced that a Strategy
Council on Intellectual Property would be established and the necessary policy mea-
sures advanced, and in accordancewith this policy and theCouncil’s deliberations, an
“Outline on Intellectual Property Policy” was formulated, leading to the enactment
of the Basic Law on Intellectual Property in March 2003.
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of a Twenty-First-Century Policy
on the Economy and Industry
1 Establishment of the Ministry on Economy, Trade
and Industry (METI)
The government carried out a major reorganization of bureaucratic administration in
January 2001, andMITI’s name was changed toMETI:Ministry of Economy, Trade,
and Industry. The reorganization was in effect a reflection of the administrative and
financial reforms that accompanied the deregulation of the 1980 and 1990s and that
appeared in the Administrative Reform Council’s “Final Report” of 1997.
1.1 The Administrative Reform Council’s “Final Report”
The December 1997 “Final Report” of the Administrative ReformCouncil explained
the “reasons for the need to undertake administrative reform” in terms of the “prin-
ciples and aims of administrative reform,” which it defined first as: “to reconstruct
‘how this country does things’ with the aim of forming a freer and fairer society
while building on Japan’s achievements thus far.” Specifically, it pointed out that the
advances made by Japan’s economy during rapid growth “had created the precious
‘asset’ of economic prosperity, but had also left a legacy of enormous debt, sym-
bolized by a fiscal debt that had swelled to 400 or even 500 trillion yen; that stage
is already retreating into the past.” This raised the following issues: “As a result of
many years of striving for an industrial society modeled on those of the West, Japan
has become enveloped in an array of national regulations, conventions, and practices
that have rendered society extremely uniform and rigid”; furthermore, “the steady
growth of Japan’s economy has come to an end, and people’s values have diversified
as society has matured; thus, the same systems that in the past stimulated people’s
will to work hard and invigorated society are today if anything promoting structures
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of dependence, reinforcing the sense that Japan is a closed society, and impeding the
people’s creative will and spirit of challenge.” In short, what was being sought was
“a revision of the postwar administrative system [so as to build] autonomous indi-
viduals, and a shift to a 21st-century administrative system appropriate for forming
a freer and fairer society.”
These critiques of existing conditions led to the establishment of the following
goals. “In order to rebuild ‘the way things are done in this country,’ what we need first
and foremost is to reform government organizations, which have become excessively
large and rigid, and to realize a streamlined, efficient, and transparent government
suitable for effectively carrying out important national functions.” The Report thus
called for reflection, in line with these goals, as to “whether the bureaucracy was
not interfering excessively in various aspects of people’s lives.” “The policies and
regulations designed to protect the people’s interest have become increasingly self-
referential, with the result that they increasingly defend only the vested interests of
certain people, that conflicts and contradictions between different policy objectives
are handled internally without transparency, or that resolutions to problems are sim-
ply put off.” The Report concluded that in order to rectify this situation, the core of
administrative reform must now focus on “the rigidity of the policy planning depart-
ments that were bound by the interests and constraints of a given project; inefficient
implementation [of policy] that neglected the convenience of the user; the unclear and
closed policy-making process and the absence of an evaluative or feedback function;
and the failure of the overall adjustment function due to an exclusive and inviolable
system of jurisdictions in which ministries and agencies are divided vertically and
are not permitted to speak out about areas in other administrative jurisdictions.” The
Report recommended that the following mechanisms and characteristics be the goal
of reform to build a “21st-century administrative system appropriate for forming a
free and fair society”:
First, ensuring a comprehensive and strategic approach. It is absolutely essential to be able
to respond quickly to the moment-by-moment changes that sometimes occur in the internal
and external environment and to the varied and sometimes contradictory policy issues that
arise, to look at the entire picture of domestic and international politics and society, to make
comprehensive and strategic judgments about which values to prioritize given the times and
the issues at hand, and to make bold decisions on values and plan policy accordingly.
Second, stressing maneuverability. The decision-making process must be speeded up dra-
matically, first in order to ensure that urgent and national tasks such as crisis management
and security are addressed without omissions and second, to prevent, across all government
administration, the folly of straying from the policy decision mechanism.
Third, ensuring transparency. Fairness in policy judgments requires transparency regard-
ing decision-making responsibilities. Also, given that this is an era of rapid change, the
demand for infallibility, imposed only on government administration, can lead to break-
downs, delays, and postponements of policy decisions. Do the times not require that we
change our assumptions, recognize that government administration might err, and adopt a
perspective that allows for and promotes constant policy evaluation and change along with
free competition on policy matters among the public and the private sectors?
Fourth, pursuing efficiency and simplicity, goals that are both old and new. Psychological
theorizing is insufficient to achieve this aim. We need to create a new administrative system
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in which markets and society can constantly monitor the efficiency of administration and in
which efficiency is considered among the most essential tasks.
The Report’s specific prescriptions included the following: (1) a dramatic expan-
sion of the functions of the Prime Minister’s Official Residence and the Cabinet
to ensure comprehensive and strategic policy-making, including the planning and
proposal of basic policies, and to improve the capacity for comprehensive coordina-
tion on important policies; (2) separation of the policy-making and implementation
functions and introduction of a reorganized system of mutual recommendations by
ministries and agencies divided along functional lines; (3) ensuring transparency,
beginning with administration; and (4) improving administrative efficiency—uti-
lizing private-sector capacity through a complete public- and private-sector joint
reexamination of projects and through the establishment of a system of independent
administrative agencies.
1.2 METI’s “Organization Plan”
A major Central Government Reform was thus implemented in January 2001, reor-
ganizing 22 ministries and agencies into one Cabinet Office and 10 ministries (Min-
istry of Internal Affairs and Communications; Ministry of Justice; Ministry of For-
eign Affairs; Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science
and Technology; Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare; Ministry of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries; Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI); Ministry
of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT); Ministry of the Environ-
ment) and two agencies (National Public Agency; Defense Agency). The Finan-
cial Reconstruction Commission and seven agencies were eliminated (Management
and Coordination Agency; Hokkaido Development Agency; Economic Planning
Agency; Science and Technology Agency; Environment Agency; Okinawa Devel-
opment Agency; National Land Agency). Under the 1998 Basic Law on Central
Government Reform, Article 21 (“Organization Plan”) for the newly established
METI laid out the following aims:
1. To promote economic structural reform
2. To develop industrial policy based on the following:
a. To stop pursuing measures to promote specific industries or redistribute
income among industries, or to reduce such practices and shift to policies
that respect market principles.
b. To focus on interdisciplinary policies such as the formulation and improve-
ment of rules on economic transactions in themarket, protection of industrial
property rights, and policy-making across industry lines regarding technol-
ogydevelopment, and to promote the smooth transformation of the industrial
structure.
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3. To actively contribute to the formation of a new international economic order
through regional or multilateral frameworks on industrial and trade policy, and
to develop measures for international coordination regarding industry.
4. To reduce administration designed to protect SMEs or SME organizations,
instead strengthening the role of regional bodies and improving the environment
to encourage the creation of new industries.
5. To strengthen the role of Japan’s regions and to reduce the involvement of the
central government in measures to promote regional economies and industries.
6. To develop energy policy based on the following:
a. a focus on measures for energy conservation and new energy.
b. a significant elimination or mitigation of regulations designed to make
supply-and-demand adjustments among business operators.
c. a strengthening of policies on crisis management and the links with
environmental policy.
d. a determination of appropriate directions for future nuclear development
and use.
7. To set government policy priorities regarding technological development.
8. With regard to the Economic and Fiscal PolicyAdvisoryCouncil’s deliberations
on basic policy governing the operation of the economy as awhole, to participate
as needed for those deliberations in developing plans from the perspective of
industrial policy, structural reform of the economy, and the maintenance and
strengthening of private sector vitality.
9. To assume the functions of the former Ministry of International Trade and
Industry on information and communicationswithout any change to the division
of functions between it and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.
10. The Fair Trade Commission will continue to be responsible for a policy on
competition that is centered on antitrust policy, which will not be taken over by
the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.
11. Regarding technological development through theLarge-ScaleProject andother
programs, the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology will be respon-
sible chiefly for academic research and scientific research, and METI will be
responsible chiefly for commercialization and practical applications.
12. The Ministry of Education, Science and Technology will be responsible for
academic and scientific research on the technological development of nuclear
power, and METI will be responsible for areas related to energy use.
13. METI will conduct the primary review of regulations to ensure the safety of
nuclear power for energy uses, and the Nuclear Safety Commission will carry
out the secondary review.
14. Reviews will be conducted of the Ministry’s internal organization, such as the
sections responsible for promoting specific industries, based on changes in
industrial policy.
The major difference between METI and its predecessor, MITI, was found in the
fact that “promotion of economic structural reform” headed the list of priorities of
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the organizational plan. Structural reform of the general economy and of trade and
industrial policy was therefore established as a major task of policy. At the same
time, in the section on industrial policy that followed, Clause 2, Item (a) called on
theMinistry to “stop pursuing measures to promote specific industries or redistribute
income among industries, or to reduce the practice, and to shift to policies that
respect market principles,” which meant, for example, as cited in Clause 4, “reducing
administration designed to protect SMEs or SME organizations.” In other words,
industrial policy to address social gaps or terminal care for declining industries was
low on the list of METI policy priorities.
Clauses 1–7 set out the main issues in economic and industrial policy, with 60
items in the Law for the Establishment of theMinistry of Economy, Trade and Indus-
try detailing the extent of administrative authority. Clauses 9 and beyond addressed
coordination with other ministries and agencies on policies concerning telecommu-
nications, competition, technology, nuclear energy, nuclear energy safety, and so on,
but these did not constitute any major change from previous policies. One of the
chief concerns of the reform was for the visions and principles pertaining to the
economy and society and for structural reform itself to take the information industry
fully into account. Given this, the explicit statement that the jurisdictional divisions
in telecommunications were to remain unchanged (meaning METI involvement was
to be restricted) undeniably represented a certain lack of vision and suggests that the
reform was less than comprehensive.
2 Trade and Industrial Policy at the Turn of the Century
2.1 Policy Development in Anticipation of Organizational
Reform
Article 21 Paragraph 14 of the Basic Law on Reform of the Central Government
Ministries and Agencies called for “ reviews… of the Ministry’s internal organiza-
tion, such as the sections responsible for promoting specific industries.” This meant
seeking the dissolution of the “window guidance” that was so particular a feature of
traditional industrial policy. The 1973 organizational reform had already taken this
path to some extent, and industrial policy increasingly cut across specific industries
with the vertical, industry-specific form of organization seen as inapt for the purpose.
Under these circumstances, as repeatedly pointed out above, “market-intervention
industrial policy” became less and less the preferred solution to issues from the 1980s
on, as the preference became “an approach to policy that respects and promotes the
market mechanism.” A typical manifestation of this change was in the relationship
with the Japan Fair Trade Commission. Until the high growth period, MITI often
conflicted with the FTC over the operation of the Antimonopoly Law; approvals of
intra-industry collaboration were regarded as valuable policy measures, and ways
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were therefore found to establish exemption legislation, administrative guidance,
and other measures.
This thinking changed dramatically in the first half of the 1980s, however, to a new
emphasis in domestic industrial policy on promoting competition and ceding coor-
dination to the scope of voluntary action by companies. According to the 1978–1983
Industry Stabilization Law (officially the Law on Temporary Measures for Stabi-
lization of Specified Depressed Industries), plants were supposed to be closed and
companies merged under publicly authorized rules to address the post-oil crisis issue
of structurally depressed industries. The 1983–1988 Structural Improvement Law
(Temporary Measures Law for the Structural Adjustment of Specific Industries) that
followed, however, took a different approach based on the “SixYamanaka Principles”
presented in its formulation: (1) contraction and revitalization (2) reduced influence
on employment and regional economies (3) implementation of comprehensive mea-
sures, (4) respect for private-sector autonomy, (5) focus on policies for competition
and adherence to open systems, (6) time-limit on policy responses. The new approach
stressed due regard for the actual circumstances of the private sector (designating
industries based on private-sector applications) rather than regulating imports, and
undertaking preliminary negotiation with the FTC but not granting exemptions to
application of the Antitrust Law. The last of these represented a major change in the
relationship with the Antitrust Law, and policy shifted in the direction of supporting
autonomous responses, including corporate mergers, at the company level.
Thus industrial policy came to focus less on industries than on the enterprise
system and corporate organization. In the 1990s, direct engagement in advance in
corporate mergers and combinations was replaced by “rule-based” policies, mean-
ing the proposal of rules to govern policies on competition (such as reviewing the
standards for examining mergers). This was evident in the June 1993 “interim com-
pilation” (based on deliberations of the Industrial Structure Council’s Fundamental
Issues Subcommittee), which proposed institutional reform (for example, for pure
holding companies, greater flexibility in the labor market, and so on) in its review of
Japan’s economic system.
These changes were moreover reinforced by overseas criticism of Japan’s indus-
trial policy, and on the fact that the Japan–US Structural Impediments Initiative (SII)
talks in 1989–1990 had attributed the closed nature of Japan’s economy to industrial
policy. The trade problems that underlay these changes had, beginning in the late
1970s, pointed to Japan’s responsibility as an “economic superpower,” and Japan’s
large trade surplus was henceforth perceived as a problem. Japan and the United
States had already seen friction over Japanese textile products, but with friction aris-
ing over one sector after another, including steel, semiconductors, and automobiles,
measures for resolving the bilateral trade imbalance often took the form of voluntary
restraints by Japan. At the same time, countries in Europe and America seeking to
export to Japan strongly criticized the Japanese market as “closed,” and demanded
market opening and expansion of the import framework not only for manufactured
goods but for primary products as well. Various domestic industry regulations that
had been singled out as non-tariff barriers were relaxed and amended to comply with
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shared international rules. Overseas pressure meant that regulatory reforms were
implemented first in those sectors involved with trade. Industry relied heavily on
exports and therefore put a priority on preventing trade friction; market opening in
the mineral and industrial products sectors therefore can be said to have proceeded
quite smoothly compared with that of the primary goods sectors. The expansion of
regulatory reform into areas unrelated to trade was in line with industry calls for
fiscal rebuilding and demands for “small government.”
However, these measures were transient and fundamentally inconsistent, given
that voluntary restrictions on exports required policy involvement, on the one hand,
while demands were made for minimal policy involvement regarding imports, on
the other. Even in trade negotiations, therefore, industrial policy sought to address
issues with rules-based approaches—that is, based on rules agreed upon by multiple
countries. Regarding unilateral measures taken in the course of bilateral coordina-
tion, Japan developed clear arguments to present at the World Trade Organization
(WTO) that adhered to the principle of free trade, and took the policy stance, as a
principle of trade negotiation, that the scope for government intervention was lim-
ited. For example, in the Japan–U.S. Steel negotiations, MITI, in accordance with
the December 1991 draft of the international rules for trade negotiations submitted
to the GATT Uruguay Round, decided that “the age of voluntary [export] restraints
has passed” and refused to extend its VERs on steel exports to the US. Similarly, in
the negotiations on automobiles, it rejected the numerical targets requested by the
Clinton Administration and finally reached agreement based on its decision to bring
the matter to the WTO for a ruling if necessary.
Industrial policy thus shifted to a reliance on the market economy system, and,
although later in coming, trade policy, too, began placing a greater emphasis on the
market. The fact that this did not remain the ultimate target is touched on briefly at
the end of the chapter.
2.2 Changing Policy Targets
The transformation of trade and industry policy not only spread the general idea
of relying on market mechanisms, but also changed the nature of traditional policy
tasks. An especially great change was seen in the policies on industry location and
on SMEs.
Industry location policy, which had sought to correct regional disparities by dis-
persing factories among different localities, was until the 1980s based on the Com-
prehensive National Development Plan and similar plans. With industry relocation
playing a leading role, the policy aimed to promote regional development through
such means as the Law for Accelerating Regional Development Based Upon High-
Technology Industrial Complexes (Technopolis Law, 1983), the Law to Promote
the Group-Siting of Designated Types of Business Contributing to Higher Grade
Local Industrial Structures (Key Facilities Siting Law, 1988), the Multi-Polar Pat-
tern National Land Formation Promotion Law (1988), the Law for Comprehensive
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Development of Regional Core Cities with Relocation of Office–Work Function
(Regional Cores Law, 1992), the Office Arcadia Plan, and others. Where the main
policy objectives of these measures concerned industrial location in the period of
high economic growth, the 1980’s saw plans to form regional cores by advancing the
service sector, premised on the 1980s Vision of a shift to a more knowledge-intensive
industrial structure.
However, these policy approaches were in large part withdrawn in the latter 1990s.
As explained above, Article 5 of METI’s Organization Plan reduced the role of the
national government, delegating more and more to regional localities; in 1998, the
Technopolis Law and the Key Facilities Siting Law were abolished and the Law
for Facilitating the Creation of New Business was established, with support for new
venture start-ups by individual business owners and SMEs in mind. Further, in 2001,
METI abolished the New Industrial City Construction Promotion Law and the Law
on the Promotion of theDevelopment of Special Regions for industrial Development.
These ideas were clarified in the 1997 New Business Creation Promotion Act
that replaced the Law on Temporary Measures for Activation of Specific Regional
IndustrialAgglomerations; in otherwords, itwas spurredby the shift from the concept
of conventional “industrial location” to that of “business creation.” The “Law on
Establishing Regional Industrial Clusters and Strengthening Them by Promoting
Investment and Innovation” (Regional Industrial Revitalization Law), enacted in
2007, represented a distillation of this idea in policy form.
Similarly, the social policy perspective, including that of business and distribution
policy, was also reversed with regard to the kind of SMEs referred to in Clause 4
(“reducing administration designed to protect SMEs or SME organizations, strength-
ening the role of regional bodies, and improving the environment to encourage the
creation of new industries).” Regarding the SME sector, where the economic dispar-
ity with large companies became a problem in the high growth period, efforts were
made to eliminate significant gaps in productivity, corporate income, and wages,
and to raise the stability and standard of living of SME owners and their workers,
based on the Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Basic Law of 1963. It was for that
purpose that policies to “modernize and upgrade the corporate structure of SMEs”
and to “compensate for disadvantages in business activities” were adopted.
However, entering the 1990s, the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law, which was one
of the points at issue between Japan and the United States, led to a rethinking of the
existing practice of protecting small-scale businesses through restrictions on store
openings. Protective measures for SMEs underwent a transformation, as indicated
by the Law’s relaxation of restrictions on opening stores and the emphasis on pro-
moting local areas through the concentration of commerce. The Large-Store Law
was abolished in 2000, a move that was in accord with the Administrative Reform
Council’s recommendation that the government’s “excessive intervention” be ended.
With these changing expectations surrounding SMEs and the SME role, correcting
thedisparitieswasno longer the aimofSMEpolicy.Rather, basedonhopes for growth
potential in the SME sector, the nucleus of policy became to develop an environment
in which SMEs would be able to fully exercise that potential. The Basic SME Law
revision of 1999 demonstrated this new principle, as expressed in the statement
2 Trade and Industrial Policy at the Turn of the Century 317
that, “Conducting distinctive business activities in diverse business fields, providing
opportunities for diverse employment, and providing opportunities for individuals
to demonstrate their abilities and carry out their projects would form the foundation
of our economy.” Thus the concepts underlying policy changed, and with the new
policy objective of creating “diverse and vibrant SMEs,” the New Business Creation
Promotion Law was enacted and the old policy measures were greatly changed.
Even in policy on the textile industry, which had numerous SMEs, the registration
system began to shift toward a free-trade structure. MITI, already taking steps to
rely on the market economy system and support voluntary activities by companies,
abolished the Law on Extraordinary Measures for the Structural Improvement of
the Textile Industries (“Textile Industries Law”), replaced it with a revised version,
and ultimately abolished that as well in 1999. This constituted the end of industrial
adjustment policies targeting the coal and the textile industries, meaning that at the
end of the twentieth century, the curtain was falling on measures that had played
such a large part in postwar industrial policy.
Industrial technology policies followed a similar trajectory in the withdrawal
of central government involvement. Industrial technology policy had leaned increas-
ingly toward basic research since the 1980s, based on the Industrial Science andTech-
nology Agency’s “MITI National Research and Development Program” (“Large-
Scale Projects”), andwas promoting government-led large-scale projects asmeasures
to secure international competitiveness through the development of original technol-
ogy. Moreover, promotion of the “Sunshine” and “Moonlight” projects notwith-
standing, R&D supported by the central government tended to focus more on basic
research. In the late 1990s, however, the creation of new industries assumed greater
importance in the face of structural recession, and technological development shifted
to projects with more practical applications. The November 1995 Science and Tech-
nology Basic Plan, which derived from the Basic Law on Science and Technology
(July 1996), called for the strong promotion of R&D in response to social and eco-
nomic needs, also illustrating the shift to practical research, and greater stress was
placed on the role of private research institutions in R&D. Following the Central
Government Reform of January 2001, the National Academy of Sciences and Tech-
nology was renamed in Japanese and in April that year it changed organizationally as
well, becoming theNational Institute ofAdvanced Industrial Science andTechnology
(AIST).
Industrial policy on the information industry, a main focus of technology develop-
ment, had originated and developed based on the 1956 Law on Temporary Measures
for the Promotion of theMachine Industry (“Machine Industries Law”) and the 1957
Law on Temporary Measures for the Promotion of the Electronics Industry. Around
1990, however, the central issues shifted to the fusion of information management
and telecommunications and the development of human resources as the backbone
of industry. However, although the new policy issues arising with the information-
oriented society often required coordination among ministries and agencies across
multiple jurisdictions, the 2001 reorganization of administration did not result in
consolidation. As a result, despite growing calls for the creation of an advanced
information and telecommunications society, many areas requiring comprehensive
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policy responses were left to the Cabinet, and the twenty-first century began without
the establishment of an apposite strategy.
Meanwhile, the intellectual property system emerged as a key policy issue due to
negotiations on intellectual property rights in the GATT Uruguay Round. In order
to further harmonize with international systems on the basis of the 1994 Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”), a
series of revisions were made that led to the enactment of a new Basic Law on
Intellectual Property in 2002. This represented a shift to a new framework.
2.3 Policy Areas Focusing on New Issues
While some policy areas saw disengagement, others had new issues to address. The
principle example was environmental issues.
Until the period of high growth, MITI had implemented regulations such as green
area ratios for industrial plants, based on the Factory Location Law. This reflected
the point of view of environmental conservation. Later efforts included emissions
regulations to curb air pollution and regulations on the treatment of industrial waste
and other issues. Environmental regulations had a considerable effect, and Japan,
once described as “a leader in pollution” became “a leader in pollution control.”
The movement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions bore fruit with Japan’s adop-
tion of the Kyoto Protocol including a six-percent emissions reduction in the 1997
“Third Conference of Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change”
(Kyoto Conference on the Prevention of Global Warming, COP3). Meanwhile, the
Japanese government established a “Basic Law on the Environment” in 1993 and
issued a Cabinet Decision on a Basic Environment Plan in 1994. In 1997, the “Envi-
ronmental Impact Assessment Law” was enacted, and the system for environmental
impact assessment, long a concern, was improved and made more consistent. In the
process, MITI sought to ensure maximum corporate autonomy on environmental
measures, and to ensure that environmental regulation not restrict economic growth.
Both these features accordingly became part of policy on the environment. MITI’s
policy stance recognized that environmental efforts could become a springboard for
economic progress and took a flexible approach to incorporating new policy issues.
Respecting corporate autonomy and seeking to develop administrative approaches
reliant on the market economy system, MITI created various legal frameworks for
recycling waste products and promoted the recycling of packaging containers, scrap
automobiles, and used home appliances. This approach shared features with the shift
to a voluntary system concerning industrial safety and represented the basic policy
response to newly emerging issues.
The core issues of energy policy had to be redefined in relation to such environ-
mental measures. The electricity industry was liberalized and petroleum industry
regulations were relaxed: both cases reflected the expectation that greater freedom
in corporate activity would launch a virtuous cycle, and this point of view became a
basic feature of production.Hopeswere high that the basic aim that had long governed
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energy policy—namely, securing an abundant and low-cost supply of energy—would
be served by introducing a competitive order (because competition would “lower
costs”) and by nuclear power generation (because it promised an “abundant” supply
of energy). This was crucial because the increased supply of energy resulting from
economic growth could not be made compatible with environmental demands for
reduced greenhouse gas emissions without reducing fossil-fuel dependency.
METI’s Basic Energy Plan of 2003 was thus based on the Basic Law on Energy
Policy. Its three key issues were “ensuring stable supply,” “adapting to the envi-
ronment,” and “utilizing the market principle.” The Plan stated that METI would
“continue to promote [nuclear power generation] as a main power source, premised
on ensuring safety,” and announced that it “planned to diversify [Japan’s] energy
sources,” including “domestic nuclear energy.” In this way, energy policies were
accelerated that included the construction of new nuclear power plants, but a major
shift in this policy was forced by the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Plant in March 2011.
The basic policy of emphasizing harmonization based on multilateral rules gov-
erning trade policy also fluctuated in the early twenty-first century over policies
related to Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). This, too, represented a sig-
nificant change. In particular, given that regional trade liberalization does not always
proceed smoothly, participating countries’ interest in free trade agreements (FTAs)
signaled the need for different policy approaches than before. At the start of the
twenty-first century, Japanese trade policy had to make the shift from a complete
commitment to “multilateralism” to the “joint pursuit of bilateral and multilateral
agreements.”
3 Conclusion
Konosuke Odaka has pointed out that “from the late 20th to the early 21st century,
the policy thinking explored by MITI (later METI) was the question of how to
break away from ‘industrialism’ or the focus on industrial growth” (Odaka 2013,
p. 572).1 However, as Odaka himself cautions, it is not appropriate to narrowly
interpret MITI’s promotion of leading industries and new industries with growth
potential as meaning that industrial “growth” was its “core” concern. The Visions
of heavy and chemical industrialization and then of forming a knowledge-intensive
industrial structure sought to create an affluent society through structural shifts to
more advanced industrial structures, that is, industrial sectors with higher value-
added productivity. That is why MITI dealt aggressively with the friction arising in
declining industries due to structural change, and why it took social policy needs
1Odaka points to the following factors as triggering these changes: (1) changes in Japan’s macro
economy, (2) the economic globalization that began to be observed on a global scale, (3) people’s
declining expectations of the role of the government, and (4) the elevation of international opinion
concerning maintenance and preservation of the environment.
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into account in its measures for the SME sector which might well to be left behind
by these changes. In that sense the move beyond “industrialism” was developing at
the start of the twenty-first century.
Needless to say, however, the issues facing economic society and economic devel-
opment have changed with the times, and because of the need to address these issues,
the focus of policy, viewed in the near term, has also changed with the times and
thus become a mirror reflecting the age. More important, however, is that the pol-
icy approaches, and the ideals supporting them, have themselves changed with the
times, to a premise of reliance on the market economic system, respect for corpo-
rate autonomy, and a universally shared way of thinking that transcends national
boundaries.
From the late twentieth into the twenty-first century, international economic soci-
ety has undergone major structural changes due in large part to rapid growth in Asia.
What is required of trade and industrial (or economic and industrial) policy is that
it “play the role of effectively formulating the ideas governing macroeconomic pol-
icy” and that it “maintain constant attention to the intersections of the macro with
the micro, harmonizing them through policy, and also play the important role of
maintaining a balance between the domestic economy and its relations with overseas
economies.” Those in policy positions have striven to meet these obligations (Odaka
2013, p. 591). As MITI did before it, METI will continue to bear responsibility
for responding flexibly to shifts in policy needs and for developing resolutions that
address those needs effectively.
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